IR 05000483/1998024

Insp Rept 50-483/98-24 on 981026-30.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Implementation of NRC Approved Fire Protection Program

ML20196G351
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	11/25/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196G320	List: IR 05000483/1998024 ML20196G319 ML20196G347
References
50-483-98-24, NUDOCS 9812070317
Download: ML20196G351 (19)

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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV ,

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Docket No.: 50-483 l

i; - License No.: NPF-30

, Report No.: 50-483/98-24 l l

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Licensee: Ur, ion Electric Company

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Facility

Callaway Plant  ;

Location: Junction Hwy. CC and Hwy. o j Fulton, Missouri l

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Dates: October ~26-30,1998 Inspector: R. Bywater, Reactor inspector Approved By: T. Stetka, Acting Chief Engineering Branch  ;

Division of Reactor Safety {

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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l f

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9812070317 981125 PDR

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1 EXEC,UTIVE SUMMARY l l

Callaway Plant )

NRC Inspection Report 50-483/98-24  !

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This announced, routine inspection reviewed the licensee's implementation of the NRC- i approved fire protection progra j j Plant Sucoort ,

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Overa!!, a good fire protection program was maintained. Effective measures had been j

established to prevent the occurrence of fires, minimize the magnitude of fires that may i

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occur and limit potential damage to ensure that safe shutdown capability was s

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An example of a violation of Operating License Section 2.C(5)(c) was identified involving l the failure to initiate a fire protection impairment permit and compensatory actions for an  !

j inoperable fire door between the control room and control room pantry (Section F2). l 4  ; *

An example of a violation of Operating License Section 2.C(5)(c) was identified involving i the failure to include several fire doors in the control building, and the elevator and

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dumbwaiter doors in the auxiliary building, in plant procedures to ensure that required j

, surveillance inspections were performed and compensatory actions taken when they '

were inoperable (Section F3). j

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• Quality assurance oversight was effective. Audits were excellent in quality and resulted  ;

in meaningful findings that were properly documented and tracked for closure in the l

! corrective action program. Quality assurance surveillance activities provided good l

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performance-based assessment of the fire protection program (Section F7).

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An unresolved item was identified regarding the potential for fire-induced circuit failures j to prevent the operation of equipment required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire {

that requires control room evacuation. As a result of a finding in a Final Safety Analysis l Report review effort, the licensee identified and reported in 1.icensee Event Report 50- j

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483/98009 that the isolation / transfer switch control circuitry for a motor-operated valve i required for post-fire safe shutdown did not have redundant fusing to protect it from the l

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effects of a fire. The licensee revised its alternative shutdown procedure to add manual actions to verify correct valve position; however, the NRC will need to review further the

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licensee's evaluation regarding the survivability of components following spurious

actuation to ensure that the alternative shutdown capability is consistent with the j licensing basis (Section F8). ,

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Summary of Plant Status

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The plant operated at full power during the inspectio i

IV. Plant Support  !

F1' Control of Fire Protection Activities ) Insoection Scope (64704)  !

The inspector reviewed the licensee's fire protection program to verify that the licensee had properly implemented and maintained the fire protection program required by the l operating license. The inspector reviewed fire protection procedures, administrative i

controls, quality assurance audit reports, fire reports, fire brigade qualifications, fire )

brigade staffing, and fire watch staffing to determine if they were in accordance with the approved fire protection program. The inspector also conducted walkdowns and tours .

of the facility to verify licensee implementation of the approved fire protection program. 1 Observations and Findinos The inspector noted that most administrative controls were properly implemented and i that most administrative control procedures were adequate. The inspector noted a few minor exceptions that are discussed in other sections of this report. Fire brigade personnel were qualified, plant housekeeping for control of transient combustible !

materials was excellent, the number of component impairments / breaches was very low, i and station fire response equipment was well maintained. There were very few fires at the facility and corrective actions had been developed and implemented for those minor fires that had occurre l Conclusions j

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Overall, a good fire protection program _was maintained. Effective measures had been !

established to prevent the occurrence of fires, minimize the magnitude of fires that may l occur, and limit potential damage to ensure that safe shutdown capability was i maintained, l

F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment i Insoection Scope (64704) i

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The inspector performed a walkdown of accessible areas of the facility containing safe shutdown equipment. The inspector also visually inspected fire protection equipment located throughout the facility, including fire suppression and detection equipment, fire rated assemblies, and fire brigade and operator emergency response equiprnent located

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in equipment storage areas. The inspector reviewed maintenance and surveillance !

testing records of selected fire protection equipment to verify that equipment was maintained in an operable conditio i The inspector also randomly selected components required for safe shutdown following l control room fire and evacuation by Procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, " Control Room '

inaccessability," Revision 16, to verify that they were accessible and had adequate emergency lighting to perform required task ! Observations and Findinas  !

J The inspector observed that most fire response equipment was well maintained, !

accessible, within calibration, and in good working order. All valves observed by the :

inspector in the fire suppression systems were in their correct position. Preventive ;

maintenance and testing of fire protection equipment was performed in accordance with !

approved procedure [

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The inspector noted that all fire brigade response equipment was well maintained and l

ready for immediate us t l

The inspector did not identify any discrepancies during a review of selected l maintenance and surveillance records of fire protection equipmen '

The inspector reviewed the list of active fire protection equipment impairment permit The fire protection system was in an excellent state of readiness as indicated by the low number of impaired component i However, while on a plant tour, the inspector noted that the fire door between the control room and the control room pantry (Door DSK36021) was propped open with a trash can without an impairment permit and compensatory measures. The inspector asked the licensee why there was no impairment permit for this door and was informed that the {

door was normally blocked open and that this had been previously evaluated as an acceptable condition because the control room was continuously staffed and there were fire detectors in the control room and the pantry. The licensee was not able to locate :

the evaluatio I Door DSK36021 was required by the fire protection program to be a 3-hour fire-rated assembly penetrating the 3-hour fire barrier betwee.1 Fire Areas C-27 and C-2 Procedure APA-ZZ-00703," Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance ;

requirements," Revision 10, required that fire-rated assemblies be considered part 1 of the required fire barrier and shall be operable at all times. If the fire barrier was l inoperable and there were operable detectors on at least one side of the barrier, Procedure APA-ZZ-00703 required that an hourly fire watch be establishe ,

Additionally, Procedure APA-ZZ-00701," Control of Fire Protection impairments,"

Revision 7, required that a fire protection impairment permit (FPlP) be generated to :

administratively control impairments. Door DSK36021, which was impaired by being !

propped open, did not have a fire protection impairment permit as required by

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Procedure APA-ZZ-00701 and did not have compensatory measures identified or  !

implemented, as required by Procedure APA-ZZ-0070 ;

After discussions with the inspector, the licensee initiated Suggestion Occurrence ,

j Solution (SOS) 98-3707 to document this issue and initiate corrective actions to j

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evaluate operability requirements for fire-rated assemblies between Fire Areas C-27 and :

C-28. The licensee initiated FPlP 1587 on October 30,1998, to establish the required L compensatory hourly fire watch.

! I Operating Licena NPF-30, Section 2.C(5)(c) requires that the licensee shall implement i j and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The failure ;

i to initiate an FPIP for Door DSK36021 was considered to be an example of a violation of ;

l the operating license (50-483/9824-01). The licensee implemented immediate  :

j corrective actions for the violation by initiating the FPIP and the inspector considered the j j actions proposed in SOS 98-3707 adequate to address the violatio !

I During a tour of the auxiliary building, in an area containing equipment required for post- l l fire safe shutdown manual actions, the inspector noted that the lamps on Emergency l i Light OD296 did not appear to be aimed correctly. The licensee provided a copy of the ;

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checklist for Procedure OTS-OD-00001, " Emergency Lighting Tests," Revision 10, and !

Drawing E-2L1404," Lighting, Grounding, and Communications, Auxiliary and Reactor ;

Buildings," Revision 29. The note on Drawing E-2L1404 indicated that one of the two i

, lamps on Emergency Light OD296 was to provide illumination of Motor Control Centers

, (MCCs) NG04T, NG02T, and Handswitch EMHS8843, and the other lamp was to

provide illumination for access / egress to Room 1409. The inspector noted that due to i the configuration of the MCCs and the handswitch, it did not appear possible for one lamp to illuminate each of the components. The emergency lighting system engineer l

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and an operator walked down the configuration and concluded that sufficient emergency l lighting would be available for operation of the components and for access / egress; j however, a work request was initiated to adjust the direction of one of the lamps to provide optimalillumination of the MCCs. The inspector considered this acceptable.

l During a tour of the outdoor transformer areas of the plant, the inspector noted that the transformer vaults were covered with small diameter aggregate that appeared hard

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packed. The licensee informed the inspector that an evaluation had been performed

regarding the acceptability of the small diameter aggregate that was covering larger

} aggregate below, and capacity of the aggregate-filled vaults to contain oil and water j following a fire and suppression system actuatio The inspector ceviewed evaluations in Audit Report AP96-004 and SOS 97-1286. The j evaluations identified that a note on Drawing C-2C0902," Yard Transformers Conc. Neat

! Line and Reinforcing Sections and Details, Sheet 1," Revision 0. The note specified the j use of a rock fill in the transformer vaults that was 1-inch size aggregate in accordance j with ASTM D448," Standard Classification for Sizes of Aggregate for Road and Bridge .

j Construction," or 40 percent voids, in order to ensure adequate capacity for oil and !

j water. The inspector reviewed Drawing C-2C0902 and identified that the note specified

Size 1 aggregate conforming to ASTM Designation D448 or as an alternate, an

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6-aggregate fill with a minimum of 40 percent voids. The inspector referred to ASTM Designation D448 and concluded that the licensee had misinterpreted the note on Drawing C-2C0902 to mean "1-inch" size aggregate instead of "#1" size aggregat The ASTM standard identified that #1 size aggregate has a nominal size of 3.5 to 1.5 inch, less than 15 percent by weight is less than 1.5 inch, and less than 5 percent by weight is less than 0.75 inch. The inspector noted that the aggregate surrounding several of the transformers was only on the order of 1 inch in size. The inspector was concerned that in the event of a transformer fire, burning oil would not soak through the small aggregate and would be contained in the transformer vault before spreading to other transformers or plant building The licensee informed the inspector that the small aggregate was placed in the transformer vaults to create a smoother walking surface above the large aggregate and an evaluation was performed to document that the contents of the vault would still meet the 40 percent void specification. The licensee was not able to locate the evaluation and generated SOS 98-3705 to document the issue and to generate a work request to inspect and remove undesirable material from the transformer vaults. The inspector considered these actions acceptabl The inspector noted that the fire protection program did not explicitly identify the transformer vaults and they were not required for safe shutdown of the facility; however, the inspector considered the vaults an important fire protection feature to maintain operable in order to prevent unnecessary spread of a fir l c. Conclusions Fire protection equipment required for program implementation was generally well maintained and available for use. Surveillance testing confirmed the operability of required equipment. One example of a violation was identified for not properly _

evaluating an impairment of a fire-rated assembly or providing compensatory measure A potential problem was identified with the functionality of the oil collection capability of the transformer vaults.

F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation a. Inspection Scope (64704) I The inspector reviewed the licensee's approved fire protection program as documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility. The inspector reviewed the procedures listed in the attachment of this report to verify that the procedures !

adequately implemented the licensee's approved progra :

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The inspector found that, with the exception of the item noted below, the procedures ;

adequately implemented the approved fire protection progra Section 9.5.1.7.3 of the Standard Nuclear Utility Power Plant System Final Safety Analysis Report stated that fire barrier penetrations, including fire doors, are considered t functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the as-designed !

condition and for those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed I condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not ;

degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetratio j Section 9.5.1.14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report - Callaway Site Addendum, stated :

that fire doors separating safety-related areas are provided wi+h closing mechanisrts !

and will be inspected semiannually to verify that the closing mechanisms arc operable i

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and that fire doors that are closed and latched will be inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position. The inspector noted that the licensee's procedures to l implement these requirements, Procedure SDP-KC 00002," Fire Door Position  !

Verification," Revision 4, Procedure OSP-KC-00015, " Fire Door inspections," Revision 7, l

and Procedure APA-ZZ-00703, did not implement these requirements for severaldoors '

within the safety-related control building and auxiliary building. Specifically, the procedures did not address surveillance or operability requirements for doors between Fire Area C-27 (control room) and Fire Area C-28 (control room pantry, janitor's closet, )

and toilet) in the control building. Nor did the procedures address the door between the ;

control room (Fire Area C-27) and secondary alarm station (Fire Area C-29) in the l control building. Also, the procedures did not address surveillance or operability j requirements for the elevator doors or dumbwaiter doors in the auxiliary building. The l inspector observed each of the doors and did not have an immediate operability concern i regarding their performance capabilities as fire-rated assemblies with the exception of j the control room pantry door which was propped open as discussed in Section F2 of this repor The licensee initiated SOS 98-3706 to document the issue regarding the elevator and dumbwaiter doors. The corrective action included a review to evaluate appropriate procedure revisions to address operability and surveillance requirement As discussed in Section F2, the licensee initiated SOS 98-3707 to address the control room fire barriers. As corrective action, the licensee identified that they would review the operability requirements of the fire doors and revise the procedures as necessary to i ensure that they were complet Operating License NPF-30, Section 2.C(5)(c) requires that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The failure to irclude surveillance testing and operability requirements for fire doors in plant procedures was considered to be an example of a violation of the Operating License (50-483/9824-01). The inspector considered the actions proposed in SOS 98-3706 and SOS 98-3707 adequate to address the violatio . - - . .

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4 Conclusions

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With the exception of one violation regarding surveillance testing and operability

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reouirements of fire doors, the inspector determined that the fire protection program

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procedures adequately implement sd the approved fire protection progra F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance

, Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspector reviewed the adequacy of the fire protection staff by conducting interviews i and plant walkdowns with staff members.

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Discussions with the fire protection engineer, fire protection system engineer, fire

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marshal, and quality assurance fire protection auditor indicated that they understood NRC requirements for the fire protection program and National Fire Code requirement They also demonstrated a detailed understanding of fire hazards associated with the i facility and understanding of the systems, testing, and analyses associated with the fire protection program. The staff also appeared to have a very good working relationship with staff in other functional areas.

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The plant had a qualified fire protection staff which had a very good working relationship with other functional areas of the statio F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification

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Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspector reviewed the readiness of the onsite fire brigade personnel to fight fires, i The inspector reviewed the fire brigade composition, qualifications (including medical),

and training records to determine if the fire brigade met the requirements of the fire protection program. Due to a plant operational occurrence, the inspector did not have the opportunity to observe a scheduled drill, but did review evaluations of past brigade performance and interviewed the fire marshal regarding brigade readiness, Observations and Findinos The inspector did not identify any discrepancies with the training and qualification requirements for fire brigade members or their physical examination requirements. Fire protection program training requirements were implemented via Procedure FPP-ZZ-00009, * Fire Protection Training Program," Revision .-- . _ _ - .- - .. - ---. _ _ - _ - . _ _ _ - . _ _ . - - _ . . - -- -_

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i-9-Although conditions prevented observing a drill, the inspector reviewed the plan for Fire ,

Drill No. 98UO8 and discussed its contents and fire brigade issues in general with the  ;

fire marshal. No discrepancies were identifie i

! Conclusions i The training and qualification of fire brigade members met the requirements of the fire -

protection progra ;

F6 Fire Protection Organization and Administration Inspection Scope (64704)

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The team reviewed the fire protection program organization designated to implement the fire protection progra Observations and Findinas

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The fire protection program was described in Procedure APA-ZZ-00700," Fire Protection f Program," Revision 9. The fire brigade organization and duties were described in .

Procedure APA-ZZ-00743," Fire Team Organization and Duties," Revision 13. The fire  !

protection program was managed under the direction of the Manager, Nuclear i Engineering. Lead individ'tals in the program included: 1) the fire marshal, who reported !

to the Superintendent, Work Control; 2) the fire protection engineer, who reported to the ,

Superintendent, Design Engineering; and,3) the fire protection system engineer, who l reported to the Superintendent, System Engineering. The inspector noted that the  !

licensee effectively implemented its fire protection program with this organizational l structur !

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The licensee's organization and administration of fire protection activities was consistent with and effectively implemented the requirements of the approved fire protection progra i F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities

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a ._ inspection Scope (64704)

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The inspector reviewed the 1995,1996, and 1997 quality assurance audits and numerous quality assurance surveillance reports to verify that the audits and  !

surveillances met the requirements of the approved fire protection progra !

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-10- Observations and Findinas r ne 1995 audit was an annual audit, the 1996 audit was a biennial audit, and the 1997 audit was a triennial audit. The quality assurance organization also performed numerous performance-based surveillances during the yea The audits were comprehensive in scope and performed an in-depth evaluation of the ,

fire protection program at the facility. Their quality was excellent. Issues identified were documented in the corrective action program for resolution by the line organization l Audits also included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the line organization's corrective actions to resolve problems. Surveillance reports provided valuable l performance-based assessment of fire protection program activitie _C_onausions The licensee's quality assurance activities were implemented in accordance with the requirements of the fire protection program. The audits were excellent in quality and resulted in meaningful findings which were properly documented in the corrective action program. Surveillance reports provided good performance-based assessment of fire protection program activities.

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues . j F8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-483/98-009: Inadvertent Deletion of Required )

Administrative Controls During Procedure Revision Led To inadequate Guidance For Safe Shutdown During A Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation Backaround During performance of a Final Safety Analysis Report review effort of the fire protettion program, the licensee identified on August 7,1998, that Valve BGLCV0112C, " Chemical Volume Control System, Volume Control Tank Outlet Downstream Isolation Valve," did not have redundant control power fusing. Therefore, in a postulated fire that required control room evacuation, a short circuit could blow the circuit fuse prior to circuit isolation. The procedure used for alternative shutdowns, Procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, j directed an operator to close Valve BGLCV0112C using a remote handswitc However, if the circuit were damaged due to the fire, the valve would not have been capable of being closed electrically and this condition could lead to gas binding and damage of the centrifugal charging pump. This equipment was required for placing and maintaining the unit in hot shutdown and must remain free of fire damag To correct this concern, the licensee issued a temporary procedure change on August 19,1998, which added a step in Procedure OTO-ZZ-00001 for an operator to locally venfy that Valve BGLCV0112C was closed. A permanent change to the procedure was made on September 11,1998, when Revision 16 was issue . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . __ . _ .._ _ _ _ _.- _ _ ._ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ ..__

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The licensee determined that Procedure OTO ZZ-00001 originally contained a step to locally verify that Valve BGLCV0112C was closed, but that this step was deleted when Revision 12 was issued on August 30,1996. At that time, the licensee believed that local verification of valve position was unnecessary because the valve would be closed using a local control handswitch. The licensee had not recognized in 1996 that the control circuitry for Valve BGLCV0112C was not protected with redundant fusin Prompted by this finding, the licensee initiated an evaluation of all isolation switch circuits used in Procedure OTO-ZZ-00001. Two additional circuits were identified that were of concern. These involved an essential service water electrical room supply fan and an emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump. Both of these components had been evaluated as part of the approved fire protection program to be long-term systems, for which minor repairs such as fuse replacement were allowe Inspection Followuo (92904)

The inspector met with licensee personnel to discuss this issue and reviewed Procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, Revis!on 16. The inspector verified that the procedure had been revised to include steps for an operator to locally verify that Valve BGLCV0112C  ;

was closed prior to starting the centrifugal charging pump and that the emergency diesel '

generator fuel oil transfer pump and essential service water electrical room supply fan

- were checked and fuses replaced from the emergency equipment bag il necessar The inspector was concerned that Valve BGLCV0112C may be damaged as a result of a fire and become incapable of being manually closed prior to circuit isolation from the control room. The licensee had not performed a weak link analysis to determine whether Valve BGLCV0112C would survive an overthrust condition if it had a spurious actuation and be capable of being manually repositioned. The redundant volume control tank outlet valve, BGLCV0112B, was not protected from circuit failure nor credited in the j licensee's fire protection program. Thereforo, it could not be assumed available if Valve BGLCV0112C were damage The inspector was not able to complete review of this issue dunng this inspectio Additional review will be required to determine if the licensee's alternative shutdown capability is consistent with the licensing basis. Therefore, this item remains unresolved, pending additional review (50-483/9824-02).

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee representatives on October 30,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

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-12-The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No information supplied to the inspectors was considered to be proprietary.

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l ATTACHMENT :

4- , SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ,

i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

. Licensee J

B. Allen, Supervising Engineer

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T. Bell, Senior Engineer, Quality Assurance i D. Bettenhausen, Supervising Engineer i L.. Eitel, Fire Protection Engineer

! B. Gentelin, System Engineer

M.' Haag, Engineer T. Herrmann, Superintendent, Design Engineering J.' Johnson, System Engineer

L. Kanuckel, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance

} R. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations j J. Laux, manager, Quality Assurance i N. Morris, Fire Marshal i '

T. Moser, Acting Superintendent, Systems Engineering G. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer j M. ' Reidmeyer, Engineer, NRC Interface

P. Shannon, Operating Supervisor .

j D. Waller, Design Engineer j H. Wilson, Senior Engineer

. . D. Wingbermueble, Supervisor, Engineering

! W. Witt, Assistant Plant Manager

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NRC.

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F. Brush, Resident inspector

i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

64704 Fire Protection Program i 92904 Followup - Plant Support I

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-2-ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened

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50-483/9824-01 VIO Two examples of a violation of Operating License Section 2.C(5)(c) for not initiating a fire protection impairment permit ,

for an inoperable fire door and for not including surveillance I testing and operability requirements for several fire doors in plant procedures (Sections F2 and F3).

50-483/9824-02 URI Potential equipment damage due to fire-induced circuit failure j (Section F8).

i Closed I 50-483/98-009 LER Inadvertent Deletion of Required Administrative Controls During Procedure Revision Led To inadequate Guidance For ,

Safe Shutdown During A Fire Requiring Control Room l Evacuation (Section F8.1).  !

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED l

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Procedures Number Title Revision ,

l ESP-KC-03003 Fire Main Flow Test 6 OTS-OD-00001 Emergency Lighting Tests 10, Temporary Change Notice 98-654 MSM-ZZ-FG002 Fire Damper Drop Test and 1 Lubrication OSP-ZZ-65045 VisualInspection of Fire August 31,1994 Penetration Seals OSP-ZZ-65046 Fire Barrier Inspection 4 OTO-ZZ-00001 ;ontrol Room inaccessibility 16 APA-ZZ-00701 Control of Fire Protection 7 Impairments OSP-KC-00015 Iire Door inspections 7

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i Number Title Revision SDP-K-00002 Fire Door Position 4 Verification APA-ZZ-00703 Fire Protection Operability 10 Criteria and Surveillance Requirements ESP-KC-03004 Fire Pump Performance Test 6 FPP-ZZ-00009 Fire Protection Training 3 Program APA-ZZ-00700 Fire Protection Program 9

. APA-ZZ-00741 Control of Combustible 12 Materials APA-ZZ-00742 Control of Ignition Sources 12, Temporary Change Notice 98-284 APA-ZZ-00743 Fire Team Organization and 13 Duties j l

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Suaaestion Occurrence )

Solution Reports 95 00G8 Fire within non-safety related January 22,1995 l electrical distribution panel l PPPG 104 96-0412 Breaker SGK04ACCB lug April 5,1996 )

red hot  ;

96-0490 Cooling tower bypass valve April 23,1996 position indicating light fire 97-0285 Fire in breaker cubicle March 4,1997 PB12301 97-1286 Improper rock placed in November 7,1997 transformer pits l

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98-0932 Fire in turbine mist oil April 8,1998 )

evaporator vent pipe due to pipe cutting l

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Number Title Revision 98-2963 Amoke alar activated when July 8,1998 l paper charred in ESW l pumphouse 98-3190 Control room fire could August 10,1998 render Valve BG-LCV-112C  ;

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inoperable j 98-3705 Restrictions to oil flow in October 29,1998 transformer pits 98-3706 Fire protection operability October 29,1998 ;

, procedure does not address '

elevator doors 98-3707 No justification for control October 30,1998 room pantry door being propped open Reauest for Resolution Reports 19048 Fire Induced Hot Short June 12,1998 Design Basis '

18388, Revision A RCP Upper Bearing RTD December 8,1997 Conduit Box Seals 15713A Evaluation of Removal of February 15,1995 Temo-Lag from Hatch Covers Audit Reports AP 95-002 Quality Assurance Audit of March 13,1995 Fire Protection AP 96-004 Quality Assurance Audit of March 20,1996 Fire Protection AP 97-001 Quality Assurance Audit of April 16,1997 Fire Protection

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Number Title Revision Surveillance Reports

! SP 95-087 Fire Main Flow Test October 20,1995 SP 96-006 Fire Protection in Extreme January 19,1996 Cold Weather SP 96-029 Adequacy of Emergency May 20,1996 Battery Lighting SP 96-048 Fire Suppression inadvertent June 12,1996 Actuations l SP 96-074 Replacement of Firewrap December 30,1996 Material l

! SP 97-009 RFR 17808A, Fire Water February 20,1997 Tank Heater Valves and Pipe j Elimination SP 97-028 Local Fire Department May 1,1997 Exercise SP 97-056 Fire Brigade Unannounced December 17,1997 l Drills l

SP 98-077 South Callaway Fire July 13,1998 Protection District Exercise SP 98-080 Review of Fire Protection September 8,1998 Program Corrective Actions and NRC Inspection Procedure Criteria OQL 96-010 Union Electric Surveillance of September 18,1996 Transco Products, In Drawinas l C-200902 Yard Transformers 0 l l

E-2L1404 Lighting, Grounding and 29 Communications Auxiliary l and Reactor Buildings,

Elevation 2026'

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.y-6-Number Title Revision 8600-X-90327 Fire Protection System Yard 5 Layout and Pumphouse One Line Diagram 8600-X-88448 Piping Plans Fire Loop and 17 Laterals Fire Protection system 8600-X-88773 Piping Plans Fire Loop and 12 Laterals Fire Protection system 8600-X-89634 Piping and instrumentation 6 Diagram Diesel Driven Fire -

Pump PKC1002A 8600-X-89635 - Piping and instrumentation 7 Diagram Diesel Driven Fire Pump PKC1002B 8600-X-89636 Piping and instrumentation 8 Diagram Fire Pump 1001 A and Freeze Protection Pumps PKC 1005A and B -

- 8600-X-89638 Piping and instrumentation 5 i Diagram Yard Fire Loop l 8600-X-89639 Piping and Instrumentation 11 Diagram Yard Fire Loop 8600-X-89640 Piping and Instrumentation 5 Diagram Yard Fire Loop 8600-X-89641 Piping and instrumentation 13 Diagram Yard Fire Loop Miscellaneous Operating License Updated Final Safety Analysis Report ,

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-7-Number Title Revision Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - Site Addendum Safety Evaluation for OTO- . September 11,1998 ZZ-00001, Revision 16 Fire Brigade Planning and October 28,1998 Authorization Drill No. 98UO8 Fire Protection Final Safety October 20,1998 Analysis Report Review Task Team Weekly Report Modification 93-1010A - Provide Steel Checker Plate November 18,1993 Fire Barrier Over .

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