IR 05000483/1990012

Insp Rept 50-483/90-12 on 900516-0630.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, ESF Walkdown & Maint & Surveillance Performed

ML20055G370
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	07/13/1990
From:	Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055G369	List: IR 05000483/1990012 ML20055G368
References
50-483-90-12, NUDOCS 9007230105
Download: ML20055G370 (9)

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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/90012(DRP)

Docket No, 50-483 License N NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection at: Callaway Site, Steedman, MO Inspection Conducted: May 16 through June 30, 1990 Inspectors: B. L. Bartlett i C.'H. Brown m _/

Approved By: ar gue, Chief 7//.2Md Reac r Projects Section 3C Date '

Inspection Summary -

Inspection from May 16 throuch June 30, 1990 (Report No. 50-483/90012(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

F A routine, unannounced safety inspection of plant operations, engineered sa1ety features walkdown, and maintenance and surveillance was performe ,

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Results: Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee responded well to an unplanned reactor trip and subsequent restart problems, Management attention and involvement was readil evident and emphasized safe operation of the unit (Paragraph 2). The status of the engineered safety feature system was independently verified and found-

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to be fully operation and well maintained (Paragraph 3).

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DETAILS j i

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1. Persons Contacted

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D. F. Schnell, Senior Vice President, Nuclear l "G. L. Randolph, General Manager, Nuclear Operations I

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• J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant l

• C, D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support

• J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance ,

• W. R. Campbell, Manager, Nuclear Engineering )

• M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control D. E. Young, Superintendent, Operations  !

R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics

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• T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Site Licensing >

G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling G. R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Program .

• G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineer Group J

• J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance C. S. Petzel, Quality Assurance Engineer J. A. McGraw, Superintendent, Design Control

• Denotes those present at one or more exit interview In addition, a number of equipment operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations, i o maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacte . Plant Operations (71707) Operational Safety Verification -I Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance-with regulatory requirements. The. inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control of operating activities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shif t technical advisors. The inspections included direct observation of activities,_ tours of the facility, '

interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions of operation (LCO), and reviews of facility' procedures, records, and L

reports. The following items were considered during these inspections:

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Adequacy of plant staffing and supervisio Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and- 4 off-normal condition Operability of selected safety related systems, including attendant alarms, instrumentation, and control u

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Maintenance of quality records and report '

The inspectors observed that control room supervisors, shift ,

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technical advisors, and operators were attentive to plant conditirns, i performed frequent panel walkdowns and were responsive to off-normal alarms and condition ! Off-shift inspection of Control Room The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shift The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the administrative controls relating to the conduct of operation were being adhered to, Plant Material Conditions / Housekeeping The inspectors performed routine plant tours to assess material conditions within the plant, ongoing quality activities and plantwide housekeeping. The inspectors also accompanied the licensee's management on monthly plant tour Radiological Controls The licensee's radiological controls and practices were routinely observed by the inspectors during plant tours and during the iaspection of selected work activitie The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, maintenance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and report Security The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspe.: tors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and departures. Observations included the secur'.ty personnel's performance associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), j and the security staff's attentiveness and thoroughnes Selected inspector observations are discussed below:

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On June 11,1990 at 10:16 AM CDT a reactor trip occurred due to high pressurizer pressure. All four main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)

had fast-closed. The loss of the secondary heat sink had caused i

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primary pressure to rise, resulting in the automatic trip. All equipment actuated properly; however, the "A" train signal to the steam generator blowdown and sample lines did not indicate it had actuated. This was later determined to be an indication problem onl The inspectors responded to the control room and observed the licensee's respons A fire detector in the auxiliary building alarmed due to steam coming from the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP).

The licensee suspects that two casing drain lines from the bottom of the turbine driver are discharging more steam / condensate to the building drains than in the past. The licensee has formed a review team to address this issu !

The root cause of the unplanned MSIV closure was determined to be a failed input buffer card in the MSIV manual fast-close circuitr The card was repaired and a restart commence During the restart and while still suberitical, the four control rods of Group 1, Control Bank "B" dropped into the core. Control rod K14 stopped within six steps of the bottom. The reactor .

operator started to manually insert K14 and Group 2 of Control !

Bank "B" when an " urgent failure" alarm was received and the rods locked-up. Following some investigation and discussion, a manual reactor trip was initiated. All equipment actuated as designe ;

The licensee identified a failed slave cycler counter card in Power Cabinet IBD. After replacing the card and testing the control rods, '

restart was recommence The reactor was critical at 6:45 PM CDT on June 12, 199 Due to problems in maintaining the axial flux difference (Delta I) within .

the target band, the licensee did not go above 48 percent power until June 16, 199 The Callaway Plant's Annual Emergency Preparedness exercise was I held on May 30, 1990. The inspectors observed the control room (simulator) crew's performance, portions of the technical support center and operations support center activities along with observation of selected in plant teams. The inspectors' specific observations and assessment of the licensee's exercise performance is included in NRC Inspection Report Number 483/90009(DRSS).

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On June 12, 1990 the inspectors accompanied regional management l and Commissioner Rogers on a routine plant visit. The commissioner interviewed personnel, toured the plant, and attended discussions on current industry and plant specific issue On May 17, 1990 during a routine plant tour, the inspectors observed covers over the 20 inch diameter drains in the main steam / main feedwater isolation valve room. In the event of a main feedwater

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line break, the drain would prevent the water level from reaching a

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height'that would cause damage to safety re16ted equipment. The covers had apparently been in place to prevent personnel from falling into the holes, resulting in serious injury. The covers, however, would have greatly restricted the flow of water from the room. The licensee performed a calculation that showed that having the covers installed did not adversely affect any safety related equipment. The licensee's calculation showed that the post-break flood levels increased from a calculated 1.33 feet to 5.87 fee This would have flooded safety related equipment required to function to mitigate a feedwater line break in this area. However, all equipment would actuate prior to submergence. The licensee removed the covers and installed other devices to keep personnel '

from falling into the drains. The licensee determined that the covers had been in place since constructio At 10:45 AM CDT on June 16, 1990, a coupling in the three inch line which supplies water to the fire pumphouse sprinkler system faile '

i: The resulting pressure drop caused all three fire pumps (one motor driven and two diesel driven) to automatically star The equipment ,

operator dispatched to the pumphouse, reported to the control room, that a pipe was broken and approximately one foot of water was on l l the floor. The control room secured the fire pumps and doors were l opened to allow the 2A diesel fire pump room to drain. The failed

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coupling caused some minor damage to some connected piping and conduit but it was limited in scope. The fire system was quickly returned to its normal lineup except for the pumphouse sprinkler The licensee determined that the Dresser Style 38 coupling had I failed due to inadequate engagemen This condition had existed since initial construction. The broken connections were repaired, ,

the coupling reinstalled, and similar couplings were inspected. On June 22, 1990 at 9:20 AM CDT the coupling failed again. The failed coupling has been replaced with a flanged connection. Other ;

i similar, accessible connections are being replaced with threaded -

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connections.

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3. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Essential Service Water System (ESW or system designator EF). The purpose of the walkdown was to l independently verify that a selected ESF system was operable as required by plant technical specifications (TS).

The inspectors verified the position of the EF valves in the plant (by direct obserystion), the position of the associated electrical breakers l

in the various switchgear rooms, and that the associated switches on all L control panels were in their proper positions. Components, breakers, and compartments were found to be clean and appropriately maintained (no valve packing leaks, no bent valve stems or missing handwheels).

Comments generated from the plant walkdown, comparison of procedures and i prints, review of TS, and review of the updated safety analysis report (USAR) are discussed below:

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While all valves vere found in their correct position, nine vent / drain lines d;d not have their pipe caps installed. Lines downstream of valve;- 614, 129, 159, 161, 196, 209, 256, 257 and i

V324 were identified e plant drawings as being capped, but the caps

, were missin Normal operating procedure OTN-EF-00001 has check-off

' lists designed to ensure the ESW cystem is properly lined up. These lists, however, do not verify that the caps are properly installe The check-off lists do verify some containment penetration caps are

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installed; however, the list is inconsistent, as not all penetration ,

( caps are verifie The licensee should verify the caps are installed >

as required by plant drawing Side panels were missing from both the "A" and "B" spent fuel pool corling pump room coolers (SGG04A and SGG04B). This allowed a large ,

percentage of the air flow through these coolers to bypass the '

filters and cooling coil Several differences between the USAR and the actual plant configuration were identifie Site Addendum 3.8.4.1.5 and Procedure 00A-EF-00001 differ, by l one foot, on what is the normal level of the ultimate heat sink (VHS) retention pon Figure 3.5-1 Turbine Missile Trajectory did not identify the j UHS cooling tower as a component essential to attaining and maintaining safe shutdown even though it was identified as being within a possible mair. turbine missile trajector ,

USAR Section 9.2.5.2.2.1, " Heat Loads Following a LOCA," states, in part, " Heat rejected to the UHS following a LOCA is based on the following assumptions: a. Two ESW trains in operation for the initial eight hour b. One ESW train in operation for the remainder of the 30 days." These assumptions do not match the licensee's current emergency operating procedures, which have no [

provisions to shut down one train of ESW if both trains properly ,

actuate,

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In summary, the inspectors found the ESW system to be fully operable and well maintaine The licensee is taking steps to address the comments noted above, none of which impacted the operability of the syste . Maintenance / Surveillance (62703) (61726)

Selected portions of the plant surveillance, test and maintenance i activities on safety related systems and components were observed or '

reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were

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obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing i and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and j housekeeping conditions were maintaine ;

' Maintenance

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The reviewed maintenance activities included:

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Work Request N Activity ,

W125532 Inspect torque switch for limiter plat P445418 Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump PALO1A -

- lubricate couplin ;

P464111 PALO1A - oil chang !

W124457 Inspect torque switch spacers on EG-HV-0013, essential service water to component cooling ,

water train "A" downstream hand control valv Selected inspector observations are discussed below: '

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ESW Pump "B" pre-lube storage tank (TEF01B) was drained and cleaned during this inspection period.- The inspectors observed:

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-Workman's Protection Assurance (WPA) Order Number 90-1399 was issued to isolate the tank and drain it. The inspectors >

observed that not all inlets to the tank were isolate !

Valve EF-V247 (cross-connect from pre-lube storage tank "A")

was still open, allowing water to flow into TEF018. This flow of water did not present any danger to the workers; however, normal practice should be to isolate all paths

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to and from equipment that is being worked o Normal operation is for water to flow into the two pre-lube i storage tanks (TEF01A and TEF018) and then overflow to the intake forebay. The inspectors observed that the amount of water overflowing from TEF01A did not match the amount 1 flowing into TEF01B through the still open cross-connec The inspectors informed the shift supervisor who wrote a ,

work request (W133061) to clean out the apparently obstructed '

cross-connect line, l

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" Surveillance i

The reviewed surveillances included:

Procedure N Activity ITL-GK-00R41 Access control area radiation detecto .

ISL-BB-433A Reactor coolant temperature wide range (T-HOT).

p ITL-GD-00T11 Essential service water pump room ;ipply fan

CGD01 OSP-SA-0017A Train "A" SIS /CSAS slave relay test, p

OSP-EF-00003 UHS cooling tower fans and UHS ripra ISF-AL-00P37 Condensate storage tank to auxiliary feedwater pump suction header pressure transmitte ,

ISL-BB-T443R Reactor coolant system loop 4 cold leg protection "A" temperature elemen ISF-AB-0P546 Steam generator "0" main steam outlet upstream protection "B" pressure transmitte ISF-AE-OL553 Steam generator "C" protection "B" level

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transmitte ISF-AB-0P514 Steam generator "A" main steam outlet upstream protection "B" pressure transmitte Selected inspector observations are discussed below:

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During the performance of ITL-GD-00T11 the I&C technician:

determined that the temperature loop was within calibration but that the inlet and recirculation dampers would not respond to an indicated change in temperature. The I&C technicians informed the shift supervisor of the deficiene, and suspended their surveillance. Troubleshocting efforts jetermined that the actuating mechanisms were frozen. Pendini the receipt of new actuators the licensee temporarily modified the dampers by failing them to their post-accident position Operations surveillance procedure OSP-GN-00002, Revision 1 #

was reviewed as part of the ESW inspection. TS 4.6.2.3. requires the licensee to verify a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 2200 gpm to each cooler grou The intent of the TS surveillance was for the licensee to evaluate any flow discrepancies for evidence of flow

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blockage. The normal service water system was intended to be used; however, due to the seasonal changes in valve positions in the turbine building this would have rendered any data gathered useless. During 1987 the licensee developed internal questions on how to meet this surveillance. Thi licensee decided that in order to meet the intent of the TS that ESW should be used. This would allow for the trending of

flow data that the changing flow conditions in the normal service water system would mas In response to questions t' rom the inspector the licensee committed to either modify

' the TS to mare clearly show how to perform this surveillance or to delete this TS surv ;11anc . Exit Meeting (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspectorsiaiso discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors'during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar ,

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