Text

Amends 138 & 120 to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,respectively, Revising Boron Concentration Limits within Refueling Water Storage Tank
	ML20057A035
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	08/26/1993
From:	Matthews D; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20057A031	List: ML20057A030; ML20057A035; ML20057A036;
References
	NUDOCS 9309100325
	Download: ML20057A035 (33)
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j ,!,)f;( E UNITED STATES

't K-J ! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

%[ ss ,/ WASHINGTON, D C. 205M4001 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-369 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION. UNIT 1 AMEN 0 MENT TO FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.138 License No. NPF-9

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 filed by the Duke Power Company (licensee) dated July 13, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9309100325 930826 PDR ADOCK 05000369 P PDR

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 138 , are hereby incorporated into this license. The licentee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/

David B.'Matthews, Director Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: August 26, 1993

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j kzig") !i UNITED STATES ggg g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ng j W ASHINGTON, D.C. 2055W1 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-370 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE ,

Amendment No.120 License No. NPF-17 i t

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: !

A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit i 1 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 filed by the Duke Power Company (licensee) dated July 13, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be l conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to tt common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the ,

Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications i The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised i through Amendment No. 120, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance :

with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection i Plan. .

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION f i

David B. Matthews, Director ,

Project Directorate II-3 t Division of Reactor Projects - I/II ;

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification !

Changes !

Date of issuance: August 26, 1993 !

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.138 [

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-9 i

DOCKET NO. 50-369 l AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.120 ;

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-17 ;

DOCKET NO. 50-370 l Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with l the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and !

contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. t Remove Paoes insert Paoes 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 j 3/4 1-lla :

3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 i 3/4 1-12a ,

3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 '

3/4 5-la 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 i 3/4 5-2a (new)

(old) 3/4 5-2a 3/4 5-2b l 3/4 5-12 3/4 5-12 !

3/4 5-12a !

3/4 9-1 3/4 9-1 3/4 9-la 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-16a B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2a B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3a (new)

(old) B 3/4 1-3a B 3/4 1-3b B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la B 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-la B 3/4 9-3 8 3/4 9-3 B 3/4 9-3a l

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l l UNIT 1 ONL1 l

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

l 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

3. A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing System ;

with: l

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 6132 gallons.

2) Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and l 3) A minimum solution temperature of 65 F. I

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

l l 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 26.000 galloi.s.

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2) A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm. and l

l 3) A minimum solution temperature of 70 F.

1 i APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

l ACTION:

thth no borated water source OPERABLE. suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or posit"ve reactivity changes.

SURVEILL ANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

l 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

l 1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

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2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

, 3) Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the j source of borated water.

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b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 70*F. l l

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i McGUIRE UNIT 1 3/4 1 11 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l

UNIT 2 ONLY l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN i

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.2.5 As a minimum. One of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

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a. A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 6132 gallons.

2) Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of baron, and

3) A minimum solution. temperature of 65 F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 26.000 gallons.

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2175 ppm. and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 70'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES S and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity charges.

SURVEllLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: I

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the bor0n concentration of the water.

2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and j

3) Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 70*F.

l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

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UNIT 1 ONLY l q l

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.1.2.6 As a minimum the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2-i

a. A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing System with: l

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 20.453 gallons. ;

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2) Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and l

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65 F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

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1) A contained borated water volume of at least 372.100 gallons.

2) Between 2000 and 2275 ppm of boron, j 3) A minimum solution temperature of 70*F. and ,

4) A maximum solution temperature of 100 F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4.

ACTION:

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a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one of the 'l

, above required borated water sources. restore the storage system to 0PERABLE I status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least it delta k/k at 200 F:

restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and i

in COLD SHUIDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1).

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l

UNIT 2 ONLY .

1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 20.453 gallons.

2) Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65 F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1) A contained borated water volume of at least 372.100 gallons.

2) Between 2175 and 2275 ppm of boron.

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3) A minimum solution temperature of 70 F. and i

4) A maximum solution temperature of 100 F. 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one of the -

above required borated water sources, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200 F:

restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

1 UNIT 1 ONLY 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 5 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG INJECTION LIMIT)NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

l a. The isolation valve open. $

1 I b. A contained borated water volume of between 6870 and 7342 gallons.

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c. A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2275 ppm.

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 639 psig, and

e. A water level and pressure channel OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3*

ACTION: !

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation '

valve or boron concentration less than 1900 ppm. restore the inoperable accumuletor to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed.

either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY !

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 I psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration less than 1900 ppm and:

1) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators 1900 ppm or greater. restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the low boron determination or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators less than 1900 ppm but greater than IB00 ppm. restore the inoperable accumu-lator to OPERABLE status or return the volume weighted average boron con-centration of the three 'imiting accumulators to greater than 1900 ppm and enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . ;

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Reactor Coolant System pressure above 1000 psig.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) 8

UNIT 2 ONI.Y 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS !

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG INJECTION '

tIMIT!NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A cortained borated water volume of between 6870 and 7342 gallons, f

c. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2275 ppm.

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d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 639 psig, and

e. A water level and pressure channel OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, and 3*

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration less than 2000 ppm. restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY l within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed.

either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 (

psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . I

c. With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration less than 2000 ppm 1 and: l

1) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators 2000 ppm or greater, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE l status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the low boron determination or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators less than 2000 ppm but greater than 1900 ppm. restore the inoperable accumu- l lator to OPERABLE status or return the volume weighted average boron con-centration of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 2000 ppm l and enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

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Reactor Coolant System pressure above 1000 psig.

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 5 la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

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UNIT 1 ONLY EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators 1800 ppm or less, return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulator to greater than 1800 ppm and enter ACTION c.2 within I hour of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEltLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPEPABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure .

in the tanks, and

2) Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is ,

open.

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume not resulting from normal makeup by verifying the bcron concentration of the accumulator solution; '

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected; and

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying proper operation of the power i disconnect circuit. '

4.5.1.1.2 Each cold leg injection accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL 1 TEST. and l

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b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

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McC'"oE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

UNIT 2 ONLf EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITlDN FOR OPERATION (Continued) i

) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the accumulators 1900 ppm or less, return the volume weighted average baron concentration of the three limiting accumulator to greater than 1900 ppm and enter ACTION c.2 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of the 10w boron determination or be in HCT !

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ard reduce Reactor Coolant System pressure to less than 1000 psig w' thin the following 6 nours.

SURVEILLANCE _ REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by: ;

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and

2) Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is open.

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume not resulting from f normal makeup by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution;

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected; and

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying proper operation of the power disconnect circuit.

4.5.1.1.2 Each cold leg injection accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL l TEST, and l

b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

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McGUIRE UNIT 2 3/4 5-2a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) i

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I Page 3/4 5-2b intentionally deleted. l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5 2b Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (014it 2) l

i UNIT 1 ONLY

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l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION i 3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A contained borated water volume of at least 372.100 gallons.

b. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2275 ppm of boron.

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c. A minimum solution temperature of 70*F. and

d. A maximum solution temperature of 100 F. '

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: *

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 70 F or greater than 100*F.

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l McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 5 12 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l .

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) j

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UNIT 2 ONLY, l l

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

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a. A contained borated water volume of at least 372,100 gallons,

b. A boron concentration of between 2175 and 2275 ppm of baron, l

c. A minimum solution temperature of 70*F. and

d. A maximum solution temperature of 100*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank. and

2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 70'F or greater than 100 F.

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l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 5 12a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

UNIT 1 ONLY I 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i

3/4 9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION ,

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met: i

a. Either a K,,, of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.

l APPLICABILITY: MODE 6*. with the reactor vessel head uusure bolts less than fully !

l tensioned or with the head removed.

ACTION:

I With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all i operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and I continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater '

than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K,y is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2000 ppm. whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANrE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head and

b. Withdrawal of any full length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

4.9.1.3 NV-250 shall be verified closed under administrative control at least once per 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months s: or. NV 131. NV-140. NV-176. NV-468. NV-808. and either NV-132 or NV-1026 shall be verified closed under administrative control at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when necessary to makeup to the RWST during refueling operations.

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The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 9-1 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

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UNIT 2 ONLY 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and l the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more ;

restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met: '

a. Either a K,,, of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2175 ppm.

l APPLICABILITY- MODE 6*. with the reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully I tensioned or with the head removed. '

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boratio1 at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater i than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K,,, is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2175 ppm. whichever is the more restrictive.

l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to: i

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal of any full length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal -

shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

4.9.1.3 NV-250 shall be verified closed under administrative control at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; or. NV-131. NV-140. NV-176, NV 468. NV-808, and either NV-132 or NV 1026 shall be verified closed under administrative control at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when necessary to makeup to the RWST during refueling operations.

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The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 - (Unit 2)

UNIT 1 ONLY REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,

3.9.12 Fuel is to be stored in the spent storage pool with:

a. The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool maintained at greater than or equal to 2000 ppm; and l

b. Storage in Region 2 restricted to irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days and one of the following: ,

1) fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.9-1; or

2) Fuel which has been qualified by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure with a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that k,,, is no greater than 0.95 including all i' uncertainties: or

3) Unqualified fuel stored in a checkerboard configuration. In the event checkerboard storage is used, one row between normal storage locations and checkerboard storage locations will be vacant. :

APPLICABILITY:

i During storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool. l ACTION: l l

a. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if {

it is determined a fuel assembly has been placed in the incorrect Region until ,

such time as the correct storage location is determined. Hove the assembly to i its correct location before resumption of any other fuel movement. ,I l

b. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined the pool boron concentration is less than 2000 ppm, until such time as the boron concentration is increased to 2000 ppm or greater.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVE:LLANCE REQUIREMENTS j 4.9.12a. Verify all fuel assemblies to be placed in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool are within the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.91 or that k,,, s 0.95 by checking the assemblies

design and burnup documentation or the assemblies' qualifying analysis documentation respectively.

b. Verify at least once per 31 days that the spent fuel pool boron concentration is greater than 2000 ppm.

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McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 9-16 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l .

Amendment No.120 - (Unit 2)

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UNIT 2 ONLY t l REFUELING OPERATIONS I l

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL g T y CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 Fuel is to be stored in the spent storage pool with:

a. The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool maintained at greater than or 1 equal to 2175 ppm; and I

b. Storage in Region 2 restricted to irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days and one of the following:

1

1) fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.91: or '

2) Fuel which has been qualified by means of an analysis using NRC approved !

methodology to assure with a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent !

confidence level that kg , is no greater than 0.95 including all i uncertainties; or i

3) Unqualified fuel stored in a checkerboard configuration. In the event checkerboard storage is used, one row between normal storage locations and checkerboard storage locations will be vacant.

APPLICABILITY:

Ouring storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

a. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined a fuel assembly has been placed in the incorrect Region until such time as the correct storage location is determined. Move the assembly to its correct location before iesumption of any other fuel movement. '

b. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined the pool boron concentration is less than 2175 ppm. until such time as the boron concentration is increased to 2175 ppm or greater.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.12a. Verify all fuel assemblies to be placed in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool are within the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.9-1 or that kg , s 0.95 by checking the assemblies' design and burnup documentation or the assemblies

qualifying analysis documentation respectively.

?

b. Verify at least once per 31 days that the spent fuel pool boron concentration is greater than 2175 ppm. l McGUIRE UNIT 2 3/4 9-16a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l

UNIT 1 ONLY l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits i since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551 F. This limitation is required I to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range. (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range. (3) the pres-surizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RTNDT temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS 1

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available !

during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this func- 1 tion include: (1) borated water sources. (2) charging pumps. (3) separate flow paths.

(4) boric acid transfer pumps. (5) associated Heat Tracing Systems. and (6) an emergency power supply from GPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F a minimum of two boron injection flow.

paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed fail-ure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 16.321 gallons of 7000-ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 75.000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

With the RCS temperature below 200 F. one Baron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

1 The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and l the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE l pump to be inoperable below 300*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure 4 transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

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I McGUIRE - UNIT 1 8 3/4 1 2 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l i

UNIT 2 ONLY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 1

MODERATOR TEMPEPATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near i the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits !

since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron '

concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.I,4 HINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specifice. ion ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551 F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature {>

range. (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range. (3) the pres-surizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble. and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RTN DT temperature.

{

3/4.1.2 BOPATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this func-tion include: (1) borated water sources. (2) charging pumps. (3) separate flow paths.

(4) boric acid transfer pumps. (5) associated Heat Tracing Systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed fail-ure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and - '

requires 16.321 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 75.000 gallons of 2175-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). l With the RCS temperature below 200 F one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive j reactivity changes in the event the single Baron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE l pump to be inoperable below 300*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure I

transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

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l McGUIRE UNIT 2 B 3/4 L-2a Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l

. Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

UNIT 1 ONLY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 200*F is suf ficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of It delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140 F. This condi-tion requires either 2000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 10.000 gallons of 2000-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within contain- l ment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPEPABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

l 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES l The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained. (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained. and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The control rod insertion limit and shutdown rod insertion limits are specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT per specification 6.9.1.9.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design cri-teria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integ-rity during continued operation. In addition. those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T greater than or equal to 551*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures,lhat the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LC0's are satisfied.

McGUIRE - UNIT I B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

l UNIT 2 ONLY ,

, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 200*F is suf ficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN cf It delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140*F. This condi-tion requires either 2000 gallons of 7000-ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 10.000 gallons of 2175-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank. l The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and baron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within contain-ment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the l '

4 ef fect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPEPABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained. (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained. and (3) the potential effects cf rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod l positions and thereby e.isure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The control rod insertion limit and shutdown rod insertion limits are specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT per specification 6.9.1.9.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design cri-teria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integ-rity during continued operation. In addition. those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time i used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T, greater than or equal to 551 F and '

with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures [ hat the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABII.ITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

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McGUIRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3a Amendment No.130 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l I

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I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS !

BASES t

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued) j For Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTIONS c. and d. it is incumbent upon the plant personnel to verify the trippability of the inoperable control rod (s). This may be by ;

verification of a control system failure, usually electrical in nature, or that the j failure is associated with the control rod stepping mechanism. !

I During performance of the Control Rod Movement periodic test (Specification .

4.1.3.1.2), there have been some " Control Malfunctions" that prohibited a control rod bank or group from moving when selected, as evidenced by the demand counters and DRPl*.

In all cases, when the control malfunctions were corrected, the rods moved freely (no i excessive friction or mechanical interference) and were trippable. l l

This surveillance test is an indirect method of verifying the control rods are not i immovable or untrippable. It is highly unlikely that a complete control rod bank or i bank group is immovable or untrippable. Past surveillance and operating history provide l evidence of "trippability."

Based on the above information, during performance of the rod movement test, if a ;

complete control rod bank or group fails to move when selected and can be attributed to :

a " Control Malfunction," the control rods can be considered " Operable" and plant l operation may continue while ACTIONS c. and d. are taken. 1 If one or more control rods fail to move during testing (not a complete bank or group and cannot be contributed to a " Control Malfunction"), the affected control rod (s) shall be declared " Inoperable" and ACTION a. taken.

(

Reference:

W letter dated December 21. 1984, NS-NRC-84 2990. E. P. Rahe to Dr. C. O. Thomas) .

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Digital Rod Position Indicators McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 1 3b Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l 1

UNIT 1 ONLY l l

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l BASES l

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPEPABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Leg Accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pres-sure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

1 The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. l The allowed down time for the accumulators are variable based upon boron concen- l tration to ensure that the reactor is shutdown following a LOCA and that any problems i are corrected in a timely manner. Subtriticality is assured when baron concentration is ;

above 1800 ppm. so additional down time is allowed when concentration is above 1800 ppm.

A concentration of less than 1900 ppm in any single accumulator or as a volume weighted average may be indicative of a problem. such as valve leakage, but since reactor shut-down is assured, additional time is allowed to restore boron concentration in the accumulators.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating l bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a pro-tective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. ,

In addition. as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occur-ring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unaccept- -

able peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately I opened the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is i required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required. l The original licensing bases of McGuire assumes both the UHI system and the Cold -

i Leg Accumulators function to mitigate postulated accidents. Subsequent analyses, docu- l mented in "McGuire Nuclear Station, Safety Analysis for UHI Elimination" dated September 1985, and docketed by Duke letter dated October 2, 1985, support the determination that UHI is no longer required provided the Cold Leg Accumulator volume is adjusted to be

consistent with that assumed in the Safety Analysis.

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McGUIRE UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.133 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) I l

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i UNIT 2 ONLY i l

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABillTY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Leg Accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the DCS pressure falls below the pres-sure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the 1 initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures. I The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The allowed down time for the accumulators are variable based upon boron concentra-tion to ensure that the reactor is shutdown following a LOCA and that any problems are corrected in a timely manner. Subcriticality is assured when boron concentration is above 1900 ppm. so additional down time is allowed when concentration is above 1900 ppm. :

A concentration of less than 2000 ppm in any single accumulator or as a volume weighted '

average may be indicative of a problem, such as valve leakage, but since reactor shut-down is assured, additional time is allowed to restore boron concentration in the accumulators.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279 1971, which requires that bypasses of a pro- ,

tective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. !

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria. J removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an )

isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occur- i ring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unaccept- ,;

able peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened. the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required, j The original licensing bases of McGuire assumes both the UHI system and the Cold ,

Leg Accumulators function to mitigate postulated accidents. Subsequent analyses. docu- ;

mented in 'McGuire Nuclear Station Safety Analysis for UHI Elimination" dated September ,

1985, and docketed by Duke letter dated October 2. 1985. support the determination that '

UH1 is no longer required provided the Cold Leg Accumulator volume is adjusted to be i consistent with that assumed in the Safety Analysis.

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McGUIRE UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l

. - -. - . _ . --- - - - . . . . - . - . - . - . - - - . - . - - - - - - - . ~ . .

7. .

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i

BASES l

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued) j for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA f analyses.

l The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because 3 of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ;

ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within contain- l !

ment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the ;

effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. i i

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I McGUIRE UNITS I and 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

UNIT 1 ONLY I

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subtritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial con-ditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K,y includes a 1% delta k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties.

Similarly, the boron concentration value of 2000 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

The Reactor Makeup Water Supply to the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System is normally isolated during refueling to prevent diluting the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. Isolation is normally accomplished by closirr "alve NV-250. However.

1 solation may be accomplished by closing valves NV-131. NV-140. NV-176. NV 468. NV-808, and either NV-132 or NV-1026, when it is necessary to makeup water to the Refueling Water Storage Tank during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION i The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

! 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subtriticality prior to movement of irradiated ;

fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactile decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. -

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are ;

sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

Operation of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and i charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the ,

assumptions of the accident analysis. The methyl iodide penetration _ test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9 1 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

UNIT 2 ONLY 3/4.9 REFUEllNG OPERATIONS BASES 3/4 9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subtritical during CORE ALTERATIONS. and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial con-ditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K,,, includes a 1% delta k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties.

Similarly. the boron concentration value of 2175 ppm or greater includes a conservative l uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

The Reactor Makeup Water Supply to the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System is normally isolated during refueling to prevent diluting the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. Isolation is normally accomplished by closing valve NV-250. However,

)

isolation may be accomplished by closing valves NV 131, NV-140, NV-176. NV 468 NV 808, and either NV-132 or NV 1026, when it is necessary to makeup water to the Refueling ;

Water Storage Tank during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subtriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. !

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ;

ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from i leakage to the environment or filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. .

Operation of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and t charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the :

assumptions of the accident analysis. The methyl iodide penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

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i McGUIRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l ,

, Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) !

l

~

UNIT 1 ONLY l

BASES 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is

, available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.11 FUEL HANDLING VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM i

The limitations on the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The t

OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with .

the assumptions of the accident analyses. ANSI N510 1975 will be used as a procedural :

guide for surveillance testing. The methyl iodide penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL !

The requirements for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool on 3.9.12 (a) and (b) ensure that: (1) the spent fuel pool will remain subtritical during fuel storage; and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained in the water volume in the spent fuel pool for ;

reactivity control. The value of 0.95 or less for Keff which includes all uncertainties i at the 95/95 probability / confidence level as described in Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR '

a 1s the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool. Table 3.9-1 is con-servatively developed in accordance with the acceptance criteria and methodology refer-enced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications. Storage in a checkerboard con-figuration in Region 2 meets all the acceptance criteria referenced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications and is verified in a semi-annual basis after initial 2

verification through administrative controls. ,

The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that: l (1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that could result in a critical array during the movement of fuel; and (2) the boron concen-tration is maintained at 2000 ppm during all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that: (1) fuel stored in Region 2 meets the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.91 or the K s 0.95 acceptance criteria of an analysis using NRC approved methodology; and (2)thebyoron concentration meets the 2000 ppm limit. ;

I i

l l

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

(CIT 2 ONLY t l

BASES 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL 2

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the 6 assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.11 FUEL HANDLING VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM The limitations on the fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System ensure that all l radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The i OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with ;

the assumptions of the accident analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. The methyl lodide penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than rectired for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

3/4 9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL The requirements for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool on 3.9.12 (a) and (b) ensure l' that: (1) the spent fuel pool will remain subtritical during fuel storage: and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained in the water volume in the spent fuel pool for reactivity control. The value of 0.95 or less ior Keff which includes all uncertainties :

at the 95/95 probability / confidence level as described in Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR ;

1s the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool. Table 3.9-1 is con- l servatively developed in accordance with the acceptance criteria and methodology refer-enced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications. Storage in a checkerboard con.

figuration in Region 2 meets all the acceptance criteria referenced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications and is verified in a semi annual basis after initial '

verification through administrative controls. i 1 The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that; j (1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that '

i could result in a critical array during the movement of fuel; and (2) the boron concen- '

tration is maintained at 2175 ppm during all actions involving movement of fuel in the l spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure j that: (1) fuel stored in Region 2 meets the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.9-1 l or the K , s 0.95 acceptance criteria of an analysis using NRC approved methodology; and j (2)theboronconcentrationmeetsthe2175ppmlimit. l ]

i McGUIRE , UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3a Amendment No. ',38 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) ,

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