IR 05000483/1999003

Insp Rept 50-483/99-03 on 990321-0501.Noncited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20207A420
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/19/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207A417	List: IR 05000483/1999003 ML20207A413
References
50-483-99-03, 50-483-99-3, NUDOCS 9905260316
Download: ML20207A420 (17)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-483 License No.: NPF-30 Report No.: 50-483/99-03 Licensee: Union Electric Company Facility: Callaway Plant Location: Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri Dates: March 21 through May 1,1999 Inspectors: D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector J. D. Hanna, Resident inspector Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B

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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information 9905260316 990519 PDR c

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! EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant l NRC Inspection Report No. 50-483/99-03 Operations

! . . The failure to pull the correct fuses for the Emergency Diesel Generator B control panel, during a planned maintenance outage, was a violation of Technical Specification 6. There were no personnel injuries because of redundant tagging. This Severity LevelIV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Suggestion-Occurrence Solution Report 99-0593 (Section O4.1).

. Operator training on the effects of the axial offset anomaly on continued plant operation was thorough. The instructors displayed comprehensive technical knowledge. There was very good participation by the trainees, particularly on suggested procedure improvements. The instructors captured the suggestions for further evaluation. Plant management ensured that all licensed operators had this training prior to standing watch with the revised procedures in effect (Section 05.1).

• The number of new suggestion-occurrence-solution reports initiated in 1999 regarding workman's protective assurance activities suggests that the licensee-identified adverse trend in 1998 has not improved. Furthermore, quality assurance personnel did not review progress in resolving the 1998 adverse trend during an audit of the operations department performed early 1999. The licensee recently began taking action to review effectiveness of past corrective actions (Section 07.1).

Maintenance

• - With the exception of the essential service water system, external equipment material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant was generally very good. Several pin hole leaks occurred in essential service water system piping during this report perio The operability determinations were acceptable. The leaks were repaired promptly, in accordance with code requirements, and with the proper emphasis on optimizing safe plant conditions (Section M2.1). i

Enaineerina

• The Onsite Review Committee's discussion of the formal safety evaluation allowing continued operation with the axial offset anomaly was thorough, well-prepared, and adequately documented. The engineering department was effectively and actively I

involved throughout the safety evaluation approval process (Section E2.1).

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2-Plant Support '

i a Plant workers exhibited ge >d radiation worker practices. Survey maps and postings I

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were current and showe:i accurate information. Personnel demonstrated good "as low as reasonably achieve 51e" practices during spent fuel pool rerack activities (Section R1.1).

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Report Details

l f;ummary of Plant Status The plant began the report period on March 20,1999, at 100 percent power. On April 21,1999, operators reduced reactor power to 95 percent to repair a tube leak on low pressure feedwater Heater 3A. By April 23,1999, licensee personnel completed repa ts cod restored the reactor to 100 percent powe l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations j O1.1 General Comments (71707) l The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating l problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and l plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room i coordination were properly controlle Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707) j The inspectors walked down workman's protection assurance Tagouts 30144 and 30114 on the emergency diesel generator and essential service water Train B. The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position l

prescribed by the tags. The inspector also performed a walkdown after the tagouts were cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system j lineup.

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O2.2 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety I

features and vital systems:

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l . Auxiliary Feedwater

. Essential Service Water

. Component Cooling Water )

. Emergency Diesel Generators

Equipment operability, external equipment material condition, and housekeeping were very good; however, material condition of the essential service water system was diminished due to several small through-wall leaks (see Section M2.1).

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l-2-l l 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Workman's Protection Assurance Tacaina Error Insoection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions when an equipment operator inadvertently pulled the wrong fuses while hanging tags for an outage on Emergency Diesel Generator The inspectors reviewed:

. Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00310," Workman's Protection Assurance and Caution Tagging," Revision 13;

. Operations Department Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310, " Workman's Protection Assurance Tagging," Revision 7;

- Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0593; and

. Workman's Protection Assurance Package 3015 Observations and Findinas On March 30,1999, an equipment opera or inadvertently pulled the wrong fuses while _

hanging tags for an outage on Emergency Diesel Generator B. The licensee identified this problem when the workman's protection assurance tagout was being restored. The wrong fuses pulled were:

. NEFUNE106FU1

- NEFUNE106FU2

- NEFUNE106FU3

. NEFUNE106FU4

. NEFUNE106FU5

. NEFUNE106FU6

.- NEFUNE106FU7

. NEFUNE106FU8 The correct fuses to be pulled were located within fuse blocks. Each fuse block held two fuses. The correct fuse blocks to be pulled were:

. KJFUKJ122FU1FU2

. KJFUKJ122FU3FU4

. KJFUKJ122FU5FU6

. KJFUKJ122FU7FU8

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-3-l The tagout control sheet for workman's protection assurance Package 30154 instructed i that tags 11,12,13, and 14 be hung on the four Cabinet KJ122 fuse blocks described !

above. However, the operators hung tags on the eight Cabinet NE106 fuses instea The fuse blocks provided protection for equipment located in the Emergency Diesel Generator B control pane From a personnel safety perspective, there was no consequence of pulling the incorrect fuse blocks. Another tag in the same workman's protection assurance package was redundant to the pulling of the Cabinet KJFUKJ122 fuse blocks. The licensee initiated l Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0593 to document the subsequent  !

investigatio l The licensee preliminarily determined the root cause to be inadequate self-checkin !

Two equipment operators and one field supervisor, using dual verification techniques, l selected Cabinet NE106, instead of the Cabinet KJ122 where the fuse blocks were j located. The licensee initiated a forrnal investigation which will be documented on l Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0593. The operations superintendent stated I that the outcome of the formalinvestigation may change the preliminary causes or j contributors for this even The licensee also identified that there was incomplete labeling inside the cabinet. In both Cabinets NE106 and KJ122, the fuses were labeled the same, namely, FU1FU2, FU3FU4, etc. Once insido the cabinet, there were no other cues available to indicate I the wrong fuses were being selecte The licensee identified one possible corrective action. This involved installing a sign or listing which would contain the full fuse identification numbers of all the fuses inside I each cabine l The inspectors agreed with the licensee's preliminary investigation and possible corrective action. The inspectors determined that the operators demonstrated poor performance by hanging tags on the incorrect component ' Callaway Plant Technical Specification 6.8.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 197 Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A,1.c, requires, in part, that administrative procedures be written for equipment control taggin Administrative Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310, " Workman's Protection Assurance Tagging,"

Revision 7, step 4.1.16.2.2, required that each individual verifies, using self-verification techniques, that they are on the correct component prior to operating the componen l The inspectors determined that the failure to pull the correct emergency diesel :

generator control panel fuse blocks was a Severity Level IV violation. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0593 (50-483/99003-01).

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I 4 Conclusions The failure to pull the correct fuses for the Emergency Diesel Generator B control panel, during a planned maintenance outage, was a violation of Technical Specification 6. l There were no personnel injuries because of redundant tagging. This Severity Level IV

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violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC 4 l Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as l

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Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-059 Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Axial Offset Anomalv Trainina Insoection Scope (71707)

On April 19,1999, the inspectors attended operator training on the axial offset anomaly and its impact on plant operation for the duration of the current fuel cycl Observations and Findinas The training included discussions of:

• History of the axial offset anomaly at Callaway a Axial offset anomaly mechanism

. Shutdown margin calculations

= impact on safety evaluations

. Impact on Technical Specifications

• Procedure changes in addition, the inspectors observed simulator scenarios which demonstrated emergency operating procedure changes made as a result of the axial offset anomal The inspectors determined that the quality of the training was very good. The instructors displayed comprehensive techriical knowledge. There was very good participation by the trahees, particularly on suggested procedure improvements. The instructors captured the suggestions for further evaluation. Plant management ensured ,

that alllicensed operators had this training prior to standing watch with the revised i procedures in effect, i Conclusions Operator training on the effects of the axial offset anomaly on continued plant operation was thorough. The instructors displayed comprehensive technical knowledge. There was very good participation by the trainees, particularly on suggested procedure improvements. The instructors captured the suggestions for further evaluation. Plant management ensured that all licensed operators had this training prior to standing watch with the revised procedures in effec L .'

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-S-07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Review of Workman's Protection Assurance Trends Insoection Scope (71707)

. The inspectors reviewed workman's protection assurance trends as described in the i latest quality assurance department's semiannual trend analysis report (July through

December 1998). The inspectors also reviewed

. Procedure APA ZZ-00500," Corrective Action Program," Revision 28;

• Quality assurance department Audit Report AP99-05; and

. Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-325 Observations and Findinas The data in the semlannual trend analysis report showed that, during the last 6 months of 1998, the licensee wrote 34 suggestion-occurrence-solution reports that involved workman's protection assurance activities. During the same time period in 1997, the licensee wrote 18 suggestion-occurrence-solution reports involving workman's protection assurance activities. Both sets of data compared statistics for nonrefueling outage period The trend report stated that an existing suggestion-occurrence-solution report had already identified an adverse trend in this area. This was Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-3253 initiated in August 1998. The inspectors reviewed the i licensee's progress on Report 98-3253. The short-term corrective action was to form a i task team and revise Procedure APA-ZZ-00310,." Workman's Protection Assurance and Caution Tagging," Revision 13. All site personnel were trained on the use of this procedure. The licensee extended the due date for Report 98-3253 until September 1, i 199 The inspectors discussed Procedure APA-ZZ-00310 improvements with the general supervisor for daily planning, who was a leader of the task team. The improvements included:

. Operations personnel do not release systems for work until the system is completely draine . ' Fasteners are installed to preclude tagged components from moving from their tagged positio . Voltage checks are performed when electrical circuit breakers are tagge . Maintenance personnel may install a personnel hold-off device (e.g., a lock) on a tagged circuit breake e 6-

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The inspectors determined that the changes to the procedure were improvements to the workman's protection assurance program. The inspectors were also informed that the task team included personnel from mechanical maintenance, electrical maintenance, !

and instrument and control as well as equipment operators, reactor operators, quality assurance personnel, maintenance supervisors, and plant management. The inspectors determined that the presence of these individuals on the team showed that management support was goo The inspectors reviewed quality assurance department Audit Report AP99-005, dated March 31,1999. The audit was performed from February 22 through March 9,199 The report included an assessment of workman's protection assurance activities, including the review of many workman's protection assurance tagouts. Although quality assurance personnel provided a good evaluation of workman's protection assurance activities during the time period the audit was performed, there was no discussion of the effectiveness of the corrective actions for Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-3253. The inspectors determined that this did not meet the expectation that quality assurance persor,nel review the trend analysis reports for effectiveness during normal audit and surveillance activities (Procedure APA-ZZ-00500, step 14.3).

Although the licensee did not perform the effectiveness review during Audit AP99-005, the licensee explained that such an effectiveness review was in the process of being -

performed and was being documented on Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0593. This review encompassed an effectiveness review of suggestion-occurrence-solution report " occurrences," or events, initiated since 1995 for workman's protection assurance activities. This review began in early March 1999. The licensee identified some preliminary findings and was scheduled to have conclusive findings within the next several day The inspectors also reviewed past NRC findings from a corrective action inspection conducted from August-September 1998 (NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-20). That inspection found that performance in the workman's protection assurance area had not improved. Similarly, the licensee's corrective action audit (quality assurance department Audit Report AP98-011), conducted during the summer of 1998, confirmed the existence of the adverse trend and recommended that more timely analyses of workman's protection assurance problems be performe The inspectors [eviewed workman's protection assurance data for 1999. The inspectors observed that the licensee wrote 44 suggestion-occurrence-solution reports involving workman's protection assurance activities from January 1 through April 28,1999. The inspectors determined that, although the licensee made some positive steps in resolving workman's protection assurance concerns with procedure improvements and training, the number of new suggestion-occurrence-solution reports suggests that the adverse trend has not improve c. Conclusions The number of new suggestion-occurrence-solution reports initiated in 1999 regarding workman's protective assurance activities suggests that the licensee-identified adverse

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-7-trend in 1998 has not improved. Furthermore, quality assurance personnel did not review progress in resolving the 1998 adverse trend during an audit of the operations department performed in early 1999. The licensee recently began taking action to review effectiveness of past corrective action l 11. Maintenance j I

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

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M General Comments - Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:

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• Work Authorization W198254 - adjust outboard packing on motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B; j i

. Work Authorization C632594 - provide panel ventilation on Emergency Diesel Generator B control panel; I

. Work Authorization P602851 - perform brush inspection and tension check on Emergency Diesel Generator B;

. Work Authorization W193988 - repair Cylinder 2 Jacket water leak on Emergency Diesel Generator B; ,

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. Work Authorization W194265 - replace expansion joint gaskets on Emergency l Diesel Generator B; and i

- Work Authorization W187370 - repair fuel oil leak on Cylinder 7 sight glass on Emergency Diesel Generator Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified no substantive concerns. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when require M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance Inspection Scoce (61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:

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-8-l * Test Procedure OSP-SF-00001, " Shutdown Margin Calculation," Revision 22;

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Test Procedure OSP-AL-P001B," Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump *B

Inservice Test," Revision 20; and l

- Test Procedure OSP-EN-P001B, " Containment Spray Pump "B" inservice Test,"

Revision 1 Observations and Findinas The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's j approved programs and the Technical Specification M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors performed routine plant tours, attended daily status meetings, and reviewed suggestion-occurrence-solution reports to evaluate plant material conditio Observations and Findinas l

With the exception of several through-wall leaks that occurred in the essential service water system in April 1999, material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant were very good. The inspectors observed a noticeable improvement in the material condition of the emergency diesel generators from the previous inspection report period (reference NRC Inspection Report 50-483/99-01). Most deficiencies that existed in the plant had already been identified by the licensee for corrective action. The licensee documented these discrepancies and initiated corrective actio Essential Service Water System Leaks The following is a description of the essential service water system leaks that were identified in April 1999.

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. The licensee identified a pin hole leak in a weld at the bottom of the essential service water systera self-cleaning Strainer A drain differential pressure control Va've EFPD0019. The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0662. The licensee performed an ASME Section XI code repair I

(removed defective area and re-weld). The licensee determined the cause to be microbiologically-induced corrosion of the carbon steel at the leak locatio . The inspectors identified a leak in a weld at the component cooling water heat Exchanger A essential service water outlet drain Valve EGV0355 connection to the 24-inch essential service water header. The inspectors identified this leak

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-9-while performing a walkdown of operable essential service water Train A while essential service water Train B was inoperable for another pin hole leak repair (following paragraph). The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0744. The licensee determined there was an approximate 3.5 inch linear indication around the toe of the weld. The actual amount of leakage was extremely small. The licensee performed an ASME Section XI code repair (removed defective area and rewelded). The licensee had not yet determined a root cause by the end of this inspection report perio . The licensee identified a pin hole leak in the 4-inch essential service water .

supply line to containment spray Train B room Cooler SGL13B. The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0746. The licensee performed an ASME Section XI code repair (removed defective area and !

re-weld). The licensee determined the cause to be microbiologically induced corrosion of the carbon steel at the leak locatio .

The licensee identified a rJn stole leak on an 8-inch essential service water supply line to the residual heat removal pump and containment spray pump Train A room coolers. The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0645. The licensee performed an ASME Section XI code repair (installed a valve assembly on top of the leak). The licensee determined the cause to be microbiologically-induced corrosion of the carbon steel at the leak locatio The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability determinations at the time the leaks l

were discovered and considered them acceptable. The licensee ensured the leaks were i repaired promptly and with the proper emphasis on rnaintaining safe plant condition l The licensee had previously experienced only one or two pin hole leaks per year in the essential service water system piping. Due to the leaks identified in April 1999, the Supervising Engineer - Mechanical Systems established an essential service water task team. The agenda for the first meeting was to include:

. Review of division action plan for updating the response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13 (service water system corrosion);

• Discuss schedule and modification to resolve vibration problems at the component cooling water system heat exchangers;

. Discuss schedule and modification for various essential service water system pipe replacements; and

. Review criteria for performing pipe replacement The inspectors reviewed the action plan and determined that several actions had already been completed. The inspectors determined that the licensee was aggressively pursuing corrective and preventive actions in response to the severalleaks in the essential service water syste .

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-10- Conclusions With the exception of the essential service water system, external equipment material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant was generally very good. Several pin hole leaks occurred in essential service water system piping during this report perio The operability determinations were acceptable. The leaks were repaired promptly, in accordance with code requirements, and with the proper emphasis on optimizing safe -

plant condition Ill. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities'and Equipment

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E Review of Formal Safetv Evaluation for Continued Plant Operation with the Presence of the AxialOffset Anomalv Insoection Scooe (37551)

As described in past NRC inspection reports, the plant has experienced an axial offset anomaly that has caused shutdown margin to reduce at a faster rate than predicte ' Shutdown margin recently approached the limit of 1300 pcm required by Technical Specification 3.1. To preclude reaching the 1300 pcm limit, the licensee re-examined the established method of calculating the shutdown margin. This method assumed that 100 percent of the boron in the crud would be instantaneously released into the reactor coolant system following a reactor trip. The licensee evaluated taking credit for a time release of boron from the crud during a reactor trip which would raise the calculated shutdown margi The inspectors assessed the formal safety evaluation and observed onsite review committee discussions associated with continued operation in the presence of the axial

" offset anomal Observations and Findinos

- The l'icensee developed a formal safety evaluation for reviewing the release rate of axial offset crud and boron. The formal safety evaluation was developed based on the axial

. offset anomaly experiences at Callaway and other plants and on evaluations by the reactor vendor and others within the industr From April 7-14,1999, the formal' safety evaluation was reviewed by the Onsite Review Committee, which included personnel from the reactor engineering, chemistry, and

. operations departments.' Other affected groups also participated in the reviews. The discussions were thorough and probing. One example involved a discussion on the

- chemical structure of the crud on the surface of the fuel assemblies. Another example involved the discussion of a postulated main steam line break resulting in an

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-11 uncontrolled cooldown. This scenario, combined with the release rate model, posed the most restrictive requirements on shutdown margin. These discussions improved the quality of the formal safety evaluatio Engineering personnel actively sought opportunities to understand and resolve questions. Engineering personnel solicited questions and incorporated comments from participants outside of the onsite review committee, which resulted in a more detailed formal safety evaluatio Engineenng department personnel's involvement in the review and revisions to the formal safety evaluation were comprehensive. Technical and editorial issues were

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thoroughly addressed. The licensee determined that the boron release rate model ensured continued compliance with all applicable Technical Specifications and did not pose an Unreviewed Safety Question.

f The inspectors reviewe l the training given to operators on this issue, as described in Section 05.1 of this .aspection repor Conclusions The Onsite Review Committee's discussion of the formal safety evaluation allowing continued operation with the axial offset anomaly was thorough, well-prepared, and adequately documented. The engineering department was effectively and actively involved throughout the safety evaluation approval proces IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practice Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problem The inspectors also observed spent fuel pool rerack activities. Surveys were thorough and well performed. Technicians demonstrated good "as low as reasonably achievable" practices. Health physics technicians and supervisors were knowledgeable of the various evolutions and assigned responsibilitie .

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-12-c. Conclusions Plant workers exhibited good radiation worker practices. Survey maps and postings were current and showed accurate information. Personnel demonstrated good "as low as reasonably achievable" practices during spent fuel pool rerack activitie V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on May 3,1999. The licensee did not express a i

position on any of the findings in the repor The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the !

inspection should be nnsidered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie I

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEQ Licensee R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant G. N. Belchik, Supervising Engineer, Operations J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Emergency Preparedness R. E. Famam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Operations J. M. Gloe, Superintendent, Maintenance D. S. Hollabaugh, Superintendent, Design Engineering J. V. Laux, Manager Quality Assurance J. A. McGraw, Superintendent, Engineering A. C. Passwater, Manager, Corporate Nuclear Services J. T. Patterson, Superintendent, Work Control (Acting)

J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness G. L. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer M. A. Reidmeyer, Senior Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Chemistry L. S. Sandbothe, Superintendent, Operations

' INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 99003-01 NCV Pulled incorrect fuses on Emergency Diesel Generator B control panel (Section 04.1).

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2-Closed 99003-01 NCV Pulled incorrect fuses on Emergency Diesel Generator B control panel (Section 04.1).

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