IR 05000483/1998014
| ML20236Q650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q631 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-98-14, NUDOCS 9807200386 | |
| Download: ML20236Q650 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE l
l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l REGION IV l
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! Docket No.: 50-483 License No.: NPF-30 Report No.: 50-483/98-14 Licensee: Union Electric Company Facility: Callaway Plant Location: Junction Hwy. CC and Hwy. o Fulton, Missouri Dates: June 29 through July 2,1998 Inspector (s): Gail M. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst John D. Hanna, Reactor Engineer Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Attachment: SupplementalInformation
Y 9807200386 980717 3 r DR ADOCK 0500
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC !nspection Report 50-483/98-14 A routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the licensee's emergency preparedness program was conducted. The inspection included the following areas:
emergency facilities and equipment, organization and management control, training (excluding drills), and followup on open items. Emphasis was placed on changes that had occurred since the last routine emergency preparedness inspectio Plant Sucoort
. Overall, implementation of the emergency preparedness program was generally goo Emergency response facilities were operationally maintained, and appropriate equipment and supplies were readily available at the primary facilities. The emergency preparedness training program was properly implemented. Emergency preparedness department staffing and supentision had stabilized. A full-time superintendent was named, and staffing levels and assignments were well defined. There was enough depth in the emergency response organization to ensure continuous staffing (Sections P2, P5, and P6).
. Documentation was incomplete or unclear for two unusual events. For one event, the event review team's report did not clearly identify the event declaration time or question the absence of the event declaration time on the offsite agency notification for Notification forms and logs for the second event contained discrepancies involving offsite agency notification times, but the post-event report did not address the reason for the discrepancies. The emergency preparedness department did not participate in the formal event review process; therefore, the events were not properly used to assess and improve emergency plan implementation. The corrective action program procedure was revised to include emergency preparedness department participation in future assessments for events that involve emergency plan implementation (Section P1).
. The need to perform additional NRC review of backup emergency operations facility capabilities was identified because a radio base station to communicate with offsite field monitoring teams was not available at the backup facility. The absence of a radio base station was identified by the licensee in March 1998 but was not corrected until the issue surfaced during this inspection (Section P2).
. Crew performance curing the walkthroughs was generally good. The first crew promptly recognized and classified all emergency events. The failure of the primary notification system and the transition to the backup system caused some minor delays in offsite l agency notifications during the first walkthrough. The second crew did not classify one of three events in a timely manner because an emergency operating procedure conflicted with an emergency implementing procedure. The procedure for emergency operating procedure usage stated that emergency action level determination commences after
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l exiting the reactor trip procedure. The classification procedure required classification when abnormal readings indicate an emergency situation has occurred. The first crew did not have the same problem because it entered the reactor trip procedure later in the scenario. The delayed classification was identified as a performance weakness. Both crews effectively performed communications, protective action recommendations, and dose assessments (Section P4).
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Although a recent callout drill was successful, due 10 historical problems and inconsistent performance in this area, a longstanding open item irivciving acceptable augmentation response times remained open pending acceptable performance during an October 1998 offhours callout drill (Section P8.1).
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-4-B_q.pprt DeLa_ih IV. Plant Support P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities a. Insoection Scoce (93702)
The inspectors reviewed event notifications made since May 11,1997, to determine if events were properly classified. Classified events were reviewed to determine if the emergency plan was properly implemented. The following declared emergency events were reviewed:
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July 17,1997, Unplanned Loss of Most or All Alarms (Annunciators) for Greater Than 15 Minutes - Unusual Event (Event Report 32653)
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November 20,1997, Security Threat - Unusual Event (Event Repart 33290)
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed both events and determined that the emergency classifications were proper. However, supporting documentation and licensee review of the emergency plan implementation aspects of the events were incomplete. For example, the inspectors could not determine if offsite agency notifications for the annunciator event were timely because the event declaration time was not included in the documenta6on. Also, the security event documentation contained different times for offsite agency .'. notifications (15 minutes apart).
The aforementioned discrepancies were not captured by the licensee's self assessments. Moreover, the emergency preparedness staff did not participate in the event review to determine if the emergency plan was properly implemented. The licensee informed the inspectors that emergency preparedness participation on formal event review teams was not required at the time the events occurred but that the corrective action program had since been modified to include emergency preparedness representation on review teams for events involving emergency plan implementatio The incomplete documentation and lack of emergency preparedness participation reduced the value of the self assessments.
l c. Conclusions Documentation was incomplete or unclear for two unusual events. For one event, the event review team's report did not clearly identify the event declaration time or question j the absence of the event declaration time on the offsite agency notification form.
I Notification forms and logs for the second event contained discrepancies involving offsite agency notification times, but the post-event report did not address the reason for the discrepancies. The emergency preparedness department did not participate in the j l
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-5-formal event review process; therefore, the events were not prsperly used to assess and improve ernergency plan implementation. The corrective action program procedure was revised to include emergency preparedness department participation in future assessments for events that involve emergency plan implementatio P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources a. Insoection Scoce (82701-02.02)
The inspectors reviewed the status of emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies to ensure that they were maintained in a state of operational readiness. The inspectors toured the following facilities:
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Control room
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Technical support center / Operational support area
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Emergency operations facility b. Observations and Findinas Emergency response facilities continued to be dedicated facilit:es. All facilities were tidy and appeared capable of rapid activation. Emergency kits and position reference files were sealed to prevent tampering. Sampled position reference files contained current emergency implementing procedure revisions. Radiation survey instruments were within calibration dates, and potassium iodide tablets and silver zeolite cartridges had not exceeded shelf-life expiration dates. Inspectors verified that the technical support center and emergency operations facility ventilation systems were periodically teste Emergency response facilities, instrumentation, and supplies were properly maintaine While touring the control room, the inspectors verified that special respirator glasses were available for operators who wore prescription glasses. Through discussions with control room personnel and a review of the latest, completed respiratory equipment emergency kit inventory check list, the inspectors determined that small, medium, and large-sized full-face respirators were available in the control room. Appropriate respiratory protection equipment was available in the control roo In reviewing the emergency response facilities, the inspectors questioned the emergency preparedness staff about the readiness of the backup emergency operations facility and whether the facility contained a radio base station to communicate with the offsite field monitoring teams (a capability and function of the primary emergency operations facility).
Requirements for providing and maintaining adequate emergency response facilities and equipment are located in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and Appendix E.IV.E. The backup emergency operations facility was established at the Ike Skelton Training Site in southeast Jefferson City, Missouri (25 miles from the plant).
The licensee stated that the backup facility did not have a radio base staton to communicate with the field monitoring teams and that a suggestion occurrence solution I
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-6-l (98-0481) was identified on March 24,1998, to track resolution of the equipment
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variance. The condition still existed as of June 29,1998. However, on June 30,1998, the licensee installed a radio base station at the backup facility and took actions to
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acquire two cellular telephones for the field team kits. Further review of the backup emergency operations facility capabilities will be conducted during a future NRC inspection to determine if: (1) past drills were adequate to identify this lack of capability; (2) other equipment, procedures, and supplies were missing; (3) provisions were made for maintenance of the backup facility; and (4) corrective actions were timely (50-483/98014-01). Conclusions Emergency response facilities were operationally maintained, and appropriate equipment and supplies were readily available at the primary facilities. The need to perform additional NRC review of backup emergency operations facility capabilities was identified because a radio base station to communicate with offsite field monitoring teams was not available at the backup facility. The absence of a radio base station was identified by the licensee in March 1998 but was not corrected until the issue surfaced during this inspectio P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness Insoection Scooe (82701-02.01)
The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with two typical control room crews (one actual and one composite) using a dynamic simulation on the plant-specific control room simulator. Durin0 the walkthroughs, the licensee was evaluated on the ability to:
- Evaluate plant conditions,
- Identify respective emergency action levels,
- Classify the emergency using the latest procedures,
- Recommend appropriate protective actions,
- Perform and evaluate dose calculations, and
- Make timely notifications to offsite agencie The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a general emergency. Initial conditions included containment hydrogen purge Valve GS HV-20 in the open position due to a failed surveillance. The initiating event was an alert based on reactor coolant leakage (reactor l
coolant pump seal return leak) or containment radiation level increases (due to increased reactor coolant activity). The increase in reactor coolant activity was caused by two loose parts monitor alarms that occurred before the leak. The reactor coolant system leak increased to about 300 gpm and radiation levels in containment increased to greater than 2800 R/hr, prompting the declaration of a site emergency (term used by the j licensee, as opposed to site area emergency) based on the loss of the reactor coolant system and fuel clad barriers. An electrical planner who was dispatched to look at the i
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-7-operator for the outer valve caused a breach in containment that resulted in a general l emergency declaration. Each walkthrough lasted approximately 120 minute b. Observations and Findinas Crew 1 Communications during the first simulator walkthrough were good. Briefings were frequent and contained sufficient detail to understand plant status and prioritie Three-part communications were effectively used, and appropriate alarms and announcements were used to notify plant personnel of changing plant conditions and the need to report to designated assembly area The first crew promptly recognized and classified the three emergency condition Communicators were familiar with operation of the computerized offsite agency notification system (SENTRY); however, the system failed while making the notifications for the first event and forced the two communicators to use the backup method (telephone).
Although the communicators displayed proficiency using the backup method, there were some opportunities for improvement and further review. For example: J
. Recognition that the system failed and transition to the backup method chat!snged the 15-minute requirement for offsite agency notifications. The alert and general emergency notifications were initiated at about 13 and 16 minutes, respectively. The system was thought to have been repaired prior to the general emergency; however, when it failed a second time, the communicators were slow
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to return to the backup method. Notifications for the site emergency were initiated within about 3 minute . Since both communicators were involved in statellocal notifications, the normal division of responsibilities was altered and appeared to cause some confusio Both made notifications to the simulated NRC for the same even . One of the local agency representatives was unsure if the latest notification form was available, and another questioned the licensee's telephone protocol. The licensee planned to followup on this matter with the offsite agencie The scenario required the crews to make default general emergency protective action recommendations (evacuate a 2-mile radius and 5 miles downwind) and then to upgrade the recommendations (evacuate a 5-mile radius and 10 miles downwind). The first crew made correct and timely protective action recommendations on both occasions. The health physics technician was knowledgeable in the use of the MAGNEM dose assessment system and performed numerous dose calculations to verify protective action recommendation _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _
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-8-Crew 2 Communications during the second simulator walkthrough were also good, with some room for improvement in three-part communications. Final acknowledgments (third part)
were not always made, particularly during busy / critical times during the scenari Briefings were frequent and contained sufficient detail to understand the plant status and priorities. Appropriate alarms and announcements were used to nctify plant personnel of changing plant conditions and the need to report to designated assembly area The second crew failed to promptly recognize and classify the first scensrio event (alert).
At 10:07 a.m., the shift supervisor was informed that the containment high area radiation monitors (CHARMS) read 128R/hr. This reading significantly exceeded the alert emergency action level (CHARMS reading greater than 6.4 R/hr). The CHARMS exceeded the 6.4 R/hr value at about 9:50 a.m. The shift supervisor did not declare the alert until 10:28 a.m. (21 or 38 minutes later, depending on the start time used). During i this period of time, the shift supervisor was not involved in directing mitigation efforts or reviewing the emergency action levels. In contrast, the site and general emergencies j were declared within minutes of the corresponding initiating condition When the inspectors expressed concerns about the timeliness of the alert declaration, the licensee explained that the operators were following operations procedure Specifically, Step 4.10.1.2 of ODP-ZZ-00025, " Emergency Operating Proceeare Usage,"
Revision 1, stated that determination of emergency action level applicability is -
commenced when E-0 (reactor trip) has been exited. E-0 was entered at 10 a.m. and exited at 10:21 a.m. The alert was declared 7 minutes late The inspectors acknowledged that the operators followed ODP-ZZ-00025 but concluded that, in this case, implementation conflicted with the following radiological emergency response plan and emergency classification procedure requirements. Chapter 4 of the ;
emergency plan required assessment and event classification as soon as possible; '
emergency implementing procedure EIP-ZZ-00101, " Classification of Emergencies,"
Revision 21, required classification when alarms and abnormal instrument readings indicate an emergency situation has occurred. The failure to classify the alert in a timely manner was identified as a performance weakness (50-483/98014-02).
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Offsite agency notifications for all three events were made within regulatory time limit The two communicators were familiar with the operation of the SENTRY system (the l central processing unit was replaced after the first walkthrough). Notifications were i completed much sooner than the first walkthrough because the SENTRY system operated properly.
- Emergency response organization members were called out (simulated) within about l 10-13 minutes after the alert declaration (8-13 minutes fcr the first walkthrough).
Although these times were considered reasonable, the inspectors cautioned the licensee about the need to complete this task promptly, since the NRC uses declaration time as
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-9-the clock start time for personnel augmentation purposes. The ability to meet emergency plan augmentation goals has been a recurring problem (see Section P8.1 below).
Protective action recommendations were correctly and promptly made for the general emergency (default) and when plant conditions indicated a need to upgrade the recommendations. Similar to the first walkthrough, the health physics technician easily and quickly computed numerous dose calculations (via MAGNEM) to confirm protective action recommendation Conclusions Crew performance during the walkthroughs was generally good. The first crew promptly recognized and classified all emergency events. The failure of the primary notification system and the transition to the backup system caused some minor delays in offsite agency notifications during the first walkthrough. The second crew did not classify one of three events in a timely manner because an emergency operating procedure conflicted with an emergency implementing procedure. The procedure for emergercy operating procedure usage stated that emergency action level determination commences after exiting the reactor trip procedure. The classification procedure required classification when abnormal readings indicate an emergency situation has occurred. The first crew did not have the same problem because it entered the reactor trip procedure later in the scenario. The delayed classification was identified as a performance weakness. Both crews effectively performed communications, protective action recommendations, and dose assessment P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness a. Insoection Scoce (82701-02.04)
l The inspector reviewed the training program and training records for selected individual i b. Observations and Findinas Training program implementation was consistent with training department procedure !
Although the procedure (TPD-ZZ-00066) was revised to allow the use of drills for training requalification under certain restrictions (see Section P8.5 below), the superintendent, emergency preparedness decided to discontinue this practice for the time bein Inspectors determined that this was a prudent decision and that the intent was to j maintain an effective emergency preparedness training progra i Training records indicated that all emergency response organization members had completed the necessary training requirements for the individual's assigned positio Severalindividuals were within the 3-month grace period but had been notified of the need for training. Training records properly itemized initial training, requalification training, and drill participation date ,
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c. Conclusions The emergency preparedness training program was properly implemented. The prac' ice of using drills for training requalification was discontinued but was still allowed by procedare P6 Emergency Preparedness Organization and Administration a. Insoection Scooe (82701-02.03)
The inspector reviewed emergency preparedness program staffing and managen1ent, emergency response organization staffing and control, and offsite support organization agreement b. Observations and Findings Discussions with the emergency preparedness superintendent and staff indicated thei !
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program supervision and staffing had stabilized. The new superintendent was g;Lnted on May 15,1998. Prior to that date, for about a year and a half, the supervisory position was filleJ by a staff member who functioned in an acting capacity. The impact caused by the past fluctuations in leadership and staffing was difficult to determine during this inspection. Certainly, recent emergency preparedness inspection results (50-483/97-13, 98-06, and 98-10) reflected some deterioration in program implementation. With the appointment of the new superintendent, the individual who functioned as the acting supervisor was able to return to assigned duties. The new superintendent appeared enthusiastic about the newly acquired responsibilities and challenges, and appeared committed to moving the program in a forward directio j l
At the time of this inspection, the staff consisted of six staff members (one clerical and five technical specialists). The technical specialists appropriately included individuals with operations, health physics, security, and emergency preparedness expertise.
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Responsibilities were now clearly defined and appeared evenly distributed. As of July 1,
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1998, the responsibility for implementing the emergency preparedness training program was transferred back to the training department. The individual who had performed the training in the emergency preparedness department (not counted as one of the six staff members mentioned above) also transferred back to training. Discussions with those involved, training and emergency preparedness, indicated that the transfer was a positive move that would expand the resources available for training. One new position j in the emergency preparedness department was recently approved, raising the staffing level to seven. The goal was to fill the position by September 1,1998. Emergency l preparedness staffing appeared sufficient to implement the program.
l l The emergency response organization was staffed with a sufficient number of individuals, and sufficient controls existed to ensure continuous staffing. Three teams of designated rapid responders, two for each position, were identified. A rapid responder staffing schedule was issued weekly to document duty rotations. Controls for personnel l (
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-11-l who traded duty weeks appeared sufficient. An informal (not documented) but effective system for adding and removing personnel from the response organization existe Inspectors verified that offsite agency agreements specified in Appendix C to the radiological emergency response plan were reviewed in accordance with the emergency plan. The last review was conducted in December 1997. This review was added to the site-wide sun /eillance system in 1997 to enhance the control and scheduling of this activit Conclusions Emergency preparedness department staffing and supervision had stabilized. A full-time superintendent was named, and staffing levels and assignments were well define There was enough depth in the emergency response organization to ensure continuous staffing. Offsite agency agreements were properly reviewed and maintaine P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues P8.1 (Ooen) IFl 50-483/95003-03: acceptable augmentation response times. The need to followup on actions to resolve problems with augmentation response times was identified during an NRC inspection in January 1995. The issue involved concems about the licensee's ability to achieve acceptable staff augmentation response times (consistent with emergency plan goals) and the need to establish acceptance criteria for augmentation drills. Since that time, the licensee: (1) purchased a computerized callout system, (2) prioritized callouts to contact close-in personnel first, (3) provided pagers to rapid responder positions (key emergency response facility personnel) and established a duty rotation, (4) unsuccessfully attempted to extend the response times in the emergency plan (see Section P8.3 below), (5) reorganized the emergency response organization, and (6) conducted numerous drill The licensee's actions to resolve this issue have had mixed results. At least six suggestion occurence solution items have been opened, closed, and reopened since the issue was identified. The tracking items alternated between hardww software, telephone directory, and response time problems. However, on June 23,1998, the licensee conducted an unannounced, offhours callout drill with an acceptable respons All rapid responders and all but four non-pager callout personnel responded within the emergency plan goals. The four who did not were within 5 minutes of the response time goals.
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Nevertheless, the licensee still faced some challenges to achieve consistency.
l Specifically, the licensee still has not established acceptance criteria for augmentation drills and measured the time from callout system activation, rather than event declaration l time. Moreover, due to year 2000 compatibility problems, the callout system will have to
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be replaced. The licensee scheduled an unannounced, offhours callout drill during October 1998. Due to the historical problems, and the mixed successes during drills, this issue will remain open pending an acceptable performance during the October 1998 dril I i
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-12-P (Closed) IFl 50-483/97013-01. failure to make timely offsite agency notification Programmatic complications that affected the ability to make timely offsite agency notifications were identified during the 1997 biennial exercise. The complications involved declaration time determination, communicator response times, and SENTRY system familiarity. Corrective actions, as described in the licensee's October 1,1997, response to the exercise weakness, included: (1) conducting operations training (to clarify declaration and notification time requirements), (2) conducting shift supervisor training on SENTRY system use, and (3) developing a SENTRY system operator ai The ability to make timely offsite agency notifications was evaluated during the simulator walkthroughs (see Section P4 above) with satisfactory results. Event declaration times were properly determined and communicators were familiar with SENTRY system us P (Closed) VIO 50-483/98006-01 personnel response goals extended in emergency pla A violation was identified during a March 1998 inspection for extending personnel response time goals in the emergency plan, without prior NRC approval. The licensee l implemented corrective actions on March 30,1998, by issuing Revision 21, Change I Notice 98-004, to the Callaway Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Inspectors verified that the response goals were restored, including operational support area position P (Closed) VIO 50-483/98006-02 : field monitoring team training requirements deleted from the emergency plan. A violation was identified during a March 1998 inspection for deleting an annual drill requirement to collect and analyze offsite sample media (solid, liquid, gas) from the emergency plan, without prior NRC approval. During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the requirement was reinstated in Revision 21, Change Notice :
98-004 to the Callaway Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated March 30,199 I P (Closed) IFl 50-483/98010-01 : review of personnel training qualifications and implementation of training program enhancements. During an NRC inspection in April i 1998, the inspector identified concerns regarding the licensee's emergency l preparedness training program (using drills instead of classroom training for emergency response organization requalification). On June 17,1998, the licensee confirmed commitments made during the April 30,1998, exit meeting. The commitments included establishing specific requirements for granting requalification credit for drill and exercise evaluators / controllers, only if the individual observed / assessed the same emergency response organization position (or a functionally equivalent position) as the one held by l the individual. The licensee also committed to make several enhancements to the training program, including modifications to clearly identify how drills and exercises are used to meet training requirements (development and review of objectives, evaluation criteria, and training materials).
The inspectors verified that the commitments had been satisfied via a revision to training department procedure TPD-ZZ-00066, " Radiological Emergency Response Plan Training Program." The procedure was revised to require emergency preparedness review and concurrence on objective approval forms which specify the conditions, l
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-13-objectives, and training completion criteria. The inspectors reviewed selected training records for personnel who had functioned as a drill evaluator / controller and verified that the individuals observed the same/similar position V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 2,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support S. Crawford, Supervisor, Radiation / Chemistry, Emergency Preparedness A. Daume, Shift Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness M. Evans, Superintendent, Emergency Preparedness R. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations l J. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance l D. Lewis, Supervisor, Radiation / Chemistry, Emergency Preparedness G. Nevels, Supervisor, Radiation / Chemistry, Training J. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness M. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance / Regulatory Support P. Sudnak, Supervisor, Radiation / Chemistry, Emergency Preparedness i A. White, Senior Supervisor, Training NBC D. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector I
LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program 92904 Followup - Plant Support 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Reactors LIST OF ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened
, 50-483/98014-01 IFl Backup emergency operations facility capabilities (Section P2)
50-483/98014-02 IFl Failure to classify an alert in a timely manner (Section P4)
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Closed 50-483/97013-01 IFl Failure to make timely offsite ager.cy notifications (Section P8.2)
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-2-l l 50-483/98006-01 VIO Personnel response goals extended in emergency plan (Section
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P8.3)
50-483/98006-02 VIO Field monitoring team training requirements deleted from the emergency plan (Section P8.4)
l 50-483/98010-01 IFl Review of personnel training qualifications and implementation of '
training program enhancements (Section P8.5)
Discussed
! 50-483/95003-03 IFl Acceptable augmentation response times (Section P8.1)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Emeraency lmolementina Procedures EIP-ZZ-A0020 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Revision 14 EIP-ZZ-00101 Classification of Emergencies Revision 21 ElP-ZZ-00102 Emergency implementing Actions Revision 19 ElP-ZZ-00200 Callout/ Augmentation of the Emergency
, Organization Revision 6 ElP-ZZ-00201 Notifications Revision 28 EIP-ZZ-00212 Protective Action Recommendations Revision 16 Other Procedures
! ODP-ZZ-0CO25 Emergency Operating Procedure Usage Revision 1 TPD-ZZ-00066 RERP Training Program Revision 12 i
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HTP-ZZ-05007 Maintenance and inventory of HPOPS
- Emergency Equipment Kits Revision 5 APA-ZZ-00500 Corrective Action Program Revision 28 l APA-ZZ-00542 Event Review Program Revision 4 APA-ZZ-00100 Procedure Adherence Revision 11 l
Other Documents Callaway Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 21 Callaway Plant Simulator Scenario for NRC Inspection, dated May 28,1998 Revised Plant Simulator Scenario for NRC Inspection, undated Critique and Comments 82701 Audit, dated July 1,1998 l
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-3-Reply to Exercise Weaknesses, inspection Report No. 50-483/97013, dated October 2,1997 Reply to Notice of Violation, inspection Report No. 50-483/98006, dated May 22,1998 Reply to Inspection Report No. 50-483/98010, dated June 17,1998 Suggestion Occurrence Solutions 96-1920,97-0852,97-1343,97-1486,98-0150,98-0481,98-2676,98-2708,98-2775,98-2853,98-2889 Surveillance Report No. SP98-066, dated May 27,1998 Surveillance Report No. SP96-099, dated December 6,1996 Proposed Insert A for Surveillance ST-12064 Selected Training Records Emergency Duty Officer / Recovery Manager Contingency Staffing ERO Schedule, issued June 29,1998 RERP Integrated Team Training Drill package (December 8,1997)
RERP Integrated Team Training Drill package (January 1,1998)
RERP Integrated Team Training Drill package (February 9,1998)
RERP Integrated Team Training Drill Lesson Plan (T68.2000.8)
Emergency Response Organizational Qualification Matrix RERP Training lesson plan / lab approval forms T68.1090.6 Dose Assessment Course T68.1090.6 Dose Assessment Lab T68.104A.6/.8 Operations Support Personnel Course T68.1050.6 HP Operations Course T68.1010.6 Recovery Manager Course T68.1070.6 Dose Assessment Staff Course T68.1070.6 Dose Assessment Staff Lab T68.1110.6 Off-Site Liaison Coordinator & Communicator Course Notification Checklists for July 1997 Annunciator & November 1997 Security Events Licensee Event Report 92-011-00, Loss of Main Control Board Annunciators Caused by Blown Power Supply Fuses
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-4-Shift Supervisor Daily Logs for July 1997 Annunciator & November 1997 Security Events Root Cause Analysis for SOS 97-0852, Annunciator Event .
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