IR 05000483/1999001
| ML20205J948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205J943 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-99-01, 50-483-99-1, NUDOCS 9904120274 | |
| Download: ML20205J948 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV '
Docket No.:
50-483.
l License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/99-01 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri Dates:
February 7 through March 20,1999
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Inspectors:
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector R. V. Azua, Project Engineer J. D. Hanna, Reactor Engineer Approved By:
D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B
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ATTACHMENT:
SupplementalInformation l
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9904120274 990405 l
PDR ADOCK 05000483 L
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report No. 50-483/99-01 Operations Operations personnel demonstrated good communications, coordination, command and
control, and procedure usage during routine control room activities including shift turnovers. Management oversight of these activities was appropriate. Equipment operators were knowledgeable of responsibilities in their assigned areas (Sections 01.1 and O1.2).
Maintenance External material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant was generally very
good; however, periodic failures of heating elements for the ultimate heat sink cooling tower sump heaters were found to be a distraction for operators and maintenance personnel and did not meet management's expectations for system reliability and availability. In addition, oil seepage from the emergency diesel generators was noted.
Neither of these items affected equipment or system operability. The licensee initiated actions to address these deficiencies (Section M2.1).
In violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, electricians failed to terminate eight
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solenoid valves for the main steam bypass valves as required by preventive maintenance work documents. As a result, the bypass valves would not operate during the postmaintenance slave relay surveillance test. Electricians subsequently terminated and successfully tested the valves to assure operability. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0212 (Section M4.1).
There were multiple examples of a violation of Technical Specification surveillance
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requirements as a result of the failure to perform surveillances of the emergency diesel generators' ability to override a degraded voltage signal and cause immediate shed of the emergency electrical bus upon a safety injection signal and subsequent plant mode changes made while relying on those surveillances. On December 17,1997, the licensee discovered this problem. The licensee was performing reviews mandated by NRC Generic Letter 96-01. The licensee failed to perform these surveillances as a result of inadequate procedures. The licensee revised the appropriate procedures and successfully performed the testing. The failure to test the emergency diesel generators in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.g constitutes an additional example of noncited Violation 50-483/98025-03 and is not being cited separately (Section M8.1).
Enaineerina Modification packages to replace the feeder breakers for the essential service water to a
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump valves were properly prepared with clear installation instructions (Section E1.1).
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Plant SuppoA Surveys for the spent fuel pool rerack project were thorough and well performed. Health
physics technicians and supervisors were knowledgeable of the evolution and their individual responsibilities. Extraction of a diver from the pool and subsequent decontamination was performed safely and with proper attention to detail. Health physics technicians and supervisors demonstrated conservative decision making and proper concern for keeping radiological dose as low as reasonably achievable (Section R4.1).
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Stati!s The plant began the report period on February 7,1999, at 100 percent power. The plant operated at or near full power throughout the report period.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
l The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that adequate control room staffing and control room professionalism were maintained.
Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that provided for proper communication of plant status from one shift to the other. Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of plant status, equipment status, and reasons for lit annunciators. Operators were aware of the lirniting condition for operation action statements associated with inoperable equipment. Management oversight was good.
O1.2 Plant Tours (71707)
The inspectors routinely toured various areas of the plant, including the diesel generator rooms and switchgear rooms, to assess the safety' conditions and adequacy of plant equipment. The inspectors verified that various valve and switch positions were correct for the current plant conditions. With the exception of the emergency diesel generators, housekeeping was very good. There was some oil seepage from various locations on the emergency diesel generators. The licensee stated that actions were planned to address this observation.
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Personnel were observed obeying rules for personal safety, and entry and exits into and
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out of vital areas were performed in accordance with licensee regulations.
l The inspectors toured radiologically controlled areas with a primary equipment operator.
The operator was knowledgeabh of his responsibilities. The inspectors independently verified the information the operator recorded in his log. Overall, the operator's performance was good. The inspectors also reviewed the log and verified that previous tours had been performed within the appropriate time intervals.
i O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Review of Eauipment Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors walked down Workman's Protection Assurance 29771 for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspectors did not identify any
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discrepancies. The tagout was properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the
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correct devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags. The inspectors also performed a walkdown after the tagouts were cleared. All components were in the proper position for the required system lineup.
~ O2.2 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:
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, Emergency Diesel Generator, ;
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- Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower, and
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Essential Service Water.
Material condition, operability, and housekeeping were acceptable. Material condition of the ultimate heat sink cooling tower sump heaters, however, was degraded (see Section M2.1).
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03.1 Lockina Device Verification Walkdown a.
Inspection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors used Procedure ODP-ZZ-00004, " Locked Component Control,"
Revision 22,' Checkoff List 1, to inspect valves in the main steam and main feed isolation valve room (Area 5). In addition, the inspectors used Checkoff List 2 to inspect valves in the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified no mispositioned valves. The inspectors identified that all
. valves required to be locked or sealed had the appropriate locking device installed.
Although the inspectors identified no significant discrepancies, there were some procedure improvement opportunities noted. One example was that the specific type of locking device.(seal or breakaway padlock) was not specified for some of the valves listed on Checkoff List 1. The inspectors gave this information to the shift supervisor for followup action.-
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m 3-II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance.
M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance a.
Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:
Work Authorization P541363 - Replace Component Cooling Water Surge Teak A
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Vacuum Breaker EGV0305,
' Work Authorization P543166 - Replace Component Cooling Water Surge Tank A
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Relief Valve EGV0159, Work Authorization P545326 - Replace Component Cooling Water Heat
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Exchanger A Shell Side Relief Valve EGV0024, Work Authorization P620199 - Calibrate Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Pump
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Speed Governor, Work Authorization W197326'- Response Time Test Steam Generator Lo-Lo
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Start of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A, Work Authorization W197327 - Response Time Test Steam Generator Lo-Lo
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Start of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B, and Work Authorizations W197328 and W197329 - Response Time Test Phase A
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initiation of Containment Purge Isolation.
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Observations and Findinas With'the exception of the maintenance described in Sections M2.1 and M4.1, the inspectors identified no substantive concerns. All work observed was performed with
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the work packages present and in active _use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control
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M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance a.
Inspection Scope (61726)l The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
Test Procedure OSP AL-V001 A," Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Operability,"
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^ Revision 16,.
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i I-4-Test Procedure QSP-AL-V001C, " Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
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Operability," Rev;sion 16, Test Procedure OSP EG-V001 A, " Component Coo'ing Water Train A Inservice
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Test," Revision 5, l
Test Procedure OSP-NE-0001B, " Standby Diesel Generator 'B' Periodic Tests,"
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Revision 5, and Test Procedure OSP-EF-P001B, " Essential Service Water Train B inservice
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Test," Revision 27.
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Qbservations and Finoinas Procedural compliance was good. Procedures were of the latest revision, as verified i
through the licensee's document ccatrol program. In addition, the procedures were j
reviewed and approved, as noted by the appropriate signatures. Finally, these surveillance activities satisfied the requirements and intent of the Technical
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Specifications and were performed within the appropriate time period. The inspectors identified no substantive concerns.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tou.s a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectom performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
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Observati;ns and Findinas With the exception of the emergency diesel generators and ultimate heat sink cooling tower sump heaters, external material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant were very good (see below and Section O1.2). Most deficiencies that existed in the plant had already been identified by the licensee for corrective action. The iicensee documented these discrepancies and initiated corrective action.
Ultimate Heat Sink Coolino Tower Sumo Heaters During a routine tour, the essential service water system engineer identified that both of the ultimate heat sink cooling tower Train B sump heater elements had failed. Plant workers removed one of the two operable Train A sump heaters and installed that heater into the Train B sump. Replacement heaters were not readily available cnsite.
The licensee initiated Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0282 to investigate and evaluate the root cause of the heater failure and determined the appropriate
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-5-ccrrective actions. The licensee has an existing engineering evaluation (Request for Hesolution 5466), stating that the heaters are not required for operability of the essential service water system or ultimate heat sink unless ice formed to block the return path of essential service water to the pond.
The licensee issued a night order stating that an equipment operator should inspect the sumps every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if the temperature of water in the sump reaches 40*F. This night order was to be effective pending installation of now heaters.
The licensea has experienced previous problems with the ultimate heat sink cooling
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tower sump's heating system. NRC Inspection Report 50-483/95-18 discussed a l
January 1996 event when an equipment operator performing his daily sump inspection found ice blockage in the Train B sump. The licensee determined that temperature switches for the heaters had failed. Following this event, the licensee implemented a modification to improve the reliability of the system.
j The inspectors determined that this and previous sump heater failures, plus the subsequent monitoring involved to identify these failures, was a distraction for operators and maintenance personnel. In addition, the recurring failure of the pond sump heating system did not meet management's expectations for system reliability and availability.
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Conclusions External material condition and housekeeping throughout the plant was generally very good; however, periodic failures of heating elements for the ultimate heat sink cooling i
tower sump heaters were found to be a distraction for operators and maintenance
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personnel and did not meet management's expectations for system reliability and availability. In addition, oil seepage from the emergency diesel generators was noted.
Neither of these items affected equipment or system operability. The licensee initiated actions to address these deficiencies.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
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M4.1 Inadeauate Maintenance on Main Steam isolation Valve Bvoass Valves a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
On February 2,1999, operatort. were performing slave relay test procedures to stroke the main steam isolation valve bypass valves following preventive maintenance. The valves would not stroke. The licensee determined that eight new solenoid valves, installed on all four bypass vanes, were not terminated.
The licensee conducted an event review team meeting and commenced an investigation. The inspectors reviewed the minutes from the meeting and discussed the event with licensee personne c
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-6-The inspectors also reviewed:
Work Authorization Documents A565699A, A565702A, A565751 A, and
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A565703A - Prefabricate Replacement Solenoid Valves, Work Authorization Documents E565699, E565702, E565751, and E565703 -
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Install Prefabricated Solenoid Valves, Procedure OSP-SA-0005A(B), "7ain A(B) Steam Line isolation Signal Slave
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Relay Test," Revisicn 9, and Procedure APA-ZZ-00330, " Preventive Maintenance Program," Revision 14.
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Observations and Findir as j
Upon receipt of a main steamline isolation signal, the solenoid valve changes position to release air from the actuator on the main steam isolation valve bypass valvo. This results in closing the bypass valve. The licensee was replacing the solenoid valves as an equipment qualification preventive maintenance task to maintain equipment qualification requirements.
On December 28,1998, plant electricians completed assembling the new replacement solenoid valves up to the point of terminating the leads. The electricians properly completed this work in accordance with the instructions on Work Documents A565699A, A565702A, A565751 A, and A565703A. These' documents did not instruct the electricians to terminate the leads because of a 24-hour cure time of the sealant used.
These solenoid valves were scheduled to be installed on the bypass valves in January 1999.
On January 28,1999, electricians installed the now solenoid valves on the bypass valves using Work Documents E565699, E565702, E565751, and E565703. However, the electricians did not follow Step 1 on these work documents, which included j
termitiating the leads. The electrical supervisor had earlier mased this step as not i
applicable.
The supervisor believed that Step 1 was already completed on Work
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Documents A565699A, A565702A, A565751 A, and A565703A. The supeL wor did not open and inspect one of the solenoid valves to see if the leads were termir,ated. One reason he did not was that he was under the impression that the leads and cover plate screws had been toiqued and he did not want to have to torque them again. After completing the rest of the instructions, the supervisor signed Work Documents E56569C, E565702, E565751, and E56570 as completed.
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. On February 2,1999, operators attempted to perform the postmaintenance tests in accordance with applicable portions of Procedures OSP-SA-0005A and -0005B. These J
tests required that the bypass valves be opened. The control room operator was unsuccessfulin opening the valves. Upon investigation, the licensee determined that the solenoid valves were not terminated. The licensee immediately developed a new
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work package and correctly terminated all eight solenoid valves. Later that same day, operators successfully performed Procedures OSP-SA-0005A and -00058.
The licensee identified several causes as discussed below.
The supervisor marked Step 1 "not applicable" without physically checking the
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solenoids due to assumptions made regarding the work documents.
On most work documents, all the steps for preparation are performed together
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on one document instead of splitting steps out. The point where the "A" and "E" -
work documents were split caused confusion.
One crew did the preparation work and another crew performed the installaovn
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work, with a month in between.
Due to past instances where paperwork was inaccurate, it was assumed that the
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document was incorrect.
Through discussions with the electrical general supervisor and reviewing the various documents, the inspectors agreed with the causes that the licensee identified.
The licensee identified several potential corrective actions, including:
i Incorporating the termination step into the "A" documents so that the preparation
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work is kept together and the "E" documents are specifically for installation.
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Providing a copy of the "A" documents for use as reference to the workers
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performing work using the "E" documents.
Incorporating instructions in the planner's guide stating that "A" documents need
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to take equipment to a state of readiness for installation.
Discussing this event with other supervisors in the electrical, mechanical, and
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instrument and control diciplines.
When possible, using the same crew to take a work package from start to finish.
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The inspectors agn ed with the corrective actions that the licensee identified. Through review of Procedure APA-ZZ-00330, the inspectors determined that the electrical supervisor was not nuthorized to make any change to the "E" work documents.
Step 4.12.7 of the procedure stated that only the environmental qualification engineer may.make changes to "E" work documents, even if the changes do not change the intent, scope, or frequency of the task.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommer.ded in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
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Appendix A, Section 9.a states, in part, that maintenance which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be performed in accordance with written instructions.
I The inspectors determined that the failure to terminate the eight solenoid valves for the main steam bypass valves, as a result of personnel error, was a Severity Level IV violation. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, i
consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the j
licensee's corrective action prograrn as Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution j
Report 99-0212 (50-483/99001-01).
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Conclusions in violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. electricians failed to terminate eight solenoid valves for the main steam bypass valves as required by preventive maintenance work documents. As a result, the bypass valves would not operate during the postmaintenance slave relay surveillance test. Electricians subsequently terminated and successfully tested the valves to assure operability. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Suggestion-Occurrence-Solution Report 99-0212.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-483/97005 06: incomplete overlap testing of safety injection slave relay and degraded voltage time delay contact.
On December 17,1997, the licensee determined that Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.g 4.c. was r.ot being properly implemented. The Technical Specification required that each ernergency diesel generator be demonstrated operable by verifying that a safety injection signal will override the degraded voltage signal and cause immediate shed of the emergency electrical bus. The surveillance is required every 18 months, during plant shutdown.
The licensee determined that emergency diesel generator and sequencer testing procedures adequately verified the degraded voltage time delay feature and the ultimate tripping of the normal and alternate emergency bus feeder breakers. Also, the licensee verified proper operation of the override function by verifying proper operation of a contact on safety injection slave Relay K617. However, the licensee did not verify the continuity of wires between the Relay K617 contact and the degraded voltage time delay circuit. Therefore, there was no demonstration of overlap. This condition existed since initial plant startup.
On December 17,1997, the licensee declared both emergency diesel generators inoperable. The licensee also entered the provision of Technical Sr
'fication 4.0.3 that allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to complete missed surveillance tests. The licenset.. Med both circuits l
satisfactorily and exited Technical Specification 4.0.3 appmximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> !ate r
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The licensee determined the cause for the incomplete testing to be misinterpretation of the surveillance requirement. The licensee revised appropriate test procedures to ensure testing would be performed with proper overlap in the future.
Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.g stated that the testing be performed "at least once per 18 months, during shutdown." The inspectors determined that the failure to perform overlap testing resulted in the emergency diesel generators exceeding the utage times.
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1see reported similar instances of failure to perform adequate emergency diesel
..ar testing every 18 months during shutdown in Licensee Event
.oports 97005-02,97005-03,97006-04, and 97005-05. The inspectors' closeout review of these reports is documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-483/98-25 and 50-483/98-26. As with the other Licensee Event Report 97005 supplements, the licensee identified the current problem ouring reviews mandated by Generic Letter 96-01," Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits."
Technical Specification 4.0.3 states, in part, that the failure to perform a surveillance requirement within the allowed surveillance interval shall constitute noncompliance with the operability requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation.
Technical Specification 4.0.4 states, in part, that entry into an operational mode or other specified condition shall not be made unless the surveillance requirements associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval.
Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires, in part, that entry into an operational mode shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.
Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.b required that two separate and independent emergency diesel generators be operable in Modes 1,2,3, and 4.
The inspectors concluded that there were multiple examples of a violation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements as a result of the failure to perform surveillances of the emergency diesel generators' ability to override a degraded voltage signal and cause immediate shed of the emergency electrical bus upon a safety injection signal and subsequent plant mode changes made while relying on those surveillances. The licensee failed to perform these sunreillances as a result of inadequate procedures. The licensee revised appropriate procedures and successfully performed the testing. The failure to test the emergency diesel generators in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.g constitutes an additional example of noncited Violation 50-483/98025-03 and is not being cited separatel,
-10-lli, Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Modification Packaaes for Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Breaker Reolacement a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the modifications to replace the feeder breakers for the essential service water to turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump Valves ALHV0032 and ALHV0033. The work was performed using work documents C574968 (ALHV0032)
and C575015 (ALHV0033). The modification package was Callaway Modification Package 91-1035.
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors determined that the design change packages had been properly i
prepared with clear installation instructions. Quality control inspections were performed as required by the work documents. The inspections appropriately verified critical j
installation details. Installation of the breakers was performed in accordance with the j
installation instructions. Postmodification testing was determined to be appropriate for J
the circumstances and was satisfactorily accomplished. The inspectors verified that updates of plant drawings and the Callaway Equipment List were properly initiated or completed. The inspectors identified no concerns, c.
Conclusions Modification packages to replace the feeder breakers fcr the essential service water to turb;ne-driven auxiliary feedwater pump valves were properly prepared with clear installation instructions.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problem,
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-11-R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4.1 Radiation Protection Durina Scent Fuel Rerack Evolutio.n a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
On February 16,1999, the inspectors observed the radiological controls associated with
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the removal of racks from the spent fuel pool. Areas that were assessed include procedural performance and radiological precautions taken during the evolution.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the decontamination and radiological surveying of fuel racks as they were being removed from the spent fuel pool. The inspectors found the surveys to j
be thorough and well performed. The inspectors noted that the isometric view of the racks on the survey maps (vice a plan view) and the detailed notations taken facilitated the recording of results and made the maps easy to read. Technicians demonstrated i
good "as low as reasonably achievable" practices throughout the activity. This was evident in the locations where they requested personnel to standby during periods of low activity or while monitoring job progression. Additionally, the inspectors questioned health physics technicians and supervisors and found them to be knowledgeable of the evolution and their responsibilities.
During the evolution, a fuel pool diver that was assisting in rack removal exited the pool.
j The inspectors observed the extraction of the diver from the pool and the subsequent decontamination and removal of his dry suit. The inspectors noted that, while the diver
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was being assisted by health physics technicians, the rack removal procedure was placed in a temporary hold at a safe stopping point. The inspectors found that the work activities were delayed to ensure that the full attention of the crew would not be split between two radiologically sensitive efforts: the decontamination of the diver and an ongoing fuel rack lift. This radiological precaution was assessed as a performance strength by the inspectors.
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Conclusions Surveys for the spent fuel pool rerack project were thorough and well performed. Health physics technicians and supervisors were knowledgeable of the evolution and their individual responsibilities. Extraction of a diver from the pool and subsequent decontamination was performed safely and with proper attention to detail. Health physics technicians and supervisors demonstrated conservative decision making and proper concern for keeping radiological dose as low as reasonably achievabl s; i~
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-12-V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted or. March 18,1999. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support D. G. Cornwell, General Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance M. S. Evans, Superintendent, Emergency Preparedness R. E. Farnam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Operations S. P. Hogan, Maintenance, Engineer J. A. McGraw, Superintendent, Engineering T, A. Moser, Superintendent, Systems Engineering D. W. Neterer, Assistant Superintendent, Operations J. T. Patterson, Superintendent, Work Control (Acting)
J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness G. L. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance Regulatory Support R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Chemistry L. S. Sandbothe, Superintendent, Operations T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Systems Engineering M. E. Taylor, Manager, Nuclear Engineering W. A. Witt, Assistant Manager, Callaway Plant INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61720 Surveil lance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92700 One!!e Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities 92902 Followup - Maintenance
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2-ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 99001-01 NCV Failure to terminate solenoid valves as a result of personnel error (Section M4.1).
Closed 99001-01 NCV Failure to terminate solenoid valves as a result of personnel error (Section M4. !).
97005-06 LER incomplete overlap testing of safety injection slave relay and degraded voltage time delay contact (Section M8.1).
Discussed 98025-03 NCV LER 97005-06 was discussed as an additional example of this NCV (Section M8.1).
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