IR 05000483/1998011
| ML20236M283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-98-11, NUDOCS 9807140006 | |
| Download: ML20236M283 (14) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-483-License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/98-11 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri Dates:
May 24 through July 4,1998 Inspectors:
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector F. L. Brush, Resident inspector J. F. Ringwald, Senior Resident inspector, Wolf Creek Approved By:
W D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9807140006 900708 PDR ADOCK 05000483 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-11 Ooerations Control room decorum and professionalism were well maintained. Distractions were
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minimized. Operators displayed proper communications. Control room logs were i
properly maintained. Shift briefings appropriately covered upcoming events and evolutions (Section 01.2).
Maintenance Material condition was good. The percentage of the total power generation for Cycle 9
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that was lost due to maintenance-related causes was about 1 percent. This was below the licensee's goal of 2 percent and below the industry median for plants in the United States. The licensee operated the plant with a " black board"in the control room during most of the current inspection report period (Section M2.1).
Enaineerina The inspectors concluded that the formal safety evaluation for the continuous addition of
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ammonia hydroxide to the reactor coolant system was comprehensive. Plant and procedure changes discussed in the evaluation were implemented. The licensee followed the modification process when actions were initiated to improve the continuous addition pump's design following implementation of the modification (Section E1.1).
Plant Suocort The licensee effectively prepared for and implemented the process for shearing radwaste
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filters. The licensee effectively implemented ALARA work practices. Personnel dose for the project was below the licensee's goal (Section R1.2).
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Report Details
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Summarv of Plant Status I
The plant began the report period May 24,1998, at 100 percent power. The plant operated at l
100 percent power throughout the period I
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 1:
01.1 General Comments (71707)
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i The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and i
plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room
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coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and noted no problems.
O1.2 Control Room Activities and Performance a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors observed control room activities on several different occasions.
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Observations and Findinos Control room decorum and professionalism were well maintained. Distractions were minimized. Operators displayed proper communications. Control room logs were properly maintained. Shift briefings appropriately covered upcoming events and evolutions.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Review of Eouioment Tacouts (71707)
The inspectors walked down the following tagouts:
Workman's Protection Assurance 27142 - Control Room Air Conditioning Unit A;
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and Workman's Protection Assurance 27373 - Emergency Diesel Generator B.
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The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position l
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I-2-prescribed by the tags. The inspectors also performed a walkdown after Tagout 27373 was cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system lineup.
02.2 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:
Essential Service Water Trains A and B;
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Emergency Diesel Generator A; and
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Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A, B, and T.
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
Operator Training and Qualification
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l 05.1 Simulator Scenario Observation a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors observed a simulator scenario involving plant operations with choking vapors in the control room.
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b, Observations and Findinas The primary objective of the scenario was to practice using new portable breathing air equipment in the control room. The new equipment was intended to replace older and more cumbersome self contained breathing apparatuses.
The inspectors observed that operators had difficulty donning and using the new equipment. However, the crew held a thorough critique and the training instructor documented important improvement suggestions.
The training instructor discussed actualindustry events related to the importance of the breathing air equipment. The licensee intended to perform additional scenarios using the new breathing air equipment to implement the lessons learned before the new equipment is installed in the control room. The inspectors found the licensee's actions to be
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
l 08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-483/97003-01: reactor operator violation of overtime requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the use of overtime by operations department personnel to verify consistency with regulatory requirements. The inspectors reviewed the hours
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worked by 23 licensed operators from March 28 through April 13,1998. Most of this
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period was during the last refueling outage.
The working hours were governed by Technical Specification 6.2.2.f and Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00905," Limitations of Callaway Plant Staff Working Hours,"
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The inspectors assessed the licensee's compliance by reviewing time cards for all 23 licensed operators. The inspectors found that none of the operators exceeded established overtime limits.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance l
M1,1 General Comments - Maintenance a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:
Work Authorization W621588 - Apply Thread Lock to Steam Generator C Main
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l Feedwater Regulating Valve AEFCV0530; c
Work Authorization G619122-019 - Troubleshoot Class 1E Air Handling
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Unit SGK05B; Work Authorization G620758-001 - Perform Shearing Operation on Radwaste
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Filters; Work Authorizations C610825 and C610826 - Replace Drain Valves on
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Emergency Diesel Generator B Intercooler; and Work Authorizations C610827 and C610828 - Replace Drain Valves on
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Emergency Diesel Generator B Lube Oil Cooler.
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Observations and Findings The inspectors identified no substantive concerns. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed j
supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel
were present when required.
M 1.2 General Comments - Surveillance a.
Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
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Test Procedure OSP-EJ-P001 A, " Residual Heat Removal System inservice
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Test," Revision 23; i
Test Procedure OSP-AL-P0002, " Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump I
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Inservice Test," Revision 25; i
Test Procedure OSP-AL-V001D," Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Suction Check Valve Test," Revision 6; Test Procedure OSP-AL-V001C, " Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Valve Operability," Revision 16; and Test Procedure OSP-EG-V001B, " Component Cooling Water Train 8 Section XI
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Valve Surveillance," Revision 15.
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Observations and Findinas i
The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's i
approved programs and the Technical Specifications.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Review of Material Condition During PlanLInus I
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Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
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Observations and Findinas i
The inspectors observed that material condition and housekeeping of accessible areas i
of the auxiliary building, the fuel building, the essential service water pump house, the ultimate heat sink cooling tower, and most areas of the turbine building were good.
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-5-The licensee operated the plant with a " black board"in the control room during most of this inspection period. Although a few annunciators on various equipment were bypassed, none were significant.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's " Maintenance Rule Monthly Status Report Through May 4,1998." The inspectors reviewed with the licensee the Unplanned Capability Loss Factor chart. This factor showed the percentage of the total power generation for the cycle that was lost due to maintenance-related causes. For Cycle 9, which ended April 3,1998, the Unplanned Capability Loss Factor was 1.09 percent. This was below the licensee's goal of less than or equal to 2 percent. The median loss factor for plants in the United States in 1996 and 1997 was 6.0 and 4.9 percent, respectively.
Although the licensee identified and corrected many material condition deficiencies during the current inspection period, the inspectors did identify some deficiencies. These included:
The inspectors heard a steam leak from turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
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steam supply from main steam Loop 2 manualisolation Valve ABV0085. The licensee determined that the valve packing leaked. Maintenance personnel tightened the packing; however, the packing continued to leak. Operators placed the valve on its backseat, stopping the leak. The licensee planned to repack the valve.
The inspectors observed a packing leak and partial stem rotation on Steam
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Generator C main feedwater regulating Valve AEFCV0530. Maintenance personnel tightened the packing, which stopped the leak.
The stem rotation did not affect feedwater flow because of an earlier modification to the valve. The licensee had installed an antirotation blocking device which prevented significant stem rotation. The licensee determined that the partial stem rotation did not adversely affect valve operability. Maintenance personnel later welded the blocking device to the valve operator to prevent further stem rotation.
The licensee planned to modify the feedwater regulating valves during the next refueling outage to address stem movement and other concerns. The licensee initiated Modification Package 98-2005 and Request for Resolution 18590.
Additionally, the inspectors identified several other minor discrepancies. The licensee initiated action to resolve the discrepancies.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that material condition was good. The percentage of the total power generation for Cycle 9 that was lost due to maintenance-related causes was about
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Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Formal Safety Evaluation for Modification Packsoe CMP 98-1015A a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the formal safety evaluation for modification package CMP 98-1015A. This modification involved installation of a continuous ammonia injection system for the reactor coolant system.
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Observations and Findings On December 2,1997, the licensee began making batch additions of ammonia hydroxide to the reactor coolant system as a means to mitigate the axial offset anomaly of Cycle 9. The licensee determined that the most likely cause of the axial offset anomaly was a buildup of crud that contained a high percentage of nickel, which trapped boron on the fuel pins in the upper spans of the core. The licensee determined that the ammonia would act to dissolve the nickel compounds. As the ammonia dissolved the nickel, the crud would undergo changes to release trapped boron.
The licensee developed modification package CMP 98-1015A to install components to add ammonia hydroxide to the reactor coolant system on a continuous basis. The licensee determined that continuous addition of ammonia hydroxide was preferable to batch addition because reactor coolant system pH would be more stable.
The inspectors determined that the formal safety evaluation was comprehensive. The inspectors verified that plant and procedure changes discussed in the evaluation were implemented. The licensee later identified an improvement to the continuous addition pump design following implementation of the modification. The licensee followed the modification process when actions were initiated to improve the pump design. The licensee determined that there was not an unreviewed safety question as a result of adding ammonia hydroxide to the reactor coolant system, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the formal safety evaluation for the contiquous addition of ammonia hydroxide to the reactor coolant system was comprehensive. Plant and procedure changes discussed in the evaluation were implemented. The licensee followed the modification process when actions were initiated to improve the continuous addition pump design folicwing implementation of the modification.
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E8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-483/97014-03: Cycle 9 axial offset anomaly.
The plant experienced an axial offset anomaly during Cycle 9 that caused shutdown l
margin to reduce at a faster rate than predicted. During the cycle, the inspectors
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routinely verified that the licensee was in compliance with the power distribution limits described in Technical Specifications section 3.2. The inspectors also observed that the licensee was aggressively monitoring shutdown margin and other plant parameters to ensure the plant remained within operating limits. The plant concluded Cycle 9 on April 3,1998.
To preclude further axial offset problems, the licensee implemented a number of changes for the Cycle 10 core. These included the addition of 97 new, lower enriched fuel assemblies, some with wet annular burnable absorber rodlets. The changes were
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intended to lower the overall reactor coolant system boron concentration and flatten the flux distribution throughout the core.
However, at the beginning of Cycle 10, the licensee again identified a deviation from the initial axial offset prediction. The licensee's original prediction for axial offset at the beginning of life for the core was -6.5 percent. The actual axial offset was -11.5 percent.
The limit for axial offset at full power was -17 percent.
Upon reviewing the incore flux maps, the licensee determined, and the fuel vendor concurred, that the deviation was associated with the crud layer on the previously bumed fuel assemblies reloaded in the Cycle 10 core. The licensee developed a revised prediction for the Cycle 10 axial offset based on the following assumptions:
The amount of boron presently in the crud layer of the previously burned
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assemblies remained the same for the remainder of the cycle; and
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during the cycle.
l The revised prediction showed axial offset changing from approximately -12.5 percent, peaking at +2.0 percent just after midcycle to -1.0 percent at the end of cycle. To date, the actual axial offset has been trending just ahead of the revised prediction. Based on this and other data, the licensee determined that the plant would not have to reduce
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power during Cycle 10 due to shutdown margin concerns.
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-8-IV. Plant Sucoort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problems.
R1.2 Shearing of Radwaste Filters a.
hLsoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the radiological controls for shearing of radwaste filters.
The inspectors reviewed pertinent documents, including:
Radiological Work Permit 98-03920;
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Pre-job Al. ARA Briefing Package for Radiological Work Permit 98-03920; and
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Radiological Survey Sheets.
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In addition, the inspectors observed some of the shearing operation.
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Observations and Findings The licensee performed the shearing operation to reduce the volume of the filters prior to shipping for burial as radioactive waste. The process involved shearing the filters into two or three pieces and placing the pieces in a high integrity container. The licensee designed the process to use remote operation as much as possible.
The inspectors determined that the shearing operation was performed in accordance with work documents and procedures. The inspectors independently surveyed the area and verified that the licensee's radiological survey sheets accurately refiected the actual dose rates. The inspectors also verified that the actual radiological control boundaries were accurately depicted on the survey sheets. The licensee effectively implemented the exposure reduction and monitoring strategies stated in the ALARA prejob briefing package.
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-9-The inspectors reviewed the licensee's exposure data. The data showed that on
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June 30,1998, total accumulated exposure for the job was 361 mR. The licensee's goal I
was 480 mR. The licensee was close to completing the job and was on target for completing the job below the expected dose goals.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively prepared for and implemented the
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process for shearing radwaste filters. The licensee effectively implemented ALARA work practices. Personnel dose for the project was below the licensee's goals.
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P8 Miscellaneous EP issues (92904)
P8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-483/97006-00: loss of annunciators and
unusual event declaration due to lightning strikes.
This event involved the failure of annunciator card connectors that shorted contacts which lowered the output of 125V dc field power supplies to approximately 25V dc.
Since the emergency action level procedure failed to define the conditions that constituted a failed annunciator field power supply, the operators and engineers were initially reluctant to declare that the power supplies had failed. After field testing confirmed that some annunciators continued to function while others did not, and engineering personnel could not specify how many annunciators had failed, plant management decided to declare the unusual event based on the failure of these power i
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l The corrective actions for this event included reviewing the annunciator system for potential design enhancements, providing a clear definition of a failed annunciator field
power supply in applicable procedures, and training appropriate personnel on the lessons learned and corrective actions from this event. Engineering personnel i
determined that any time 125V de annunciator field power supply output voltage dropped below 105V de, licensee personnel should declare it inoperable.
Engineering personnel also considered the installation of fuses between the four annunciator field power supplies and the seven multiplexer chassis, and surgo protectors on all annunciator inputs. Engineering personnel concluded that the installation of the fuses would be prudent and initiated Modification Package 97-2010, which was approved for implementation. Engineering personnel plan to issue the design for this modification prior to October 1,1998, and expect that the implementation will be complete during the subsequent 6 months, depending upon other priorities. However, engineering personnel determined that the cost to install the surge protectors would far exceed any cost l
savings. The inspectors considered these corrective actions to be adequate.
The inspectors noted that the licensee event report and associated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 97-0852 failed to document any evaluation of the adequacy of site lightning protection. During discussions with a design engineering supervisor, the I
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-10-inspectors learned that engineering personnel engaged in an informal discussion about additional lightning protection, but decided to not pursue any further work in this area because absolute assurance could not be provided that additional lightning protection equipment would protect against every lightning strike.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on July 1,1998. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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e ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support M. R. Faulker, Assistant Superintendent, Security J. M. Gloe, Superintendent, Maintenance R. T. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations l
J. V. Laux, Manager Quality Assurance D. W. Neterer, Assistant Superintendent, Operations M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Chemistry M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations
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62707 Maintenance Observations
71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup - Plant Operations 92903 Followup - Engineering 92904 Followup - Plant Support I
ITEMS CLOSED t
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I 97003-01 VIO Reactor operator violation of overtime requirements (Section 08.1).
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2-97014-03 IFl Cycle 9 axial offset anomaly (Section E8.1).-
97006-00 LER Loss of annunciators and unusual event declaration due to lightning strikes (Section P8.1).
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