IR 05000483/1997017
| ML20199A528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199A522 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-97-17, NUDOCS 9711170212 | |
| Download: ML20199A528 (14) | |
Text
,~
...
.,
--
.
...
f_NCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY = COMMISSION. -
REGION IV
~ Docket No.:-
50-483
,
..
License' No.:
NPF 30.
. ?
-
Report No.i 50 483/97 17
- Licensee:
Un' ion Electric Company
.
M Facility:
Callaway Plant -
Location: -
Junction Highway CC and Highway O ~
Fulton, Missouri
.
.
Dates:
September 14 through October 25,1997
- lnspectors
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector
~
F. L. Brush, Resident inspector.
Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch 8 ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
.
_
L, 9711170212 971112-PDR-ADOCK 05000483
.
- e PDR
,,
,
,,,g e
w
-
, -, -
r
--'
e=we
- -,--,
., -'
i-a
........
-
!
i
'
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-17 Operations Control room operator shif t turnovers and briefings were good (Section 04.2).
- A senior reactor operator was not present in the control room for 13 seconds with
the reactor in Mode 1 (Section 08.1).
'
Maintenance Control room operators performed a slave relay test procedure for the auxiliary / fuel
building emergency exhaust ventilation system Train B out-of-sequence. This resulted in the tripping of the supply breaker for an auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust fan, rendering Train B of the auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust ventilation system inoperable (Section M1.3).
Contacts in the emergency diesel generator bypass protection Relay ESX were not
being adequately tested. The licensee successfully tested the relay with the reactor in Mode 1. Literal compliance with the Technical Specifications rnay have required that the licensee perform the testing while shutdown. The licensee agreed to include in the written response for Unresolved item 50-483/9715-01 their position on testing of Relay ESX and associated contacts with the plant at poxor
'
(Section M8.1).
Enaineerina The licensee's evaluation of the impact of changing the control rod insertion limits
Wds thorough (Section E4.1).
Plant Suonort Material condition of equipment in the radwaste evaporator building was good.
- Housekeeping showed improvement (Section R2.1).
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
. _ _.
...
.
..
..
..
...
.
.
.
Report Details
SumEarv of Plant Status The plant operated at 70 percent reactor power throughout the report period.
LOperations i
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Gene'ral Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was pmfessional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
,
02.1 Review olEauipment Teacuts (71707)
The inspectors walked down the following tagouts:
Workman's Protection Assurance 24172 - Emergency Service Water
Pump A; Workman's Protection Assurance 24145 - Component Cooling Water
Pump C; Workman's Protection Assurance 24086 - Emergency Diesel Generator B
Starting Air Compressor D; and Workman's Protection Assurance 21254 - Containment Spray Pump A.
- The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the' position prescribed by the tags. The inspectors also walked down the first two tagouts after they were cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system lineup.
02.2 Erigineered Safety Feajure System Walkdowns a.
Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater system.
The inspectors reviewed the following:
\\
I
-
..
-
-
. _ _ __
I B
.
-2-Auxiliary Feedwater System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram M 22ALO1,
Revision 17; Callaway Equipment List:
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.4.9;
Fire Preplan Manual, Revision 1;
Safety System Functional Assessment of the Auxiliary Feedwater System
(SSFA 94-02(AL), December 9,1994; and Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.
- b.
Qbietvgupns and Findinns The inspectors did not observe any conditions that affected the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system. All valves were in the correct position. Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
02.3 Eontainment Isolation Valve Walkdown (717_011 The inspectors walked down various containment penetrations to ensure containment integrity. The inspectors used Surveillance Procedure OSP-GP-00001,
" Containment integrity Verification," Revision 6. The inspectors identified no concerns.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 !Lnplanned_Entrv Into a Technical Specification Action Statement An operator error during a surveillance test resulted in an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.7.7. This event is discussed in Section M1.3.
04.2 Shif t Turnovers anri Briefinns a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed shif t supervisor and control room staff shift turnovers and briefings.
b.
Qbtervations and Findinns The inspectors did not observe any problems during the turnovers and briefings.
Control room personnel reviewed the control room logs, walked down the panels, and thoroughly discussed the status of plant equipment during turnovers. The shif t
_..
-
_
_. _
_
__
_
_
.. _ _ _ _ _... _. _ _. _ -
..
.
...
.
_.3-
_
! supervisor held good briefings for the_ shif t crews. (Additionally, operators remained-
- cognizant of plant conditions during the turnovers and briefings.
-
08'
Miscellaneous Operations issues '(92901)
08.1 (C'osed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-483/97-008: senior reactor operator not present in control room for 13 seconds.
On September 9,1997, there was no senior reactor operator in the control room for -
13 sec_ nds. The plant was in Mode 1.at 70 percent reactor power.
o There are normally three senior reactor operators assigned to the control room - a shif t supervisor, a field supervisor, and a control room supervisor. The shift--
,
supervisor was in the plant performing a tour. The control room supervisor left_the control room to get a draft procedure for review. The field supervisor was in the control room during this time,
' At 1:16:01 a.m., the field supervisor left the control room. The field supervisor saw
,
the control room supervisor outside the control room and realized that there was no senior reactor operator in the control room.- At 1:16:14 a.m. the field supervisor-re-entered the control room.
The licensee identified the causc to be ineffective communication between the
!
control room supervisor and the field supervisor.
The licensee identified several corrective and preventive actions:
The licensee added a clip-on badge to the security badge of the senior
reactor operator in charge of the control room which prevents inadvertent exit.
The licensee established the following communication policy:
When the shift supervisor or control room supervisor plans to_ leave the
control room, the communication to the senior reactor operator remaining in the control room must clearly state the person will be the last remaining senior reactor operator in the control room;
-The control room supervisor must inform the reactor operators when leaving
-*
and returning to the "at the controls area"; and j
~
.
_
The shift supervisor should inform the reactor operators when leaving and
returning to the control room.
?The licensee will review the event during training, m
-
_
__ ________ - -
.
!
-4-l Technical Specification 6.2.2.b required that at least one lice ed senior reactor operator be in the control room with the plant in Mode 1. Sinco the plant was in Mode 1 at the time of this event, this is considered a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9717-01).
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 Deneral Comments - Maintenancq
_
a.
inspection Scope (6270_7J The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:
Work Authorization A607795A, " Service Essential Service Water Pump A
Discharge Drain Valve";
Work Authorization C602596, " Install Heater Test Switch in Hydrogen
Analyzer A";
Work Authorization R582371C, " Perform a Complete Trip Check in
Accordance with MPE-ZZ-QY111"; and, Work Authorization W608469, " Service Essential Service Water to Turbine
Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Check Valve ALV0015."
b.
Observations and Findinas With the exception of the maintenance described in Section M8.1, the inspectors found no concerns with the maintenance reviewed or observed. All work observed l
was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors
'
frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when required, i
M 1.2 General Comments - Surveillance (
a.
Inspection econe (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
Test Procedure OSP-NE-0001B, " Standby Diesel Generator B Periodic Tests "
Revision 2;
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I
.
5-Test Procedure OSP-EF P001 A, " Essential Service Water Train A
Operability," Revision 25; and, Test Procedure OSP-AL V001D, " Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Suction
Check Valve Test," Revision 5.
b.
Observations and Findinas With the exception of the test error described in Section M1.3, surveillance testing reviewed or observed during this inspection period was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications.
M1.3 Procedure Viola 1 ion Durina Surveillance Test a.
Jnspection Scope (S1726)
The inspectors examined the licensee's response to an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.7.7. The licensee performed a slave relay test out-of-sequence, rendering one auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust ventilation train inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the following:
Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ 00100, " Procedure Adherence,"
Revision 11; Suggestion / Occurrence / Solution Report 97-1172;
Technical Specifications 3.7.7 and 6.8.1.e; and,
Test Procedure OSP-SA-0012B, " Train B Safety injection System Slave Relay
Test," Revision 5.
b.
Observations and Findinas Operatcrs were performing Section 6.6 of Procedure OSP-SA-00128, which directed testing of Relay K601. Relay K601 starts the auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust ventilation Train B fan on a simulated safety injection signal.
During performance of the procedure, an operator stopped auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust Fan CGG02B prior to resetting Relav K601. Relay K601 was required to be reset prior to stopping the fen. Because Relay K601 had not been reset, the fan attempted to restart but the supply breaker tripped on overcurrent.
<
The licensee found that because the operator held the main control board switch for Fan CGG028 to "off" for less than one second, the counterelectromotive force of the f an motor had not completely decayed at the time the motor received ariother start signal. The licensee postulated that the voltage and current applied during the
_
_
_-
_-_
6-restart attempt may not have been in phase with that of the counterelectromotive force, resulting in the abnormally high startir9 current.
Af ter the supply breaker to Fan CGG02B tripped, the licensee declared the auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust ventilation Train B inoperable per Technical Spe fication 3.7.7. Operators directed electricians to inspect the supply breaker. The electricians did not find any problems. Operators then successfully performed Section 6.6 of Procedure OSP-SA-00128 and exited the action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.7.
Procedure OSP-SA-0012B was c'assified as a continuous use procedure. During review of this event, the inspectors noted tnat Procedure APA-ZZ-00100 required that continuous use procedures be performed exactly as written but allowed continuous use procedure steps to be performed out of the prescribed sequence if prior approval was granted by the shift supervisor and the steps were documented in the order actually performed. The inspectors identified that operators performed other steps of Procedure OSP-SA-0012B out of the prescribed sequence and f ailed to get prior approval from the shift supervisor. The inspectors also identified that operators f ailed to document performance of Procedure OSP-SA-0012B steps in the order actually performed. The f ailure to perform Procedure OSP-SA-0012B exactly as written is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.e (50-483/9717-02).
Additionally, the inspectors foend that the sten in Procedure OSP-SA-OO12B for restoring equipment af ter testing e.me not clear. The licensee's investigation had a similar finding. The licensee revised and clarified procedure OSP-SA-OO12B to preclude performing the steps out of the prescribed sequence. In addition, the licensee reviewed all other slave relay test procedures and identified eleven others for revision. The licensee completed revisions to all of the procedures.
The inspectors considered the licensee's corrective and preventive actions to be appropriate.
c.
Conclusions Operators f ailed to follow the procedure for testing the auxiliary / fuel building emergency exhaust ventilation system Train B. The licensee's corrective and preventive actions were appropriatst.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8,1 (Onen) Unresolved item 50-483/9715-01: failure to test load shed and emergency load sequencer inhibit circuits.
NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-15, Section M1.3, described the licensee's failure to test several contacts in the load shed and emergency load sequencer circuit that
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
_ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_
_
.
-7-inhibit the auto-start signals of certain pumps. Although subsequent testing demonstrated that the contacts would operate satisf actorily, literal compliance with the Technical Specifications may have required that the testing be performed during shutdown conditions. Since this testing was performed with the reactor at power, there was a potential that Technical Specification requirements were violated.
The inspectors identified a similar Technical Specification compliance issue. The licensee discovered that contacts on emergency diesel generator bvpass protection Relay ESX we.e not being adequately tested. As with the inhibit circuit testing, the licensee identified this problem during Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits NRC Staff Technical Position on Fire Protection for Fuel," reviews.
The inspectors reviewed:
Final Safety Analysis Report Section 8.3.1.1.3, " Standby Power Supply;
Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety Related Logic Circuits";
Preventive Maintenance Procedure MPE-ZZ-QY111(QY128), " Operational
Test Sequence of 4.16KV Diesel Genera'or NE01(NE02) Air Circuit Breaker 152NB0111(152NB0211)," Revision 7; Suggestion-Solution-Occurrence Report 97-1168;
Technical Specifications 4.0.3 and 4.8.1.1.2.g.5; and,
Work Authorization R582371C, Perform a Complete Trip Check in
Accordance with MPE-ZZ-QY111."
On October 16,1997, the licensee discovered that contacts on emergency diesel generator bypass protection Relay ESX were not being tested. This relay prevents certain automatic trips of the emergency diesel generators during a safety injection signal or loss of offsite power. The affected trips were:
Reverse Power
Loss of Field
Generator Overcurrent
Generator Voltage-Restrained Overcurrent
Generator Ground Overcurrent
Underfrequency Protection
+
The licensee considered the failure to test Relay ESX contacts as a failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.g.5. This surveillance required that the automatic trip bypass feature be tested once per 18 months, during shutdown. The licensee has been testing this feature every 18 months
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ -
.
.
8-during shutdown by verifying that Relay ESX energizes and an amber light illuminates when one set of contacts on the relay closes. Although this verifies that the relay coil and one set of the relay's contacts function property, it does not venfy that all the remaining sets of contacts on Relay ESX can perform the required function.
The licensee had a separate preventive maintenance test activity, performed every 36 months, that verified that contacts on Relay ESX functioned properly. The preventive maintenance test documents were MPE-ZZ-OY111 and MPE-ZZ-QY128.
The licensee entered Technical Specification 4.0.3 for Emergency Diesel Generator B at 9:50 a.m. on October 16,1997. The licensee successfully performed the required testing using MPE-ZZ-QY128. The licensee exited Technical Specification 4.0.3 for Emergency Diesel Generator B at 4:54 p.m. on October 16, 1997.
Testing of Relay ESX and associated contacts on Emergency Diesel Generator A, using Procedure MPE-ZZ-QY111, was previously performed on August 6,1997.
The licensee performed Procedure MPE ZZ-QY111 as part of a postmodification test (Modification 95-1021) to install a volts per hertz relay in the Emergency Diesel Generator A control panel.
Although testing of the emergency diesel generators were satisfactory, literal compliance with the Technical Specifications may have required that the licensee perform the testing while shutdown. Since this testing was performed on both emergency diesel generators with the plant at power, it is possible that the Technical Specification requirement was not met.
The 'icensee has agreed to include in the written response for Unresolved item 50-483/9715-01 their position on testing of Relay ESX and associated contacts with the plant at power. The inspectors will review this issue further pending receipt of the licensee's written response.
Ill. Ennineerina E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Fuel Cycle 9 Rod insertion Umits Revision a.
Inspection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Request for Resolution 17096, Revision R, which evaluated changing the rod insertion limits for Fuel Cycle 9. The request for resolution contained a formal safety evaluation, which included a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, a licensing impact review, and fuel vendor technical information. The inspectors also I
-_
. _ - - - _
..
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
________ _ ________ _ _ _ ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- -_
l l
l
.
attended the licensee's onsite review committee meeting'which approved the rcquest for resolution.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee changed the rod insertion limits from 201 steps for Control Bank D at 100 percent power to 201 steps for Control Bank D at 70 percent power. The change in rod insertion limits improved the core shutdown margin which had decreased due to the axial offset anomaly discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97 15, Section E8.1,
,
Th6 inspectors observed that the safety evaluation was thorough. The licensee determined that there was not an unreviewed safety question as a result of changing the rod insertion limits. lhe onsite review committee was thorough in discussing the request for resolution. In addition to the technical adequacy of the request for resolution, the committee also discussed the impact on plant procedures '
and the best method to implement the changes.
c.
Conclusions Thp inspectors concluded that the licensee s evaluation of the impact of changing the rod insertion limits was thorough.
'
IV. Plant Suppod R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purposa of radiation protection, and found no problems.
R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Radwaste Buildino Tour a.
Inspection Scone (71750)
The inspectors toured various areas of the radwaste building.
_ - _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-y._._
.
.
..
_.
.
. -. _ - _.. _.. _
..
__
._-.
.
.
-. -
A
.
'
"
- m a
.,.;.
,
{
', s ;
!
-
,
-10
.
-?
3e b.
= Observations and Findinos -
J
~
Contaminated areas'and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys:
.
posted outside rooms were current. Doors and containers were properly locked for
.
radiation protection purposes.
!
Material con'dition was good. Housekeeping-in the liquid radwaste evaporator.
> room showed improvement. The licensen repaired severalleaking valves and-
= removed catchments. Tho-inspectors did'not observe any active boric acid leaks,
'a-There was properly contained, dried boric acid at the base of some of the
'
.
equipment skids. Overall housekeeping was satisfactory.
, V. Management'Meetions
%
.X1 Exit Meeting Summary -
The exit meeting was conducted on October 24,1997. The licensee did not
-
express a position on any of the findings in the report.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materialt examined during the inspection should be' considered proprietary. Proprietary information' reviewed during the inspection was returned to the licensee.
.
u
,
. _ _
~~
_
b
.
'.
,
[.
'
i s
l i..
-
-.
-,
,.
,., _, _
,_,,
.,
, _.
,.
-o
.
- ATTACHMENI SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant
' D. L. Bettenhausen. Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance-J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support B. P. Bredeman, Operating Supervisor, Mainte.. nce R. E. Farnam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Operations J. V. Laux, Manager Quality Assurance J. A. McGraw,' Superintendent, Engineering R. D. Miller, Supervisor, Radiological Waste and Environmental C. D, Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. W. Neterer, Assistant Superintendent, Operations J. T. Patterson, Shift Sur ervisor, Operations M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer,. Quality Assurance Regulatory Support M. E. Taylor, Ansistar*t Manager, Work Control W. A. Witt, Superintendent, Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IP) USED IP: 37551 Onsite Engineering IP: 61726 Surveillance Observations IP: 62707 Maintenance Observations IP: -71707 Plant Operations IP: 71750 Plant Support Activities IP: 92901 Followup - Plant Operations iP: 92902 Followup - Manitenance ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-483/9717-01 NCV Senior reactor operator not present in control room (Section 08.1)
50-483/9717 02 VIO Failure to fcilow surveillance test procedure (Section P 3)
-o
.
2-Closed 50 483/97008 LER Senior reactor operator not present in control roorn (Section 08.1)
50-49'l/9717-01 NCV Senior reactor operator not present in control room (Section 08.1)
Discussed -
50-483/9715 01 URI Failure to test load shed and emergency load sequencer inhibit circuits (Section M8.1).