IR 05000483/1998008
| ML20248L267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248L248 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-98-08, 50-483-98-8, NUDOCS 9806110051 | |
| Download: ML20248L267 (19) | |
Text
'
EfLCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-483 License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/98-08 Licensee:
Union Electric Company i
I Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri l
Dates:
April 12 through May 23,1998 Inspector (s):
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector
F. L. Brush, Resident inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT:
Supplementalinforrnation 9806110051 980608 PDR ADOCK 05000483 G
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
o
,
s
.
, ' -
.
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-08 Goerations The licensee's communications, command and control, and cross-checking were
.
thorough during fuel movement in Refueling Outage 9.
The licensee effectively implemented foreign material exclusion controls around the refuel and spent fuel pools (Gection O1.2).
The licensee effectively prepared for and implemented midloop operation during
.
Refueling Outage 9 (Section 01.3).
An unresolved item was identified regarding inconsistencies between the Final Safety
.
Analysis Report and the Emergency Operating Procedures describing the procedure and
,
steps to transfer the suction of the emergency core cooling systems and the containment l
spray system fram the refueling water storage tank to the containment recirculation sump l
following a loss of coolant accident (Section 03.1).
'
Control room operators demonstrated attentiveness to plant parameters by immediately
-
recognizing and responding to the inadvertent tiansfer of refueling cavity water I
(Section M4.1).
Maintenance An inadvertent transfer of 600 gallons of refueling cavity water to the chemical and
.
volume control system was due to a personnel error. Workman's protection assurance tagging was inadequate (Section M4.1).
The licensee failed to vent the safety-related centrifugal charging pumps, as a result of
.
misinterpretation of Technical Specification requirements. The licensee took corrective actions to address this issue (Section JA8.1).
The licensee failed to properly test pressurizer pressure Permissive P-11, as a result of
.
l inadequate design. The licensee took corrective actions to address this issue (Section M8.2).
'
'
The licensee failed to propedy test the main steam isolation valve bypass valves, as a
.
result of an inadequate test procedure. The licensee took corrective actions to address this issue (Section M8.3).
Enaineerina Plant modifications were well designed and propei1y implemented (Section E1.1).
.
. _ _ _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
..
___ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _.
_-
- _ - _ - _ - _ - - _
l
..,
,
(;.
2-Plant Suocort Health physics personnel provided thorough coverage of the containment recirculation
.
sump inspections and reactor vessel upper internals reinstallation. The licensee -
l implemented effective radiological controls (Section R4.1).
l r
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ _ _
,"-
.
.
Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant began the report period April 12,1998, in Mode 6, with Refueling Outage 9 in progress.
The reactor was taken critical at 6:37 p.m. on May 2,1998. Low power physics testing was completed and Mode 1 was entered at 4:13 a.m. on May 4,1998. At 6:45 a.m. on May 4,1998, the licensee closed the main generator output breaker to end Refueling Outage 9. The outage duration was 31 days. The plant reached 100 percer;t reactor power on May 9,1998.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and outage plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were property controlled, except for the item discussed in Section M4.1.
The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and attended various outage meetings.
The inspectors did not identify any significant issues.
O1.2 Observations of fuel off-load and re-load a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors observed portions of fuel transfer to the spent fuel pool and core reloading. The inspectors reviewed Procedure ETP-ZZ-00035," Refueling Performance,"
Revision 17.
b.
Qblervations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the licensee adhered to Procedure ETP-ZZ-00035. The senior reactor operator in charge of fuel movement displayed good command and control. The fuel movement team demonstrated good communications. Personnel exhibited good self-checking and cross-checking techniques. The licensee effectively
implemented foreign material exclusion controls around the refuel and spent fuel pools.
The inspectors had no concerns.
On two occasions, the licensee stopped core reloading. The first occasion was just after placing a residual heat removal train in service. The refuel pool water in the reactor vessel became cloudy. The senior reactor operator stopped reloading until the water became clear. The second occasion was just after 600 gallons of refueling cavity water f
i
. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
,
- _ _
--
_ _ _ _. - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,-
.
-2-was inadvertently transferred to the volume control tank. This event is discussed in Section M4.1. The inspectors observed that, on both occasions, the licensee's actions were appropriately conservative.
Following core reloading, the inspectors observed that all fuel assemblies had been placed in the correct core location as prescribed by Procedure ETP-ZZ-00035.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's communications, command and control, and crcss-checking were thorough during fuel movement in Refueling Outage 9.
The licensee effectively implemented foreign material exclusion controls around the refuel and spent fuel pools.
01.3 Midlooo Ooerations a.
Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors observed and reviewed midloop activities. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee's preparatory actions for entering midloop in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-03.
The inspectors reviewed:
Procedure OTN-BB-00002, " Reactor Coolant System Drain Down," Revision 17;
.
Procedure OTO-Es-00001, " Loss of Residual Heat Removal," Revision 10; and
.
Procedure OOA KF-0002A," Containment Equipment Hatch / Jib Crane Diesel
.
Generator Alternate Power Source," Revision 2.
The licensee reduced reactor coolant system inventory to midloop level operation twice.
The first was after core removal to the spent fuel pool and the second was following core reloading.
o.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the pre-job briefing prior to commencement of mid-loop following core reloading. The briefing was thorough. Licensee management attended and stressed the importance of deliberate, thoughtful actions. The briefing covered the applicable procedures and stressed points of high risk. The briefing also covered contingency actions in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling.
The inspectors also observed control room activities when operators drained the reactor coolant system to midloop following core reloading. The inspectors verified that the licensee followed Procedure OTN-BB-00002. The licensee's preparation and
_ _.
. - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
________ - __ _ __ _ _
__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_
.
,
l
.
3-f implementation were effective. Required levelinstrumentation was calibrated and operable. Management and quality assurance persoriael were present during the evolution. Control room supervisors exhibited good command and control.
Communications were good. The licensee minimized control room distractions.
Operators maintained good awareness of plant parameters and exhibited good self-checking. The inspectors identified no concerns.
!
' c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively prepared for and implemented midloop operation during Refueling Outage 9.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707)
Normal Ooerations The inspectors walked down the following tagouts:
Workman's Protection Assurance 27080 - Centrifugal Charging Pump B; and
-
Workman's Protection Assurance 27057 - Centrifugal Charging Pump B Room
-
Cooler.
The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags Befuelina OutaQC The inspectors reviewed configuration control during the outage. The inspectors observed that the major train outages were properly coordinated. The licensee implemented strict administrative requirements for removing and restoring systems.
The inspectors reviewed the suggestion-occurrence-solution reporting system for occurrences of protective tagging errors. The inspectors determined that the occurrences were minor and without safety significance. One exception was the occurrence discussed in Section M4.1.
The licensee planned to conduct postoutage critiques on the implementation of
. protective tagging.
j
l
.
_ _..
___--__ ___
_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
_____-___-
.
- ,-
.
.
i 4-l O2.2 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems during normal plant operation:
Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A, B, and T; and
.
Emergency Diesel Generators A and B.
.
Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
02.5 Reactor Buildina Closeout insoection The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel during the reactor building closeout inspection. Material condition and housekeeping were very good. The licensee properly removed or secured all refueling outage equipment. The licensee conducted a thorough cleanup.
The inspectors did identify a small amount of debris and trash at various locations. This included washers, nuts, tape, and wire. The licensee also identified a small amount of trash and debris. The loose material did not affect operability of the recirculation sumps.
't he licensee removed the material from the reactor building.
O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation O3.1 Cold Lea Recirculation Resoonse Time a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed a concern on emergency operating procedure response times for transferring from emergency core cooling system injection to cold leg recirculation.
The inspectors reviewed:
Emergency Operating Procedure E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant,"
.
Revision 182; Emergency Operating Procedure ES-1.3, " Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation,"
.
Revision 1 A1; Final Safety Analysis Report Table 6.3-12 - Refueling Water Storage Tank
.
Outflow (Large Break)- Worst Single Failure; Final Safety Analysis Report Table 6.3-8 - Sequence of Changeover Operation
.-
from injection to Recirculation;
)
I
....
..
........
- .
.
,
I.
5-Annunciator Response Procedures; and
.
Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-1577.
.
b.
Observations and Findinas l
Procedure ES-1.3 described operator actions necessary to transfer suction of the emergency core cooling systems and containment spray system to the recirculation mode. Operators would perform Procedure ES-1,3 after the refueling water storage tank level is lowered to 36 percer.t after a loss of coolant accident.
The inspectors compared Final Safety Analysis Report Tables 6.3-12 and Table 6.3-8 to Procedure ES-1.3. Procedure ES-1.3 included steps to realign component cooling water from the spent fuel pool hcat exchangers to the residual heat removal system heat exchangers. Table 6.3-8 included these steps, but stated that the steps would be performed before the refueling water storage tank level was lowered to 36 percent. The inspectors determined that Procedure ES-1.3 was inconsistent with Table 6.3-8.
The licensee initiated suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-1577. The licensee alleviated any immediate operability concems. Plant operators performed three large break loss-of-coolant accident scenarios on the plant simulator. Operators were able to enter the recirculation mode of core cooling prior to rendering the emergency core cooling system pumos and containment spray pumps inoperable. The inspectors concurred with the licensee's preliminary conclusion.
The licensee's safety analysis group was reviewing the simulator data at the close of this inspection. The inspectors will review the results of this analysis during a future inspection. Pending the review, this is considered an Unresolved Item (50-483/98008-01).
11. Maintenance
.
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:
Work Authorization W618189 - Special Magne-Blast Breaker Inspection on
.
PB0301; Work Authorization W618202 - Special Magne-Blast Breaker inspection on
.
PB0404;
_
_ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
o
.
.,
t.
.
-6-Work Authorizations A6073411 R607341C, R598923E, A607341H, A607341Z,
'
R598923A, R598923H, A607341Y, R6073418 - Replace Essential Service Water Pump B; Work Authorization C595999 - Replace Essential Service Water from
.
Containment Cooler C Manual Valve GNV0003; Work Authorizations R601727A and R601735A - Perform Postmodification
.
Testing on P4/Lo Tavg Feedwater Isolation Bypass Switch; Work Authorization A602022A - Install Expansion Tank on containment
=
recirculation sump to containment spray pump suction Valve ENHV0001; Work Authorization W195705 - Replace 4-Way Valve on Feedwater Isolation
=
Valve AEFV0042 Train B actuator; and Work Authorizations RG78401 A, R578402A, R578403A, R578404A, R610335A,
.
,
R610336A, R610337A, R610338A - Perform Postmodification Testing on Main Feedwater Regulating and Bypass Valves.
b.
ObsmyAtions and Findinas With the exception of the maintenance described in Section M4.1, the inspectors identified no substantive concerns. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when required.
M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance a.
Insoection Scooe (61725)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
Test Procedure OTS-EF-P001B, " Performance Testing of Essential Service
-
Water Pump B," Revision 0; Test Procedure OSP-EN-P001 A, "Section XI Containment Spray Pump
Operability," Revision 16; Test Procedure OSP-SA-0019A, " Train-A CISA Slave Relay Test," Revision 5;
.
Procedure OSP EJ-00003," Containment Recirculation Sump Inspection,"
-
Revision 2; e
_.
_ - _ - _ _ _
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _.
..
.
-7-Procedure OSP-SA-00004, ' Visual inspection of Containment for Loose Debris,"
.
Revision 9; and Procedure ISP-SA-02414. " BOP /ESFAS Trip Actuating Device Test," Revision 9.
.
b.
Observations and Findinas The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
b.
Observations and Findinas During plant operation, material condition and housekeeping of accessible areas of the auxiliary building, the fuel building, the essential service water pump house, the ultimate heat sink cooling tower, and most areas of the turbine building were good.
During the refueling outage, material condition of operable systems was good. The licensee corrected material condition concerns that were identified during the operating cycle. Early in the refueling outage, four nonsafety-related circuit breakers failed to operate properly. The licensee performed a thorough root cause investigation and corrected the discrepancies prior to plant startup. This is further discussed in Section M8.4.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Transfer of Refuelina Cavity Water to Volume Control Tank a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an inadvertent transfer of water to
'
the volume control tank from the refueling pool.
l The inspectors reviewed:
Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-1657;
.
Root Cause Analysis Report UO 98-0015;
.
I l
-
_____ - ____ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ - _ - - _ __
"
.-
~,
.
-8-(
MTM-ZZ-QA006,'"Limitorque Actuator Electrical Rework and Adjustment,"
.
Revision 34; and Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-0310, ' Workman's Protection Assurance and
.
Caution Tagging," Revision 11.
Lb.
Observations and Findinas On April 19,1998, the licensee inadvertently transferred approximately 600 gallons of refueling cavity water into the volume. control tank. The licensee was refueling the reactor at the time of the event. The licensee was also performing maintenance on
. valves in residual heat removal Train A.~ The maintenance included work on residual
'
heat removal Train A charging pump supply isolation Valve EJHV8804A.
When electricians opened Valve EJHV8804A, a flow path from the refueling cavity to the chemical volume and control system was established. Control room operators immediately observed an increase in the volume control tank level. Operators also immediately noted that Valve EJHV8804A had opened. In response, operators closed the residual heat removal Train A loop suction isolation valves to isolate the flow path. In addition, operators suspended fuel movement.
The actual safety consequences of this event were minimal for two reasons. The activity was scheduled during a time of low risk. Also, the control room operators promptly recognized and responded to this event. The level of water in the refueling cavity remained greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. The level of refueling cavity water never dropped below the limit required by Technical Specifications. The licensee estimated that the cavity water level dropped only approximately 0.2 inches.
The licensee convened an event review team and initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-1657 to document the investigation. The root cause was documented on root cause analysis Report UO 98-0015.
The licensee identified several causes for the event which included:
There was no protective tagging placed on the residual heat removal Train A loop
.
f suction isolation valves. The job planning ir.structions did not alert the workman's L
protection assurance writers that Valve EJHV8804A would be opened.
^
. The licensee's pre-job briefing did not cover all of the job requirements.
.
The licensee implemented corrective and remedial actions which included:
. Plans to reviso Procedure APA-ZZ-0310 to provide additional guidance -
.-
L establishing system boundaries and workman's protection assurance tagging for
!
maintenance on motor operated valves. The licensee also planned to review the
>
r II
",
e
,
.
(.
_
-
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
!..
l*
.g.
event for lessons learned as part of a workman's protection assurance program review.
Review of Procedure MTM-ZZ-QA006 by the electricians to ensure personnel
.
understood the requirements.
Placement of protective tagging on the residual heat removal Train A loop suction
.
isolation valves.
Review of all similar jobs on motor-operated valves to determine adequacy of the
.
protective tagging.
Reminding maintenance supervisors of the importance of conducting thorough
.
pre-job briefings.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation and results, and agreed with the licensee's root cause evaluation and corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed the associated procedures. Procedure APA-7.Z-0310, Step 3.4.1, required that workman's protection assurance tagging be prepared so that maintenance can be performed safely. The failure to have adequate protective tagging for work on Valve EJHV8804A was a violation (50-483/98008-02).
The inspectors determined that operators demonstrated excellent attentiveness to the main control board by immediately recognizing that Valve EJHV8804A had opened. The licensee's decision to cease refueling operations was appropriately conservative.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the inadvertent transfer of 600 gallons of refueling cavity water to the chemical and volume control system was caused by a personnel error.
Workman's protection assurance tagging was inadequate. Control room operators demonstrated attentiveness to plant parameters by immediately recognizing and responding to the event.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 [ Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-483/97009-00: failure to vent the centrifugal charging pump casings.
On October 14,1997, the licensee determined that Technical Specification 4.5.2.b.1 had not been met since initial plant startup. Technical Specification 4.5.2.b.1 required that the centrifugal charging pump system be verified to be full of water by venting both pump casings and accessible discharge pipin _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ - _ _ _
'-
.
,
.
-10-The centrifugal charging pump casings did not have installed vents. Instead, the pumps were designed as self-venting. The suction and discharge piping were top-mounted.
Although the licensee determined that this design adequately vented the pumps, literal compliance with Technical Specification 4.5.2.b.1 was not met.
The licensee's immediate corrective action was to vent the pumps using flush connections on the piping at the discharge of each pump. Later, the licensee installed a vent line on each pump's discharge piping. The inspectors verified that the licensee was properly venting the pump casings.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's practice of venting the system high point locations. The inspectors reviewed isometric Drawing M-23EM02, Revision 6, and Procedure OSP-SA-00003, " Emergency Core Cooling System Flow Path Verification and Venting," Revision 9. The inspectors verified that the licensee properly included the high point vent locations in Procedure OSP-SA-00003. The inspectors had no further concerns.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to vent the centrifugal charging pumps, as a result of misinterpretation of Technical Specification requirements, was a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/98008-03).
M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-483/97005-00: inadequate surveillance of pressurizer pressure interlock.
On June 4,1997, the licensee determined that engineering safety feature actuation system pressurizer pressure Permissive P-11 was not adequately tested. Technical Specification 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2, Item 11a required a quarterly analog channel operability test of Permissive P-11.
Permissive P-11 permitted a normal cooldown of the reactor coolant system and depressurization without actuation of safety injectior, or main steam line isolation. The licensee's surveillance and calibration procedures for Perm.ssive P-11 did not adequately verify proper overlap. The licensee determined the cause to be inadequate system design.
The licensee installed a permanent channel test card jumper to provide the proper overlap during testing. Engineering department personnel evaluated and documented approval to install the jumper in Request for Resolution 18196A.
The licensee revised the following test procedures:
Procedure ISF-BB-OP455,
-
Procedure ISF-BB-OP456, and
Procedure ISF-BB-OP456.
-
i L
--
- ,-
.
.
-11-The licensee's actions ensured the proper testability of Permissive P-11. The inspectors identified no concerns.
The inspectors concidded that the failure to properly test pressurizer pressure Permissive P-11, as a result of inadequate design, was a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/98008-04).
M8.3 (Cloggd) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-483/97005-01: inadequate surveillance of the manual initiation function for steam line isolation.
On July 23,1997, the licensee determined that testing of the manual isolation signal to each main steam isolation valve bypass valve was not adequate. The licensee did not verify that the bypass valves closed on a main steam and main feedwater isolation signal.
The licensee determined that the cause was an inadequate surveillance test procedure.
The licensee revised Procedure ISP-SA-02414, " BOP /ESFAS Trip Actuating Device Test," Revision 9. The revision included a step to verify that each main steam isolation valve bypass valve closed on a main steam and main feedwater isolation signal The inspectors observed testing on the main steam isolation Train B bypass valves. The inspectors identified no concerns.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to properly test the main steam isolation valve bypass valves, as a result of an inadequate test procedure, was a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/98008-05).
M8.4 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-483/98003-02: review licensee's investigation of l
I General Electric Magne-Blast and PowerVac circuit breaker failures.
Early in Refueling Outage 9, three Magne-Blast breakers and one PowerVac Vacuum Interrupter breaker failed to operate properly. All four breakers were nonsafety-related and were located in the turbine building. Magne-Blast and PowerVac circuit breakers use the same operating n echanism but different arc suppression. The failures were in the operating mechanism.
The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Reports 98-0716,98-0797,
!
98-0801,98-0839, and 98-1191 to document the breaker failures and subsequent investigation. Report 98-1191 summarized the licensee's overall investigation.
l There were 67 breakers in the NB (4160V safety-related), PB (4160V nonsafety-related),
.
and PA (13,800V non-safety related) busses. Sixty-one were Magne-Blast and six were l
PowerVac. As part of the refueling outage,16 breakers were originally scheduled for
'
j iL
_ - - - - - -
-
)
n
..
,
a-12-
,
inspection and maintenance. The licensee performed additionalinspections to encompass all 67 breakers.
The licensee discovered some minor discrepancies. None affected breaker operability.
The licensee implemented corrective actions for all discrepancies. Also, the licensee informed industry working groups of the problems.
The inspectors observed inspections and testing on several breakers. The licensee's inspections were thorough. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and identified no concerns.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was aggressive in determining the root causes and generic implications of the four nonsafety-related breaker failures. The licensee's corrective actions were satisfactory.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Modification F-1ckaoes a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors observed or reviewed postmodification testing of the following modification packages:
Modification Package 96 'l016 - P4/Lo Tavg Feedwater Isolation System Bypass
.
Switch Modification; Modification Package 97-1002 - New Essential Service Water Pump;
.
Modification Package 94-1007 - Replace Train A Essential Service Water Valves;
.
Modification Package 96-1025 - Containment Sump Valve Modification; and
.
Modification Package 92-1051 - Main Feedwater Regulating and Bypass Valve
.
Modification.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified no substantive concerns with the modification packages.
- Postmodification testing was satisfactory. Equipment in service for reactor startup and power operation functioned paperly.
i I..
l (
-.- - - - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _.
- ,
.
.
-13-C.
Conclusions
' The inspectors concluded that the modifications were well designed and properly implemented.
IV. Plant Suno.gg R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 ' General Comments (71750)
Normal Ooerations The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices. Contaminated and high radiation areas were properly posted.
Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problems.
Refuelino Outaae See NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-07.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4,1 Containment Recirculation Sumo inspections and Reactor Vessel Uoper Internals
'
Reinstallation a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel on an inspection of the containment recirculation sumps. In addition, the inspectors observed the reinstallation of the reactor vessel upper internals.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure OSP-EJ-00003, " Containment Recire Sump Inspection," Revision 2.
b.
Observations and Findinas Licensee management personnel performed thorough pre-job briefings for both activities.
- Health physics technicians established proper radiological boundaries and periodically E
ensured that personnel were aware of radiological conditions.
!:
b L.
!.
..
-
(
_ _ _
. _ _
. _ _ _ _
___ - __
_
.
.
-14-Sgt,nsoection During the sump inspections, the assigned health physics technician properly monitored radiological and air quality conditions. The health physics technician verified that personnel complied with the radiological work permit requirements, which required extra precautions due to loose surface contamination. The loose surface contamination was an expected condition. There were no personnel contaminations. The sumps were free of debris. The inspectors had no concerns.
Reactor Vessel Uooer internal Reinstallation The inspectors observed that all personnel involved practiced good ALARA principles.
Personnel not directly involved remained in low dose areas during movement of the internals. The number of personnel directly involved was kept to a minimum. Health physics technicians continuously monitored radiological conditions. The licensee completed the reinstallation safely. The inspectors had no concerns.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that health physics personnel provided thorough coverage of the containment recirculation sump inspections and reactor vessel upper intemals reinstallation. The licensee implemented effective radiological controls.
V. Manaaement Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on May 22,1998. The incident involving inadequate protective tagging was discussed at length, with licensee management providing their perspective on the significance of the errors identified by their evaluation of the event.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
i
,
l
!
i r
b
._.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'
.
,
.
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support D. G. Cornwell, General Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance R. E. Farnam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Operations G. A. Hughes, Supervising Engineer, independent Safety Engineering Group L. H. Kanuckel, Supervising Engineer. Engineering R. T. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations J. V. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance J. A. McGraw, Superintendent. Engineering C. L. Nurnberg, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Control M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support T. A. Robertson, Senior Engineer R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Radwaste W. A. Witt, Superintendent, Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 98008-01 URI Cold leg recirculation response time (Section O3.1).
98008-02 VIO Inadequate tagging for work on EJHV8804A (Section M4.1).
,
98008-03 NCV Failure to vent centrifugal charging pump casings (Section M8.1).
98008-04 NCV inadequate surveillance of pressurizer pressure interlock (Section M8.2).
l_
98008-05 NCV Inadequate surveillance of manualinitiation function for steam line
'
isolation (Section M8.3).
L___________
_
_-.__-______-__.____-_-____- - -__ _ - _ - - _
- _ -__ - - -
.
..
-2-t.
Closed 97009-00 LER Failure to vent centnfugal charging pump casirgs (Section M8.1).
,
98008-03 NCV Failure to vent centrifugal charging pump casings (Section M8.1).
97005-00 LER Inadequate surveillance of pressurizer pressure interlock (Section M8.2).
98008-04-NCV inadequate surveillance of pressurizer pressure interlock (Section M8.2).
97005-01 LER Inadequate surveillance of manual initiation functicn for steam line isolation (Section M8.3).
. 98008-05
. NCV. Inadequate surveillance of manual initiation function for steam line.
isolation (Section M8.3).
98003-02
. IFl Investigation of Magne-Blast and PowerVac circuit breaker failures (Section M8.4).
N-..-.__-_.'-..___x_a.____________.l__________
___j'_ _ _ _ _, _ _
-