IR 05000483/1997010

Insp Rept 50-483/97-10 on 970330-0510.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20141H144
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/19/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141H136	List: IR 05000483/1997010 ML20141H130
References
50-483-97-10, NUDOCS 9705230203
Download: ML20141H144 (16)

Text

. - . . - . - . . _ = . . . -. . - . . . . . - . . . _ . . - . . . - . . - . - - . ... . - .-.. . . .

-

.

!.

\:  !

l ENCLOSURE

!

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

l Docket No.: 50-483 i License No.: NPF-30 Report No.: 50-483/97-10 I

Licensee: Union Electric Company

. Facility: Callaway Plant  :

i Location: Junction Highway CC and Highway O  !

i Fulton, Missouri .!

i i Dates: March 30 through May 10,1997 i inspectors: D. G. Passeht, Senior Resident inspector F. L. Brush, Resident inspector i

Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B i i

l ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information .,

-

l I

i

,

,

r i

i .

f3

'9705230203 970519 PDR ADOCK 05000403 G PDR 4e

- ..

. _ . ~ . . . - - . . . -

l

!

'

t I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '

Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-10 t

Operations

[

I i

The licensee was making a strong effort to correct and prevent tagging and valve ,

alignment errors' discussed in past NRC inspection reports (Section 04.1). ,

^

L

'

A noncited violation was identified for operators failing to maintain reactor output greater than steam demand during startup from Refueling Outage 8 as required b l the.startup procedure. This resulted in a turbine trip and engineered safety features ,

actuation (Section 08.2). J

-

-

.

.

l-

'

Failing to ensure that steam generator water levels were stable before transferring  ;

feedwater flow control from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to '

.the main feedwater regulating valves during startup from a forced outage was a '

!: weakness in operator performance. This resulted in a turbine trip and engineered .l safety features' actuation (Section 08.3).  !

!

,

Maintenance

.

l

,

The licensee made good progress in correcting weaknesses in maintenance

- procedures. The licensee began a concerted effort in 1995 to review most .

'

maintenance department repair and surveillance procedures and correct deficiencies- ,

(Section M3.1). >

.

,

Enaineerino

'

.The licensee's operability and root cause determination for a small through-wall leak from essential service water system piping'were very good (Section E1.1). '

i Plant Suonort i i

Radiological controls associated with sluicing resin from a chemical and volume

'

control system demineralizer were very good (Section R4.1).

l-l

[

!

,

F-l l

.

+ , , . . - , , , . , . . - , , , . - - - - , . . -- .

_ _ _ . _ . _ .

!'

! ,

!.

'

,

t

! Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated near full power throughout the inspection perio ,

l. Querations 01- Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

i

"

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed numerous shift turnovers and noted no problem !

l 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance  !

04.1 Corrective Actions For Operator Errors l Insoection Scoce (71707)

l l

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to address operator errors

'

documented in several previous NRC inspection reports. This included reports 50-

! 483/97-07, 96-14, 96-11, 96-09, and 96-03, i

The inspectors reviewed:

!

! * Procedure APA-ZZ-00310, " Workman's Protection Assurance and Caution Tagging," Revision 11; and

Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310. "WPA (Workman's Protection Assurance)

Tagging," Revision 2.

l l Observations and Findinas

- To address tagging errors and other human performance concerns, the licensee developed a " Guideline Flow Chart for Workman's Protection Assurance." The flow

' chart combined Procedures APA-ZZ-00310 and ODP ZZ-00310 into a single document for ease of reference and use. The flow chart displayed the entiro

, workman's protection assurance process. This included requesting, preparing,

, hanging, and verifying workman's protection assurance tr.9ging. Expectations for

-

'

walking down and' hanging tags were clearly stated on the flow chart. The licensee intended to post the flow chart at various locations, including the control room and

! the equipment operator " ready room."

l

?'

.

. .

-2-Separately, the licensee began a " shift supervisor initiative" in January 1997. The shift supervisors and the operations department manager reviewed all 69 events in the 1996 suggestion-occurrence-solution condition report database for which human performance errors occurred. Of the 69 reports, the group identified and focused on 12 repc:ts. The operations department manager stated that the 12 reports were most representative of problems experienced in the operations department over the last 10 year The group further broke down the events described in each report into potential causes and contributing factors. The group classified the causes and factors into the following areas targeted for improvement: (1) procedures; (2) communications; (3) distractions; (4) ownership; (5) self-checking; (6) knowledge; (7) labeling; (8) scheduling; and, (9) on-shift managemen The group identified and prioritized solutions for each area. The group also began developing action plans to implement the solution The inspectors noted some examples of immediate actions taken:

• Operators began to affix temporary labels to inadequately labeled equipmen The licensee had appropriate controls in place to ensure that permanent labels replace the temporary label * The licensee increased the frequency of training for equipment operators on the tagging proces * Operators increased the use of flowcharts for maintenance and testing. This allowed operators to better visualize plant conditions for testing and maintenanc * To reduce control room distractions, most surveillance testing was assigned to be performed on the night shift. Also, review and approval of routine work packages was taken off-shift and assigned to the senior reactor operator in charge of schedulin c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee was making a strong effort to correct and prevent human performance weaknesses in the operations department. The l

licensee's approach was comprehensive.

!

l l

l l

l

-

l l -3-I

~05 Operator Training and Qualification

05.1 NRC Review of Third-Party Assessmenl Inspection Scone (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the February 27,1997, "World Association of Nuclear Operators Peer Review," report of the licensee's performance. The peer review was performed during the weeks of January 13 and 20,199 Obsetvations and Findinos The inspectors identified no substantial inconsistencies between the findings described in the peer review report and NRC perceptions of the licensee's performance. The irspectors determined that no additional regional followup was required at this tim Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-483/96014-01: worker protection tag placed on the wrong component. An equipment operator intended to pull secondary fuses for Transformer XPB121, but instead pulled fuses for Bus PB122. This resulted in a main circulating water pump trip. The licensee identified the primary cause to be personnel error. The equipment operator failed to perform self-checking of the

'Norker protection tag against the component label. The licensee also identified that component labeling could be improve The licensee reviewed the event with all equipment operators, in addition, the licensee enhanced operations requalification training for the training cycles ending March 15 and May 1,1997. The enhancement included the use of a "Stop, Think, Act, Review" training device. This was a control panel simulator designed to challenge self-checking performanc The inspectors found the licensee's actions to be appropriate. Section 0 discussed additional corrective actions the licensee initiated to address this and other errors that have occurred. Based on these actions, the inspectors consider this item close .2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-483/96-005: turbine trip and engineeted

! safety features actuation due to steam generator high level followed by plant shutdown due to high vibrations on reactor coolant pump. The event occurred during the plant startup following the 1996 refueling outag l

f l

l l

.

l-4-The inspectors reviewed:

• Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, " Plant Startup Hot Zero Power to 30 Percent Power," Revisions 16 and 17;

• Suggestion-Occurrence-So!ution Report 96-1774; and

• Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 96-177 On November 11,1996, at about 12 percent reactor power, a main turbine trip and engineered safety features actuation occurred. The cause was a high water levelin Steam Generator A. The high level was caused by problems when operators were i transferring frorn the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main '

feedwater regulating valve During the transfer, Steam Generator A level fluctuations increased to the high level i trip setpoint. Shortly thereafter, vibrations of reactor coolant Pump B reached l 17.5 mils. Operators tripped the pump and commenced a plant shutdown to Mode j

1 The licensee identified the following causes: '

There was poor indication of feedwater flow with the plant at low powe This mace it difficult to determine when feedwater flow and steam flow were matche *

The operators allowed the steam demand to get ahead of reactor outpu This made controlling steam generator level difficult with the positive moderator temperature coefficien * There was a weakness in Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, Revision 16. The procedure directed operators to increase reactor power at a rate which minimized steam generator level perturbations. However, the procedure did not clearly define the method to accomplish thi The licensee performed the following corrective actions:

• The licensee was reviewing methods to provide better feedwater flow indication for control room operator * Operations personnel revised Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, Revision 16, to provide better guidance to ensure reactor output leads steam demand when operating with a positive moderator temperature coefficien * Operations personnel revised Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, Revision 16, to limit the main turbine loading rate following main generator synchronization.

l l

l

_ _ m _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . - . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _

.

..

l

,

-5-l

-* . The crew that performed the startup following this event practiced on the simulator. There was special emphasis on keeping the reactor ahead of the turbine during the load increase. There were no significant steam generator water level control problems during the subsequent actual plant startu Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, " Plant Startup Hot Zero Power to 30 Percent Power,"

l Revision.16, Step 3.14, stated that, while operating with a positive moderator j temperature coefficient, always have reactor output lead steam demand. The L failure to have reactor output lead steam demand is considered a violation. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, l consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Eaforcement Policy'(50-483/9710-01).

The licensee identified the cause for the high vibration of reactor coolant Pump B to be associated with the drop of the reactor coolant system temperature following  ;

injection of auxiliary feedwater into the steam generators. The licensee rebalanced '

reactor coolant Pump B. The pump has not exhibited any further vibration l problems. The licensee planned to remove reactor coolant Pump B internals during the next refueling outage.for inspection and modificatio .3 (Closed) LER 50-483/96-006: turbine trip and engineered safety features actuation

! due to steam generator high level. The event occurred during startup following a ,

'

forced outage to repair feedwater isolation Valve AEFV0042. The event was similar l

to the one discussed in Section 08.2.

.

The inspectors reviewed:

!

,

• Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003, " Plant Startup Hot Zero Power to 30 Percent  ;

Power," Revisions 16 and 17; and, j

'

• Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 96-192 ;

l On December 5,1996, at about 19 percent reactor power, a main turbine trip and

,

engineered safety _ features actuation occurred. The cause was high water levelin l Steam Generator B. Operators had problems when transferring from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main feedwater regulating valve During the transfer, fluctuations in Steam Generator B water level increased to the !

trip setpoint. Operators commenced a plant shutdown to Mode i The licensee identified that there was a small steam generator level oscillation in l progress when operators initiated the transfer to the main feedwater regulating l l valves. The licensee identified that operators did not ensure that steam generator i

'

l water levels were stable before transferring to the main feedwater regulating valves.

,

,

The inspectors noted that Procedure OTG-ZZ-0GCO3 had been revised to ensure

,

reactor power led steam demand when operating with a positive moderator l

L l

.

. . _ . .m _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _

,

i

! .

l.

! -6-l l' ')

.l temperature coefficient. The licensee was also in the process of implementing the corrective and preventive actions identified following the previous event l (Section 08.2).

l The licensee initiated additional corrective actions:

• Procedure OTG-ZZ-00003 was enhanced to require operators to stabilize steam generator water levels prior to transferring to the main feedwater regulating valves. This was accomplished by holding turbine load at 60 MWe until average reactor coolant system temperature and feedwater l preheating were stabl .

.The licensee formed a task force to evaluate the main feedwater regulating l valve transfer process during plant startup. The licensee was considerin several options to improve control of steam generator water level at low power level.

l I

i There were no steam generator water level deviation alarms during the subsequent

.plant startu The inspectors concluded that the failure of operators to ensure that steam !

generator water levels were stable before transferring to the main feedwater regulating valves was a weaknes '

! The inspectors also concluded that the licensee was proceeding in an acceptable l l manner to address the steam generator water level control problems during startu !

li._ Maintenance I

! -

M1 . Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Comments - Maintenance Insoection Scope (62707)

i-

[ The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:

l  ?

l * Work Activity W192237 - Repair Leak on the Crossconnect Line at the

'

l Discharge of Essential Service Water Pump A; i  !

• Work Activity P564754 - Clean and Inspect Load Center PG22; l * Work Activity P571082 - Calibrate Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

,

Governor Valve Control Station; and

.

,

!

_ .

'

l .

'

.

I -7-

• Work Activity P584006 - Service Limitorque Operator for Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip and Throttle Valve, Observations and Findinas The inspectors found no concerns with the maintenance observed. All work  ;

observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently ober.ed :;u,nervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personmi were present when require The inspectors' reviow of the license <,'s operability and root cause determinations I for the essential ser rice water line leak (Work Activity W192237) is addressed in l Section E M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance i Insoection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:

• Surveillance Procedure OSP-KJ-V002B, "Section XI Diesel Generator "B" Air ;

Start Check Valve Test," Revision 2; and, i

• Surveillance Procedure OSP-NE-0001 A, " Standby Diesel Generator "A" Periodic Tests," Revision Observations and Findinas Surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was conducted natisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specification M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3,1 Maintenance Department Procedure Imorovement Proaram insoection Scope (61726)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's effort to improve mai7tenance department repair and surveillance procedure Observations and Findinas i

Early in 1995, the licensee formed a task team to review most maintenance l department repair and surveillance procedures and correct deficiencies. The j licemee identified the need to perform the review because of weaknesses with l

. - - . . .. -_ - . _ .- - . - - . - . - - - _

.- . . , - ,. .

.

i

!

.

'

-8- ,

many of the procedures. These included procedures for electricians, machinists, welders, insulators, and helpers. The licensee expected to complete the reviews and make necessary changes to the maintenanc.e procedures by the end of 199 '!

NRC Inspection Report 50-483/95-13 discussed a reactor coolant system leak during reactor coolant pump seat maintenance. The root cause of this event was a weakness in maintenance Procedure MPM-BB.QP001, " Reactor Coolant Pump Seal  !

Removal and Replacement," Revision 19, which had not yet been reviewed by the team at the time of the even The task team performed a detailed review of 378 maintenance procedures. The licensee made improvements to 236 of the procedures. The licensee used the ,

revised reactor coolant pump seal maintenance procedure to replace three reactor {

coolant pump seals in the 1996 refueling outage. There were no reactor coolant ;

system leaks during the wor Also, the licensee stated a charging pump seal was replaced, while in Mode 1,  !

using an improved procedure. This was completed in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, well within the ,

- associated 72-hour Technical Specification action statemen l Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee made good progress in correcting weaknesses in maintenance procedure M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-483/9506-02: movement of a load over the reactor vesse During Refueling Outage 7, the inspectors observed the containment polar crane cperator transport a large metal box, weighing about 450 pounds, over the reactor vessel. The licensee had commenced core reload, and the reactor vessel was

. partially loaded with fuel. Moving the large metal box over the open reactor vessel was a violation of Technical Specification The inspectors reviewed:

• Procedure ETP-ZZ-000035, " Refueling Performance," Revision 15;

• Lesson Plan T65.06.04C, " Polar Crane," Revision 851017; and

• Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 95-0803.

l The polar crane operator was aware of the safe load path, but had lost track of

! plant conditions that prohibited movement of loads over the reactor vessel.

s

,

_ ,_

. . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _. _ ___ _ . . .. _ . . . _ . ___ __

.

I

l

,

l-9- ,

!

'

!

The licensee changed Procedure ETP-ZZ-00035 to require that the containment coordinator be notified prior to commencement of core reload. The lesson plan for ,

polar crane operators was changed to have polar crane operators contact the R containment coordinator at the start of each shift to determine status of refueling, j The licensee also included the suggestion-occurrence-solution report for this event ;

.in training seminars held for all crane operator l

\

i l The inspectors concluded that the licensee implemented adequate procedural .j j guidance and training for performing safe movement of loads around the reactor  !

,

- vessel during refueling operations. The inspectors noted no similar problems during !

(, Refueling Outage 8.

i

,. Ill. Enaineerina ' I l I El Conduct of Engineering l I

E Essential Service Water System Operability Review i I

I Insoection Scooe (375511 l l The inspectors reviewed the licensees operability determiriation following discovery l

'

of a small through-wall. leak from essential service water system piping. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's root cause determinatio '

i The inspectors reviewed: '

'

• Ultrasonic Examination Report 97-003;

,

,

• Request for Resolution Report 007674A: and i

'

• Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 97-040 !

l Observations and Findinas On March 30,1997, an equipment operator found an approximate 1.5 gallon per minute leak from the essential service water system. The leak was from a

'

0.25 inch hole, located just upstream of essential service water Pump A discharge crossconnect Valve EFV009 i The licensee determined that the leak did not pose an immediate operability concern

[ for the following reasons:

-

• ' The rate of leakage was negligible. The licensee referenced Request for

'

Resolution 007694A, which determined the maximum allowed leak rate to maintain system operability, with a given level of the ultimate heat sink i

.. .. ,. - . , . , _

. . - . _ _ - .- - .- - .. . .. .

..

J

.l-1

.

]

- 10-

!

.l pond. The levelin the ultimate heat sink pond was 76.4 percent when the operator found the leak, well above the Technical Specification required .

minimum of 57.9 percent. The allowable leak rate for the 76.4 percent pond -

level, according to Request for Resolution 007694A, was over 50 gp * The leakage was not spraying on any safety-related equipmen * The leakage did not affect structural integrity of the piping. The licensee performed an ultrasonic examination of the area adjacent to the leak. The ,

'

data showed localized pitting restricted to an area of 1.5 inches or less in l diameter. Localized pitting was not considered to have a significant adverse )

impact on structural integrity of the pipin '

The licensee determined the root cause of the leak to be microbiologically induced

~

corrosion. The piping at the location of the leak contained mostly stagnant water ;

and, therefore, received minimal chemical treatment during monthly runs of the j essential service water pum l I

Although chemical treatment for the small length of pipe at the leak location was ineffective, the system engineer stated that there were no plans to perform any I,

additional monitoring. This was because there was no evidence of major wall thinning based on the ultrasonic examination results. Further, the pitting observed was restricted to a small area of the piping. The inspectors agreed and had no other concern i The licensee repaired the leak in accordance with the ASME Section XI repair instructions. The inspectors identified no problems with the repair method or

,

results.

I Conclusions

.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's operability and root cause determinations were very good. The operability determination was well l documente IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls l R1.1 General Comments (71750)

l The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Prejob briefs for work in radiologically

,

I

. . , -

. . .. .

i .

!

.

-11-l

!

!

controlled areas were satisfactory, with opea discussions on radiological and personal safety. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas used good radiation worker practice Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys l posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked l a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problems.

R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4.1 Primary Resin Sluice Insoection Scone (71750)

The inspectors attended the prejob brief in preparation for sluicing resin from chemical and volume control system Cation Demineralizer FBG028. The inspectors also walked down areas to verify that the !icensee implemented proper posting and monitoring requirements.

l The inspectors reviewed:

= Procedure RTS-HC-00310, " Primary Resin Changeout/ Sampling,"

Revision 13; and

! * Procedure HTP-ZZ-06034, " Resin Sluice," Revision 2.

l l Observations and Findinas The project coordinator led a good discussion of Procedure RTS-HC-00310. The l discussion included the entire procedure, including appropriate discussions on precautions, limitations, and initial conditions. There were good discussions on expectations, communications, responsibilities, and contingencies. Radwaste l department supervisors were present and led some of the discussion The inspectors walked down the areas where dose rates were expected to change because of the resin sluice. The inspectors used a checklist frorn Procedure HTP-ZZ-06034 for the walkdown. The checklist identified 16 areas l where proper radiologica'. postings were required to be verified. The posting for I many of the areas was required to be upgraded from " caution high radiation area" l to " danger high radiation area." The licensee also installed different locks on the

!

" danger high radiation area" doors per Procedure HTP-ZZ-0603 The inspectors found no problems with the licensee's radiological control of the various areas. The inspectors found that all postings were correct and that alllocks were appropriately changed.

!

l

,

.

, .

!

'

t

. . .

_

s'

l n . -12-

1 ji Conclusions

! 1The inspectors concluded that the prejob' brief was very good. The licensee

'

properly implemented radiological controls for areas affected by the resin sluic ,

V. Manaaement Meetinas

!

l X1 Exit Meeting Summary l

The exit meeting was conducted on May 9,1997. The licensee commented on an inspection item in this report.

t During the discussion of the maintenance department procedure improvement program (Section M3.1),.the licensee stated:

• ' Many of the maintenance procedures that were improved received a field validation and verification by maintenance department supervisors and craftsmen; and 'i'

.

• Improvement of the maintenance procedures was a team effort involving -

l engineering department personnel. System engineers redrafted the procedures that warranted improvemen .;

'

The inspectors informed the licensee of an inspection followup system numbering error in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-07. Section E3.1 of that report incorrectly identified an unresolved item as 50-483/9707-05. The unresolved item should have been numbered 50-483/9707-06.

!

,

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection l should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

I ^

i l

!

I

!.

-

i i 4 l

l l

,

.

)

f

-

- - - , . . . -,

.

a

.

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORM ATION

> PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licen. ,

R. D. Aff alter, Manage, Callaway Plant D L. Battenhausen, Supervisor, Quality Assurance

.J 0. 0.waer, Manager, Operations Support G. , t n t. hin, Superintendent, Training M 5 .:a i, Superintendent, Health Physics J. M. Give, Superintendent, Maintenance G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance J. A. McGraw, Superintendent Technical Support Engineering C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering G. L. Randolph, Vice President, Nuclear M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Rad Waste M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control

, INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observation i I

62707 Maintenance Observation ]

71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup Operations 92902 Followup Maintenance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 97010-01 NCV Failure to have reactor output lead steam demand (Section 08.2) {

_ - _ _ - _ _ _ _

f-

[ ' l

!

, <

2- i

!

)

Closed ,

96014-01. VIO Worker Protection Tag Placed on Wrong Component j (Section 08.1)

{

96005 LER Turbine Trip and Engineering Safety Features Actuation due )

to Steam Generator A High Level Followed by Plant :i Shutdown due to High Vibrations on Reactor Coolant- i

.

Pump B (Section 08.2)  !

l 97010-01 NCV Failure to have reactor output lead steam demand )

(Section 08.2).

96006 LER Turbine Trip and Engineering Safety Features Actuation Due l to Steam Generator B High Level (Section 08.3)

l 95006-02- VIO Movement of a Load over the Reactor Vessel l (Section M8.1)

j ..

{'

.

r I

!:

!~

l t

!

!

'

,

l L

!

!

!

i i

s

,

i l

_,