IR 05000483/1997020
| ML20203H173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203H148 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-97-20, NUDOCS 9712180333 | |
| Download: ML20203H173 (18) | |
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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION =
REGION IV
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Docket No.:
50-483
- License No.:
NPF-30 '
- Report No.:
50-483/97-20 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri
- Dates:
October 26 through December 6 -1997 Inspectors:
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector F. L. Brush, Resident inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch 8
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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information
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9712180333 971216 PDR ADOCK 05000483 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-20
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f Ooerationt Operators maintained a heightened state of awareness to plant parameters durin0
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remodeling of the control room. There was minimal impact on shift crews during the
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remodeling. The work was performed when the on-line maintenance risk was low
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An equipment operator exhibited poor work practice and damaged an essential service
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water motor-operated valve actuator (Section 04.1).
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Maintenance i
Preventive maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator A was not properly controlled.
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A differential pressure gauge remained installed after the maintenance was completed (Section M2.1 ).-
Licensee Event Report 50-483/97-002 reported that containment isolation valves in the
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containment hydrogen control system were not properly tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.3.1 (Section M8.1).
Engineering Modifications to the unit vent flow transmitter, the emergency diesel generator lube oil
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and jacket water temperature control valves, and the control room were generally well planned and executed (Section E1.1).
Plant Sucogd
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A licensee inspection of the chemical and volume control system boric acid filter was
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performed with proper radiological controls (Section R2.1).
The licensee's response to a security threat was appropriate. Proper notifications were
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made and appropriate contingency actions were implemented (Section P1.1).
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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 70 percent reactor power during the report period.
1. Operations
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01_
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Commer ts (71707)
The inspectors cond scted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the
conduct of cperations was professional and safety conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were apprnpriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings.
In general, plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination was properly controlled. An exception was noted in Section M2.1 The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and found no problems.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors writed down the fonowing tagouts:
Workman's Protection Assurance 24463 - Residual Heat Removal Pump B; and
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Workman's Protection Assurance 24559 - Component Cooling Water Heat
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Exchanger B.
The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position-prescribed by the tags.
The inspector also performed a walkdown of Workman's Protection Assurance 24559 after the tagout was cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system lineup.
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2-02.2 Enoineered Safety Feature System 'Waikdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:
Emergency Diesel Generator Trains A and B,
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Essential Service Water Train B and
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Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A and B.
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With the exception of the finding discussed in Section M2.1, the inspectors found no concerns with equipment operability, material condition, or housekeeping.
02.3 Contr'ol Room Remodelino a.
lasoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the schedule and scope of work for remodeling of the control room. This included the impact on shift crews. The inspectors' review of the modification is discussed in Section E1,1, b.
Observations and Findings The inspectors observed that the elevated noise levels for core drills and other work had minimalimpact on shift crews, Operatort maintained a heightened state of awareness to plant parameters during periods of elevated noise levels. The dust from the core drills and the cutting of a panel on fire protection control Cabinet KC008 was appropriately controlled.
The work was performed when the on-line maintenance risk was low. The licensee entered appropriate Technical Specification Action Statements for equipment affected by the control room work. There were no other Technical Specification Action Statements in effect during this time. Work was appropriately stopped when the plant entered a Notification of Unusual Event due to a security threat (Section P1,1).
The inspectors did not identify any problems during the work.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Ooerator Caused Damage to Motor-Ocerated Valve Actuator a
insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation into damage to an essential service-water valve actuator.
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The inspectors reviewed:
Procedure ODP-ZZ-00016, 'Watchstation Equipment Logs and Practices,"
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t Revisiun 37; and Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 97-1302.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that an equipment operator damaged the actuator on essential service water to component cooling water Heat Exchanger B motor-operated Valve EFHV0052. This occurred while restoring the essential service water system Train B to service following planned maintenance.
When the operator attempted to manually open Valve EFHV0052, the actuator handwheel did not move. The operator then used a wrench to provide additional force and damaged the actuator.
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checked the valve position prior to operating the handwheel. The licensee determined that the actuator w6s damaged by the force from the wrench.
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The licensee repaired the actuator and completed the required MOVATS testing prior to restoring essenW1 service water Train B to service. The operator's error resulted in an unplanned extei. son of the essential service water Train 8 outage. The licensee still completed the outage within the time anowed by Technical Specifications.
The inspectors found that the operator did not violate any procedures. However, the use of the wrench on the motor-operated valve actuator was a poor work practice. The
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operator did not follow a recommendation in Procedure ODP-ZZ-00016 to obtain a maximum torque value prior to using the wrench on the actuator, j
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that an equipment operator used a poor work practice which resulted in damage to a motor-operated valve actotor.
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e-4-i 11. Maintenance M1
' Conduct'of Maintenance M1,1 General Comments - Maintenance a.
Insoection Scone (62707)
The. Inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:
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Work Authorization G579599-134 -inspect boric acid filter;
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Work Authorization P579029 - perform motor circuit evaluatien on residual heat
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removal Pump B motor; Work Authunzation P591063 - clean, mspect, and check belt tension on residual
heat removal Pump B room cocier; Work Authorization C580051 - install new bonnet and temperature control
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internals on Emergency Diesel Generator B lube oil cooler inlet / bypass temperature control Valve KJTCV0134;
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Work Authorization P530912 - clean and inspect motor control Center NG04D;
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Work Authorization W610058 - disassemble, troubleshoot, repair, and
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reassemble motor operator for essential service water Train B to component cooling water heat Exchanger B Valve EFHV0052;
. Work Authorization W192879 - repair nitrogen leak on main feedvuter isolation
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Valve B yellow train accumulator; and Work Authorizations P606288, A606288A, and A6062888 - record essential
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service water flow and differential pressure on the Emergency Diesel Generator A engine, k
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Observations and Findinas With the exception of the maintenance described in Section M2.1, the inspectors found no concerns with the maintenance observed. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when required.
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. M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance
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Insoection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
Test Procedure ISF-SB-00A29, "Fctnal-Anal; SSPS Train A Fctnal Test,"-
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Revision 18;-
- Test Procedure OSP-EM-P001 A, "Section XI Safety injection Train A Operability,"
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Revision 22; and Test Procedure OSP-AL-V001 A, " Train A Auxiliary FeedwaterValve Operability,"
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Revision 14.
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Observations and Findings Surveillanae testing observed during this inspection period was satisfactorily conducted
'in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical f,pecifications.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Temocrary Gauce Left Installed After Maintenance on Emeraency Diesel Generator A a;
Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors identified that a temporary differential pressure gauge remained installed after preventive maintenance was completed on Emergency Diesel Generator A. The
- gauge was installed to permit measurement of essential service water differential pressure and flow for the Emergency Diesel Generator A engine.
The inspectors reviewed:
Request for Resolution 7694A, " Ultimate Heat Sink Level Versus GPM Leakage
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Criteria";
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Surveillance Procedure OSP-EF-P001 A, " Essential Service Water Train A
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Operability," Revision 25;
- Work Authorizations P606288, A606288A, and A6062888 - Record essential
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service water flow and differential pressure on the Emergency Diesel Generator A engine; and Suggestion-Occurrence-So;; tion Report 97-1249.
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Observations and Findino:i The differential pressure gauge was installed by instrument and control technicians to allow performance of Work Authorization P606288. This was a preventive maintenance task to record flow and differential pressure across the essential service water supply and return lines to the Emergency Diesel Generator A engir.e. The pressure and flow data was collected during performance of Procedure OSP-EF-P001 A.
Work Authorization A606288A directed instrument and control technicians to remove the differential pressure gauge following completion of the task. Work Authorization P606288 was the controlling document, and contained a step to ensure that the gauge was removed and that the valves used to connect the gauge were closed and capped when the work was complete.
On October 29,1997, the inspectors identified that Work Authorization P606288 was signed off as complete with the differential pressure gauge stillinstalled and the two 3/4-inch valves used to connect the gauge still open. The two valves were the Emergency Diesel Generator A intercooler heat exchanger tube side drain Valve KJV0788A and the Emergency Diesel Generator A iube oil cooler tube side drain Valve KJV0801 A.
Specifically, Step 4.a of Work Authorization P606288 required that the differential pressure gauge be removed and that Valves KJV0788A and KJV0801 A be closed and capped per Work Authorization A606288A.
Contrary to this step, Work Authorization P606288 was signed off as complete without the differential pressure gauge valved out and removed per Work Authorization A606288A. This failure to follow the instructions on Work Authorization P606288 is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (50-483/9720-01).
The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 97-1249 to investigate and document the operability of the emergency diesel generator. The differential pressure gauge remained installed with Valves KJV0788A and KJV0801 A open for approximately 14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after Procedure OSP-EF-P001 A was completed.
The licensee performed a preliminary evaluation based on Request for Resolution 7694A. This evaluation determined the allowable essential service water leakage for a given levelin the ultimate heat sink pond. The evaluation concluded that a leak rate of approximately 100 gpm for 30 days could be tolerated without rendering affected equipment inoperable. The licensee's prelimirary evaluation determined that the potential leakage from Valves KJV0788A and KJV0801 A were bounded by the request for resolutio o
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ConclusiODS The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to follow work instructions during a preventive maintenance task on Emergency Diesel Generator A.
M2.2 Review of Material Condition During Plant Tours a.
IDspretion Scoce (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
b.
Observations and Findinos With the exception of the item discusced in Section M2.1, plant material condition was good. The inspectors observed a small number of oil and water leaks that were already identified by the licensee. These discrepancies were being appropriately tracked by the licensee's maintenance program. The inspectors identified no concems with storage of equipment.
The inspectors identified some minor discrepancies, such as bumed out position indicating lights for a few pieces of equipment. The licensee took proper action to correct the discrepancies.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Medium Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance Prograro a.
Insoection Stone (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preventive maintenance program for medium voltage (4.16 kV and 13.8 kV) circuit breakers, including breaker overhauls. The inspectors also interviewed the cognizant system engineer.
The inspectors reviewed:
Procedure MPE-ZZ-OS005, " Annual Cleaning, inspection, and Lubrication of
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4.16 kV Breakers," Revision 14; Procedure MSE-PA-OS002," Cleaning, inspection, and Lubrication of General
Electric 13.8 kV Breakers," Revision 11; and Procedure MPE-ZZ-OS004 " Cleaning, inspection, and Lubrication for 13.8 kV
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and 4.16 kV Switchgear and Disconnect Switches," Revision 8.
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Observations and Findings The licensee performs routine preventive maintenance on medium voltage circuit breakers on a 3-year frequency and on the associated switchgear on a 6-year frequency.
The circuit breaker maintenance included circuit breaker checks, relay calibrations, and trip sequence checks. The switchgear maintenance included potential transformer inspections, roset inspections, elevating mechanism inspections, and bus bar resistance checks.
The licensee has not yet performed a complete overhaul of a medium voltage circuit breaker. The licensee's intent was to perform overhauls when breakers reach 2000 to 2500 cycles of operation. None of the medium voltage circuit breakers onsite have reached 2000 to 2500 cycles of operation. The breakers with the most cycles were the component cooling water pump motor feeder breakers, with approximately 1300 cycles.
The system engineer stated that the breakers would be overhauled more frequently should the need arise. The determination to overhaul a breaker would consider additional factors besides the number of cycles, such as results of breaker timing tests and lubricant condition.
The system engineer stated th-t a plan was in place to overhaul two spare 4.16 kV breakers after the 1998 refueling outage. A procedure was being developed, incorporating industry experience and vendor recommendations, to accomplish the overhaul.
The following is a detailed summary of the preventive maintenance program for medium voltage circuit breakers.
Routine Breaker Preventive Maintenance (Procedures MPE-ZZ-QS005 and MSE-PA-OS002) - 3 years:
Timing Trending (Breaker Opening and Closing Time)
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General Inspections
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Routine Contact Checks (Electrical Contacts)
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Mechanism Latch Wipes (Fiearing Contact Surfaces)
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Micro-Switch Clearancos (Strike Arm to Switch)
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Megger Tests (Insulation Resistance)
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Ductor Tests (Low Resistance Between Contacts)
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Lubrication
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Pawl inspections (Charging Spring Motor)
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Control Circuit Checks
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Trip Sequence Checks - 3 years:
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Checks Control Circuit Function and Breaker Operation
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Relay Calibrations - 3 years:
. Protective Relay Calibrations in Breaker Trip Circuits
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Switchgear Maintenance (Procedure MPE-ZZ-OS004) - 6 years:
Potential Transformer inspections
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General inspection and Cleaning
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Elevating Mechanism Lube and Inspection
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Clean, inspect, and Lube Primary Rosets
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Megger Test (Bus Bar insulation Resistance)
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The licensee had a program to evaluate operational experience. The system engineer was chairman of the Magne-Blast users group. The engineer stated that the users group had completed an initiative that assembled allindustry experience on Magne-Blast breakerr, The informatioa would be made available for other utilities.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-483/97-002: missed containment isolation valve technical specification surveillance.
On March 17,1997, the licensee discovered that containment isolation valves in the containment hydrogen control system were not properly tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.3.1.
Technical Specification 4.6.3.1 requires that each containment isolation valve be demonstrated operable prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit. The demonstration of operability was to be accomplished by cycling the valve and verifying isolation time.
On March 17,1997, the licensee discovered that in 1992 and 1995,13 containment isolation valves in the containment hydrogen control system were declared operable after replacing relays in the control and power circuits without verifying the valves' isolation time.
The va! 1., were subsequently demonstrated operable, in accordance with Technical Specific,ation 4.6.3.3 and ASME Code requirements, a few months after the maintenance was performed.
The licensee determined that the cause of this event was personnel error. The mair'tenance department planner responsible for specifying postmaintenance tests on work authorization documents failed to specify the correct postmaintenance tes c
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The failure to demonstrate operability of the 13 containment isolation valves in the containment hydrogen control system without first cycling the valves and verifying isolation times was a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9720-02).
III. Engineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Modification Packaaes (37551)
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Insoection Scong The inspectors reviewed the following modifications:
Modification Package 96-2005 - replace unit vent flow Transmitter GTFT0021BA,
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Modification Package 93-1051 - modify emergency diesel generator tube oil and
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jacket water temperature control valves, and Modification Package 93-1009 - remodel the control room and shift supervisor
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furniture.
b.
Observations and Findinas Modification Package 96-2005 - reo' ace unit vent flow Transmitter GTFT0021BA The replacement of unit vent flow Transmitter GTFT0021BA under Modification 96-2005 resolved a significant long-standing operator workaround. The unit vent radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation has been inoperable for approximately 2 years because Transmitter GTFT0021BA was unreliable and inaccurate.
To satisfy the action statement for in sperable radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation in Final Safety Analysis Report Table 16.11-5, item id, operators had to contact health physics department personnel whenever starting or stopping a unit vent fan. This was to allow health physics department personnel to manually input flow rate data into wide range gas Monitor GTRT00218, via control room Minicomputer RM-11, for determining the amount of radioacti/e gaseous effluent releases. The flow rate data was predetermined by measuring and recording actual flow rates for the different unit vent fans and combination of fans.
The inspectors identified a minor concern with the licensee's process for controlling this modification. Operations department personnelinitially determined that no procedure changes would be required when the modification was implemented. The inspectors
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-11-later found that some procedures had been reviseo the day before unit vent flow:
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Transmitter GTFT0021BA was declared operable. The procedures were:
Procedure ODP-ZZ-00016,' Watch Statior Equipment Logs and Practices,"
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Revision 37; Procedure OTN-GG-00001, " Fuel Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air
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Conditioning System," Revision 9; and Procedure OTA-SP-RM011, " Radiation Monitor Control Panel RM-11,"
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Revision 14.
These procedures should havo been identified for revision during the initial stages of the modification process. This was considered a weakness.
Modification Packnae 93-1009 - remodel the control room and shift suoervisor fumiture The control room changes covered by the modification included:
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Replacing the control room supervisor's desk,
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Replacing the reactor operators' desks, a
Removing the front apron of the fire protection panel,
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Relocating communications equipment, and e
Recarpeting the control room floor.
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The licensee implemented the modification in the control room simulator prior to the actual control room work. This was to determine the impact on shift personnel. The licensee was able to determine which work processes produced the minimum impact on control room personnel. As an example, the number of core drills was reduced from nine
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The inspectors observed that the modification, ackage safety evaluation was thorough.
The modification was well planned in order to minimize impact on control room shift personnel.
The inspectors had no comments concerning Modification Package 93-1051. The inspectors found that for all the modifications, the procedures, drawings, and other design documents were properly updated prior to declaring the affected equipment operable.
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Conclusions The insr ectors concluded that, with one minor exception, the modifications were well planneo and executed.
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12-E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-483/9G09-02: configuration control for hydrogen recombiner not maintained, lii September 1996, the licensee modified a hydrogen recombiner temperature indicator without revising the associated operating procedure. The inspectors verified that the licensee properly revised the associated operating procedure.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed several modifications to ensure that procedures, drawings, and other design documents were properly updated. These modifications included:
Modification Package 96-2005 - replace unit vent flow Transmitter GTFT0021BA
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(Section E1.1),
Modification Package 93-1051 - modify emergency diesel generator lube oil and
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jacket water temperature control valves (Section E1.1),
Modification Package 93-1009 - remodel the control room and shift supervisor
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furniture (Section E1.1),
Modification 95-1021 -install blown fuse indication in Emergency Diesel
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Generator A (NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-15),
Modification Package 96-1008A - add local controllers to Steam Generator 8
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and C atmospheric relief valves (NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-12), and Modification Package 96-1014 -install an isolation valve in Train B essential
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service water to auxiliary feedwater pump suction line (NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-12).
The inspectors identified no further concerns and consider this violation closed LV. Plant Supppn R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors ot; served health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologica!!y controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
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-13-Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no probicms.
R2.1 Bo.ric Acid Filter in192G1LQ0 a.
insoection Scone f71750)
The inspectors observed licensee personnel inspect chemical and volume control system boric acid Fitter FBG07.
The inspectors reviewed:
Operations Procedure OTN-BG-00005, " Chemical and Volume Control System
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Filters," Revision 0, and Radiological Controls Procedure RTN-HC-00500, " Filter Handling Operation,"
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Revision 17.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors attended the prejob brief and observed radiological work practices. The prejob brief was satisfactory. The chemiciry/radwaste department supervisor and the operations field supervisor led the brief and properly discussed the procedures and contingencies. Roles and responsibilities were appropriately discussed. The evolution was successfully performed. The inspectors verified that personnel adhered to the requirements of the radiological work permit and exhibited safe work practices.
Radiological postings and surveys were appropriate.
P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities P1.1 Moldication of. Unusual Event Due to Security Threat a.
luspertion Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a security threat.
b.
Observations and Findinas At 11:10 a.m. on November 20,1997, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event to determine the credibility of a security threat. Plant security personnel, along with local and federal law enforcement officials. investigated the threat. The licensee implemented appropriate interim contingency measure.
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The licensee later determined that the security threat was not credible. At 5:40 p.m. on November 20,1997, the licensee exited the Notification of Unusual Event.
The NRC Information Assessment Team evaluated the threat and ensured that proper notifications were made. The inspectors identified no concems with the licensee's implementation of contingency actions.
V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on December 5,1997. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. Proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was retumed to the licensee.
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e ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant D, L. Bettenhausen, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance
- J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Health Physics K. W. Kuechenmeister, Superintendent, Design Engineering R. T. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations J. V. Laux, Manager Quality Assurance C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. W. Neterer, Assistant Superintendent, Operations M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Radwaste
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T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Systems W. A. Witt, Superintendent, Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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i 37551 Onsite Engineering
61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities
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92902 Followup - Maintenance 92903 Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Onened 9720-01 VIO Failure to Remove Temporary Differential Pressure Gauge (Section M2.1)
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9720-02 NCV:
Missed Containment Isolation Valve Technical Specification Surveillance (Section M8.1)=
Closed 97002:
LER Missed Containment isolation Valve Technical Specification ~
Surveillance (Section M8.1)
9720-02 NCV Missed Containment isolation Valve Technical Specification Surveillance (Section M8.1)
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96009-02 VIO Configuration Control for Hydrogen Recombiner not
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Maintained (Section E8.1)
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