ML20236C288

Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,consisting of Revs to Tech Spec 3/4.7.7 to Increase Scope of Surveillance,Operating Flexibility & Reduce Overly Conservative Actions That Exist in Plant Specs

ML20236C288
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	10/15/1987
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C277	List: ML20236C275 ML20236C288
References
NUDOCS 8710270087
Download: ML20236C288 (74)

Text

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION:- .

. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION ~;

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'. AUXILIARY-BUILDING FILTERED VENTILATION EXHAUST' SYSTEM-1 3 /4 ; 7. 7.. l o

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8710270087 B71015-PDR ADOCK 05000369 P PDR.

ATTACHMENT 1 1 h

BACKGROUND l 1

INTRODUCTION: This proposed technical specification revision has been submitted to improve the present McGuire specification by revising several technical aspects and by reducing the overly-conservative features of Speci-fication 3/4.7.7. NRC letters dated November 29, 1985 and January 7, 1987 have been used to dnvelop some of the changes proposed herein. Specifically, Duke is proposing to include surveillance requirements and associated Action statements to address the ability of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventila- i tion Exhaust (VA) system to maintain a negative pressure in the ECCS equipment areas of the Auxiliary Building. Additionally, Duke is addressing the equip-  !

ment cooling and humidity issues which the staff has previously raised. Fur- '

thermore, Duke is proposing changes in the periodic testing associated with test temperature, acceptance criteria and reference to the 1980 version of ANSI /ASME N510. In support of the relaxation of Action times, Duke is pro-viding a summary probabilistic risk assessment as well as recent technical  !

information from NRC documents.

This proposed technical specification revision package consists of the follow-ing changes to present McGuire specification 3/4.7.7:

a. Provide a 7-day Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable filter package

b. Provide a 72-hour Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable flowpath '

c. Ptovide a 7-day Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to maintain

.25" WG

d. Provide a 72-hour Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to main-tain a negative pressure

e. Provide a 24-hour Action time with both VA trains inoperable

f. Replace term " charcoal" with " carbon"

g. Replace term " ANSI N510-1975" with " ANSI N510-1980"

h. Replace current carbon sample test temperature and acceptance criteria (80'C and 99%) with 30'C and 90%

1. Replace "720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />" with "1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />" of carbon adsorber operation In summary, the total scope of proposed changes to Specification 3/4.7.7 will reduce the overly-conservative nature of the present requirements, increase j the surveillance testing requirements, and make the specification more closely l represent the actual 11 censing basis of the plant.

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Attschm:nt 1-P:go 2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: (The following is taken from FSAR Section 9.4.2)

The design bases for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System are to: l 1

.(a) Provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment and per- ')

-sonnel access as~ required for inspection, testing and maintenance.

(b) Maintain the building at a slightly negative pressure to minimize out-leakage, 1 i

. (c) ' Provide purging of the building to the unit vent. The air exhausted to j the environment from potentially contaminated areas is monitored and {

filtered, as required, so that the limits of 10CFR 20 and the Technical l

Specifications are not exceeded, and j (d) Provide a cuitable environment for the operation of vital equipment during an accident. l (Notes. 10CFR100 values are applicable for accident situations.)

The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System is composed of the following sub-systems:

l (a) Fuel Handling Ventilation Supply Makeup air from outdoors for the fuel handling area is provided for each station unit by a separate supply . subsystem (FSAR Figure 9.4.2-3) con-sisting of one 100 percent capacity fan with heating and cooling coils l and a medium efficiency (50 percent) air filter. This subsystem does not i have a standby capacity. The air is distributed throughout the fuel handling area by the suction of the fuel handling ventilation exhaust subsystem.

(b) Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust The fuel handling ventilation exhaust subsystem consists of two 100 percent capacity fans, duct work, bypass and filters (prefilters, ab-solute and carbon filters). Exhaust air is directed either through the ,

prefilter, absolute filter, and carbon filter, or through the filter l train bypass, and then to the unit vent. (See comment C2-1, page 4, FSAR d Table 9.4.2-2 for complete bypass description.) This operc ion affords a minimum of ten air changes per hour over the fuel pool to continuously '

purge the area of any heat humidity, gaseous, and/or particulate matter.

The maximum and minimum design temperatures expected in the fuel handling area are 90*F and 65'F, respectively.

I (c) Auxiliary Building General Ventilation Supply i Makeup air from the atmosphere for the general ventilation supply sub-system in the Auxiliary Building is provided for each station unit by a separate system consisting of two supply fans with heating and cooling coils and a medium efficiency (50 percent) air filter. These subsystems have neither standby capacity nor carbon filters. Normally, both fans )

operate at their design speed with the air distributed throughout the I building by the ruction of the various exhaust ventilation systems.

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(d) Radiation Area Supply 1

One supply fan with prefilters, heating and cooling coils, and duct work j serves the various compartments in the Auxiliary Building which deal with '

the processing or handling of radioactive liquids, solids and gases. In j addition, the radiation area supply subsystem for Unit i serves the hot i machine shop. Ventilation is based on limiting temperatures to 90*F 1 maximum and 65'F minimum.

(e) Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Each station unit is served by two independent exhaust subsystems, Auxiliary Building filtered ventilation exhaust and Auxiliary Building general ventilation exhaust subsystems. Each system consists of two 50 percent exhaust fans. Auxiliary Building filtered ventilation exhaust I

system incorporates prefilters, absolute filters, carbon filters, bypass {

and associated duct work extending to areas subject to contamination. 1 These contaminated areas will be maintained under a negative pressure.

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The Auxiliary Building general ventilation exhaust subsystem serves areas I that are not subject to contamination. These areas have ventilation rates based upon heat loads only. ]

k All the exhaust systems in the Auxiliary Building are of greater capacity than the supply systems, thus maintaining the Auxiliary Building at a negative pressure. During operation of either unit, all associated Auxiliary Building ventilation systems are activated to " normal" oper-ation. During shutdown of either unit, associated Auxiliary Building ventilation systems may operate in part or in total to suit maintenance, inspection, testing or refueling conditions.

Continuous monitoring is provided at appropriate areas throughout the  ;

Auxiliary Building to assure safe conditions of temperature and radio- d activity and to alert operating personnel of any abnormality (FSAR subsections 12.1.4 and 12.2.4). l I

Specification 3/4.7.7 addresses only the OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building j Ventilation Exhaust (item (e) above) to ensure that the radioactive materials I which ma) leak from the ECCS equipment within the Auxiliary Building following a LOCA ate filtered prior to reaching the environment. i Under normal operating conditions the supply and exhaust fans are loaded so that the Auxiliary Buildin8 is at a negative pressure with respect to atmo-sphere, thus minimizing outleakage. All vents from the building are directed to the vent of the respective unit and monitored before release to the atmo-sphere. All supply is pref 11tered. All systems are located within the j Auxiliary Building and arranged for ease of access, control and monitoring.

The filtered exhaust portion of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System )

provides filtration for the ECCS pump rooms under post-LOCA conditions. The '

filtered exhaust fans receive an automatic start signal to assure the availa-bility of these fans under post-LOCA conditions.

NUKEG-0422 provides the Staff SER on the design of McGuire. Therein it is I stated that the " system is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the auxiliary building following an accident."

. Attachment 1-

<Pago 4 Thus, licensing' basis of McGuire includes the requirement to maintain a negative pressure post-accident within the ECCS area of the Auxiliary Buil-ding. NRC has stated that without a demonstration of 0.25 inch W.G. negative pressure there is inadequate assurance of flow from the adjacent pump room.

Duke has performed a test to demonstrate that indeed the unit specific VA i systeras are capable of providing a 0.25 inch W.G. negative pressure. These '

test results,which are documented in TT/0/A/9100/162, were provided to NRC by letter dated October 9, 1986. These results are hereby incorporated by reference into this submittal.

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I ATTACHMENT 2 l l

j RISK BASED TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION l The primary purpose of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust System (VA) carbon adsorbers post-LOCA is to mitigate the radiological consequences of iodine . released from ECCS pump room leakage. Standard Review Plan (SRP) {

15.6.5, Appendix B, describes the non-mechanistic accident sequence that can  !

be used to determine if VA carbon adsorbers are needed to remove iodine from l the effluent released in the ECCS pump rooms. It is assumed that 50 percent of the core iodine inventory, based upon the maximum reactor power level, is instantaneously mixed in the sump water being circulated through the external piping systems. The types of postulated leakage from ESF components include the leakage from valve stems and pump seals that can be expected during the operation of the ESF recirculation systems, and the leakage from a postulated gross failure of an ESF passive component such as the failure of a pump seal. l Ter, percent of the iodine activity leaked is assumed to be released immediate-ly to the environment. No natural, chemical, or physical retention factors are considered. By taking a mechanistic approach to an accident sequence, a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to describe more realistically fission products behavior and retention associated with various phenomena, plant systems, and structures.

l A PRA is useful in determining the overall risk a plant poses to the public and also the major contributors to the risk. A PRA of McGuire Nuclear Station Unit I was initiated in March 1982. The study was performed by Duke Power Company staff with Technology for Energy Corporation as a contractor. The two major classes of results produced by a PRA are core-melt frequency and public-health risk.

The core-melt frequency is the result of plant systems analyses that identify combinations of component failures and human actions that lead to a core melt and also the probability of their occurrence. Public-health risk is obtained by combining the core-melt frequency analysis with an analysis of core-melt consequences. This consequence analysis consists of a determination of the level and likelihood of radioactivity released to the environment for the various core-melt sequences and an evaluation of the health effects resulting from each raleases, q

The ECCS pump room leakage accident sequence described in SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B, consists of the following three major events:

(1) core melt, (2) recovery of cooling after the core melt, and (3) pump seal failure The frequency of occurrence for the ECCS pump room leakage accident can be estimated by multiplying the probability of a core-melt accident for McGuire by the probability of a residual heat removal (RHR) pump seal failure. This is a conservative approach since it assumes a 100 percent probability of ECCS recovery af ter the core melts. The probability of a core-melt accident at McGuire is less than 10E-4 per year. From information given in NUREG/CR2886, "The In-Plar.t Reliability Data Dase for Nuclear Plant Components," the failure probability of the RHR pump seal / packing within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter initiation of recirculation is 3.6E-3. Therefore, the probability of a core melt concurrent

Attachm:nt 2 '

Pegt 2 with a gross - passive failure of a RHR pump seal 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after accident initiation is on the order of 3.6E-7 per year. In other words, the accident sequence described in SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B, is estimated to occur only.once in 3.3 million reactor-years at McGuire.

If this highly unlikely' sequence should occur, based on a mechanistic approach to the activity release calculation, the potential radiological consequences from recirculation leakage in the ECCS pump rooms are negligible. The ECCS leekage pathway to the Auxiliary Building contains a substantial length of piping which provides significant attenuation of the release of fission products. Additional fission product retention is provided by plateout on exposed surfaces within the Auxiliary Building rooms where the leakage is taking place. For the fission products that are exhausted out of the ECCS pump rooms, significant plateout and deposition would occur along the 350 feet  !

of ductwork leading to the VA filter trains. The McGuire VA filter trains l contain prefilters and HEPA filters which would serve to efficiently remove  !

any remaining fission products in the effluent. I l

The VA carbon adsorbers are designed and were installed to remove the rela-tively volatile elemental iodine (I ) . SRP 15.6.5 assumes that iodine is 2

composed of 91 percent elemental iodine, 4 percent organic iodides, and 5 percent particulate iodine. Recent source term information published by the NRC and numerous study groups implies that the treatment of iodine release in SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B, is incorrect. From NUREG-0956, " Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms" (July, 1986), all base-case analyses currently being performed for the NRC risk rebaselining study use the l assumption that iodine is released from the core as CsI, a highly soluble i salt. In this form, the iodide has a much lower volatility than elemental l iodine and will primarily exist in either dissociated ionic form or as an  ;

aerosol. Thus, it is readily removed f rom the transport path by engineered safety features and by natural processes such as solubility, vapor condensa-tion, and aerocol deposition. These processes result in a substantial reduc- l tion in the potential release of iodine to the environment. Further, NUREG-  !

0956 states that the more volatile forms of iodine do not behave as noble gases and retention mechanisms would operate.

NUREG-0771, " Regulatory Impact of Nuclear Reactor Accident Source Term Assump-tion" (June,1981), in evaluating the VA system effectiveness states that:

If the leakage from fluid recirculation systems contains iodine in the form of dissolved cesium iodide, the potential for I airborne iodine releases in the Auxiliary Building becomes a  !

function of the physical process involved in the postulated leakage. For water leaking in the form of drops or small )

I streams of liquid, such as would be expected from low temp- )

erature, low pressure systems, essentially no_ airborne release '

is expected.

The passive failure assumed in SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B, occurs 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> post-LOCA at which time the temperature and pressure of the ECCS leakage would be relatively low (less than 135'F, less than 180 psi), and therefore no airborne I release would be expected.

l Because the accident sequence described in SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B, is such a low frequency, low consequence event, the removal of the VA carbon adsorbers

Attsch:2nt 2 Page 3 from the Technical Specifications would not impact the public-health risk from

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McGuire. Also, concerns over removing large amounts of elemental iodine from ECCS pump room effluents, which was the very purpose for installing the carbon adsorbers in -the first place, are thus no longer . valid. Therefore, all technical specification requirements related to the VA carbon adsorber beds could be deleted on technical merit. However, Duke proposes only the follow-ing technical specification revisions which are supported by this technical j discussion l

a. Provide a 7-day Action time for l' train of VA inoperable due to inoperable filter package

b. Provide a 72-hour Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to I inoperable flowpath

c. Provide a 7-day Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to maintain

.25" WG

d. Provide a 72-hour Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to main-tain a negative pressure

e. Provide a 24-hour Action time with both VA trains inoperable l

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l ATTACHMENT 3 POST-ACCIDENT HEAT REMOVAL AND HUMIDITY CONCERNS A design basis of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust (VA)  !

System is to provide a suitable environment for the operation of vital equip- i ment during an accident. This function is basically a heat removal require-ment, and is accomplished by several essential cooling units which serve mechanical safeguards equipment (reference FSAR Figure 9.4.2-2). This system of cooling units complements the function of the Control Area Ventilation (VC)

System, which provides cooling for the essential electrical equipment areas.

In addition to the cooling units serving selected essential mechanical equip-ment, some components are fluid cooled, either from component cooling (KC),

nuclear service water (RN), or directly from the process fluid. Cooling methods for various pieces of equipment are delineated below:

SYSTEM COMPONENT COOLING SOURCE ND RHR Pump VA Cooling Unit NS Containment Spray Pump VA Cooling Unit KF Fuel Pool Cooling Pump VA Cooling Unit CA Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Service Water KC Component Cooling Pump Service Water NI Safety Injection Pump Service Water NV Centrifugal Charging Pump Service Water NV Boric Acid Transfer Pump Process Liquid RN Nuclear Service Water Pump Service Water VC/YC Control Area Ventilation Service Water VE Annulus Ventilation Process Air Operation of the Filtered Exhaust portion of the system for purging and l ventilation provides supplemental cooling for unconditioned areas of the auxiliary building. Calculations have been performed to predict post-accident j temperatures in the auxiliary building based on heat loads measured during normal plant operation. These calculations indicate a maximum expected building temperature of 130'F, but are conservatively based on extended j operation at high ambient outdoor temperatures, minimum ventilation rates, and with no credit taken for reduced heat loads concurrent with unit shutdown.

These areas are, from a temperature standpoint, considered a mild environment, and are similar to any normal industrial environment. Electrical equipment located in these areas is generally designed for a continuous operating temperature of 120*F. Excursions above this value should have no adverse j effect provided they are infrequent and are of short duration. The venti- i lation system is usually shut down once a month for preventive maintenance, j with only one or two of the filtered exhaust fans remaining in operation to  ;

maintain a negative pressure in the building. No adverse temperature condi-j tions are experienced during this operation. .

An additional design basis of the VA system is to filter potentially contam-  ;

inated exhaust air prior to atmospheric release through the unit vent. The l air cleaning industry recognizes the effect of humidity on the performance of l activated carbon used in filter systems, and therefore has adopted the prac-tice of limiting relative humidity of the influent air stream to 70 percent.

The McGuire VA system contains inherent features which will limit the influent i

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Attechm;nt 3 Pcge 2 q relative humidity to a maximum of 76 percent under all postulated conditions. .

(This maximum value occurs under the postulated condition where all filter exhaust fans function.) These features are as follows:

1) Building air from all levels of the building mixes prior to entering the filter unit. Potentially high humidity in the ECCS pump areas will be diluted by relatively dry air from other areas prior to  ;

entering the filter unit.

2) Internal heat gains from lights and equipment raise the temperature of the air so that the relative humidity is lowered.

In support of these calculated air e.onditions, actual data recorded at the l

Unit i VA filtered exhaust inlet has been collected since June 1987. The temperature and relative humidity of air entering the filter package was measured intermittently through June, and essentially continuously since mid-July. This period has spanned different VA supply / exhaust operating configurations to allow for preventative maintenance.

Review of the accumulated data shows no temperatures in excess of 92*F (nor-mally ranging from 85 - 90*F) and no relative humidities in excess of 70%

l (normally ranging from 40 - 60%). Raw data, in the form of strip chart ,

l output, is available upon request. Present plans call for VA inlet tempera- l l ture and humidity recording to proce'ed through November 30, 1987.

Conclusions Under normal operating conditions, temperature and humidity within affected l areas of the Auxiliary Building are not a concern.

Under the proposed technical specification conditions of one VA train being inoperable for 7 days or for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the one remaining VA train is suffi-cient to provide ambient cooling. Further, the maximum humidity at the filter bed is not expected to exceed the air cleaning industry standard of 70% RH.

Even if the humidity did become excessive and caused degradation of the filter bed, the postulated off-site dose is still within the acceptance criteria of 10CFR100 (see Attachment 4). ]

i The technical justification provided in this attachment supports the following proposed technical specification revisions:

a. Provide a 7-day Ac tion time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable filter package I i

b. Provide a 72-hour Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable flowpath. j l

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<r .Att:chmenti3 Pcgel3:

. Estimate of Maximum Average Building Temperature

-for-Reduced Ventilation Conditions Purpose.

To e stimat'e auxiliary building air temperature under the following config- ,

urations of the filtered exhaust ventilation system. All cases are without -  !

the supply air units and without the normal unfiltered exhaust fans operating.

l a) All exhaust fans operating (ABFXFIA, 1B, 2A, 2B) b) Two (2) exhaust fans operating, one (1) from each filter system j (ABFXFIA and 2A, or ABFXF-1B and 2B) c) Two (2) exhaust fans operating, both from Unit 1 (ABFIF-1A and 1B) '

d) Two (2) exhaust fans operating, both from Unit 2 (ABFIF-2A and 2B)

Input Data L

From attached temperature survey data, average building temperature is 88'F, i based on' correction to design supply air temperature of 75'F. Zone maps are included to relate survey information to the actual building locations.

l Supply air flow rate during temperature survey was approximately 150,000 cfm

(cubic feet per minute).

Outdoor daily average temperature is conservatively selected as 85'F for input to the ventilation calculations. This value is based on a maximum temperature ,

of 95'F and a 20*F daily range in accordance with ASHRAE design data for the McGuire site.

Design flow for a pair of Unit 1 exhaust fans is 54,000 cfm, and design flow for a pair of Unit 2 exhaust fans is 43,000 cfm. When only one of two paral-1el fans is operating, the approximate flow rate is two-thirds of the design value.

Methodology Building internal heat gains are estimated based on observed survey tempera-tures, corresponding ventilation flow rates, and supply air temperature. The heat gain value is used to calculate an estimated average building temperature at the various conditions of reduced ventilation.

Survey results indicate a uniform temperature distribution in areas served by l the filtered exhaust ventilation system. Even though the building is struc-turally compartmentalized, openings and airways exist to avoid significant 4

l temperature gradients throughout a floor. With only the filtered exhaust fans 1 l in operation, a measurable negative pressure in the building will tend to j distribute inleakage via the supply duct system, thereby as,sisting in achiev-i ing a reasonable temperature distribution. For these reasons, calculation of l an average temperature is considered justified.

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,Nltthchme'nt 3 i 'i Pego: 4 '

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Calculations

• Internal building heat gains

.q Q btu /hr =~1.08 x-CFM x (Troom-Tsupply) d

-Q beu/hr = 1.08~x 150,000'x.(88-75)

Q,~= 2.11 x'106 btu /hr l

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-* Building temperature calculation Troom.= Toutside +. Q

-1.08 X CFM

_a) All'four fans operating Ventilation flow = 54,000'+ 43,000 = 97,000 CFM

Troom = 85 + 2.11 X 10 6

< 1.08 X 97,000 Troom = 105'F b)' Two exhaust fans operating, one from each ' filter system Ventilation flow = 97,000 x .66 multiplier for. one _ of two parallel fans operating

= 64,000 CFM 1

Troom = 85 + 2.11 X 10 0 1.08 X_64,000

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Troom = 116'F c)'Two' exhaust fans operating, both from Unit i Ventilation flow = 54,000 CFM Troom = 85 + 2.11 X 10 6 1.08 X 54,000 Troom'=.121'F d) Two exh'aust fans operating, both from Unit 2 Ventilation flow = 43,000 CFM 6

Troom 85 + 2.11 X 10 1.08 X 43,000 Troom = 130'F

Atttchment 3 P:g3 5 Summary Utilizing heat loads computed from observed area temperatures, resulting space temperatures have been estimated for various operating configurations of the auxiliary building filtered exhaust ventilation system. For extended operation with all of the fans operating, the estimated building temperature  ;

1s 105'F. For operation with' only the Unit 2 fans, the estimated building  !

temperature . is 130'F. All analyses are based on summer design ambient con-ditions of 95'F and daily temperature range of 20'F.

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Attcchment 3 P g4 6

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Humidity Analysis for' Carbon Filter Inlet Conditions Purpose To pre' dict auxiliary building humidity under several operating conditions-including variations of the building ventilation system and. extremes in outdoor weather conditions. Postulated accident conditions (Conditions 1

through 4 are- based .on -ECCS pump room conditions' of 145'F and,1p% relative humidity. . . A minimum . internal building heat gain of 1.2 X 10 Beu/hr is assumed, which is approximately? 50 percent of. the normal heat gain. Normal conditions (conditions 5 and 6) are based on conditioned supply air leaving . j the suppig unit . cooling coils at 95% RH, and normal building heat . gain of '

'2.11 X 10 Btu /hr computed from actual temperature surveys.-

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. Input ~ Values

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Exhaust ventilation design flow rate from the ECCS pump rooms is 6000 cubic feet : per minute with . all fans ' operating. Design flow rate is 3000. CFM with

only the Unit:2 fans operating.

Total filtered exhaust flow rete with all fans operating is 97,000 CFM. Flow  ;

rate with only the Unit 1 fans operating is 54,000 CFM. Flow rate with only the Unit 2 fans operating is 43,000 CFM.

l Methodology For.. postulated accident conditions , - the analysis assumes that' unconditioned outside air is admitted to the building in the form - of inleakage.

The air temperature increases due to internal building h9at gains. Finally, the' air is mixed with exhaust from'the ECCS pump rooms for determining the conditions entering the carbon filter unit.

For normal conditions, the analysis assumes that conditioned supply air is admitted.to the building through the normal air handling supply units and duct {

. system at. near-saturated conditions. The air temperature increases due to internal building heat gains, mixes with infiltration air from excess exhaust -]

y requirements, and enters the carbon filter unit.

Calculations

' Calculations are performed using psychrometric equations and terminology presented in the 1972 ASHRAE Handbook of Fundamentals. Properties of water vapor are taken from Steam Tables by Keenan, Keyes, Hill and Moore.

• ' Conditions 1-4 l Postulated accident conditions with operation of the filtered exhaust fans

!. only. ECCS pump rooms assumed tg be 145*F and 100% RH. Internal building

j. heat gain is taken to be 1.2 X 10 Btu /hr.

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Attochment 3.

-Pcge.7 Condition 1) All four exhaust fans operating, outside air at 95'F' dry bulb and 80'F wat bulb.

Total exhaust flow = 97,000 CFM Pump room flow = 6,000 CFM Remainder of building flow = 91,000 CFM Tbidg = Toutside + Q Btu /hr-1.08 X CFM Tbidg = 95 + f.2 X 10 0 1.08 X 91,000 Tbidg = 107'F Determine' specific volume at the pump room condition of 145'F and 100% RH:

Psat at 14S*F = 3.285 psia from steam tables Humidity ratio W. = 0.622 (Pvap) 3' l

(Pats-Pvap)

W.= 0.622 (3.285)

(14.696-3.285)

W = 0.179 lb vapor /lb dry air Pair r= 14.696 - 3.285 = 11.411 psia Specific volume v = RT =

53.34(145+460)

P 11.411(144) 3 v = 19.64 ft /lb dry air From the Condition 1 psychrsmetric chart at 107'F dry bulb', the humidity ratio of the building air is 132 grains of moisture per pound of dry air.

Determine'opecific volume at building condition of 107*F and 132 grains:

Humidity ratio W = 132 graine =

,0.622 (Pvap) 7000 grains /lb (14.69 6-Pvap) .

W = 0.019 lb vapor /lb dry air 0.641 Pyap = 0.2778 W

Pyap 0.433 psia 1 l

Pair = 14.696 - 0.433 = 14.263 psia l Specific volume v =

53.3 4 (107+4 60) I 14.263(144) 3 v = 14.73 ft /lb dry air j 1

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httcchment3 Pcg3 8

~ Using specific volumes, determine mass flow rate of each flow stream compo-nant, and perform mass .and energy balances to determine final condition of-mixture:

M1 =

6000 ft 3/ min = 305 lb dry air / min 3

L19.64 ft /lb dry air M2 = 91,000 ft 3/ min = 6178 lb dry air / min 3

14.73 f t /lb dry air Determine.enthalpy of each flow stream component:

h - ha.+ Whg, where h = enthalpy of moist air ha = 0.240 T, and hg '= 1061 + 0.444 T h1 =

(0.240 X 145) + 0.179(1061 + 0.444 X 145) h1 =

236.2 Btu /lb l Lh2 =

(0.240 X 107) + 0.019(1061 + 0.444 X 107) h2 =

46.7 Btu /lb Determine enthalpy of mixture by applying conservation of energy:

M1h1 + M2h2 = Mmixhmix hmix = .(305-X 236.2) + (6178 X 46.7)

(305 + 6178) hmix =

55.6 Btu /lb Determine humidity ratio of mixture by applying conservation of mass to the water vapor:

M1W1 + M2W2 = MmixWmix Waix =

(305 X 0.179) + (6178 X 0.019)

(305 + 6178)

Wmix = 0.0265 lb vapor /lb dry air From enthalpy and humidity ratio, determine final mixture temperature:

hmix =

(0.240 Tmix) + Wmix(1061 + 0.444 X Tmix) 55.6 =

(0.240 Tmix) + 0.0265(1061 + 0.444 X Tmix) 0.252 Tmix = 55.6 - 28.1 Tmix = 109.1*F w______--

i ttichment'3'

Page-9" l

' Determine . relative humidity of ' final. mixture based on ' temperature (Taix) and humidity ratio (Waix):

Waix = 0. 622' '(Pvap) '

(14.696 - Pyap) i', O.027.(14.696 - Pvap) '= 0.622 (Pvap) 0.649.Pyap - 0.397 Pyap = 'O.611 Psat'at 109'F is 1.2399 psia RH =' O.611' X 100. - 49%

l 1.2399 Condition 2) Only Unit 2 exh'aust fans. operating, outside air at 95'F dry bulb and 80'F wet bulb.

l L . Total. exhaust flow . = 43,000 CFM l Pump room flow =- 3,000 CFM

Remainder of building-flow. = 40,000 CFM 1.2 X 10 6

~

Tbidg .~= 95 +

1.08 X 40,000 Tbidg = 123*F' From the Condition 2 psychrontric chart, the humidity ratio of the building air is 132 grains of moisture per pound of dry air.

Determine specific volume at building condition.of 123'F and 132 grains:

Humidity ratio W = 0.019 lb vapor /lb dry air Pvap = 0.433 psia Pair = 14.263 psia Specific volume v =

53.34 (123 + 460) 14.263 X 144 v = 15.14 ft /lb dry air Determine mass flow rate of each flow stream component: ,

M1 = 3000 ft 3/ min = 153 lb dry air / min 3

19.64 ft /lb dry air M2 = 40,000 f t / min = 2642 lb dry air / min 3

15.14 ft /lb dry air l

~

iAttishment 3

-Pcg3 10

'l Determine enthalpy of each flow stream component:

C hl.- .236.2 Btu /lb h2 =

(0.240 X 123) + 0.019(1061.+ 0.444 X 123) h2 = -50.7 Beu/lb Determine enthalpy of mixture:

haix =

~ (153 X 236.2) + (2642 x 50.7)

(153--+ 2642)

-haix =

'60.85 Btu /lb' l-

l. 'Det' ermine humidity. ratio of mixture:

Wmix = (153 X 0.179)'+ (2642 X 0.019)

(153- + 2642)

.- Wmix = ' O.0278 lb vapor /lb dry air f From enthalpy and humidity ratio, determine final mixture temperature:

(- 60.85 =

(0.240 Tmix) + 0.0278(1061 + 0.444 Tmix)

O.252 Tmix = 60.85 - 29.!i Tmix = 124.4*F Determine : elative humidity of final mixture:

0.0278(14.696 - Pyap) = 0.622 (Pvap) 0.650 Pyap = 0.409 Pvap = 0.629 Psat at 124*F is 1.8921 psia RB = 0.629 X 100 = 33% ,

1.8921 l Condij; ion 3) All four exhaust fans operating, outside air at 80*F dry bulb and 70'F vet bulb

• otal exh.nust flow = 97,000 CFM i

' Pump room flow .

= 6,000 CFM p

,f !Remainder of building, flow = 91,000 CFM Tbids = 80 + 1.2 X 10 6 1.08 X 91,000 Tbidg = 92.2'F p

L_______-___ \

Attechmnt.3 Paga.11 From the Condition 3 ' psychrometric chart at 92.2*F dry bulb, the ' humidity ratio of the building air is 144 grains of moisture per pound of dry air.

Determine specific volume at building condition of 92.2*F and 144 grains:

Humidity ratio W = 144 = 0.0206 lb vapor /lb dry air 7000 0.0206 = 0.622(Pvap)

(14.696 - Pvap) 0.643 Pvap = 0.3027 Pvap = 0.471 psia Pair = 14.696 - 0.471 = 14.225 psia l Specific volume v =

53.34 (92.2 + 460) 14.225 X 144 3

i v = 14.38 ft /lb dry air i Determine mass flow rate of each flow stream component:

M1 = 305 lb dry air / min 3

M2 = 91,000 ft / min = 6328 lb dry air / min 3

14.38 ft /lb dry air.

Determine enthalpy of each flow stream component:

h1 = 236.2 Beu/lb.

h2 =

(0.240 X 92.2) + 0.0206(1061 + 0.444 X 92.2) h2 =

44.83 Btu /lb Determine enthalpy of mixture:

hmix =

(305 X 236.2)'+ (6328 X 44.83)

(305 + 6328) hmix =

53.63 Btu /lb-Determine humidity ratio of mixture:

Wmix =

(305 X 0.179) + (6328 X 0.0206) l (305 + 6328)

Wmix = 0.0279 lb vapor /lb dry air

q

~

b -

(

' Atthchment L3.. f LPage.12 n ,

1 From enthalpy and humidity ratio,' determine final mixture temperature:

53.63 =

(0.240 Tmix) + 0.0279(1061 + 0.444~x Tmix) 0.252 Teix = 53.63 - 29.60 Teix =- 95.4*F Determine relative humidity of final ~ mixture:.

'0.0279(14.696 - Pyap) ' = 0.622 (Pvap) 0.650 Pyap = 0.41 Pyap = 0.631 psia P

Psat at 95.4*F' = 0.8264 psia

'RH = -0.631~ X 100 = 76%

0.8264 Condition 4) Only Unit 2 exhaust fans operating, outside air at 80*F dry bulb and 78'F wet, bulb.

Total exhaust flow = 43,000 CFM Pump room flow = 3,000 CFM Remainder of building flow = 40,000 CFM Tbidg - 80 + 1.2 X 10 0 1.08 X 40,000 l 1

Tbidg ~= 107.8'F From the Condition 4.psychrometric chart at 107.8'F dry bulb, the humidity 5 ratio of the building air is 144 grains of moisture per pound of dry air.

Determine specific volume at building condition of 107.8'F and 144 grains:

Humidity ratio W = 0.0206 lb vapor /lb dry air Pyap = 0.471 psia Pair = 14.225 psia i Specific volume v = 53.34(107.8 + 460) 14.225 X 144 3

e v = 14.79 fc /lb dry air L.  !

! Determine mass flow rate of each flow stream component:

I M1 = 153 lb dry air / min M2 = 40,000 f t / min = 2705 lb dry air / min 14.79 ft3 /lb dry air

Attdchment.3 ,

LP gi 13-

' Determine,enthalpyfof each flow stream. component:

I h1 -- 236.2 Btu /lb i

.h2 - -(0.240 X 107.8),+ 0.0206(1061'+ 0.444 X 107.8) h2 =

48.71 Btu /lb g Determine'enthalpy of mixture:-

thmix =

(153 'I 236.2) + (2705 X 48.71)) I

.(153 + 2705) haix =- 58.75 Btu /lb L

l'

. Determine humidity ratio of' mixture

I L Waix =

(153 X 0.179) + (2705 X 0.0206)

(153 + 2705)

Waix- = 0.0291 lb vapor /lb dry air

From enthalpy and humidity ratio, determine final mixture temperatures 58.75' = (0.240 Tmix) + 0.0291(1061 + 0.444 Tmix) 0.253 Tmix ' = 58.75 - 30.88 Tmix - 110.2*F' Determine relative humidity of final mixture

l 'O.0291(14.696 --Pvap)-:= 0.622 (Pvap) 1 0.651 Pvap. -

0.428 Pyap = 0.658 psia Psat at 110.2*F = 1.2838 psia 1

RH = 0.658 X 100 = 51%

1.2838 ,

l

• Conditions 5-6 Normal operating conditions with operation of all gupply and exhaust fans. l Internal building heat gain is taken to be 2.11 X 10 Btu /hr. Outside air at 80*F and.78'F wet bulb for infiltration computations.

)

J Total exhaust flow = 173,000 CFM Total supply flow = 150,000 CFM Infiltration flow = 23,000 CFM

(:

{.

1 l-r

L - _ - _- - _ _ _ '

~Attachahnt'3 )

< P g3 14 , l i

I Condition 5) Supply air.is delivered to the space at 75'F and 95% RH. )

.)

Tbidg = 75 + 2.11 X'10 0

.1.08 X 150,000 q Tbidg = '88'F excluding temperature changes due to infiltration. I Building air mixes with infiltration air. Determine temperature of mixture:

Tmi.x' = (150,000 X Tbidg) + (23,000 X Tinfil) 173,000  ;

i Tmix =- (150,000 X 88) -+ (23,000 X 80) 1 173,000 f Tmix = 86.9'F i

From-Condition 5 psychrometric chart, the relative humidity of the mixture is  ;

approximately 67%.

Condition 6) Supply air is delivered to the space at 45'F and 95% RH.

-l Tbidg - 45 + 2.11 X 10 6 1.08 X 150,000 Tbidg = 58'F excluding temperature changes due to infiltration.

Building air-mixes with infiltration air. Determine temperature of mixture:

Tmix = (150,000 X 58) + (23,000 X 80) 173,000 Tmix = 60.9'F From Condition 6 psychrometric chart, the relative humidity of the mixture is approximately 70%.

i

'Attschm:nt 3-Pags 15

'Results

/ Several cases were analyzed to determine- humidity of air entering the carbon filter unit. The-' analysis examined combinations of ventilation, building internal heat loads, and outdoor weather er.tremes to predict the expected range of humidity. Humidity is expected to range from 33% to a maximum of 76%

under the worst case conditions examined. Results are , presented in tabular; format below:

Condition Air Entering Equipment Number Space Configuration Influent RH l

1 '95db,'80wb All filt exh 49%

L 2- 95db, 80wb Unic 2 exh 33%

-3 .80db, 78wb All filt exh 76%

4 80db, 78wb Unit 2 exh 51%

5 75db, 95%RH All normal 67%.

6 45db, 95%RH All normal 70%

l.

1 I

i L

l

Page.No. 1 07/30/87 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Auxiliary Building Temperature Data Normal Plant Operation

' Adjusted Survey HVAC Zone # Temperature l 695 't 91 695-2 88 L

695-3 92 l

-695-4 Note 1 1

695-5 Note 1 695-6 86 695-7 86-l 695-8 87 695-9 87 695-10 00 695-11 89 716-12 87 716-13 88 716-14 92 716-15 88 716-16 Ct 716-17 t ra t e 2 716-18 21 716-19 49 716-20 GG 716-21 98 716-22 87 i

716-23 .87

.~)

f i- -

t, 1

' ~Page No.. 2. '

.07/30/97 MCGUIRE. NUCLEAR STATION .j

/.:

' Auxiliary Building Temperature D'ata..

Normal. Plant Operation Adjusted'

, HVAC Survev-Temperature Zone #.

.716-24 Note 3 716 89 716-26 89.

"116-27 92 716-28 90 716-29 '90-716 as f- ,

716-31 89 716-32 87 716-33 Note 3 716-34' Note 4 716-35 Note 4

'716-36 99 i

t 716-37 G8 716-38 09 716-39 Note 4 716-40 Noee 4 716 CO 716-42 68 716-43 59 716-44 'Jote 4 716-45 92

' 716 89

--_ _x ___ : - _  : .

n .. -

s I j Page No.' 3 B 07/30/87:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

-Auxiliary Building Temperature Data

-Normal Plant Operation Adjusted Survey

'HVAC

'11CD gr a[ur g .

2__ 0

___ "_* ~ #

' 716-47 . Note 5

.716-48 .Noto 1 .

716~49 95 j f

716-50.' 104 -

716-51 98 l 716-52 108

.716-53 ,

Note 1 96.5 l 733-54 J l

Note 2 j

.733-55 i

733-56 Note 2 733-57 92 733-58 96 S4 733-59 C2 733-60 733-61 99 733-62' Note-3 94 733-63 24

~733-64 Note 2 733-65 Note e 733-66 Note 6 4 733-67 Note 'l

. 733-68 Note 7 733-69 l

,)

1

+

Page No. 4- .

.07/30/97 .

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION -

Auxiliary Building Temperature Data Normal Plant: Operation j Adjusted Survey

'HVAC.

. Temperature Zone.# -----------

733 'Notej7 1733-71 Note-7

-733 Note 7-Note 7 733-73 c 733-74 Note 6' l.

733-75 'e Note a 733-76 Note.4 ,

733-77 104 733-78 Note 4-F 733-79 93.5 733-80 99 733-81 89 733-82 Note 4 l 733-83 Note 4 733 23.5 733-85 Note 5

-*1 733-86

)

733-07 Note 1 19 733-88 flo te 1 733-89 733-90 Note 5 733-91  !!9 733-92 l!6

- - _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - -- - ._ _ _- -

') ,

+

Page[No. 5 07/30/87.

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION:

-Auxiliary Building-Temperature Data

' Normal Plant, Operation' Adjusted Survey HVAC

' Temperature Zone # -----------

i 733-93' 111 l, -

- 733 ' Note-5 i

733-95 104 733-96 Note 5 733-97' '121~

i 733-99 119 750-99_ 99 750-100 84.5 750-101 91 1

750-102 88 750-103 84.5-750-104 84.5 750-105. 90.5 90 750-106 750-107 79 o1 750-108 750-109' 89 750-110- 84.5 77 750-111 99 750--112 750-113 99 0'*5 750-114 94.5 750-115 Ei____m____1_____

7 4

Page.No. .6

,, 07/30/07 ..

"- ~ MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION-Auxiliary Bulkding. Temperature Data Normal. Plant' Operation Adjusted Survey HVAC Zone #. Temocrature

-750-116 94.5 I

r ..

i 750-117 79 l'

l' 04.5 750-110

96 750-119 750-120 99 750-121 94.5

750-122 84.5 I 750-123 94.5 79 750-124 750-125 96

.750-126 94.5 94.5 750-127 Note 5 750-129 110 750-129 103 750-130 1 O

750-131' Ilo t e 5 750-132 Note 3 750-133 i i

' to *. e 5 750-134

'O 750-135 1 Note 5 750-136 112 l:

750-137 i

113 750-139 j,

i

~

i 1 Page'No.- .. .?

!" , .07/30/07 .

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR' STATION Auxiliary Building Temperature Data Normal Plant Operation Adjusted Survey

.HVAC. Temperature Zone M-- -----------

767-139 _ Note 3' .

j

.778-140- Note 8 <

1 c ,j [y . .

'l 778-141 _No.te 8 a

j) h si

'767-142 88  ;

jb '.767-143. 82

. :l

]

767-144- 88 _

i

' '(

767-145 . 88 767-146 88 l t

88 'l 767-147 i 1

i 767-148 88 767-149 88 767-150 88 a

'l 1 767-151 - 88 l

\

l

~

767-152 88 {

l 767-153 88 I

767-154 88 48 767-155 28 l 767-156 1

48 767-157 88 767-158 Note 5 767-159 Note 5 767-160 Note 5 767-161 I

l

__ _______ _ - - -_w

i I

Page No. 8 07/30/07 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Auxiliary Building Temperature Data Normal Plant Operation Adjusted Survey HVAC Zone # ' Temperature 767-162 Note 5 767-163 79 767-164 90 778-166 Note 8 l

778-167 Note G l

1 i

f l

l l

+, <

'l I

4

.Notest 1.- No temperature ' reading was taken'for these zones;during

. field survey due to inaccessibility.: These zones'are pioe chase areas.

,. .2.' NoLtemperature' reading.was taken for these: ones.during L

' field survey due to inaccessibility. Maximum temperature in I these. zones is not expected to exceed ~120 F.

l. . . A No' maximum temperature value is'recuired for these :ones-  ;!

i: 3.- 'i (Zones 71'6-24 & 33 are-the bottom.of. units 1 & 2 fuel cool.

Zone.767-139 is the Auxiliary Service Building).

1

4. No temperature _ reading was.taken for these zones during  !

survey due to inaccessibility. Maximum temperature.in'these

ones is' expected to be between 125 F to: 130 F due to-L limited air flow.'

j; These zonestare considered parts of the Control Complex 5.

Area. For maximum temperature value, see Table 7.0-2 of the=

McGuire Plant Enviro-+1ntal Parameters Manual, vol. 1.. l

6. No temperature reading was taken during survey due to a inaccessibility. Maximum normal temperature.is not expected to be higher than the calculated value of 80 F since RHR an  !

NS' Heat'Exchangers are not operating during normal

~

1 operation.

7. No Temperature reading was taken for these :enes during ]

j field survey due'to inaccessibility. Some of these zones However, no )

may have electrical safety-related equipment. l problems are anticipated since the maximum heat load calculated temperature is well below 130 F. (See Table ]

8.0-3 of the McGuire Plant Environmental Parameters Manual.

Vol. 1.)

These zones *are considered parts of the Fuel Building. .f 9.

for maximum temperature v. slue, see Table 7.0-4 of the 1.

McGuire Plant Environmental Parameters Manual. Vol.

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i ATTACHMENT 4  !

0FF-SITE DOSE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS -

Introduction:

The McGuire Design Basis Accident (DBA) off-site dose consequence analysis is summarized - in'. McGuire FSAR Section ' 15.6.4. The applicable pages from the i

" latest FSAR revision are attached. Two DBA cases are addressed in the FSAR;  !

Case 1 assumes.ECCS leakage at twice the maximum operation leakage (0.033 GPM) l for. the' duration of the accident with no credit taken for filtration, even i {

.though system is installed, and Case 2 assumes no ECCS leakage.

In order - to - demonstrate the acceptability - of revising McGuire Technical '

Specification 3.7.7 as proposed, a dose assessment which considers the leakage from a gross failure of a passive component is performed consistent with i Standard - Review Plan (SRP) 15.6.5, Appendix B methodology. The calculated results of the gross passive failure dose' analysis are added to the FSAR,  !

Case 1 analysis results and the total doses are compared to 10CFR100 site' I criteria values.

Additional ECCS Leakage Dose Analysis:

For nuclear power plants that do not provide an ESF atmosphere filtration system, SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B requires that the design basis LOCA dose assessment' include the leakage from a gross failure of a passive component.-

l . This.. leakage should conservatively be assumed to be 50 gallons per minute, l l

starting at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the accident and lasting for 30 minutes. The total i activity release for each radionuclides resulting from- the postulated leakage  ;

.can'be determined as follows: y g ARi = 0.5 x A i x L x F -

A g jf ,

v,  ;

E  % XV ARg = 0.5 A LF f G D 24' , ,2.i24.5) s 'i Where:  !

AR g

=

Total activity release for radionuclides i due to passive failure (C1) l 0.5 =

Fraction of core iodine activity assumed in recirculating containment sump water.

Ag = Total core activity for radionuclides 1 (Curies)

L =

ECCS Leakage rate due to postulated passive failure (Gal /Hr)

F = Fraction of iodine in ECCS leakage which is assumed to be ,

released as airborne effluent.

V, =

Total post-LOCA containment sump volume (Gal) hi = Decay constant for radionuclides 1 (Hr )

L---__-._=-_- -.

1 Att3chment 4.

Pcgs 2 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the parameters and assumptions used in calculating l the ECCS passive failure leakage activity -release for each radionuclides. }

Table 2. includes the calculated AR g results.

Since the ' passive failure .is assumed to occur 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter the initiation of the accident, only the low population zone.- (LPZ) dose is considered. The limiting LPZ thyroid dose contribution for each radionuclides is calculated as follows:.

Dg = -AR g x BR x X/Q x DCF x 10 Where:

BR =

Maximum individual breathing rate (M /sec)

X/Q = The relative concentration estimated at the outer boundary of the low population zone for the 0-8 hour time per1od 3

which is exceeded no more than 5 percent of the time (Sec/M )

DCF g = Inhalation dose conversion factor for thyroid exposure (mrem /pCi) 9 10 =

Conversion factor (pCi-Rem /Ci-mrem)

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the parameters used in calculating the maximum-individual LPZ thyroid dose contribution resulting from the ECCS passive failure leakage assumption. Table 2 includes the calculated D results.

Results and Conclusion .

From Table 15.6.4-9 in the McGuire FSAR (attached), the LPZ thyroid dose (with ECCS leakage) is 48 Rem. The conservatively calculated dose resulting from a postulated failure of a passive component is 34.4 Rem. Adding the calculated dose estimate for the postulated short-term passive component failure to the previously calculated 30-day LPZ dose estimate yields a total 30-day LPZ thyroid dose of 83 Rem. Since this calculated total LPZ dose is below the 10CFR100 value of 300 Rem, the revision of McGuire Technical Specification 3.7.7 is considered acceptable as proposed.

The dose analysis presented above was performed in accordance with NRC guld-ance provided in SRP 15.6.5. Appendix B. The assumed volatility of iodine in this analysis is considered extremely conservative in the light of new source term studies as discussed in Attachment 2. Thus, even in the unlikely event that a postulated accident were to occur, coupled with the failure of one o_r,r both VA systems, the off-site dose is still predicted to be within the 10CFR100 acceptance criteria.

Attachrant 4

.PageL3' This dose analysis; coupled with'the technical discussions provided previously support the following proposed technical specification revisions:

a. Provide a '7-day Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable filter package '

b. Provide a. 72-hour Action- time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to l inoperable flowpath

c. Provide a 7-day Action time when 1 train of.VA is unable to maintain

.25" WG

d. . Provide a 72-hour Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to main-tain a negative pressure e.

~

Provide a 24-hour Action time with both VA trains inoperable l~

"Attechment 4 i Pcg2.4; TABLE '1'- ECCS PASSIVE FAILURE LEAKAGE LPZ DOSE ANALYSIS CALCULATION PARAMETER

SUMMARY

PARAMETER VALUE REFERENCE i

Ai (Curies) TABLE 2 L (Gal /Hr) 3.00E+03 SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B

'F 0.02 (1) SRP 15.5.2 Vs;(Gallons) 6.41E+05 McGuire FSAR, Table 6.2.1-13A LAMDAi-(Hr-I) TABLE 2 BR'(M /sec) 3.47E-04 U.S.N.R.C. Regulatory Guide 1.4 3

X/Q (sec/M ) 2.60E-05 McGuire SER, NUREG-0422 DCF1 (mrem /pC1) TABLE 2 l

NOTES:

(1) Containment sump water temperature less than 212*F .@ 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />  ;

.following . a ' LOCA. Release fraction of 0.02 corresponds to the j iodine partition coefficient listed in Table 6.5.2-1 of SRP 15.6.2 ,

for boric acid spray solutions (1500-2500 ppm).

i i

l A

i L___.__,____._____

_ - - _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - _ - - - - - - j Page 5 l

I TABLE 2 - ECCS PASSIVE FAILURE LEAKAGE LPZ DOSE ANALYSIS I CALCULATION PARAMETER AND RESULTS

SUMMARY

l NUCLIDE Ai-(1) LAMDA1 (2) DCFi (3) ARi Di (C1) (HR. -1) (mrem /pC1) (C1) (Rem)

I131 1.00E+08 3.58E-03 1.49E-03 2.15E+03 2.89E+01 I132 1.50E+08 3.01E-01 1.43E-65 2.36E+00 3.05E-04 I133 2.10E+08 3.30E-02 2.69E-04 2.21E+03 5.36E+00 I134 2.30E+08 8.00E-01 3.73E-06 2.04E 6.85E-10 i

\

I135 2.00E+08 1.03E-01 5.60E-05 3.82E+02 1.93E-01 TOTAL 8.90E+08 --- ---

4.74E+03 3.44E+01 L= 3.00EK)3 GAL /HR F= 2.00E-02 Vs = 6.41E+05 CAL 3

BR = 3.47E-04 M /SEC X/Q = 2.60E-05 SEC/M l

NOTES:

(1) McGuire FSAR, Table 15.0.8-1.

(2) Table of Isotopes, Sixth Edition, Lederer, Hollander, and Perlman.

(3) U.S. N.R.C. Regulatory Guide 1.109.

l l

l i

l

• l l l As expected, the increase in hydraulic resistance mismatch for the 17 x 17 0FA j )I assembly was shown to produce a reduction in reflood steam flow rate for the l 17 x 17 0FA assembly at the mixing vane grid elevations during the transition core period. This reduction in steam flow rate is offset by the fuel grid heat transfer enhancement predicted during reflood. The various fuel assembly j specific transition core analyses performed resulted in peak clad temperature i increases of up to 10*F for core axial elevations where PCTs can possibly j occur. Therefore, the maximum PCT penalty possible for 17 x 17 0FA during l transition cores is 10*. Once a full core of the 17 x 17 0FA fuel is achieved, 4 the large break LOCA analysis with UHI removed will apply without the crossflow '

penalty.

15.6.4.3 Environmental Consequences The postulated consequences of a LOCA are calculated for 1) offsite and 2) l control room operators.

Offsite Dose Consequences l

The offsite radiological consequences of a LOCA are calculated based on the following assumptions and parameters.

1. 100 percent of the core noble gases and 25 percent of the core iodines are released to the containment atmosphere.

2. 50 percent of the core iodines are released to the containment sump and available for release via ECCS leakage outside containment. { }

3. Annulus activity which is exhausted prior to the time at which the annulus reaches a, negative pressure of -0.25 in. w.g. is unfiltered.

4. ECCS leakage begins at the earliest possible time sump recirculation can begin.

5. ECCS leakage oc, curs at twice the maximum operational leakage.

6. Bypass leakage is 7 percent of total containment leakage.

7. The effective annulus volume is 50 percent of the actual volume.

8. The annulus filters become fouled at 900 seconds resulting in a 15 percent reduction in flow.

9. Elemental iodine removal by the ice condenser begins at 600 seconds and continues for 2540 seconds with a removal efficiency of 30 percent.

10. One of the containment air return fans is assumed to fail. = =-

1:. . The containment leak rate is fifty percent of the Technical Specification limit after 1 day.

12. Iodine partition factor for ECCS leakage is 0.1 for the course of the accident.

15.6-16 1986 Update

13. No credit is taken Yor the auxiliary building filters for CCCS leakage. '

14. The redundant hyrdogen recombiners and igniters fail. Therefore, purges- f are required for hydrogen control. l

15. The' annulus ' reaches equilibrium af ter 200,000 seconds such that the only discharge is due to inleakage.

16. Water density at 160PF is used to calculate the sump water mass.

17. Elemental and particulate iodine removal from the containment atmosphere by containment spray begins at the initiation of the event and. continues

.for 1/2 minutes with spray removal lambdas of 1.52E-02 minutes 1 and .

4.10E-02 minutes 1, respectively. l

18. Other assumptions are listed in Table 15.6.4-9. )

Based on the mod.el in Appendix 15A, the thyroid and whole body doses are calculated at the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone. The

doses are presented in Table 15.6.5-9 and are within the limits of 10 CFR 100. .

\

l Control Room Operator Dose l The maximum postulated dose to a control room operator.is determined based on the releases of a Design Basis Accident. In addition to the parameters and

!. assumptions listed above, the following apply:

1. The control room pressurization rate is 1,000 cfm; the filtered recircula-tion rate is 1,000 cfm.

2. The unfiltered inleakage into thd' control room is 10 cfm.

3. Other assumptions are listed in Table 15.6.4-10.

15.6.5 A NUMBER OF BWR TRANSIENTS Not applicable to McGuire, m

\

15.6-17 1986 Update t

)- - - - _ _ -

i e

Table 15.6.4-9 (1 of 2)

Parameters for LOCA Offsite Dose Analysis ,

l

1. Data and assumptions used to estimate -

radioactive source from postulated

-accidents

a. Power Level (MWt) 3565

b. Failed Fuel 100% of fuel rods in core

c. Activity released to containment atmo-sphere from failed fuel and available for release (percent of core activity)

Noble gases 100 Iodines 25 l d. Iodine activity released to containment 50 sump and available for release via ECCS leakage outside containment (percent of core activity)

e. Iodine fractions (organic, elemental, Regulatory Guide 1.4 J and particulate)

D j

2. Data and assumptions used to estimate act-ivity released *  !

a. Containment free volume Upper containment volume (ft3 ) 6.70E+05 Lower containment volume (ft3 ) '

3.68E+05 ,

Total containment volume (ft3 ) 1.038E+06 I

b. Containment leak rate (percent of containment volume per day) 1 0< t < 24 hrs

~

0.3 t > 24 hrs , 0.15

c. Bypass leakage fraction 0.07

d. Annulus veritilation iodine filter 95 efficiency (percent)

D 12/86 l

l

Table 15.6.4-9 (2 of 2)

Parameters for LOCA Offsite Dose Analysis

e. Total annulus ventilation flow rate (cfm) 0-900'sec 8000 900+ sec 6800

f. Time at which annulus ventilation  !

system is operable (sec) 97

g. Annulus volume (ft3 ) 422,361

3. Dispersion data

a. Distance to exclusion area boundary (m) 762-

b. Distance to low population zone (m) 8850 l c. x/Q at exclusion area boundary (sec/m3 ) l 0-2 hrs 9.0E-04 i

. d. x/Q at low popylation zone (sec/m3 ) l 1

0-8 hrs 8.0E-05 8-24 hrs 5.2E-06 1-4 days 1.7E-06 4+ days 3.7E-07

4. Dose data

a. Method of dose calculations Appendix 15A

b. Oose conversion assumpt, ions Appendix 15A

c. Dose's (Rem) i i

Case 1 (With ECCS leakage) i Exclusion Area Boundary Whole Body 4.2 Thyroid 2.2E+02  ;

Low Population Zone Whole Body 8.0E-01 Thyroid 4.8E+01 Case 2 (Without ECCS leakage)

Exclusion Area Boundary Whol'e Body 4.1 2.0E+02 Th9toid Low Population Zone Whole Body 7.9E-01 Thyroid 4.0E+01  ;

12/86

ATTACHMENT 5 l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED CHANGES

This proposed technical specification revision package consists of the follow-ing changes to present McGuire specification 3/4.7.7

a. Provide ' a 7-day Action time for 1 train of VA . inoperable due to inoperable filter package

b. Provide a 72-hour Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to_ i inoperable flowpath

c. Provide a 7-day Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to maintaia

.25" WG

d. Provide a 72-hour Action time when.1 train of VA is unable to main-  !

tain a negative pressure 'I

e. Provide a 24-hour Action time with both VA trains inoperable

f. Replace term " charcoal" with " carbon"

g. Replace term " ANSI N510-1975" with " ANSI N510-1980"

h. Replace current carbon sample test temperature and acceptance criteria (80'C 'and 99%) with 30'C and 90%  ;

i. Replace "720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />" with "1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />" of carbon adsorber operation Each of these proposed changes will be discussed in the following safety evaluations.

Provide- a 7-day Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable filter package.

In this . degraded condition, one train of VA is fully operable (flowpath, filter package, capability to maintain negative pressure) and one train of VA is degraded in that the filter package has failed one or more of the identi-fled surveillance testing specified in Specification 4.7.7.1 (flowpath is still operable in that the filter package can be bypassed). Thus, the ability of the VA system to mitigate ECCS leakage is reduced.

Thio degraded condition is considered acceptable for several reasons. First, probability of an event occurring, which requires the VA system to mitigate its consequences, is remote (Attachment 2). Second, even if an event were to occur, the offsite dose consequences remain within acceptable limits. (At-tachment 4). Third, the ability to maintain a negative Auxiliary Building pressure is maintained (Attachment 1). And fourth, equipment cooling and humidity effects during normal operation and post-accident are acceptable (Attachment 3).

The allowable outage time (A0T) of 7 days provides adequate time to remove and replace the degraded activated carbon in the filter package.

Att:chsent 5 Pcge 2

-l

'1 Provide a 72-hour Action time for 1 train of VA inoperable due to inoperable flowpath.

In this degraded condition, one train of VA is fully operable (flowpath, filter package, capability to maintain negative pressure) and one train of VA l is degraded in that the flowpath is inoperable except for the filter package and the ability to maintain negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building. This condition would exist by failing the surveillance testing contained in Speci-fication 4.7.7.2.

This degraded condition is considered acceptable for several reasons. First, the probability of an event occurring which requires the VA system to mitigate its consequences, is remote during this A0T (Attachment 2). Second, even if an event were to occur, the off-site dose consequences remain within accepta-ble limits (Attechment 4). Third, equipment cooling and humidity effects during no rma.' operation and post-accident are acceptable (Attachment 3).

Finally, the A'S of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provxdes adequate time to restore the inoperable flowpath to opsrahle status and is consistent with typical A0Ts for two-train systems where one redundant train is inoperable.

I Provide a 7-day Action time when 1 train _,of VA is unable to maintain 0.25" WG.

In this degraded condition, one VA Exhaust System is unable to maintain 0.25" WG at the ECCS pump room relativa to outside atmosphere. Typically, the remaining VA Exhaust Fans will be capable of maintaining 0.25" WG. However, even if they only maintain a negative building pressure, continued operation of the units is acceptable. (Action C.2 covers the ACTION to be taken in the i event any exhaust fan is unable to maintain negative auxiliary building  !

pressure.) This condition would exist by one VA Exhaust System failing the j surveillance contained in Specification 4.7.7.3.

This degraded condition is considered acceptable for several reasons. First the probability of an event occurring which requires the VA system to mitigate its consequences is remote during this A0T (Attachment 2). Second, even if an event were to occur, the off-site dose consequences remain within acceptable limits (Attachment 4).. Third, this condition still provides for the capabil-ity to maintain a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building (Attachment 1). l Equipment cooling and humidity control are unaffected by operation in this degraded condition inasmuch as both exhaust fans in each unit are operable. l This A0T provides adequate time to determine the cause of f ailed test and to restore the affected system to operable status without unnecessarily causing a unit shutdown.

Provide a 72-hour Action time when 1 train of VA is unable to maintain a negative pressure.

In this degraded condition, one VA Exhaust System is unable to maintain negative pressure at the ECCS pump room relative to outside atmosphere. This condition would exist by one VA Exhaust System failing the surveillance contained in Specification 4.7.7.3.

This degraded condition is considered acceptable for several reasons. First, the probability of an event occurring which requires the VA system to mitigate 1

l l

l _. . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ .

Att:chment 5 Pags 3 its consequences is remote during this A0T (Attachment 2). Second, even if the event were to occur, the off-site dose consequences would remain within acceptable limits (Attachment 4). Equipment cooling and humidity control are unaffected by operation in this degraded condition.

This A0T provides adequate time to determine the cause of the failed test and i to restore the affected system to operable status without unnecessarily causing a unit shutdown.

Provide a 24-hour Action time with both VA trains in each unit inoperable.

In this degraded condition, both VA Exhaust Systems are inoperable. This condition is not likely to exist but is provided to be consistent with exist-ing technical specifications.

This degraded condition and action time is considered acceptable for several reasons. First, the probability of an event occurring, which requires the VA l system to mitigate its consequences is remote during this action time period (Attachment 2). Second, even if the event were to occur, the off-site dose consequences would remain within acceptable limits (Attachment 4) . Equipment cooling and humidity control are unaffected by operation in this condition for this limited period of time (Attachment 3). Finally, this condition is con-l sistent with that which presently exists in the McGuire Technical Specifica-tion.

l

! This A0T provides adequate time to determine the cause of the failed test and f

to restore the affected systems to operable status without unnecessarily causing both units to shutdown.

Replace term " charcoal" with " carbon":

This change is provided in several places in order to make the specification technically correct. It is consistent with common usage and the Bases of existing Specification 3/4.7.7. The change itself is administrative and has no safety significance.

Replace term " ANSI N510-1975" with " ANSI N510-1980":

This proposed change is in response to a Staff request contained in a letter dated November 29, 1985 to Duke on the McGuire dockets. Duke considers this change acceptable because the new standard represents current industry prac-tice and is acceptable to NRC.

Replace current carbon sample test temperature and acceptance criteria (80'C and 99%) with 30*C and 90%:

This proposed change is in response to a Staff request contained in a letter dated November 29, 1985 to Duke on the McGuire dockets. The 30*C test temper-ature is selected in order to provide a more meaningful assessment of the capability of the carbon beds. In the letter, the Staff recognized that such i a change may require relaxation of the acceptance criteria for the laboratory test. Duke proposes an acceptance criteria of 90%. This is acceptable even ]

I

~Attachasnt 5'

• PegeF41

,r.

' without- the . carbon bed operable, i the off-site dose consequences' would remaint

.within. acceptable limits (Attachment 4).

Replace "720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />" with "1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />" of carbon adsorber operation:

One facet ' of - the' proposed VA' Tech Spec change is the adoption of a 1440 hr.

run-time carbonz sampling frequency (as compared to the standard. 720 hr.

sampling . frequency presently required). The following justification is provided for this change.

LUnit 1 VA System has essentially. been operating in filter mode nonstopL since l - February .1985, thereby requiring monthly carbon sampling and analysis. No

-significant decrease.in radioiodine adsorption efficiency has been noted since

.that' time. Dual condition. carbon sample testing'has also been performed since .J mid '86, comparing the efficiency .results of tests conducted 'under Tech Spec  !

conditions (80*C, 95% relative humidity; as referenced by ANSI N-510,' 1987 via j

Reg. Guide 1.52, ' Rev. 2) ' to the results of tests performed at more _ rigorous j

-conditions (30*C, 95% RH).. . Trends of carbon officiency under both conditions l

support the argument for a . decreased sampling frequency, as presented by the - J following cable. Tech Specs require greater than 99% efficiency (less than 1%

penetration).

]

IVA CARBON EFFICIENCY TRENDS RESULTS R TECH SPEC INFO SAMPLE DATE' (80*C, 95% RH) (30*C, 95% RH) '

05/28/86 99.98 99.83  !

07/10/86 99.79 99.51 08/14/86 99.82 '99.54 09/11/86 99.77 99.49 09/22/86 99.84 99.66 10/02/86 99.79 99.51 11/13/86 99.90 99.72 .i 11/26/86 99.83 99.53 12/12/86 99.84 99.'i4 01/08/87 99.94 99.10 02/12/87 99.98 99.95 03/12/87 99.95 99.87 04/09/87. 99.98 99.95 05/14/87 99.94 99.80 1-L i

4 ATTACHMENT 6 -l JUSTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CHANGES AND i SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION NOTE 1: In order to facilitate understanding each proposed change, indivi- ,

Ldual elements have been identified as shown on the- marked up pro- l

, posal at the end of this attachment.

{

l NOTE 2: Elements 4 through 8 contain various allowable. outage times but have l common actions to be taken in the event the action is not completed ;j within the specified allowable outage time. This common require-ment, to be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in l

COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, is identical to that l l- which presently exists, and thus neither technical justification nor  !

significant hazards determinations are provided.

l l

ELEMENT 1:

The' present McGuire Specification 3/4.7.7 is written on a "per unit" basis.

-That is, the specification- is applicable to each unit ' individually. If one l-unit is operating, then only one VA system is required to be operable. The proposed - specification 3/4.7.7 is written as a " shared" system. If only one  !

unit is operating, both VA systems are still required to be operable, i

l The proposed change does not . involve a significant hazards consideration -!

l because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change  ;

would not: i (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of l an accident previously evaluated. In fact, the proposed _ change will  !

increase the capability to mitigate an accident by requiring both l units systems to be operable if only one unit is operating. '

s (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from )

any previously analyzed. No new accidents are created by this ,

proposed change. Operability of this system is still required to  !

mitigate the consequence of analyzed accidents.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Thio pro-posed change has no impact on margin of safety. Operability of this system is still required to mitigate the consequences of analyzed accidents.

ELEMENT 2: l The present McGuire Specification 3/4.7.7 is applicable for Modes 1, 2, 3, and

4. The proposed Specification 3/4.7.7 is also applicable for Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. There is no change, thus no significant hazards determination is required.

} {l' i EAttecbLnt6' LPage'2l -

ELEMENT 3:"

, The' ACTION line .of - the present McGuire Specification 3/4.7.7 is written so as

~

)

4 (to'be applicable on a "per unit" basis. The proposed' Specification 3/4.7.7 is

- written- so' as to . have - the . actions - applicable to .- both ' units.

~

The proposed a

< specification 'is written 'taking credit for both units VA systems.- :In ~ the -

. event an' action-time-is exceeded,' both units would be required to be shut;down ;l pursuant to Specification 3.0.3. The significant hazards determination will be addressed with each' individual. action requirement.

l

ELEMENT 4

(/ '

Proposed ACTION 'a' of Specification 3/4.7.7 provides an allowable outage time 9 for an inoperable single VA system filter. package of 7 days. The function of j the VA'~ system filter package is .to remove airbm ne radioactive isotopes prior -

to release to the ' atmosphere. Operability of the. filter package .is estab -

lished ' by surveillance 4. 7. 7.1- (a-e) . Based on = the safety evaluation _ per-

' formed,'there is low risk to the public by having'one VA system. inoperable for 7 days. - The~ - combined probability of fa11ure of the other VA system and probability of .an accident occurring on either unf t during this 7-day. period of time are-very small. Further, this period of time is a reasonable period j of time to replace a carbon filter _ bed in the event it becomes inoperable as a i result . of the surveillance performed. The present Specification - 3/4.7.7 allows 'in the situation where one nuclear unit is shutdown, that its respec- j tiveLVA system may be out of service indefinitely. Accordingly, the proposed  !

Specification 3/4.7.7 actually represents 'a more restrictive operational

' condition in this specific situation.

i The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change  ;

would not:

-(1) involve a significant increase in the' probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Safety evaluations have shown '

that a single VA system can function to mitigate the consequence of postulated accidents on either unit. The 7-day allowabic outage j' time is sufficiently limited such that the probabilities of event occurrence and failure of the alternate VA system are sufficiently small so as to pose little risk to the public.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The 7-day allowable outage time by itself does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The operability of the alternate VA system assures that the mitigation of the postulated accident will be as designed.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed )

7-day allowable outage time by itself does not significantly reduce the margin of safety. In fact the margin of safety, in a situation with only one unit operating, is in fact increased due to the requirements to have both units VA system operable.

Attach =nt 6

~Pags-3 ELEMENT 5:

Proposed ACTION 'b' of Specification 3/4.7.7 provides an allowable outage time for ' a . single inoperable VA system flowpath of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This time frame is consistent with typical two train systems, where one train is redundant to the i other. The safety analysis provided provides the bases to conclude that one I unit's VA eystem is redundant to the other. Operability of the flowpath is estab11shed by Surveillance 4.7.7.2 (a - c). The Staff has previously deter-mined that 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is an acceptable allowable outage time for an inoperabia

. train cf'a two train system. There are several examples (e.g. nuclear service vater, component cooling water, ECCS) within the McGuire Technical Specifica-tions. The 72-hour period of time provides c reasonable period of time in

' order to restore an inopecable flowpath. Again, as stated earlier, the )

probability of an event occurring during this limited period of time-is very  !

.small. And when taken in conjunction with the probability of failure of the l alternate train is even smaller, the total risk to the public is extremely l

amall. /

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration ,

because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change {

would_not:

]

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Safety evaluations have shown that a single VA system can function to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidcnts on either unit. The 72-hour allowable outage time is sufficiently limited such that the probabilities of event occurrence- and failure of the alternate VA system are sufficiently small so as to' pose little risk'to the public. i (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously annlyzed. The 72-hour allowable outage time by itself does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The operability of the alternate VA system assures that i the mitigation of the postulated accident will be as designed.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.- The proposed 72 -hour allowable outege time by itself does not significantly redisce the margin of safety. The operability of the alternate VA system assures that the mitigation of the postulated accident will be as designed. <

ELEMENT 6:

Proposed ACTION 'c.1' of Specif* cation 3/4.7.7 provides an allowable outage j time of 7-days for a single VA system unable to maintain 0.25" WG (but still l able to maintain a negative pressure, which is the licensing basis of Mc-Guire). Entry into this action statement (as well as ACTION 'c.2') is gov-erned by the results of testing performed pursuant to proposed Specification 4.7.7.3 (which does not presently exist in the McGuire Technical Specifica-tions). The safety analysis provides the technical justification to conclude l that one unit.'s VA system is redundant to the other. The low likelihood of '

the postulated accideats occurring within this 7-day time frame, coupled with the operability of the alternate VA system, makes the risk to the public 1 i

l

i Attcchm:nt 6 I Pego 4  !

l exceedingly small. In this particular action, the VA system of concern is ,

still capole of drawing a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building, which  !

is the licensing basis of McGuire. Its only deficiency is that it is unable j to achieve the 0.25" WG limit which has been established by NRC recently, i ACTION 'c.1' (and 'c.2') coupled with Surveillance 4.7.7.3 are new for McGuire l'

and represent more restrictive requirements than presently exist.

I The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration  !

because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change I would not:  !,

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This action coupled with the new surveillance represent additional restrictions on the operation of McGuire. The imposition of these new requirements will not increase j the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated. '

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. This action coupled with the new surveil-lance represent additional restrictions on the operation of McGuire.

The imposition of these new requirements will not create the possi-bility of any new or dif ferent kind of accident.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This action ,

represents additional restrictions on the operation of McGuire. It will not reduce the margin of safety.

ELEMENT 7:

Proposed ACTION 'c.2' of Specification 3/4.7.7 provides an allowable outage time of 72-hours for a single VA system unable to maintain any negative pressure, which is the licensing basis of McGuire. Entry into this action statement (as well as ACTION ' c .1 ') is governed by the results of testing performed pursuant to proposed Specification 4.7.7.3. This time frame is identical to that which is discussed previously in Element 5. The technical justification for this requirement is the same as that for Element 5, and is not repeated here.

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Safety evaluations have shown that a single VA system can function to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents on either unit. The 72-hour allowable outage time is sufficiently limited such that the probabilities of event occurrence and failure of the alternate VA system are sufficiently small so as to pose little risk to the public.

(2) create the possibility of a new or dif ferent kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The 72-hour allowable outage time by itself does not creote the possibility of a new or different kind of

(

)

t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ .

wn

. ,, a g; ,n

,x i , ,

} ;

NAttcch cntL6 ,

Pegb5f m

-accident. . The. operability of: the ' alternate VA system assures s that -

'the mitigation of.the postulated accident will be as designed.

'(3). insolvea'significant_ reduction [inamarginofsafety. The proposed.

i ' 72-hour . allowable ' outage time' by itself doesinot Significantly ~

reduce the margin of;. safety. .The operability of E the ~ alternate VA

~

system ' assures L that the mitigation. of the postulated accident' wi1L be as designed.'

i

-ELEMENT 8:L j

b; l Proposed ACTIONd' of-Specification'3/4.7.7'provides a.24-hour action time in the'unlikely=eventithe VA systems of both units are inoperable simultaneously.'

- At. leastf one system must be: restored within this period of time or else both'- ~!

units - must .be . shutdown. . The' technical justification in support ..of this j

l. > proposal-has been provided. Justification has been developed to support both  !

VA systems being inoperable for this limited period'of time.- This time period-  ;

;~

'is consistent,with present McGuire specification 3/4.7.7.- By being written-on '

a'per unit basis,-both unit's VA systems may be inoperable, for'up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> H

-and either restored, or each unit would be shutdown.' This proposed specifica-tion provides.the same requirement.- Inasmuch as this is the same requirement:

l. 'as presently exists, a significant hazards determination is not required. ,

.j ELEMENTS 9 through'18 refer.to surveillance on the VA systems. The existing

-surveillance . have been reorganized to more closely align to the specified  ;

action statements. In most cases,.the proposed surveillance have only minor '

changes from.the existing specifications:

EXISTING TS PROPOSED TS-(ELMENT) 4.7.7.a. 4.7.7.2.a *(15)  ;

b .1) ,2) 4. 7. 7.1.a 1) ,2) * (9,10) b.3) 4.7.7.2.b .*(16)

c. 4.7.7.1.b *(11) d.1) 4.7.7.1.c *(12) ,

d.2) 4.7.7.2.c (17) {

e. 4.7.7.1.d *(13)

f. 4.7.7.1.e *(14)

NONE 4.7.7.3 (18) 'I For those proposed new surveillance marked by an asterisk, the term " charcoal adsorber" is replaced by " carbon adsorber". For Elements 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 18 additional changes are proposed. For Element 17, no changes are proposed. ,

Carbon adsorber is technically the correct descript1on and in fact is consis-cent with the " carbon sample" phrase used in the present technical specifica-tion. This is an administrative change to correct a technical wording defi-ciency-in the present specifications.  !

l I

l_________i____________

Attccha nt 6 P gn 6 The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change would not:

(1). involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of i an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change f rom " char-coal" to " carbon" adsorber corrects a technical deficiency in the l

present specification. It has no impact on tt.e operation of the VA l system. It has no impact on accidents previously evaluated.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from I any previously analyzed. The proposed change from " charcoal" to j

" carbon" adsorber corrects a technical deficiency in the present specification. It has no impact on the operation of the VA system. j It cannot create any new or different kind of accident. j h

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed j change from " charcoal" to "carbop" adsorber corrects a technical  !

deficiency in the present specification. It has no impact on the operation of the VA system. It has no impact on the margin of ]

safety.

j l

ELEMENT 10: )

l Proposed surveillance 4.7.7.1.a.2) is a revised version of existing surveil-lance 4.7.7.b.2). The existing surveillance refers to Regulatory Position c.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978 which requires such testing be conducted at 80'C with a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1%.

NRC has stated that such temperature may be non-conservative and has suggested testing at 30*C which is closer to ambient temperature under design condi-tions. Concurrent with a revised test temperature is a revised acceptance criteria of 90% which is consistent with the licensing basis. The technical justification for this has been provided. This acceptance criteria has been determined to be adequate to establish that the carbon filter is operable.

Discussion has been previously provided to support the revision of charcoal adsorber to carbon adsorber.

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Technical justification has been developed that demonstrates that the revised testing temperature and acceptance criteria are adequate to assure operability of the carbon filter during the postulated design basis condition. In fact, the values are more conservative that presently exist.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The revised values continue to assure operability of the VA system carbon filter. No new or different kinds of accidents will result so long as the carbon filter bed is effectively tested to determine operability.

1

Attcchment 6 Pcge 7 (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The revised values continue to assure operability of the carbon filter. There is no reduction in the margin of safety that had been assumed in the design basis analysis.

ELEMENT 11: '

Proposed surveillance 4.7.7.1.b is a revised version of existing surveillance 4.7.7.c. The existing surveillance requires testing after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation and that a representative sample meet the labor-atory testing criteria of Regulatory Position c.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978 for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1%. Data has been provided to show that no degradation of carbon adsorber performance occurs after 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> of operation. With respect to sample testing, NRC has stated that testing pursuant to the above Regulatory Guide may be non-conser-vative and has suggested that such testing be conducted at 30*C which is closer to expected ambient temperature. Concurrent with this is a revised acceptance criteria of 90% which is consistent with the licensing basis. The technical justification for this has been provided. Discussion has been previously provided to support the revision of charcoal adsorber to carbon adsorber.

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change  ;

would not: l 4

4 (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of '

an accident previously evaluated. Technical justification has been developed that demonstrates that the revised testing temperature and l acceptance criteria are adequate to assure operability of the carbon j filter during the postulated design basis conditions. The 1440  !

hours has been shown to be acceptable in that filter degradation has l not occurred over several samples taken 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> apart. l l

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The revised surveillance will continue to I assure operability of the VA system carbon filter. No new or different kinds of accidents will result so long as the carbon l filter bed is effectively tested to determine operability. l (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The revised l values continue to assure operability of the carbon filter. In fact, the temperature is more representative of actual ambient l conditions. There is not reduction in the margin of safety that had been assumed in the design basis analysis.

ELEMENT 13, 14, 16:

Proposed specifications 4.7.7.1.d, 1.e, and 2.b are revised versions of cxisting surveillance 4.7.7.e, .f and b.3, respectively. The only other l

c Attichrent 6 Pago 8-change from that discussed previously is from ANSI N510-1975 to ANSI (

N510-1980. The technical justification of the acceptability of this change has'been provided. It'is Duke's intent-to comply with'the 1980 version of the standard. There are no changes in the inservice test requirements from.the 1975 standard to the 1980 version. In fact, by. letter dated November 29, 1985, NRC staff recommended that McGuire technical specifications be revised .

to reference the 1980 version of ANSI /ASME N510.

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident prev.iously evaluated. The 1980 version of the standard changes none of the inservice testing requirements. Only the ;

l preservice testing requirements have been revised. Such a revision j to the technical specifications now would e11minate the need for a  ;

future reaffirmation of the adequacy of a deviation from the present l technical specification.

- (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from i any previously analyzed. There is no change to the manner in which the VA system is tested or operated. Thus, there is no possibility i that a new or'different kind of accident can be created.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of-safety. There is no I change in the manner in which the VA system is operated and tested.

.The safety margin that presently exists is not reduced. I ELEMENT 18:

Proposed specifications 4.7,7.3 is new for McGuire, but is based on the wording presented in standard technical specifications. This new surveillance provides assurance that both unit's VA systems will be capable of maintaining the ECCS pump room at a negative pressure relative to outside atmosphere, which is consistent with the licensing basis of McGuire. This surveillance requirement, along with proposed ACTIONS 'c.1' and 'c.2', provide additional operational limitations on the McGuire units. The surveillance interval of once every 18 months is consistent with current NRC accepted practice for similar ventilation systems. Further, this test interval is consistent with l test intervals on other significant tests that are performed on this system.

The . proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of McGuire Nuclear Station in accordance with this change would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This proposed change increases the amount of surveillance performed on the VA system. It provides '

additional assurance that the system will be capable of performing its design function. It will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

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,Att: chm:nt 6 Pcgo 9 j

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(2) create'the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from I any previously analyzed. This proposed change increases the amount 4

of surveillance -performed on the VA system. It provides additional assurance ' that the system will be capable of performing its design function. It will not create a new'or different' kind of accident. 1 (3) involve a significant reduction _ in a margin of safety. This pro-posed change increases the amount of surveillance performed on the  !

VA system. <It provides additional ~ assurance that the system will be ,

capable of _ performing its design function.- It.will not reduce any l margin of safety.

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PLANT SYSTEMS l,,

13/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTERED VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM 'l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION >

3.7.7 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3 ACTION: (Units 1 and 2)

a. With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System filter L4 package inoperable, restore the inoperable filter to OPERABLE ' status i L within 7. days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and I in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I i

b. With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System flowpath inoperable (except carbon and HEPA filter package . components and except j t

as addressed by c.1 and c.2 below) restore the inoperable - flowpath to '

OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

t c.1 With one Auxiliary Building F1'Itered Ventilation Exhaust- System able to l maintain a negative' pressure but unable to maintain 0.25" WG at the ECCS l q

L i

pump room relative to outside atmosphere, restore system ability to j maintain 0.25" WG within the next 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY  !

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 J hours. '

i c.2 With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System unable to i maintain a negative pressure at the ECCS pump room relative to outside Y 'f a tmosphe re , restore system ability to maintain:a negative pressure within j

the next 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> '

and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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d. With both Unit I and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Systems inoperable, restore at least one inoperable system to  ;

OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the l next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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-PLANT SYSTEMSL 'f 7 7

,A SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDIENTS ( +

i 4.7.7.1 Eaclk . unit's Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System filter package shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: {

l

o. 'At,least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the EEPA filter 'or carbon adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in,any ventilation zone communicating with the system, by:

1 i

f 1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration I and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and j uses the test procedure guidance of Regulatory Positions C.S.a. J C.5.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the syster flow rate is 54,000 cfm + 10% (both fans operating - f Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans oI>erating - Unit 2);

j 0 2) Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of l

a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regula-lj 4- tory Position -C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,

( March 1978, meets an acceptance criteria for methyl iodide pene-

] , ;a tration of 90% at 30*C test temperature, and b .- Af ter 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> of carbon adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days afcer removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon ih sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regula-tory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets an acceptance criteria for )

methyl iodide penetration of 90% at 30"O Uehe temperature, and

/ ,!

S[/ At'least once per 18 months, by verifhing that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and carbon adsorber banks of less than 6 inches g Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 54,000 cfm i 10%

(' (both f ans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating -

Unit 2), and -

df Af ter each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by

')'

verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in-place penetration <

and ' bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1% in accordance with i ANSI N510--1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate , of 54,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating -

Unit 1) or 43,000iefm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 2); and e' e. Afterjeachcompleteorpartialreplacement of a carbon adsorber bank, by verifying that the carbon adsorber satisfies.the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of lep than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 54,000 cfm + 10% (both fans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans eperat'ing - Unit 2).

3/4-17

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PLANT SYSTDiS. , ,

1 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continueg)_

i 4.7.7.2 Each Unit's Auxiliary Buildiug Filtered Ve.nh.ilation Fxbaust System flowpath shall be demonstrated OPERABIK: #

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a. At least once per 31 dayd,' by' initiating, ft'om the control room, 3 flow through the HEPA filters, and carbon adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at 2 cast 15 mjoutes. '

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b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) afb r any structura'l maintenance i on the HEFA filter or carbon adsorbq bousings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone com-municating with tha'\ eystem, by ' verifying a system flow rate of

'7 54,000 cfm i 10%, (bedi' fx.s operneing - Lhit 1). or _43,000 cfm i 10%

, (both fans operatius ,Urit i

in accordance with ANI N3id - 1980, 2) duringsystertoperationwhentesteg t-3 1 c.

At least once. pet [2 montL's, by Verifying that the system starts on '

a Safety Injection t'est sigtlal and directs its exhaust flow thrgegh. 1 the HEPA filtet's apd carbon adsorbers. ' '

4. 7. 7. 3 Each Units Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust s System l shalf be demonstrated OPERABLE, at least once per 18 months, by verifying that

' thNnystem maintains the' ECCS pu:ap room at a negative pressure telative to outside ateosphere. 1

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.' ' ' . ' , ..-( > m ATTACHMENT 7 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.7 l.

PAGES 3/4.7-16

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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTERED VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION: (Units 1 and 2) j a. With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System filter package inoperable, restore the inoperable filter to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b. With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System flowpath inoperable (except carbon and HEPA filter package components and except as addressed by c.1 and c.2 below) restore the inoperable flowpath to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.1 With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System able to maintain a negative pressure but unable to maintain 0.25" WG at the ECCS pump room relative to outside atmosphere, restore system ability to maintain 0.25" WG within the next 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.2 With one Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System unable to maintain a negative pressure at the ECCS pump room relative to outside atmosphere, restore system ability to maintain a negative pressure within the next 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

d. With both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Systems inoperable, restore at least one inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l 3/4 7-16

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each unit's Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System filter package shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or carbon adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system, by:

1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedure guidance of Regulatory Positions C.5.a.

C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 54,000 cfm + 10% (both fans operating -

Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 2);

j 2) Verifying within 31 days af ter removal that a laboratory analysis of j a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regula-tory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets an acceptance criteria for methyl iodide pene-tration of 90% at 30*C test temperature, and

b. After 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> of carbon adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regula-tory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets an acceptance criteria for methyl iodide penetration of 90% at 30'C test temperature, and

c. At least once per 18 months, by verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and carbon adsorber banks of less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 54,000 cfm i 10%

(both fans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating -

Unit 2), and

d. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 54,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 2); and

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a carbon adsorber bank, by verifying that the carbon adsorber satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 54,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10% (both f ans operating - Unit 2).

3/4-17

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.7.7.2 Each Unit's Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System I flowpath shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the UEPA filter or carbon adsorber housings, or (2) following painting., fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone com-municating with the system, by verifying a system flow rate of 54,000 cfm i 10% (both fans operating - Unit 1) or 43,000 cfm i 10%

(both fans operating - Unit 2) during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

c. At least once per 18 months, by verifying that the system starts on a Safety Injection test signal and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers.

4.7.7.3 Each Units Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System l

shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, at least once per 18 months, by verifying that the system maintains the ECCS pump room at a negative pressure relative to outside atmosphere.

3 /4-17a

ATTACHMENT 8 REVISED BASES l

9 A

BASES STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND (Continued)

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommen-dations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants,"

March 1974. The Surveillance Requirements specified for the dam inspection will conform to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.127, Revision 1, March 1978.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Area Ventilation System ensures that:

l (1) the ambient. air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for j continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations person-nel during and following all credible accident conditions. Cumulative opera-tion of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31-day period is l sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEl'A fil-ters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limita-tion is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10CFR50. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance. testing.

3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTERED VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the auxiliary building following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations were assumed in the accident analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. The methyl lodide penetration test criterion for the carbon samples has been established at 10% (i.e., 90% removal) which is greater than the iodine removal in the accident analysis.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 7-4