IR 05000483/1987034

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-483/87-34 on 871002 Re Events in Which Mispositioned Valve Resulted in Reduced Flow Capability of One Essential Svc Water Train & Breached Seals Resulted in Emergency Ventilaton Sys Inoperability

ML20236H318
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	10/27/1987
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236H302	List: IR 05000483/1987034 ML20236H299
References
50-483-87-34-EC, NUDOCS 8711040072
Download: ML20236H318 (3)

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0.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION u-

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tREGION III

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RepoftNo.'50-483/87034(DRP)- '!

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Docket ~No. 50-483 '

License No. NPF- l

" - Licensee:,LUnion Electric Company . '

< Post Office Box.149 - Mail Code 400

. , . ~St. Louis, M0 63166 n ,

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i Facility Name: .Callaway Plant, Unit 1 ' '

4 Meeting At: RegioniIII:' Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois (

Meeting Conductedi October 2', 1987  !

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s Approved By: J. M. Hinds, C ief to.27 67 l

Reactor Projects ection 1A Date i

Meeting Summary ,

i Meeting on October 2, 1987 (Report No. 50-483/87034(DRP)) 'l

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. Areas Discussed: An enforcement conference conducted to discuss events in ;l which.(1) a mispositioned valve resulted in the~ reduced flow capability of one 'I essential service water. train and (2) breached control room pressure boundary

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seals resulted;in the inoperability of both trains of the control room emergency-ventilation' syste .

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8711040072 971027 PDR -ADOCK 05000483 G PDR r

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DETAILS L .

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L Meeting Attendees d

' Union Electric Company D. F. Schnell, Vice President - Nuclear W. D. Campbell, Manager, Nuclear Engineering A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant i

'NuclearReguhatoryCommission-RegionIII ,

C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator  !

J. A. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards W. L. Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 W. D. Shafer, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch, Division of Radiation' Safety and Safeguards B. A. Berson, Regional Counsel L. R. Greger, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards R. M. Lerch, Technical Assistant, Reactor Projects Branch 1 W. H. Schultz, Enforcement Specialist C. F. Gill, Senior Radiation Specialist B. H. Little, Senior Resident Inspector, Callaway G. A. VanSickle, Project Inspector, Callaway Nuclear Regulatory Commission - NRR T. W. Alexion, Licensing Project Manager, Callaway Enforcement Conference Details The enforcement conference was held to discuss two events: (1) the reduction in flow capability of one essential service water train due to a mispositioned (not completely open) valve and (2) the inoperability of both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system resulting from breached control room pressure boundary seals. These events are described in Inspection Reports No. 50-483/87028(DRP) and No. 50-483/87023 (DRSS), respectivel After the opening remarks, the licensee gave its account of the essential service water event. The licensee's chronology, which involved a series of work request issues, voidings, and reissues for the subject valve and the eventual discovery of the problem during a containment cooler flow verification test, was essentially the same as that provided by Inspection Report No. 50-483/87028. The licensee identified the following corrective actions:

. The valve was fully opened and caution tagge _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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• The licensee reviewed selected voided and open work requests, particularly focusing on those affecting safety systems, to i determine whether other component deficiencies had gone uncorrected as a result of voided work requests and reissue No such problems j were identifie i

• - The licensee's procedures for voiding work requests were strengthened by requiring that the complete scope of a voided work request must j be included in the work request which supersedes i l The licensee noted that several other technical specification

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surveillance and predictive monitoring programs would have identified 1 that the valve was mispositioned. The licensee also stated that a ]

detailed engineering analysis had determined that the reduced flow I through the partially closed valve would have been sufficient for the system to perform its required safety function The licensee next provided its account of the event involving breached control room pressure boundary seals. The licensee chronology, involving I the failure of emergency ventilation system train "A" to pass a control l room pressurization surveillance, the subsequent plugging of control room penetrations, and the later determination that train "B" had also been inoperable, was essentially the same as that provided by Inspection Report No. 50-483/8702 The licensee identified the following 4 i

corrective actions:

• The penetrations were seale q

• A hold was placed on making further penetration * A defective damper was replace ]

• The fire barrier program was enhanced to include consideration of l the impact of breaching pressure boundary seal l The licensee added that, although the control room emergency ventilation  ;

system could not provide the required positive pressure in the control l room, it was capable of limiting doses to control room personnel within l GDC 19 criteria. This determination was based on an analysis conducted by the Bechtel Power Corporatio The licensee closed its presentation on the two events with a brief I discussion of improvements in its program for conducting required 10 CFR 50.59 reviews, and expressed its belief that increased management attention in this area should help eliminate future events like that involving the breached control room pressure boundary seal The senior NRC representative acknowledged the licensee's presentation and stated that the Region III recommendation concerning enforcement action for the event would be forwarded to the NRC Office of Enforcement for its concurrence. After review by that Office, the licensee would be notified in writing of the NRC's proposed enforcement actio i

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