IR 05000483/1990013

Insp Rept 50-483/90-13 on 900701-0815.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Followup on Previous Insp Findings,Followup on Generic Ltrs,Plant Operations,Maint/ Surveillance & Regional Requests

ML20059E103
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/28/1990
From:	Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059E101	List: IR 05000483/1990013 ML20059E098
References
50-483-90-13, NUDOCS 9009100025
Download: ML20059E103 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III I l

l Report No. 50-483/90013(DRP) l l

Docket'No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30

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Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 a

Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 , I Inspection at: Callaway Site, Steedman, M0 ,

Inspection Conducted: July 1 through August 15, 1990 l l

l Inspectors: B. L. Bartlett C.~H. Brown I C. J. Phi ips

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Approved By: a '

. ,C ef, Reactor Proje ts Se tion 3C

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Inspection Summary ,

Inspection from July 1 through August 15,1990 (Report No. 50-483/90013(DRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection of licensee event reports, follow-up on previous inspection findings, follow up on generic letters, plant operations, maintenance / surveillance,, regional requests, and-licensee program for. testing and maintaining check valves was performed.-

t Results: Three violations were identified: failure to make a report within th'e time limits required by 10 CFR Part 21, failure to declare certain containment isolation valves inoperable, and failure to perform a surveillance !

during a reactor startup. These violations met the test'of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1; accordingly, no Notice- of Violation was issue During the review of the licensee event reports (LERs) the inspector-identified concerns with one LER that should have been reported as.two separate LERs and another LER that should have-had additional information'

(paragraph 2). The licensee's actions in response ~to two Generic letters were reviewed and found to be satisfactory (Paragraph 3). The inspector identified i

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examples of licensed operators-failing to pay close attention'to their control

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panels (Paragraph 4). The licensee's program for check valves was found to be I effective and well implemented (paragraph 7). '

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l DETAILS persons Contacted '

D. F. Schnell, Senior Vice President, Nuclear  ;

• G. L. Randolph, Genreral Manager, Nuclear Operations >

J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant i C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support

• J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance

• W. R. ~ampbell, C Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control D. E. Young, Superinterident, Operations .

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R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics

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T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Site Licensing G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling  :

G. R. Pendegraff. Superintendent, Security '

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L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Program

• G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Indepemnt Safety Engineer Group

• J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance

• M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Training

• C, S. Petzel, Quality Assurance Engineer J. A. McGraw, Superinter. dent, Design Control

• Denotes those present at one or more exit interviews.

In addition, a number of equipment operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations, maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacte . Inspection of Licensee Event Reports (92700) *

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of records, the following licensee event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent

recurrence was accompitsbed in accordance with Technical Specifications l (T/Ss). The LERs listed below are considered riosed.

, (Closed) LCR 90003: Both trains of Class IE air conditioner units could have been disabled by the fire protection system due to a design erro ,

Batkoround At 11:15 a.m., on March 14, 1990, following a review of the Power Block Halon Functional Test Procedure, MSM-KC-FQ001, utility engineering personnel determined that, contrary to the design requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, the fire protection Halon system De either of the engineered safety features (ESF) switchgear rooms could have disabled both trains of Class IE air conditioner units and prevented the proper ventilation and cooling of the safety

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systems located within those rooms. The affected safety systems included two redundant 4.16KV ESF buses and four 480V ESF buses which supply power to various plant safety systems. Operator action would have been required to reset the Halon panel before normal or accident related cooling could have been restored.

l Licensee's Evaluation of Cause and Corrective Actions Poot Cause >

The root cause of this event was attributable to a design error made during the construction of the plant. The architect engineer made i'

wiring changes inside the vendor supplied fire protection panel such that both Class IE air conditioner units would be tripped by a Halon <

actuation signal from either ESF switchgear roo !

t Corrective Actions

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(1) The fire protection panel was deactivated end a continuous fire watch was establishe (2) A design modification was implemented on March 15, 1990 to remove the cross train trip signal. The revised configuration will only shut down the Class IE air conditioner unit for the  !

( associated ESF switchgear roo Inspector's Review '

I The inspector determined that the event was promptly identifie .

, corrected, and reported, and that appropriate corrective action has been completed. The event posed minimal safety significance because '

i the Halon system would have extinguished a fire and would have been l reset prior to the lack of air conditioner having a detrimental

affect on any safety systems. The licensee has submitted a report of this failure in accordance with 10 CFR 21. This LER is closed, b. (Closed) LER 90003. Revision 1:

Background During the inspector's review of Revision 0 of this LER the licensee identified a failure to report as required by 10 CFR Part 21. On April 12,1990, the licensee's responsible officer determined that the event described in this LER was also reportable under 10 CFR h.rt 21. Part 21 has an initial reporting requirement of two days, but the event was not reported under Part 21 until July 20, 1990.

Licensee's Evaluation of Root Cause and Corrective Action The root cause of the event was attributed to an error on the part of the licensing engineer responsible for issuing the LER. A '

contributing cause was the normal delay in sending the internal formal evaluation from Engineering to Licensin ,

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The specific engineer that made the error had previously transferred to another licensee group, however,-the remaining engineers that perform this work have re-reviewed Part 21 reporting requirement ;

In addition, the administrative program will be enhanced to ensure '

the written evaluation is received by Licensing in a timely manne ,

J/ispector's Review Upon the initial 16 ,tification of the cross train trip signal the .

licensee immedi e ., c.,i,1fied the other Standardized Nuclear Unit '

Power Plant System (SNUPPS) unit. The other unit is owned by another utility and even though there is no legal requirement, the '

two licensees routinely exchange information. .The~other unit had the identical design error and it was promptly corrected. The .

licensee has e good record of making required reports within the '

time limits ano this failure is considered to be an isolated occurrenc l i

The Licensee's failure to meet the two day reporting requirement is a violation of 10 CFR, Part 21.21.b.2 (483/90013-01(DRP)). The violation met the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1; consequently, no Notice of Violation will be issued. This Notice of Violation and LER 90003, Revision 1 are close !

c. (Closed) LER 90005: Reactor trip due to loss of main. generator stator cooling water instrumentation caused by a blown fus Background

At 1:31 p.m. COT on May 1,1990, a reactor trip, main feedwater isolation, and auxiliary feedwater actuation occ:,rred due to a turbine trip on an indicated loss of main generato. stator cooling water (CE). During the reinsertion of the CE system inlet :

conductivity meter, following a calibration check, a foreign '

particle shorted the power leads. This resulted in the failure of power to the CE instrumentation giving an indicated loss of the CE 1 system. The turbine runback, turbine trip and reactor trip, along with the other equipment actuations were as designed for this sort of equipment failur Licensee's Evaluation of Root Cause and Corrective Action Root Cause

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The root cause of the event was a foreign particle across the power supply leads. A contributing factor was the lack of redundancy of the CE system indication circuits and power supplie Ccrrective Actions Blown fuses were replaced and the shorted assembly was cleaned and tested. The CE runback circuitry will be supplied from a separate power suppiv, the CE low pressure runback will be deleted based on a lack of need, and the CE system logic will be modified to increase reliabilit .

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Inspectors' Review t

The inspectors were on site and responded to the control room immediately following the trip. The inspectors observations of :

the trip are in Inspection Report 483/90008, paragraph 3.a. The ;

inspectors verified that reporting requirements were met, and reviewed the licensees root cause determination and corrective action. The operating crew demonstrated a well executed, disciplined performance in response to the unplanned trip. In ~

addition, the support staff was observed to perform a thorough root cause evaluation and implement effective corrective action recommendations. This LER is close ! (Closed) LER 90006: Technical specification action statement not entered for inoperable remote manual containment isolation valves, due to human performanc Background

On June 3,1990, the licensee removed power from the Essential Service Water (EF) valves which serve the containment air cooler ,

This was done in order to protect the workmen who were rewiring ;

limit switches and working on the limitorque operators. The power was removed, however, .while the valves (which were containment isolation valves) were open, and without entering the appropriate action statemen Licensee's Evaluation of Root Cause and Corrective Action R_oot Cause ,

i The root cause of the event was an incorrect internal Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI) which led.the work schedulers and licensed operators astray. The TSI stated that remote isolation valves which do not receive automatic signals could have their power removed without being declared iaoperable. However, remote manual containment isolation valves must be capable of being repositioned or be declared inoperable.

1 Corrective Actions The licensee's corrective actions included revising the TSI, reviewing the event with operat'ons and scheduling personnel and i

since TSIs are approved by the Jn-site Review Committee (ORC)..it-was also reviewed by all ORC member Inspectors' Review l

The inoperable valves were the outside containment isolation valves (CIVs). The inside CIVs were operable at all times. These valves are in a closed system that penetrates primary reactor containment

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but which is neither a part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or connected directly to the containment atmosphere. In addition,

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these valves do not receive automatic isolation signals and do not

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go closed on either a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation ;

signal. If required, the valves could have been closed using the handwheel. The licensee's failure to declare these valves '

inoperable resulted in a violation of T/S 3.6.3 (483/90013-02(DRP)).

The violation met the tests of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, Section V.G.1; consequently, no Notice of Violation will be issued and this violation and LER 90006 are considered close '

. (Closed) LER 90007: Two reactor trips due to failed input buffer card and faulty slave cycler counter card and a missed surveillance

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due to cognitive personnel erro Background On June 11, 1990, at 10:16 a.m. CDT a reactor trip occurred due to the simultaneous closure of all four main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). All engineered safety features equipment operated as designed, with one exception. "A" train of steam generator blowdown isolation was received but due to a defective relay this was not indicated on the status pane ,

On June 12,1990, at 5:01 a.m. CDT during a restart attempt, four :

control rods dropped back into the core. . One of the four control rods did not fully insert. When the control rods were being driven back into the core, an urgent failure alarm was received. After ,

assessing the situation, thelicensee manually tripped the reacto '

On June 12, 1990, durir.g the subsequent return to power, the licensee accidentally failed to perform a required surveillance on the main turbine. This failure was identified on June 18, 199 The surveillance was then performed successfull Licensee's Evaluation of Root Cause and Corrective Action

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Root Cause The root cause of the June 11, 1990, reactor trip was a failed input buf fer card in the manual fast close circuitr The root cause of the second reactor trip was a faulty slave cycler counter card. The failure mechanism was such that one control rod was relatched prior to full insertio The root cause of the missed surveillance was a failure to properly implement the surveillance schedul Corrective Actions The failed input buffer card was replaced. Discussions with the manufacturer revealed that the buffer cards-had capacitors with a higher than desired failure history. The licensee will replace these capacitors with more reliable capacitor i

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l The faulty slave cycler counter card was replaced. During bench testing no problems were identified with the card. It was removed from the plant for use as a training aid The individuals involved in the missed surveillance were counsele Additional training will be give Procedure enhancements are also being evaluate Inspector's Review i NUREG-1022. " Licensee Event Report System", Supplement Number 1, states, in part "More than one event can be reported in a single :

LER if the events are related (e.g., same general cause or-consequences). . ." The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel informing them that the missed surveillance included in i LER 90007 was not related to the two reactor trips and chus should ;

have been reported as a separate LE The inspectors follow-up to the two reactor trips was documented in inspection report 483/90012. During the discussion on the missed

r,urveillance the licensee stated they were in Mode 2 - Startup, at ;

15 percent reactor power. TSs define Mode 2 as being less than five percent reactor power. If the licensee was at 15 percent power, they were in Mode 1. .

The licensee's failure to perform a surveillance required by TS is a violation (483/90013-03(DRP)). The violation met the test of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G 1; consequently, no Notice

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of Violation will be issued and this violation and LER 90007 are considered closed, f. { Closed)_LER90008: Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations due to a maintenance electrician inadvertently grounding valve limit switch contacts during their adjustmen Background l

l At 8:18 p.m. CDT and at 8:23 p.m. CDT on 2uly-5, 1990, various ESF components were actuated when a maintenance electrician accidentally grounded contacts in a valve limit switch during adjustments. The 8:18 p.m. COT event actuated the loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

sequencer. The sequencer closed some valves and shed some loads from the bus (e.g. "B" train charging pump room cooler and control room air conditioner). The 8:23 p.m. CDT event caused a "B" train containment spray (EN) actuation signal. Due to the maintenance being performed, the EN pump was in pull-to-lock, and thus did not start. Also, the discharge valve was deenergized in the closed position so no actual containment spray was performed. The suction isolation valve from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) was closed, but in violation of plant administrative procedures governing workmen's protection,-it was energized. When the actuation was received, the suction valve upened allowing RWST water to gravity drain to the EN pump and then spill out an open one inch drain valve to an auxiliary building sump. Approximately 2,000 ,

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gallons of slightly radioactive water spilled to the building sump I and was pumped to radwaste for processing before the suction valve was isolate Licensee's Evaluation of Root Cause and Corrective Action Root Cause The root cause of the spray actuation was determined to be that the ,

screwdriver used by the electrician was insufficiently insulate In addition, the electricians ptrforming the work were aware of i energized circuits for valve position indication, but were unaware that the circuit that was actuateo was energize The root cause of the spill was deterneed to be a cognitive personnel error on the part of the personnel preparing and reviewing i the workmen's protection boundary, i

Corrective Actions  !

The licensee is currently filming a documentary on this event to use '

in the training of utility personnel. Maintenance personnel have been retrained on the importance of using properly insulated tools during the performance of work activities. Additional training, examinations, and discussions are being held with reactor operators to ensure procedures for the issuance of workmen protection clearance orders are followe Inspector's Review The same event had happened previously at the other SNUPPS unit

! (Wolf Creek) in June of 1986. Callaway is on distribution for Wolf Creek LERs and they distributed LER 482/86-035 internally, upon receipt. As part of the corrective action for this event the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) plans to review all Wolf Creek LERs to date for applicability. The two SNUPPS licensees -

regularly share operating experience and while this is not a ;

regulatory requirement it is to be encouraged.

l LER 483/90008 as transmitted to the NRC failed to make mention of the 2,000 gallon spill, its consequences or corrective actions.

l Even though the spill itself was not reportable, it was a consequence of the reportable event and should have been included in the LE The inspectors attended several meetings of the licensee's Event Review Team and observed that the event was thoroughly dissected and that appropriate and timely recommendations were issued to licensee management. This LER is close ..

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! Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Open Item 483/87008-03(DRS): Justification for not venting al)linerweldchannelsduringanintegratedleakratetest(ILRT).

The Callaway containment liner has 41 weld channels. The last ILRT was performed with 23 of the channels vented to containment atmosphere and 18.not vented. This was due to some vents being inaccessible. An item wi.s opened to follow the licensees submittal to the NRC of their justificution for not venting all the channels and the f4RC's respons On March 14, 1990, a safety evaluation (TAC 72750) was sent to the licensee informing them that it is not necessary to vent the liner. weld l 1eak chase channels provided visual inspections required by 10 CFR l Part 50, Appendix J,Section V, are performed for readily accessible areas

, prior to each subsequent type A test. On August 16, 1990, the licensee l committed to comply with this requirement and stated that the ILRT test

procedure had been modified to ensure the commitment was me This open item is close . Follow-up to Generic Letters (92701) Generic Letter 88-03, " Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" ~

{ TAC 67D3)

On February 17, 1988, Generic Letter 88-03 was issued and requested all licensees of operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and holders of construction permits for PWRs to confirm that appropriate

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' procedures are in place, and will be maintained, to minimize the occurrence of steam binding of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump The procedures require monitoring fluid conditions within the AFW system each shift during times when the system is required to be operable, and recognizing steam binding and restoring the AFW system to operable status should steam binding occu '

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l The licensee responded to Generic Letter (GL) 88-03 on May 12,198 The licensee stated that at least once per shift the AFW pumps were verified to not have steam binding by venting the pumps to check for steam and by checking for high temperature in the piping. In addition, a temperature sensor will alarm on high temperature and I

system design would minimize the chances of steam being located in l the pumps. In paragraph 7 of this report, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's check valve program. In that evaluation, a sampling of specific check valves was performed. Some of the check valves selected were AFW check valves. This was done in order to

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specifically evaluate steam back leakage in the AFW system. The l AFV check valves were found to be properly utilized and maintaine In March of 1989, the AFW system was-walked down in detail by inspectors (Report 483/89004) and no evidence of steam binding / check valve back leakage was identifie !

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During routine plant tours, the inspectors regularly check for evidence of steam binding and no irregularities have been identified at either SNUpPS uni In response to an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) request a discharge check valve at Wolf Creek was dismantled and inspected. No evidence of degradation due to poor system design or check valve utilization were identified. On l July 8,1988, the NRC accepted the licensee's written response to GL 88-03. This' Generic Letter is considered close t b. Generic Letter 88-142 " Instrument Air Supply Problems Affectino Safety-Related Equipment" (TAC 71638)

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This GL requested the licensee to review NUREG-1275 Volume 1

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" Operating Experience Feedback Report - Air System Problems" and perform a design and operations verification of the instrument air- -

syste The licensee responded to GL 88-14 on February 3, 1989. At Callaway the instrument air system is not safety-related. The safety-related ,

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components which have air operated equipment are the MSIVs, main -

feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge throttle valves, and the steam generator atmospheric /

power operated relief valves. With the exception of the MSIVs and MFIVs the safety-related components listed above have nitrogen '

accumulator backups. The design of the MSIVs and MFIVs is such that the air trapped in the piping at the valve is enough to reposition the four way control valves allowing hydraulic accumulators to close tti valve. The air is trapped using safety-related sof+. seat check

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vaives which are included in the preventive maintenance (PM) program.

l The nitrogen accumulators are isolated from the non-safety-related l portion of the nitrogen system and the instrument air through the I

use of safety-related check valves. These check valves were verified by the inspectors to be included in a testing / maintenance prugram as part of the review performed in paragraph Even though the instrument air system (KA) is not safety-related, dirty air could result in rusting / degraded safety-related components as well as potentially invalidating the fail safe positions of ,

component The licensee performs weekly samples of air quality and also had performed a startup test prior to placing the new KA compressors in service in 1986. There is a continuous check and alarm for high dewpoint temperatur The licensee's predictive / preventive maintenance program appears to

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be adequate for the proper operation of the syste On March 30, 1989, the NRC sent the licensee a letter confirming the reviewing of their response to GL 88-14 and accepting it. Generic l Letter 88-14 is close .

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. Plant Operations (71707) Operational Safety Verification Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control of operating activities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shift technical advisors. The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions of operation (LCO), and reviews of facility procedures, records, and reports. The following items were considered during these !

inspections:

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Adequacy of plant staffing and supervisio Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and off-normal condition Operability of selected safety-related systems, including attendant alarms, instrumentation, and control Maintenance of quality records and report The inspectors observed that control room supervisors, shift technical advisors, and operators were attentive to plant conditions, performed frequent panel walkdowns and were responsive to off-normal alarms and conditions, Off-shift inspection of Control Room The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shift The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the administrative controls relating to the conduct of operation were being adhered t l Plant Material Conditions / Housekeeping The inspectors performed routine plant tours to assess material conditions within the plant, ongoing quality activities and plantwide housekeeping. The inspectors also accompanied the licensee's management on monthly plant tour i

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. Radiological Controls

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The licensee's radiological controls and practices were routinely observed by the' inspectors during plant tours and during the inspection of selected work activities. The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, maintenance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and reports, Security Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspector monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to their approved security '

plan. The inspector noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted. The inspector also verified that checked vital areas were locked and alarme #

Additionally, the inspector also verified that observed personnel '

and packages entering the protected area were searched by appropriate equipment or by han During this inspection period the inspector developed concerns about ;

licensed operator's attention to. their control boards. On July 2, 1990, during a routine walkdown of the control boards, the nuclear instrumentation (NI) overpower chart recorders were observed to have three out of four pens not functioning. The pens had not followed a slight power increase which had occurred a few hours earlier and the pens were recording 100 percent power when the reactor had not been at 100 percent power since June 27, 1990. The Reactor Operator was informed and the chart recorders were repaired. On July 10, 1990, ;

during a routine walkdown of the control boards, five chart ~ recorder t pens were observed not inking. They recorded condenser vacuum, steam generator pressure, steam generator level, neutron detector upper, and neutron detector lowe The Superintendent of Operations was in the control room and was informed of the malfunctioning recorders. While the failure of the chart recorders did not represent a safety issue, it did point out that the licensed operations were not paying detailed attention to the indications 1 and controls. In general, the licensed operators are considered to ;

be attentive to their controls and currently the events described '

above are considered to be isolated occurrence No violations or deviations were identifie .

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5. Maintenance / Surveillance (62703) (61726)

Selected portions of the plant surveillance, test and maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and housekeeping conditions were maintained, Maintenance The reviewed maintenance activities included:

Work Request N Activity P-449142 Emergency fuel oil storage tank "B" to day tank bypass strainer clean-ou Feeder breaker for pressurizer heater Number 24 functional tes P-474724 Safety injection pump room cooler "A";

clean, inspect, and check belt tensio W-129878 Main generator stator cooling water heat '

exchanger "A" locate and plug tube lea S-478040 Perform VT-2 exam - auxiliary feedwate Generic WR Troubleshooting RP panel and card replacement and pulling fuses on bad power supplie Surveillance

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The reviewed surveillances included:

Procedure N Activity OSP-NE-00002 Standby diesel generator periodic tests, l

OSP-AL-P001B Section XI motor driven auxiliary feedwater -

pump "B" operability.

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ISL-GS-00A2B Containment hydrogen concentration analysis transmitte .

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l ITM-GS-0002B Hydrogen analyzer flow calibration for i

SGS02 ISF-SE-00N43 Functional, nuclear instrument power range N43.

l ISL-BB-0T431 Temperature, loop 3, delta i

temperature / temperature average.

( ISL-NF-NB02A Loop, NB02A degraded and undervoltag ITL-3G-OFI54 Loop flow; reactor coolant pump "D" seal ,

Number 1 water leak off, low range flo ISF-BB-0P456 Reactor coolant pressurizer protection "B" pressure transmitte T During the performance of OSP-NE-00002, upon attempting to load the "A" diesel generator, the "A" diesel generator output breaker tripped upon actuation of the reverse power relay. The breaker was being operated by-a reactor operator trainee in the control roo The reverse power .elay is designed to open the output breaker if load is not picked up b', the diesel generator in a short period of time. The trainee did not load the diesel fast enough to prevent the relay actuation from tripping the 3 generator output breaker. After initial determination of the problem, the breaker was reclosed and the generator was loaded without proble As required, the licensee submitted Special Report 90-01, " Invalid Failure of Diesel Generator "A" Due to Operator Error in Loading the Generator Within Allowed Time Limits." The licensee revised OSP-NE-00002 to more clearly state the loading requirements for non-emergency starts of diesel generators. This special report is close No violations or deviations were identifie ' Regicnal Requests (92701)

In response to a regional request the inspectors reviewed the four items listed below to ensure they were complete. The items are from i NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." Following a documentation review, all four items were found to be complet ,

II. Post-Accident Sampling System NUREG-0830, " Safety Evaluation Report" (SER) Supplement Number 4, issued in October of 1984, states in part that

"on the basis of its evaluation, the staff concludes that the post accident sampling system now meets all 11 criteria of item II,b.3 in NUREG-0737 'and is therefore, acceptable." Item II.B.3 is close .

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II.E. Positions One Through Four - Containment Isolation Dependability NUREG-0830, SER, issued in October of 1981, states in part, "The staff concludes that the applicant has met all the requirements of Item II.E.4.2 Positions (1), (2), (3),

(4)..." Item II.E.4.2 positions one through four are close .D.1. Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Likely to Contain Radioactive Materials NUREG-0830, SER, Supplement Number 3, issued in May of 1984, states in part, "The staff considers the implementation of the planned surveillance and system leak testing programs as discussed above a proper method for controlling unacceptable leakage from systems containing highly radioactive water." Item III.D.1. is close III.D.3. Control Room Habitability Requirements NUREG-0830, SER, issued in October of 1981, states in part, "The staff concluded that the control room habitability system is appropriately designed." Item III.D.3.4.3 is close . Licensee Program for Testing and Maintaining Check Valves (73756)

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In response to a regional request, the inspectors performed a brief evaluation of the licensee's program for testing and maintaining check valves in safety-related systems. The inspection was performed based on draf t inspection guidance. The purpose was to evaluate the licensee's program in-order to identify early indication of programmatic weaknesses and to provide early notification to the region of issues which may warrant special inspections. It was not the intent to fully evaluate the licensee's Inservice Inspection (ISI) or Inservice Testing program The proper testing of check valves was first raised'at Callaway in 1983 (Report 483/83027). Subsequently, unresolved item 483/85007-01 'l concerning the testing of safety related check valves in the closed direction was issued. In October of 1986, an inspector and the licensee reviewed 212 safety-related check valves and verified that 77 check valves would be tested in the closed directio During this inspection period, the inspectors randomly selected check val"es from various safety-related systems and verified:

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The check valves were included in a testing progra l

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The testing program verified the valves were capable of performing :

their required safety functions (in both or either direction (s), as required).

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Predictive and preventive maintenance activities were effective in preventing and/or identifying check valve failure Through field walkdowns that check valve orientation sizing, type, and location were appropriat At present, trending is not being performed due to the lack of meaningful test data, but new equipment recently purchased would allow trending to be performe Management was involved in ongoing development of a comprehensive check valve progra The inspectors determined that the licensee was utilizing an appropriate amount of resources in a timely fashion to determine the extent of any check valve f ailures, necessary repairs, and program change . Violations for Which a " Notice of Violation" Will Not be Issued The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding requiremen However, because the NRQ, wants to encourage and support licensee initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violation that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A. These tests are: (1) the violation was identified by the licensee; (2) the violation would be categorized as Severity Level IV or V; (3) the violation was reported to the NRC, if required; (4) the violation will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time period; and (5)

it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation'

Violations for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued are identified in Paragraph . Exit Meeting (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspecters during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar !

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