IR 05000483/1998004
| ML20247F705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247F685 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-98-04, 50-483-98-4, NUDOCS 9805200024 | |
| Download: ML20247F705 (11) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-483 License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/98-04 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Hwy. CC and Hwy. O i
Fulton, Missouri Dates:
April 6-10,1998 i
l Inspected By:
Dennis W. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch Approved By:
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Attachment:
Supplemental Information l
l 9905200024 990417 PDR ADOCK 05000483
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-04 This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included testing and maintenance; protected area barriers and detection aids; vital area barriers and detection aids; compensatory measures; security system power supply; security event logs; security training and qualification; protection of safeguards information; and review of previous inspection findings.
Plant Succort Performance in the physical security area remained good with no trend changes. An
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effective testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented.
Effective protected and vital area barriers and detection systems were maintained.
The barriers and detections systems provided proper delay and detection to attempted unauthorized entry. A good program for reporting security events was in place. A comprehensive security training program had been implemented. An effective program to protect safeguards information was in place. Compensatory measures were properly implemented (Sections S2.1, S2.2, S2.3, S2.4, and S2.5).
A discrepancy was identified in which requirements in a security procedure did not
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agree with requirements in the security plan. The " Compensatory Measures" security procedure specified, in part, that increased vehicle patrols may be used during periods of fog, rain or sun glare, to compensate for intrudeis that are not visible at the perimeter zone by closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras. The security plan requires that a partial failure of the CCTV surveillance and assessment system be compensated by stationing members of the security force in position to observe the effected perimeter zones. There were no events identified which included implementation of this procedure (Section S2.4).
A program had not been established to " load" test the security diesel generator. In
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May 1997, the licensee committed to develop a procedure to " load" test the security diesel generator; no completion date was establsihed. The licensee was in the process of developing a " load" test procedure and conducting a " load" test by May 1998 ction S2.5).
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-3-Report Details IV. Plant Support S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Imptina and Maintenance a.
Inspection Scoce (81700)'
The inspector reviewed the testing and maintenance program to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan, b.
Observations and Findinos The inspector determined through interviews with security officers and supervisors and a review of records that repairs to security equipment were completed in a timely manner. The timely response to repair detection aids, access control equipment, and vital area door locks and closures was instrumental in the extremely low nurnber of compensatory posting.
The inspector determined through interviews and review of records that the licensee's daily tests and checks included the following: fixed metal detectors, X-ray machines, outdoor lighting, duress alarms, communication equipment, and individual equipment assigned to security personnel.
Additionally, the licensee's weekly tests and checks included: Explosive detectors, operational microwave alarm units, vital area portals, remote multiplexer units, power inverter units, protected area portals, fence and gates, vehicle barrier system gates, and culverts
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The inspector also determined through a review of records that maintenance surveillance had been completed on: annual tamper alarms, and semi-annual security keys and cores.
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Conclusions An effective testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented.
S2.2 Protected Area Barrier and Detection Aids l
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Inspection Scope (71750 and 81700)
The inspector reviewed the protected area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the features of the protected area barriers and the design and capabilities of
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-4-the detection aids system.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of the protected area barriers and determined that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the physical security plan. Additionally, the inspector determined that the protected area barriers provided penetration resistance to both forced and surreptitious entry and was adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary.
The inspector observed the licensee test the protected area perimeter microwave system. The detection system was well designed and maintained. All attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected. The licensee's tests of the system were performance based to ensure that system failures were discovered and corrected, c.
Conclusions Effective protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained. During performance testing of the detection system at the main protected area, all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.
S2.3 Vital Area Barriers and Detection Aids a.
Inspection Scope (81'/00)
The inspector observed the licensee's vital area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observation and testing that the vital areas were appropriately locked and alarmed and that the vital area barriers were adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary. The inspector's random observations determined that unescorted access into vital areas was limited to authorized personnel. The alarms annunciated in continuously manned alarm stations.
Emergency exits from vital areas were properly locked and alarmed.
The inspector observed the licensee test the vital area door locking mechanisms and detection aids. All tests were properly conducted and all attempts to intrude into the vital areas were detected. The licensee's tests of the vital area detection system were performance based to ensure that system failures were discovered and l
corrected.
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Conclusions Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were maintained. The barriers and detection system provided proper delay and detection to attempted unauthorized entry.
S2.4 Compensatory Measures a.
Inspection Scope.(81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspector confirmed through observations that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with the requirements in the physical security plan. The inspector determined through interviews that the security personnel assigned to compensatory security posts were property trained.
Section 3.1.3.2 of the security plan requires, in part, that the partial failure of the closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance and assessment system be compensated by stationing members of the security force in position to observe the effected perimeter zone (s).
During the inspection, the inspector determined that Section 3.2 of Security Procedure SDP-SF-00011, " Compensatory Measures," Revision 3, was inconsistent with the physical security plan. The procedure specified, in part, that increased vehicle patrols may be used during periods of fog, rain or sun glare, to compensate I
for intruders that are not visible at the perimeter zone by closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras. There were no events identified which included implementation of
this procedure. During the inspection, the licensee stated that this portion of the security procedure would be revised to reflect the requirements of the security plan, that members of the security force be positioned to observe the effected perimeter zones (s). Actions to revise Security Procedure SDP-SF-00011 is an inspection l
followup item that will be reviewed during a future inspection (50-483/9804-01).
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panclusions Compensatory measures were properly implemented and security personnel were l
well trained on the program requirements. An inspection followup item identified a discrepancy in which a security procedure did not agree with requirements in the i
security pla.
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-6-2.5 Security System Power Supp_ty
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Inspection Scope (71750)
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The security system power supply was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas During a previous inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee's security diesel generator has been performance tested each month by conducting only a generator "run" test. A "" load"" test of the diesel generator had not been conducted.
As such, the security diesel generator has not demonstrated with high assurance its capability of providing required backup power to the secunty equipment. Instead, the monthly "run" tests have only evaluated the generator's ability to start and operate without a load. In May 1997, the licensee committed to develop a procedure to
- load" test the security diesel generator; no completion date was established.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee has continued to conduct monthly "run" tests of the security diesel generator. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's efforts of developing a procedure for " load" testing the security diesel generator. This matter is discussed in Section S8.2 below, c.
Conclusions A program had not been established to " load" test the security diesel generator, however, this system has continued to be "run" tested each month. The licensee confirmed an earlier commitment that a procedure would be developed and a " load" test conducted by May 1998.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Security Event Loas a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to
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determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),
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i 10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security plan.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the Suggestion Occurrence Solution system Log (security event logs) from October 1,1997 through April 6,1998. The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by regulations. The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The inspector also reviewed two Suggestion
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7-Occurrence Solution Reports (security incident reports). The logs and supportin security incident reports were accurate, neat, and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause, deportability, and corrective action taken.
The licensee's records also included trending and analysis of the major categorie events.
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Conclusions A good program for reporting security events was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. The security incident reports were accurate and neat.
SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification SS.1 Security Trainina and Quakfication Inspection Scope (81700)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security, train and qualification plan and the contingency plan.
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Observations and Findinas The security organization conducted all required training in accordance with its review of composite security training records, that the requir conducted every 12 months.
The inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. All security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the program requirements.
The inspector also observed various security defensive positions throughout the designated armed security officers in the event of an attack c.
Conclusions A comprehensive security training program had been implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
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-7-l Occurrence Solution Reports (security incident reports). The logs and supporting security incident reports were accurate, neat, and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause, deportability, and corrective action taken.
The licensee's records also included trending and analysis of the major categories of events.
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Conclusions A good program for reporting security events was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. The security incident reports were accurate and neat.
S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification SS.1 Security Trainina and Qualification a.
inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security, training, and qualification plan and the contingency plan, b.
Observations and Findinas The security organization conducted all required training in accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a review of composite security training records, that the required training was conducted every 12 months.
The inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. All security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the program requirements.
The inspector also observed various security defensive positions throughout the protected area. These positions were manned, or planned to be manned by designated armed security officers in the event of an attack upon the plant.
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Conclusions A comprehensive security training program had been implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
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-8-S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (MC 81810, 92700, 92904)
S8.1 Protection of Safeauards Information a.
Inspection Scope (81810)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for protection of safeguards information to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.
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Observations and Findinos The inspector reviewed 14 of the 20 locations used to store safeguards information.
The inspector determined through interviews and observations that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the protection of safeguards information. The licensee restricted access to safeguards to authorized persons with a need to know and disclosed this information only to authorized persons. When unattended, safeguards information was stored in a locked security storage container, and the combination to each container was known only by authorized individuals. Additionally, while in use or otherwise outside of a locked security storage container, safeguards information was under the control of an authorized individual.
The inspector also verified that each page of documents containing safeguards j
information was conspicuously marked. Additionally, the front of each document was l
conspicuously marked, and these documents were reproduced only to the minimum
extent necessary. The licensee properly destroyed documents containing safeguards information via shredding. Additionally, when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage, these documents were packaged to conceal the presence of safeguards information.
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Conclusions An effective program to protect safeguards information was in place.
S8.2 Information Notice 98-05: Criminal History Record Information-Information Notice 98-05, dated February 11,1998, was issued to alert licensees to a recent clarification of the legal constraints associated with Criminal History Record
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Information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Specifically, the FBI has i
reiterated its position that this information provided by the FBI to the NRC and its I
licensees may not be released to third parties, such as contractors.
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had reviewed it for applicability. Following their review, the licensee determined that
their current practice and procedures were adequate, and additional actions were not
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needed.
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S8.3 (Ocen) Inspection Followuo item 483/9709-01: Periodic Load Testino of Security Diesel Generator During a previous inspection, the inspector determined that since its installation in 1984, the licensee's security diesel generator had been performance tested each month via conducting only a generator "run" test. However, the security diesel generator had never been "" load" tested. As such, the security diesel generator had not demonstrated the capability of providing required backup power under load conditions to specific security equipment. Instead, the periodic "run" tests had only evaluated the generator's ability to start and operate without a load.
In May 1997, the licensee committed to develop a procedure to " load" test the security diesel generator; no completion date was established. During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee was developing this procedure.
During the exit meeting on April 10,1998, the inspector discussed the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(a) and the physical security plan for establishing and maintaining high assurance that the security diesel generator is capable of providing emergency power to required security equipment. The licensee stated that by May 1998, a
"" load"" test of the security diesel generator would be completed.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1.
Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 10,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer R. Affolter, Plant Manager J. Coash, Supervisor, Security Training M. Dunbar, Supervisor, Security Operations M. Faulkner, Assistant Superintendent, Security D. Fitzgerald, Superintendent, Security G. Hughes, Acting Manager, Quality Assurance T. Jarvis, Technician, Computer Group A. Lord, Engineer, Nuclear Engineering System R. Mertz, Supervisor, Access Control M. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance R. Rist, Superintendent, Personnel G. Scheperle, Auditor, Quality Assurance NRC D. Passehl, Senor Resident inspector F. Brush, Resident inspector Contractors J. Coash, Supervisor, Security Training, Burns Security L. David, Locksmith, Burns Security Mark Dunbar, Supervisor, Security Operations, Burns Security
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-2-INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 81810 Protection of Safeguards Information LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED AND REVIEWED ltems Opened 50-483/9804-01 IFl Revise Security Procedure SDP-SF-00011.
Items Closed None items Reviewed 50-483/9709-02 IFl Periodic Load Testing of Security Diesel Generator LIST OF DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED Safeguards Event Log from October 1,1997 to April 6,1998 Performance Indicators (Safeguards Event Log Trending), September 1996 to February 1998 On-Going Training Schedules for security officers,1997 and 1998 (partial)
Security Department Procedure SDP-SF-00011, " Compensatory Measures," Revision 3 Equipment Problem Logs (weekly), January through March 1995 Operational Tests (weekly) for Explosive Detectors, March 1-31, 1998 Operational Tests (daily) for X-Ray Machines, March 1-31, 1998 Operational Test (daily) for Metal Detectors, March 1-31, 1998 Fence and Gate Inspection (weekly), March 1-31, 1998 Alarm Tests (weekly), Daytime-Outside, March 1-31, 1998 Alarm Tests (weekly), Night Time-Auxiliary, March 1-31, 1998 m___________
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