IR 05000483/1988009
| ML20151E615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1988 |
| From: | Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151E597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-88-09, 50-483-88-9, NUDOCS 8807260142 | |
| Download: ML20151E615 (21) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/88009(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee:
Union Electric Company P.O. Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name:
Callaway Plant Inspection At:
Callaway Site, Reform, Missouri Inspection Conducted:
June 6-9, 1988
,.h h Wu 11/ IN Inspector:
. P. Patterson Team Leader at(y Accompanying:
G.
Martin Personnel K. McBride F. Victor
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Approved By:
. Snell, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on June 6-9, 1988 (Report No. 50-483/88009(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Special announced inspection of the following areas of the Callaway Plant emergency preparedness program:
Emergency Response Facility Appraisal; review of radioactive release assessment and reviews of the design and operation of the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations facility (IP 82412).
The inspection involved one NRC inspector and three contractor personnel.
Section 6.0 of this report provides an updated summary on the status of all emergency preparedness related SIMS items.
Results:
The Emergency Response Facilities of the licensee were found to be adequate with the exception of two Open Items.
No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified.
6807260142Ogghg3 PDR ADOCK PDC G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- M. Stiller, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness (NS&EP)
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- J. Gearhart, Superintendent, Quality Assurance, Operations Support (QA0S)
- G. Hughes, Supervisory Engineer, NS&EP i
- S. Crawford, Administrator, Nuclear Affairs, NS&EP
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- A. White, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedeness, NS&2P
- T. Stotlar, Supervisory Engineer, QA05
- E. Thornton, Engineering Evaluator, QAOS
- S. Meyer, Systems Engineer, Nuclear Engineering
- R. Wink, Systems Engineer, Nuclear Engineering
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- D. Young, Superintendent, Maintenance Department
- W. Hinchie, Assistant Engineer, Emergency Preparedness, NS&EP
- D. Shafer, Supervising Engineer, Licersing
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- J.
Dampf, Emergency Response Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness, NS&EP
- L. Beaty, Systems Engineer, Instruments and Controls (I&C)
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- R. Baker, Supervisory Engineer I&C D. Hug, Senior Document Control Clerk
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D. Jones, Instrument and Control Engineer B. Holderness, Corporate Health Physicist M. McLachlan, Electrical Engineer R. McCann, Qualtiy Assurance Auditor G. Stuhlman, Record Man:gement System Supervisor - General Services
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- Denotes those personnel listed above who attended the exit interview on
June 9, 1988.
2.0 Assessment of Radiological Releases
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2.1 Source Term Monitored release points consist of the Radwaste Building Vent, u in a
Plant Vent, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine discharge, and Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).
Unmonitored release pathways consist of containment leakage and blow out panels on the auxiliary building roof.
Doce assessment methodologies provide for the calculation of doses from all potential release pathways.
The radionuclide mixes used in the dose assessment methods are taken from the plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 15.
The most severe accidents described in the FSAR result in only minor fuel damage and therefore
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the nuclides accounted for consist only of noble gases and iodines.
Generally accidents considered for emergency preparedness purposes cover a wider range than those considered in a plant FSAR, with the
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most severe resulting in major fuel damage.
For severe accidents resulting in a release through an unfiltered pathway, such as a loss of coolant accident in the steam space (zone 5) with corresponding
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release through the auxiliary building roof blow-out panels, the release nuclide mix would contain noble gases, iodines and j
particulates.
None of the methods employed provides a default
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nuclide mix that consider the presence of particulates.
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Procedures are in place to calculate sourc ' term information for releases via all monitored and unmonitored release pathways.
In addition, procedures provide for calcuiating source term information from portable instrument readings, post accident sample results, and field sample results.
Other source term information can be generated
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from the output of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).
The following represent some of the analytical capabilities possessed by PASS:
isotopic analysis of reactor coolant, containment atmosphere a
and contairment recirculation sumps; dissolved hydrogen concentration of reactor coolant and recirculation sumps; and percent oxygen in containment. -PASS is also capable of obtaining both diluted and undiluted grab samples of reactor coolant, containment atmosphere, and containment recirculation sumps.
Procedure E0P-ZZ-00005, Assessing Core Damage, contains precalculated relationships between various plant parameters and percent fuel damage.
The procedure allows for the estimate of core damage using, containment hydrogen concentration, core exit thermocouple readino,
reactor vessel water level, and containment high range radiation monitor readings.
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Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
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program is adequate.
However, the following item is suggested for program improvement.
Determine whether default nuclide mixes taken from the FSAR are
truly representative for all credible accident types and release pathways.
If not, develop the appropriate nuclide mix for use
in the dose assessment models.
For example, the nuclide mix
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representing an accident rasulting in an unfiltered release to
the atmosphere, such as from the steam enclosure space, should include particulates as well as noble gases and iodines.
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2.2 Dose Assessment The Radiological Release Information System (RRIS) contains the dose assessment models which are designated as the primary means of obtaining dose projections during an emergency.
RRIS contains a i
straight line gaussian model, a segmented gaussian model, and a puff release model.
The backup dose assessment model is contained in procedure EIP-ZZ-01211, Back-Up Method For Initial Dose Assessment.
The backup model is also a straight line gcussian model and has been implemented on an IBM PC.
The dosimetric portions of all models examined employed appropriate means for calculating whole body and
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child thyroid doses.
Based upon observations made during the exercise
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and through discussions with personnel it was discovered that although
the RRIS is by procedure the primary dose assessment method, the i
personal computer version of the back-up method has become the first choice of dose assessment personnel.
It would appear that this is a result of lack of familiarity on the part of dose assessment personnel and due to awkwardness of operation and shortcomings in
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model output on the part of RRIS.
The fact that RRIS is highly automated and will' automatically acquire data and start calculations based on indications of a release has made it difficult to use during drills _and exercises.
The result is that the back-up method on the PC.is used duriag drills and exercises making it more familiar to dose assessment personnel.
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For the manual or dose projection mode, caution statements in Procedure EIP-12-01210, RRIS Operation, warns the user that the procedure may not be capable of providing a dose projection within 15 minutes of the declaration of an initial emergency classification.
Another caution points out that the tabular output does not provide the peak centerline dose or dose rate levels used for protective action decision making.
In the notes the user is reminded _that hard copy output for the TSC is available only in the 80P computer room which is a three to four minute walk from the TSC.
Hardcopy output is available in the E0F by a camera system which takes pictures of the terminal screen. While Procedure EIP-ZZ-01211 represents an adequate backup method for RRIS and for quick on-shift calculations prior to the activation of the TSC, it is not adequate as a primary means of performing dose assessment.
A review was conducted of the validation and verification documentation for the RRIS dose assessment models.
Documentation for a factory acceptance test conducted by the contractor and for a site acceptance test conducted by the licensee was reviewed and appeared adequate.
No documentation to validate and verify the PC version of the back-up dose assessment model computer code was found.
Procedure APA-ZZ-00685, Control of Computer Software and Operator Interfaces, provides administrative controls for the software comprising RRIS and Procedure EDP-ZZ-04011, Computer Software Controls, provides for the control of the PC version of the core damage estimate procedure.
No procedure exists to provide administrative control for the PC version of the back-up dose assessment method.
Some limited calculational comparisons betwaen licensee dose assessment methods and NRC and State metnods have been performed by the licensee.
However, no fully documented comprehensive ccmparison between all models has been performed.
Documentation resulting from such a study should include a description of the methodology employed, a listing of the test cases, quantitative results, Jnd a discussion which relates the differences identified to the methodologies of
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following items are suggested for program improvement.
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Alter the use and operation of RRIS such that the dose assessment
models that it contains will be used as the primary (i.e., first choice) method of performing dose projections as specified by procedure.
For example, consider the following changes; provide an exercise mode so that RRIS could be run more realistically during drills and exercises, streamline operation so that it
. will run in a more timely fashion,'and redesign the output to better meet the needs of dese assessment personnel and protective action decision makers.
Conduct and document a comprehensive calculational comparison
between all Union Electric dose assessment models and those of the State and NRC.
The resulting documentation should include a description of the methodology employed, a listing of the test cases, quantitative results, and a discussion which relates the differences identified to the methodologies of each model.
Develop and implement a procedure which provides administrative
controls for the software comprising the PC version of the back-up dose assessment model contained in Procedure
,EIP-ZZ-01211.
The procedure should establish criteria for the initial documentation, verification, approval and implementation
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of the software.
It should also provide for documentation of modifications, verification of. modifications, periodic verification, and software security.
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3.0 Meteorological Information A review was perfonned of documentation associated with the pre-operational _ appraisal of the meteorological system, observations of the system, aad documentation from licensee submittals to the NRC f
Documentation reviewed in making this determination included:
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Callaway SER, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, April 1985 based (
cn applicants submittal of August 1984, Table 7A-3, Data Sheet 17.5.
b.
Callaway Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal (EPIA),
March 1984, Improvement Items No. 24-31.
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Letter from Licensee to NF.C, Region III with responses to EPIA Improvement Items Ho. 24-31.
This review indicated that the system meets NRC requirements for adequacy, representativeness, and reliability.
Therefore, this portion of the inspection procedurc was not conducted during this ERF appraisal.
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4.0- Technical Support Center (TSC)
4.1 Location and Habitability The TSC is located within the protected area, adjacent to the Service Building.
The TSC has adequate. shielding and ventilation to ensure habitability during Design Basis Accidents.
The plant FSAR states in C* apter 18 that the TSC is constructed of reinforced concrete walls 10 inches thick and has a reinforced concrete roof 6 inches thick.
A review of Bechtel shielding calculation No. TSC-M-2, TSC Doses-Post LOCA, indicates that an appropriate radiation protection factor will be provided by the structure.
Radiation monitoring in the TSC consists of one area radiation monitor in the main worn area, with a range a'
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10,000 mr/hr, and a radioiodine menitor which will detec.
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odine in concentrations as low as 1E-07 microcuries/cc.
The.adioiodine detector will monitor TSC inlet air in eithar the emergency or normal mode of ventilation system operation.
The major components making up the TSC ventilation system are an air handling unit with an associated chiller unit, an exhaust fan, a filter absorber unit and a filtration unit fan.
In the normal mode of operation the system draws 500 CFM of makeup air from outside the TSC and combines the makeup air with the air being recirculated through the air handling unit.
Approximately 300 CFM of air is exhausted from the building.
When the TSC is actis-+ed, the ventilation system is manually shifted to the recirculation mod's.
In this mode three daepers are repositioned to divert the 500 CFM makeup air through the filter absorber unit and the filter unit fan prior to being recirculated throug') the air handling unit.
In the recirculation mode, the er.haust damper is ciorad.
Stif ting to the recirculation mode is accomplished by manual operTtion.
In observing several tests of the syster; the inspector ooted t.1e fc11owing items:
(1) When shift.ing to the ?ccirculation mode, the operator is required to verify that dampers 0-1 and D-2 close while damper D-3 opens.
Since the damper positions are not marked, the operator can not verify the extent of the change of that damper, and has no way of knowing if the damper has reached the intended position.
Since this procedure (OTN-22-00001) is used for the initial recirculation lineup when performing surveillances, the validity of those surveillances which have been performed on the system to date are questionable.
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e (2) There was no pnysical indication or quantitative instrumentation available-to determine if a positive pressure is maintained in the TSC.
Information on how the ventilation system was designed to operate could not be found.
The TSC building specifications did not contain a description of how the system operated.
The information in Section 18.3.2.2 of the FSAR stated that "the HVAC system for the TSC supplies outside air appropriately cooled or heated and has provisions to isolate inlet air and to operate in a filtered recirculation mode if radiation levels are high." This information adds confusion since the installed ventilation system does not operate as described in the FSAR (inlet air is not isolated).
In reviewing conceptual design documentation and shielding calculations, reference was made to a pressurized ventilation system for the TSC and EOF.
Shielding calculations for both the TSC and EOF appear to have been made assuming a pressurized and filtered ventilation system.
However, it could not be determined how much of a differential pressure shouid exist between the inside and outside of the TSC, nor are there any installed differential pressure gauges that could be used to measure such a differential pressure. When the system is in emergency mode there-is no evidence of a positive
pressure in the building when opening an outside door.
There is no instrumentation nor physical evidence available to indicate that in the emergency mode the TSC ventilation system is maintaining a positive pressure.
Since the shielding calculations were performed assuming a positive pressure ventilation system it can not be verified that the 1SC is capable of providing the stated protection factor.
This was considered an Open Item (50-483/88009-01).
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Based on the above findings with the exception of the open item, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
however, the following itrm is <,uggested f or progra.h inprovement:
Develop an observable indication to allow operators to verify
that ver,tilation dampers are in the correct position.
4.2 Functional Capabilities 4.2.1 Power Supplies
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Electrical loads used in the TSC are powered from a i
480V 3 phase normal supply or a 480V 3 phase alternate
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supply.
The TSC normal supply originates at the 25KV Plant Main Generator and automatically shifts to offsite power on a generator trip.
Tha TSC alternate supply
- omes from a manual start, 230 KW Diesel Generator which l
services only the TSC.
The normal or alternate power
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source is selectable through a manual transfer switch l
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located in the TSC Mechanical and Electrical Equiptr.ent Room.
A 30 KVA inverter provides uninterruptable power to the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer and all TSC computer terminals as well as radio communications equipment.
The normal power' supply for the invertor comes from the normal TSC power supply with a 60 cell battery providing backup power.
Routine surveillances are conducted on the TSC power supplies to ensure they are operational in an emergency.
In the event. of a loss of power to the TSC, the only source of emergency lighting comes from wall mounted battery powered units.
The inspector observad tests of all the above TSC power systems and inspected their physi.1 condition.
The electrolyte levels in two of the three emerger y lighting units was significantly below the minimum level for each cell.
Thit condition is believed to have occurred because the TSC emercency lighting is not covered by a routine surveillance proce bre.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following item is suggested for program improvement.
Add the TSC battery powered emergency lignting units to the
preventive maintenance schedule which covers similar units elsewhere on site.
4.2.2 Data Analysis The ERFIS, SPDS and RRIS computer terminals and manually maintained status boards are the sources of data used by TSC managers.
Trending capebility is available from ERFIS, SPDS and manual displays.
Th ERFIS display data can be transferred to hard copy through a line printer.
Trerding of plant parameters is available by comparing current copies with previous copies.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
4.3 Regulatory Guide (R.G. ) 1.97 Variable Availability Plant variables required by R.G. 1.97 are provide to the TSC and E0F using the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) as the primary method for data transmission and display.
ERFIS uses the Balance of Plant (80P) computer as a data source and has the capability to receive data from other plant subsystems such as the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), the Radioactive Release Information System (RRIS) and the Safety Parameter Display System
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4 (SPDS).
In addition to the ERFIS Cathode-Way Tube (CRT) displays, there are CRT displays for the RRIS and the SPDS systems also located in the TSC and E0F.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the' licensee's program is adequate.
4.3.1 Computer Data As discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 cbove, parameter availability via the ERFIS, RRIS and SPDS computer systems meets the requirements of R.G. 1.97.
4.3.2 Manual Data The backup system to the computer transmitted varitales to the TSC and the E0F is through dedicated te/ephone comriunicators.
There are two basic telephone systems used for thc exchange of data and information.
The Kingdom Telephone Comr.any (touch tone system) is one of the systems available and an independent dedicated ring down phone system comprises the uther.
The telephone systems are normally powered from a reliable off-site source through the safeguards transformers or power block bus PA 02.
The touch tone system is provided with a redundant automatic switching unit and the system uses batteries and the Security Diesel Generator for backup power.
The touch tone system backs up the dedicated ring down system.
Status boards are used to display parameter data.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
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4.3.5 De.ta_ Mequacy The combination of data available on the various computer termir,als, via communicators and displayed on status boards
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meets all the TSC data requirements.
t 4.4 TSC Data Collection, Storage, Analysis and Display Licenses system hardware and corresponding documentation was reviewed to determine whether Emergency Response Facility (ERF) functions would be adequately supporten Data collection, storage, display, and communications were found 'o be adequate.
4.4.1 Methods of Data Collection Real-time data acquisition, display, and storage to support ERF functions are performed by a distributed computer system. The distributed system has been progressively added to during the
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past 15 years based'on changing requirements.
Computers comprising the distributed system have been supplied by different vendors, and require hardware and software support from a variety of sources.
The following l'sts the configurations ~ and primary functions of the computers making up the distributed system:
Westinghouse NSSS (nuclear steam supply system)
Westinghouse 64 - kilobytes (KB) Random Access Memory (RAM)
1 - 2 MB hard disk unit no tape drives floppy disk unit Function:
Front end for the (Balance of Plant) 80P system for reactor coolant information.
Dual processor HONEYWELL 45000 Computers 256 kilowords (KW) - 24 bit words random access memory (RAM)
80 Megabyte (MB) hard drive dual floppy unit Large Core Storage (LCS) - 1.6 MB 2 Nine track tape drives Function:
Collects data from most of the plant sensors, computes calculated point data, and controls 4 CR (Control Room) display CRT's (cethode ray terminals) and 2 keybcards.
ERFIS (Emergency Response Facility Information System)
HONEYWELL 4400 computer 128 KW RAM (24 bit words)
1.6 MB memory in LCS 2 nine track tape drives 2 - 80 MB hard disk units 1 - dual floppy unit Function:
Provides 80P point data to personnel in the EOF and TSC.
Controls 4 color displays in the TSC and 2 in the EJP, Himics the 80P data base.
Stores pre-event and post-eve,1t archival storage on tape und disk.
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RRIS (Radioactive Release Information System)
dual DEC VAX 11-750's 4 MB RAM 1 - 128 MB hard disk 1 - ni:1e track tape drive f unction:
Collects meteorology, radiation, and air release alta for dose assessment.
Drives Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) displays (1 display in the CR, 1 display in the TSC, 1 display in the E0F, 1 display in health physics access, and 1 display in the computer room).
CPS (Communications Processor System)
HONEYWELL 4500 computer 128 KB RAM (24 bit words)
80 MB hard disk unit 1.4 Megaword (MW) LCS Function:
This is the communications processor and serves the transparent function of interfacing between the 80P, the ERFIS, and the RRIS.
The following is a list of analog (continuously variable) and digital (2 state) plant sensors routinely sampled and used to assess plant safety status:
Analog Digital Plant Annunciator Sensors Sensors Paints (also digital)
NSSS 271 286
B0P 896 1896 1400 Total 1167 2182 1400 Based upon the abave findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
4.4.2 Data Displays Data display cathode ray tubes (CRT's) supporting ERF functions l
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Control Room (CR)
4 - color CONREK (80P) CRT's 2 - color CHROMATICS 7900's (RRIS) CRT's 2 - IDT 2200 color CRT's l
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TSC (Technical Support Center)
4 - color CONREK (COP) CRT's 2 - color CHROMATICS 7900's (RRIS) CRT's 1 - IDT 2200 color CRT's EOF (Emergency Operations Facility)'
2 - color CONREK (B0P) CRT's 1 - IDT 2200 color CRT's HP Access 1 - IDT 2200 color CRT Computer Room 1 - color CONREK (BOP) CRT's Display generation is done using three different types of color graphics CRT's for this ERF supporting system.
Users are given the option of selecting displays by:
(1) pressing function keys';
(2) typing in display selection parameters on a keyboard; or (3) using a_ light pen to make selections.
Displays were generated on the CRT's in one to five seconds with no significaat delays in response to disp 1hy raquests.
l Based upon the above findings, this portior. of tne licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following items are
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suggested for prcg/am improvement.
Readability of the display CRT's in the TSC was impacted by
screen flicker. This is probably due to either unregulated power sources or problems with the CRT or display generator power supplies.
This problem should be corrected.
The licensee should develop a practice of labeling or
tagging synthetic (computer generated) data when such data is used to support testing or exercises.
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4.4.2.1.
Time Resoletion ERF supporting computers read, analyze, and store to hard disk data from 4749 analog and digital sensors.
The sampling rate for data sets varies between two seconds and ten seconds for ERF
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related plant sensors.
Meteorology and radiation data are collected between every five seconds and every 60 seconds.
The data sampling rate is considered low to moderate speed.
Data acquisition tasks are assigned a high priority and are not delayed by other tasks.
Based upon.the above findings, this portion of the-licensee's program is adequate.
4.4.2.2 Signal Isolation Block diagrams showing isolation devires and approach was supplied by the licensee for the RRIS, the 80P, and the Westinghouse computer systems.
For the RRIS, Class 1E isolation boxes using photo-coupling were reported.
Test results indicate that on the application of 1300 volts between input and output signals and between input terminals and grounds no electrical breakdown occurred.
BOP isolation was tested by applying between 1500 volts and 2200 volts between contacts and relay cases as well as between open relay contacts.
No electrical breakdown was reported. The isolation for the 80P Class 1E relay cabinets was accomplished using physical separation. barriers (6 inches minimum) and photo-coupled isolation equipment.
Westinghouse reported isolation testing on qualified isolation amplifiers.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
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4.4.2.3 Data Coe.unications Data communications capabilities were reviewed.
The following table shows the interfaces and the transmission rates:
L Computer Interface Computer Bits per Second RRIS serial link CPS 9,600 BOP shared LCS CPS dirk access rate NSSS serial link B0P 9,699 ERFIS seriai link CPS 240,000 ERFIS serial link TSC Displays 9,600 ERFIS serial link E0F Displays 9,600
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l Licensee contacts reported error checking and error correcting l
or re-transmission on error detection capability for l
communications devices.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
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4.4.2.6 Model and System Reliability and Validity Examination of existing program documentation shows that it was poorly organized and not written in a manner that was easy to follow.
Time available did not allow for rigorous verification of the programs in the system, however, based on the scope of-the review that was conducted, no problems were identified.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
4.4.2.7 Reliability of Computer Systems SPDS sensors were reported to be redundant and routine statistical checks were made by the comp"'.ers to evaluate how well redundant sensor readings match.
Computer system unavailability was documented by the utility from August 1985 through the current month.
Some time period data showed that system downtime caused availability figures to be_less than 90%.
Specifically, ERFIS availability figures show 83.69% for 1986, 92.78% for 1987, and 98.56% so far for 1988.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
4.4.2.8 Environmental Control Systems Temperature and humidity were monitored and controlled.
Design criteria for heating and heat removal were based on vendor specifications for computer equipment supplied.
The air conditioning units implemented were reported to control the temperature and humidity as follows:
Computer (s)
Temperature Range Humidity Range ERFIS 72 to 80 dcgrees F 45 to 50%
all others 60 to 72 dcgrees F 55 to 60%
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
5.0 Emergency Operations Facility 5.1 Location and Habitability The E0F is located offsite approximately one mile west of the plant.
The plant FSAR Chapter 18 states that the E0F is constructed of concrete walls approximately ten inches thick and has a roof which consists of double-T pre-cast concrete sections with a minimum
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4.4.2.4 Processing Capacities Distributed system computers and peripheral computer systems were configured to support plant safety monitoring and reporting needs.
Processing is based on multitasking to allow several software functions to be processed concurrently.
Data acquisition.and storage tasks are high priority tasks and.
execute before supporting tasks.
Licensee contacts reported the following loads for normal operation:
Computer Approximate Percent Loading RRIS 80%
ERFIS 50%
B0P 60 - 70%
CPS 20%
NSSS 50%
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program.is adequate.
4.4.2.5 Data Storage Capacity
l Plant personnel reported historical data can be stored to disk as follows:
Computer Data Storage L
RRIS 7 days of 15 minute interval data in rotary file (file where current. data overwrites old?st data when a filesize' limitation is raached) 7 days historical data 2 weeks (On an event or at user option) historical data c.3n be stored on a 9 track magnetic tape.
ERFIS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pro-event and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> post event data storage.
Also, can store data to magnetic tape for up to 2 weeks.
NSSS No storage.
i B0P Saves a database subset on an event.
CPS None Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's l
program is adequate.
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concrete. thickness of approximately six inches.
It further states that the structure provides radiation shielding equivalent to a protection factor greater than five.
A review of Becthel calculation No. 7.6.5-34, Post LOCA Doses at E0F,. indicate that the structure will provide appropriate radiation shielding.
Radiation monitoring
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is the same as described for the TSC.
If the E0F becomes uninhabitable, a backup EOF is located.in Jefferson City,-Missouri, about 25 miles southwest of the plant.
The major components making up the EOF ventilation syt, tem are 'an air handling unit with an associated cooling unit, several air return fans, a HEPA filter and filter fan.
During normal operations the HEPA filter and filter fan are isolated from the ventilation system.
Placing the ventilation system in the "Filtration Mode",
closes the normal makeup air intake damper and the exhaust damper.
Outside air is now drawn into the ventilation system through the HEPA filter and filter fan.
Shifting to the filtration mode is
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accomplished by manual operation.
In observing several tests of the system the inspector noted the following:
(1) There was no physical indication or quantitative instrumentation available to determine if a positive pressure is maintained in the EOF.
Information on how the ventilation system was designed to operate could not be found.
The information in Section 18.3.2.2 of the FSAR merely stated that "the HVAC system for the EOF is similar to that of the TSC, except it contained only HEPA and~no charcoal filterf (charcoal filters are not required).
Dose calculations indicate that the ventilation system in the filtration mode-should. operate with~a positive pressure.
There was no evidence of a positive pressure in the building when opening an outside door.
There is no instrumentation nor physical evidence available to indicate that in the emergency ventilation mode the E0f ventilation system is maintaining a positive pressure.
Since the shielding calculations were performed assuming a pressurized ventilation system, it can not be verified that the t!OF is capable of providing the stated protection factor.
This was considered an open item (50-483/88009-02).
(2) During routine surveillance of the EOF ventilation system, the HEPA filters are not tested since there are no differential pressure gauges installed across the HEPA filters.
It should be noted that this item has been identified in the facility's QA audit report AP88-006 dated May 18, 1988.
Based on the above findings with the exception of the open item listed above, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following item is suggested for program improvement:
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- Proper' surveillance tests for the HEPA filters should
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conducted.
5.2 Functional Capabilities
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5.2.1 Data Analysis Adequacy The E0F uses the same computer and manual systems for data acquisition as those used-in the TSC.
The E0F operation is significantly more oriented toward dose assessment with one entire room dedicated to operation of RRIS terminals and status boards.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
5.2.2 Backup E0F The backup E0F contains ample workspace and communications equipment and is supplied with reliable.;,ser.
Based upon the above finding, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
5.2.3 Reliability The E0F, which is located about one mile west of the plant site, has a 480 V 3 phase normal power supply and an alternate power supply.
The normal EOF power supply comes from the 12.47 KV
"Callaway Electric Cooperative" line.
The alternate supply comes from a manual start, 350 KW Diesel Generator which services the EOF only.
The normal or alternate power supply is relectable through a manual transfer switch.
A 15 KVA invartor, powered from the E0F normal power supply, provides uninterruptable power to computer terminals and communication
equipment.
A 60 cell battery backs up the 15 KVA invertor.
Routine surveillances are conducted on the E0F power supplies.
Wall mounted battery powered lighting units are the only source of emergency lighting available in the E0F during loss of power to the building.
Routine surveillance tests are conducted on these units.
The inspector observed tests of all the above E0F power systems and inspected their physical condition.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
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'5.3.
Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable Availability The data availability in the E0F is essentially the same as that in the TSC,-with various computer systems and communicator / recorder personnel serving as the primary and backup sources of data.
See Section 4.3.
5.4. Data Collection, Storage, Analysis and Display The same computers supporting TSC ERF activities support the EOF.
These systems and details of their functions have already been described.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
6.0 TMI-Related (SIMS) Items On Octobe'.' 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TMI-related items approved for implernentation by the Commission at'that time.
On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to. provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application to Emergency Response Facilities, Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas.
The status of the completion of these THI-related items are internally tracked by the NRC.
The current status of each of these items related to emergency preparedness is as follows:
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Item No.
Current Status Comments III.A Not Listed This item refers to implementation of Chapter 8 cf Supplement 1 to N1.' REG-0737, and was reviewed in tais report.
This 11,en 3hould be addeo to the tracking system with a currant status of open until the opan items discussed in Sections 4.1 and 5.1 are closed.
III.A.1.1 Not Listed This item involved short term improvements to the emergency preparedness program and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Report No. 50-483/84-02(DRMSP)
dated March 6, 1984.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
III.A.1.2.1 Closed This item involved interim upgrades to the ERF's.
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Item No.
Current Status Comments III.A.1.2.2 Not Listed This item involved design criteria for upgraded ERF's, but was subsequently determined to be not applicable (N/A).
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of N/A.
III.A.1.2.3 N/A The current status of this item is incorrect.
Because this item involved ERF modifications
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that were incorporated into MPA-F-63, 64 and 65, this item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Report No. 50-483/84-02(DRMSP)
dated March 6, 1984.
III.A.2.1 Not Listed This item involved the submittal of upgraded emergency plans.
This item was closed with the issuance of Supplement No. 3 to the SER dated May 19P4 (NUREG-0830).
This item shcald be added to the tracking system with a curreat status of closed.
III.A.2.2 Not Listed This item involved the submittal of emergency procedures.
This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Report No. 50-483/84-02(DRMSP) dated March 6, 1984.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
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III.A.2.3 Not Listed This item involved an acceptable interim meteorological program. -This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedaess Implementation Appraisal:
Report No. 50-483/84-02(DRMSP) dated March 6, 1984.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
III.A.2.4 Not Listed This item involves an acceptable final meteorological program and was addressed in this report.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
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III.A.2.5 Not Listed This item involves an acceptable Class A meteorological model and was addressed in j
this report.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
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Item No.
Current Status Comments-III.A.2.6 Not Listed This item involves a licensee's review of their Class A meteorological model and was addressed in.this report.
This item should be added.to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
III.A.2.7 Not Listed This item required the licensee to provide-a description of the Class 8 meteorological model to the NRC.
Based on the current structure of.the ERF Appraisal program, the NRC is not reviewing these submittals of the Class 8 model.
Therefore, this item should be added to.the tracking system with a current status of N/A.
III.A.2.8 Not Listed This item involves an acceptable Class 8 meteorological model and was addressed in this report.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
MPA-F-63 Not Listed This item involves a review of the TSC during the ERF Appraisal and was reviewed in this report.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of open until the open items discussed in Sections 4.1 is closed.
MPA-F-64 Not Listed This item involved a review of the OSC, which was completed during the June 3, 1987 exercise:
Reports No. 50-483/87017(DRSS);
No. 50-265/87012(DRSS)
dated June 30, 1987.
This item should
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be added to the tracking system with a current status of closed.
MPA-F-65 Not Listed This item involves a review of the EOF during the ERF Appraisal and was reviewed in this report.
This item should be added to the tracking system with a current status of open until the open items discussed in Sections 5.1 is closed.
MPA-F-66 Not Listed This item involved the Nuclear Data Link, which has been superceded by the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
This item should be added to the tracking systen with a current status of N/A.
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7.0 Exit Meating (30703)
The inspector and consultants met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 on June 9, 1988.
The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report.
The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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