IR 05000483/1998001
| ML20216A809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212H165 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-98-01, 50-483-98-1, NUDOCS 9803120329 | |
| Download: ML20216A809 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
j Docket No.:
50-483 License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/98-01 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway 0 Fulton, Missouri Dates:
January 18 through Februar 28,1998 Inspector-D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector F. L. Brush, Resident inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B Attachment:
Supplemental Information 980:5120329 980309
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PDR ADOCK 05000483 Q
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-01 Ooerations The licensee exhibited the proper enforcement perspective when responding to the
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simultaneous inoperability of auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B and Emergency Diesel Generator A. The licensee requested and received a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (Section O2.1).
An equipment operator opened an incorrec' breaker to a nonsafety-related motor control
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center while hanging tags. The failum ic open the correct breaker was due to personnel error. The operator immediately reclosed the breaker without prior centrol room authorization. The control room operators' response to this event was good (Section 04.1).
Enoineerina Engineering department personnel failed to prepare an adequate modification work
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package for a core drillin an auxiliary building concrete wall. During performance of the work, licensee personnel drilled into a 13.8 kV cable. The cable's protective devices tripped the supply breaker which prevented any personal injury. There was no significant impact on plant operations. The licensee's investigation and proposed corrective actions were good (Section E4.1).
Plant Sucoort There were four examples of licensee personnel failing to properly log into the computer-
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based electronic dosimetry system prior to entering the radiologically controlled area.
The personnel wore the correct dosimetry but inadvertently did not sign in under their own name. The licensee responded appropriately to each error (Section R4.1).
The licensee nearly failed to perform a pre-job radiological survey for a residual heat I
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l removal pump surveillance test. Health physics personnel had not been notified that vibration readings would be taken on the pump motor greater than 8 feet above the floor.
The quality of the health physics portion of the pre-job briefing was weak. The I
communications between an equipment operator and health physics personnel at the i
radiological controlled 9rea access point were also weak (Section R4.2).
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I Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant began the report period at 74 percent power. On January 20,1998, operators increased reactor power to 77 percent. Or. January 30,1998, operators increased reactor power to 80 percent.
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I. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily tumover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room i
coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift tumovers and noted no problems.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Notice of Enforcement Discretion a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Notice of Enforcement Discretion request. The auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B was inoperable j
while Emergency Diesel Generator A was inoperable.
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Qpietyptions and Findings On January 21,1998, at 7:39 a.m, the licensee declared Emergency Diesel Generator A inoperable for a scheduled system outage. Later that day, at 2 p.m., the licensee declared auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B inoperable. This was due to unsatisfactory test results for penetration of methyliodide into the charcoal. The licensee had sampled the auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B charcoal approximately 2 weeks eariier.
Coincidently, the licensee received the -harcoal test results during the Emergency Diesel Generator A outage.
j Methyl iodide was used to simulate the ability of the charcoal to remove isotopes which could be released into the auxiliary building or fuel building during a design basis accident. The charcoal did not meet the requirements of Technical Specification 4.7.7.b.2.
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2-Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action d.1, required that with Emergency Diesel Generator A inoperable, all required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on Emergency Diesel Generator B as a source of emergency power be also operable. If these
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conditions were not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the licensee was requi,ed to place the reactor in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B received emergency power from Emergency Diesel Generator B.
On January 21,1998, during a conference call with NRC personnel, NRC Region IV granted an oral Notice of Enforcement Discretion. Consequently, the licensee had until 4 p.m., on
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January 22,1998, to restore Emergency Diesel Generator A to an operable status. The granting of the oral Notice of Enforcement Discretion request was later documented in Notice of Enforcement Discretion 98-04-001.
The inspectors verified that the licensee properly took the compertsatory actions discussed during the conference call. These actions included performing no fuel handling and performing no discretionary work that could cause a plant transient or affect the operability of other systems.
The inspectors also verified that the licensee took the compensatory actions required by the Technical Specifications.
Subsequently, the licensee restored Emergency Diesel Generator A to operable status within the allowable time. The licensee issued Licensee Event Report 98-001. The event will be further reviewed and results documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-02.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee properly responded to the simultaneous inoperability of auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust system filter adsorber Unit B and Emergency Diesel Generator A.
02.2 Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors walked down the following tagouts:
Workman's Protection Assurance 25253 - Emergency Diesel Generator A, and
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Workman's Protection Assurances 23795 and 25365 - Motor-Driven Auxiliary
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Feedwater Pump B.
The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags. The inspector also performed a walkdown of Workman's Protection Assurances 23795 and 25365 after the tagouts were cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system lineu.
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-3-O2.3 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:
Component Cooling Water Train A;
Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower Trains A and B; and
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Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A, B, and T.
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Incorrect Breaker inadvertentiv Opened a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions when an equipment operator inadvertently opened an incorrect breaker when hanging worker protection tags.
The inspectors rev' Mewed:
Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-0219;
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Operations Department Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310, " Workman's Protection
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Assurance Tagging," Revision 4; Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00310,' Workman's Protection Assurance and
Caution Tagging," Revision 11; Workman's Protection Assurance System Tagout Control Sheet 25319; and
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Motor Control Center PG 20N, Electrical Circuit Index,
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b.
Observations and Findinas On February 18,1998, an equipment operator opened the incorrect breaker on nonvital Load Center PG 20, thereby deenergizing Motor Control Center PG 20N. The operator immediately realized the error and reclosed the breaker.
Plant components affected included:
One reactor cavity cooling fan;
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One pressurizer enclosure fan;
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-4-Various sump pumps; and
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Centrifugal charging Pump B auxiliary lube oil pump.
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There was no significant impact on the plant.
The inspectors observed the control room operators' response to the event. The control room supervisor exhibited good command and control. There was good communication within the control room and between control room personnel and operators in the plant.
The operators thoroughly reviewed plant status before restoring the affected equipment.
The licensee determined that two equipment operators had identified the correct breaker-to be racked out. However, prior to opening this breaker, the operators contacted the contret room to discuss a question concoming the breaker's as-found position. When the operators retumed to the load conter, they did not reverify the breaker that was to be opened. One of the equipment operators opened the breaker next to the correct one.
The licensee commenced an investigation using the corrective action program and initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-0219. The licensee dewmined that the root cause of this event was personnel error when the equipment operators failed to perform adequate self-checking and dual verification.
The inspectors determined that the immediate reciosing of Breaker PG 2003 for the motor control center PG 20N without notifying the control room was a poor practice. The _
licensee agreed.
Administrative Procedure ODP-ZZ-00310, "Wc,rkman's Protection Assurance Tagging,"
Revision 4, Step 4.1.11.2.2, required that each individual verify the correct component prior to operating the component.
The tagout control sheet for Workman's Protection Assurance 25319, Tag 3, specified that a tag be hung on the breaker for the chemical and volume control system chiller Unit SBG02. However, the equipment operator opened the breaker for Motor Control
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Center PG 20N.
Failure to follow the tagging procedure was not a violation since Motor Control Center PG 20N was not safety-related and the event had no effect on safety-related equipment.
NRC Inspection Reports 50-483/9614 and 50-483/9611 document other examples of tagging errors.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded:
Failure to open the correct breaker was due to personnel error.
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-5-The immediate reclosing of Breaker PG 2003, without control room authorization
was a poor practice that did not meet the licensee's expectations.
The control room operators' response to this event was good.
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IL Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance a.
Inspechon Scoon (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the followmg work activities:
Work Authorization W194654 - Repack lube oil cooler end joint on Emergency
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Diesel Generator A; Work Authorization P590451 - Calibrate emergency fuel oil day Tank A level
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Transmitter JELT0012; Work Authorization C610817 - Replace Emergency Diesel Generator A
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intercooler heat exchanger tube side drain Valve KJV0786A; Work Authorization P5g1254 - Record motor current waveform data on residual
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heat removal Pump B motor, Work Authorization P496148 - Service limitorque operator on condensate storage
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tank to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump B isolation Valve ALHV0034; and Work Authorization P582717 - Change oil on motor-dp auxiliary feedwater
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Pump B.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors found no concems with the maintenance observed. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progrer and quality control personnel were present when required.
M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance a.
Insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
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-6-Test Procedure OSP-EJ-P0018, "Section XI Residual Heat Removal Train 8
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Operability," Revision 22; Test Procedure OSP-EJ V001B, "Section XI Train B Residual Heat Removal
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Valve Operability," Revision 10; Test Procedurs OSP-AL-P001B,"Section XI Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
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Pump B Operability," Revision 19; and Test Procedure OSP-JE-P001 A, " Emergency Fuel Oil Pump A Section XI
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Surveillance," Revision 19.
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Observations and Findinas With the exception of the surveillance activity discussed in Section R4.2, the surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was conducted satisfactorily and in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed a small number of oil and water leaks that were already identified by the licensee.
The inspectors observed an approximate 0.5 gpm essential service water leak
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from one end bell of component cooling water Heat Exchanger EEG01 A. The
'icensee had already identified the deficiency and initiated Work Authorization W176793 to replace the end bell gasket during the Spring 1998 refueling outage.
The inspectors identified a small pool of oil beneath the Emergency Diesel
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Generator B engine. The licensee determined that there was no impact on operability. The licensee also determined that the leak did not warrant immediate repair because of the complexity of the repair and the very smallleak rate.
Licensee workers had previously identified the pool but had not initiated proper action to clean the area. The licensee cleaned up the oil and continued to monitor the lea.
-7-In addition, the inspectors made the following observations:
The inspectors identified that the "open" light was not lit on the auxiliary shutdown
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panel condensate storage tank to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A isolation valve hand indicator Switch AL-HIS-00348. The licensee had not identified this deficiency. The inspectors had observed the light to be lit the previous day.
The licensee discovered a blown fuse in the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A control circuit. With the fuse blown, the valve was not operable from the auxiliary shutdown panelin the event of a control room evacuation. The licensee entered the appropriate Technical Specification action statement for the remote shutdown panel. Electricians replaced the fuse and the licensee exited the action statement within the allowable time.
The inspectors identified an unusual noise from a cooling fan on the main
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transformer C phase. The licensee determined that the fan motor had a bad bearing. There was no short term impact on plant operation since the plant was at reduced power and the outside air temperature was cool. The licensee replaced the fan motor.
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Qgnclusions
The inspectors concluded that overall, the plant material condition was good.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Ligp.ng.ee Event Reoort 50-483/97-010-00: inadequate testing of the actuation logic of the feedwater isolation and turbine trip instrumentation.
On November 18,1997, the licensee discovered that certain logic circuits of the Westinghouse Solid State Protection System were not adequately tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.3.2.1-Sa. The licensee discovered this after notification of a similar deficiency at another nuclear plant.
Technical Specification 4.3.2.1-Sa required a monthly actuation logic test of the feedwater isolation and turbine trip instrumentation. The three functions which were inadequately tested were:
source range automatic P-10 block;
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feedwater isolation on P-14 steam generator hi-hi level; and
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feedwater isolation on a safety injection signal.
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The test was inadequate because the circuit was configured with multiple inputs tied together so that failure of one input would not be detectable.
l On December 11,1997, at 8:30 a.m., the licensee entered Technical Specification 4.0.3.
L The licensee wrote work instructions to test the affected logic circuits. The tests were satisfactory. The licensee exited Technical Specification 4.0.3 within the allowable time.
The licensee revised the surveillance procedures to include tests for the three functions.
The failure to demonstrate operability of the circuits was a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9801-01).
lit Engineering E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Core Drillina into a 13.8 kV Cable l
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Insoection Scooe (37551)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions after maintenance personnel drilled into a 13.8 kV cable.
The inspectors reviewed Modification Work Authorization Document C612323, install piping for the laundry
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decontamination facility; Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution 98-206;
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Temporary Modification Package 98-E003., disconnect damaged cable to nonvital
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Load Center PG 25; and, Temporary Modification Package 98-E004, install temporary power from nonvital
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Load Center PG 26 to PG 25H.
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Observations and Findinas l
At 7:54 a.m. on February 16,1998, while performing a core drillin an auxiliary building concrete wall, licensee personnel drilled into a 13.8 kV cable. The ground fault protection devices for the cable tripped the feeder breaker which prevented any personnel injury. When the breaker tripped, a number of nonsafety-related load centers in the turbine building were deenergized. Additionally, fuel building Load Center PG 25N was deenergize.
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-9-The unit experienced a decrease of electrical output of approximately 30 megawatts due to loss of balance-of-plant efficiency. The major operating systems or components that were affected included:
several low pressure feedwater heater normal dump valves;
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the steam generator blowdown system;
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an auxiliary / fuel building normal exhaust fan;
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a fuel pool cleanup pump;
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a fuel building air supply fan; and
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fuel building lighting.
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At 1:54 p.m., the licensee restored the turbine building load centers using normal cross ties to other sources. At 9:24 p.m. the next day, the licensee re-energized fuel building Load Center PG 25N.
The licensee disconnected the damaged cable and installed a temporary feeder cable from a nearby load center. The inspectors did not observe any problems with the temporary modification packages used to install the temporary cable and to disconnect the damaged cable. All systems and components were then restored. The licensee was evaluating the means for permanent repair at the end of this inspection period. The licensee halted core drills and anchor bolt work ur,til the immediate corrective actions were identified and implemented.
The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error.
Responsible engineering personnel did not review electrical drawings while planning 'ne work package to determine if there were any conduits in the wall. As a result, modification Work Authorization C612323 did not contain adequate instructions.
Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requires that activities affecting qualitv shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The failure to prepare an adequate modification work package was a violation (50-483/9801-02).
The licensee initiated the following corrective actions:
Revising various engineering department procedures to clarify required reviews
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for modifications; Improving access to unscheduled conduit field sketches;
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Evaluating proper use of core drill machine ground fault devices; and,
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Training personnel on corrective actions.
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The licensee resumed core drilling after satisfactorily implementing the immediate carrective actions. This included revising procedures and conducting training.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to prepare an adequate work package for the core drill. The inspectors also concluded that the licensee's investigation and proposed corrective actions were good.
IV. Plant Suonort I
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
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The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely l
touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a
sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problems.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4.1 Personnel Entered the Radioloaical Control Area Under the Wrona Name a.
Inspection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors reviewed instances when personnel entered the radioiogical controlled area under the wrong name.
The inspectors reviewed:
Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Reports 97-1434, 98-26, 98-83, and 98-146;
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and Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-1000,"Callaway Plant Health Physics
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Program," Revision 12.
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Observations and Findinas The licensee identified four occurrences, since December 15,1997, in which personnel entered the radiological controlled area under the wrong name. The licensee documented the four occuvences using the corrective action syste,
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-11-The licensee's electronic dosimetry system was computer based. Normally, personnel entering the radiological controlled area entered their badge number manually or electronically using a bar code reader. On three of the fcur occasions, workers manually entered the wrong badge number. On the fourth occasion, the bar code reader failed to read the correct badge number.
The electronic dosimetry system was set up so that personnel have to verify that the name and other information was correct prior to entering the redsologically controlled area. On four occasions, personnel did not verify that the name was correct.
The licensee initiated several corrective actions, on a progressive scale, followng each occurrence. The event dates and corrective actions were as follows:
December 15,1997 - The licensee comed the individual involved. The licensee
sent the Suggestion-Occurrence-Soution report to the licensing department for trending; January 7,1998_- The licensee coached the individual involved. Since this and
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the previous incident involved personnel from the same department, the licensee sent the Suggestion-Occurrerr.:e-Solution report to that department for action; January 21,1998 - The licensee assigned the Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution
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report to the individual's department, to the health physics department, and to the nuclear information systems department. Plant management issued a directive to all department heads to review these incidents with employees. In addition, the licensee explored improvements to the computer-based electronic dosimetry system.
February 4,1998 - Senior plant managemer.' issued instructions to ensure all
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plant personnel correctly process through the computer-based electronic dosimetry system. A description of the problems was piaced on the computer-based electronic dosimetry screens, with a caution to ansure the worker was signing in properly.
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In addition, on February 26,1998, the licensee held a stand down meeting with all site personnel to discuss the events.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and had no concems.
Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-1000, Step 4.1.5.1b required that each individual entering a radiological controlled area know and comply with radiation work permit requirements. The inspectors observed that there were 19,683 entries into the radiological controlled area from December 1,1997, through February 23,1998. The inspectors considered the four errors to be examples of one violation of the
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-12-administrative procedura requirement. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9801-03).
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that personnel failed to property log into the computer-based electronic dosimetry system prior to entering the radiologically controlled area. The licensee appropriately responded to each error.
R4.2 Radioloaical Controls for a Residual Heat Removal Pumo Test a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing and observed portions of the residual heat removal Train B operability surveillance test identified in Section M1.2.
The inspectors reviewed:
Radiation Work Permit 98-00501;
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Test Procedure OSP-EJ-P001B, "Section XI Residual Heat Removal Train B
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Operability," Revision 22; and Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-111.
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Observations and Findinos The test required an equipment operator to access portions of the residual heat removal pump motor more than 8 feet above the floor for vibration measurements. Radiation Work Permit 98-00501 required that health physics personnel survey the area when accessing areas greater than 8 feet above the floor. The licensee had not performed the survey prior to the test.
A health physics monitor assigned to the auxiliary building entered the residual heat removal pump room prior to beginning the test. During discussions, the health physics monitor realized that the equipment operator would access the area greater than 8 feet above the floor. The health physics monitor performed the required survey and personnel successfully completed the test.
The inspectors and the licensee determined that the equipment operator assigned to take the vibration measurements did not adequately discuss the scope of the test with health physics personnel ahead of time. Specifically, the equipment operator did not inform the health physics personnel that the test required access more than 8 feet above the floor. Further, health physics personnel were not present at the pre-job briefing in the control room to discuss radiological concems.
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The licensee wrote Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 98-111 to initiate corrective actions. The licensee has initiated changes to the applicable residual heat removal pump and containment spray pump surveillance procedures to ensure performance of surveys prior to testing.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that the quality of the health physics portion of the pre-job brienng was weak. Communications between the equipment operator and health physics personnel at the radiological controlled area access point were also weak.
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V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on February 27,1998. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL IN':ORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i
D. L. Bettenhausen, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support D. G. Cornwell, General Supervisor, Maintenance G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Training M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Health Physics R. E. Farnam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Operations M. R. Faulkner, Assistant Superintendent, Security L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor Engineer, Engineering C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. W. Neterer, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
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l J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness / Organizational Development G. L. Randolph, Vice President, Nucle 6r M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support
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R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Radwaste M. E. Taylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control W. A. Witt, Superintendent, Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP G2707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Fiant Support Activities IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance i
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 9801-01 NCV inadequate testing of the actuation logic of the feedwater isolation and turbine trip instrumentation (Section M8.1).
9801-02 VIO Core drilling into a 13.8 kV cable (Section E4.1)
9801-03 NCV Personnel inadvertently entered the radiologically controlled area under the wrong name (Section R4.1)
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-2-Closed 97-010-00-LER Inadequate testing of the actuation logic of the feedwaterisolation and turbine trip instrumentation (Section M8.1).
9801-01 NCV Inadequate testing of the actuation logic of the feedwater isolation and turbine trip instrumentation (Section M8,1).
9801-02 NCV Personnel inadvertently entered the radiologically controlled area under the wrong narne (Section R4.1)
Discussed 98-001-00 LER Inoperable auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust Train B (Section 02.1)
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BWX Technologies, Inc.
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Dabcock & Wilcox, a McDermott company Nava1 Nuclear Fuel Division P.O. Box 785
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Lynchburg. VA 24505-0785 (804) 522-6000
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Novembe m;_,r 25,1997 mv l
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97 DEC 18 P3 SI U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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A'ITN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Reference:
(a) NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/97-05 and Notice of Violation.
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(b) Letter dated July 23,1997 (97-064) J. A. Conner of BWXT to Document Control Desk, NRC, Reply to a Notice of Violation Gentlemen:
In Reference (b) BWX Technologies, Inc., Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) replied to the referenced Notice of Violation, Reference (a), that five items would be completed to avoid further violations. The first item states:
Modification of the overflow piping / column to move the high level probe higher to reduce any overflow into the catch tray will be evaluated and implemented if practical by September 15,1997.
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This modification was recommended by the Post Incident Review Team. It was believed that by locating the high level probe higher in the overflow line from the Low Level Dissolver column that an overflow event would be detected earlier allowing additional time for automatic shutdown and result in less overflow volume.
l The evaluation of this proposal was completed on September 11,1997. Installation and system checkout was completed on November 7,1997.
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If there are questions in this regard, please contact us.
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Sincerely,
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' Arne F. Olsen 9712100198 971125
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PDR ADOCK 07000027 Licensing Officer i
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Region II NRC Resident Inspector R,N!E,E13
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NUCLEAR REACTOR LABORATORY
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AN INTERC"PARTMENTAL CENTER OF MASSACHUSEl.S INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
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JOHN A. BERNARD 138 Afbany Street. Cambodge. MA 02139-4296 Actwalion Anatysis
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Director Telefan No (617)253-7300 Coolant Chermstry Onector of Reactor Operassons Tel. No (617253 4202 Nuclear Medicine Pnnespal Research Engwiver
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? 1 Reactor Fngineenng December 4, !.%7
n Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject:
Letter dated 26 November 97 from R. Brady (Director, Division of Facilities and Security Office of Administration) to Professor Otto K. Harling, MIT Gentlemen:
This is to advise you that Prof'ssor Harling has retired and correspondence of this type e
should now be sent to the undersigned.
In regards to your list, Mr. Lincoln Clark has retired and no longer needs NRC ac' cess
authorization. Enclosed is a Security Tennination Statement for Mr. Clark.
.G 0 hn A. Bernard, Ph..
irector JAB /koc Enclosure
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Enclosure 2
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pmC FORM 136 U.S. NuCLENi EGULATORY COMMISSION" APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 31500040
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SECURITY TERMINATION STATEMENT E c = D E E A E a'ao * O ""E E
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cuetovts Lincoln Clark Massachusetts Institute of Technology wac acccas aurwoeizaron as wuueca ra u,
emcrwE DATE oF TERupMTON December 4, 1997 i
i make the following statement in cosinection with t g termination of my access authorization granted by, or pending with, the U.S. Nuclear Regula i j g)
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1.
I shall not unlawfully r hany person any National I ormation, Restricted Data, or other classified inf
, or unclassified Safeguards inf t
of which I may have gained knowledge exce horized by law, regulations of the NRC. Q writing by officials of the NRC empowered nt permission for such disclosure.
p 2. I am aware t At Act of 1954, as a U.S.
e, Title 18, " Crimes and Criminal Pr es,* pre les
'osure ricted Data, Former1y Restricted D Safeguardst
.a 'on, relating nationd defense.
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3. I am aware tlat unless ndY C" -
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an authoriz resentative of the U.S. Govemmilht, all ions disations ;,,
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by of my havinJ
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executed SF@, *
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4. I am aware tha be#:
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I una person sensitive n (e I.f h. 6dhu
' ry Inforrr$yi) of which I have gained unclassified ini knowledge as a r f my emplo C.
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designated by the NRC,$nce with NRC security regulat I have destroyed, in a transferred to persons 5.
all cla ' ed and/or sensitive assmed information which I may have had in my possession.
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i 6. I am aware that I may be subject to criminal penaltics if I have made any statement of material facts knowing that such statement is false or if I wiltfuffy conceal any material fact (Title 18. U.S.
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Code, Section 1001).
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7. I understand that the NRC desires to be informed when persons who have been granted an NRC l
access authorization propose to travel to designated countries within 2 years from execution of this form. This does not apply to individuals who obtain an NRC access authorization and receive
access to NRC classified information solely as employees of other Govemment agencies or their contractors.
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sionarune - reason Exscurino :wis norm y
so,e John A. Bernard Lincoln Clark V
" "Di E N c Na N a7tEr TaToN tory
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology December 4,1997, Cambridge, MA
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