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.. . $ U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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s 3 9+ DIVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATION
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S,,jt.;p jjg REPORT 10 THE ADVISORY _ COMMITTEE ON REACIOR SAFEGUARDS
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BODEGA BAY ATOMIC PARK - UNIT NUMBER 1 f
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{ Note by Director of Licensing and Regulation.
' ' ':1' The attached report has been prepared by Norman Watson, John Newell, Dona'ld Knuth and other members of the Division of Licensing and Regulation for consideration by the Advisory Committee on Reactor 4
- Safeguards at its April 1963 meeting.
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d I,v Introduction y
j By application dated December 28, 1962, the Pacific Gas and
!, . j Electric Company requested Commission approval to construct and operate
- 2. . ;
'J 4 a nuclear power. plant at Bodega Bay, California. The Company's financial qualifications were set forth in Exhibits A and B of the
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application and a preliminary hazards summary report was submitted
@Q as Exhibit C. Additional technical information was submitted, at our i t,
?,
9[' request, by letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company dated March 4, 9 1963.
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. k, The proposed plant is to have a gross electrical generating
-y j c'apacity of approximately 325,000 kilowatts to be produced by a i
single turbo-electric generator. The power source is to be a single o .r u hp - : nuclear reactor of the single-cycle, forced-circulation boiling water
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$$.1 . type having a rating of 1,008 megawatts, thermal. Pacific Gas and I?;$ ,
f, Electric Company will design and supervise construction of the unit;
'f the General Electric Company will furnish the nuclear steam supply
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system and the turbine-generator, and will serve as nuclear consultant j
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t to the applicant.
.,. l This report is based on our review of the documents listed above eq and the information obtained in the various meetings with Pacific Gas 3p yg. and Electric and General Electric personnel.
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II. Site
.h s Bodega Bay is on the coast in Sonoma County, California, approximately j
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$$; 50 miles northwest of San Francisco. The Bay is formed by a hook of land
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known as Bodega Head on the north and west and by a sandspit called Doran 30 il Park on the south. The reactor'will be located on a 225 acre tract at
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. ',\ the southern and of Bodega Head. From this locacion, the distance to
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. the nearest point on the northern boundary of the property is 2700 feet.
?_?:: g 3I/j Beyond this boundary,' there is an area of approximately 320 acres which 3 .. . . . -
is'being acquired by the University of California for use as a field JyJ4 .
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- k. station.for marine biology and other scientific studies. The nearest :
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.g . residence is approximately 1-1/2'ailes from'the site. The shortest -
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q distance from the reactor site to Bodega Bay shoreline is a7 proximately
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750 feet from the' proposed reactor site to the centerline of the entrance s .r ! },' ,.
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- i channel to the Bay and 1300 feet across the channel to Doran Park. This t ,'
'i 4p& . park is owned by Sonoma County and will contain no residences. The' mf.] .,
WF1 nearest village is Bodega Bay (population of 350) located approximately- E.c M .L . . .
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,] i two miles north northeast'of the reactor site. The total popuistion .
within five miles is only 500 and within 25 miles is only'114,000.
l- Hence, from the standpoint of population density and distribution,. this e . ,3
', site is considered to be suitable for a reactor of the general type and
'1 power level proposed.
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,,!A Geoloav and Seismoloav
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The two outstanding geographical features of the site area are the t gan Andreas Fault zone immediately to the east, and the two rocky hills yy
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aach over 200 feet high which make up Bodega Head. The reactor will be IN located between these hills approximately 1000 feet from the western R$/j ,
i M limit of the fault zone. The 1.5 mile wide fault sona extends eastward
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f::om the site to the' mainland, and has reduced the northern portion of
.gf Bodega Head to crushed rock and sand dunes due to extensive movement
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.Yd cP.M The hills of' Bodega Head consist of quartz-diorite rock covered by
' G$ a shallow layer of sands and siles. The quarts-diorite formation is reported
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U to be extensively fractured due to earthquake action, and evidence of old l .
r .j.1 . minor faults in 'he t formation is reported.
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g,g With respect to minor faults, the application states "no active faulting I i
g exist's on Bodega Head and particularly under the power plant site." The j
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17 applicant amplified this statement during a meeting with the subconsittee
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.q and the staff on March 20th by stating that no faults have been located under i
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l . . 1 E3 the proposed location of the reactor power plant structures as a result of evaluations of several borings at the plant site. The applicant has described N;$&h k$ , ,
I the geologie nature of,the foundation materials (the fractured quarts-diorite) stig; - .
' M, and has concluded that structures can be adequately anchored into this rock
-y material and designed to withstand earthquake accelerations amounting to 0.3 hgg. of the acceleration of gravity (0.3G) unless a formation failure (faulting)
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[jj The staff believes that the applicant is aware of the safety and design }
m, f.. 'j.} problems associated with earthquakes, and is proceeding with the development j
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[g?{g of an adequate design based upon the predicted earthquake loadings. It should
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gfj,gj be recognized that acceptance of this site would imply agreement that the like-WP,, i
- y. p. k lihood of the occurrence of an earthquake which would cause faulting under the qyge .
structures and, consequently, possible failure of the engineered safety
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components of the reactor facility is acceptably small. The applicant claims
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%g; that slippage is more likely to occur in existing faults and that development
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ef new faults would not be expected to occur.
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- The staff does not know of.any basis for disagreement with the 3 f
.. { $ applicant's assertions as to the existence or likelihood of develop-s,;
. meat of faults. We believe, however, that further information should.
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.be developed on the existence of faults under the site through t ' '
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explorations made in the coursh of excavation. This information will k'W 9 be revi M to determine whether or not the assumption that no such faults exist is ' factual; and if evidence of faults is found, the basis for m .u ,
approval will be re-examined.
Oceanonraohv and Marine Biolony 4
The applicant proposes to withdraw approximately 250,000 spe of j
.s y c .. d cooling wates from the bay side of the head which would be discharged
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to the ocean on the ocean side of the head with an 18 degree F. rise p:,4 .
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in temperature when the plant is operated at rated load. Radioactive 'i
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liquidwastesreleasedfromtheproposedplantwouldbedilutedinthisj i
. g.] cooling water before discharge to the ocean, so that concentrations s
lh D of radioactivity in the cooling water discharge will not exceed those l
allowed by 10 CFR, Part 20. l
+ The applicant has stated in the Hazards Sun = mary Report and in s, t -
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- ; 11
%A subsequent discussions, that the effects of temperature on the marine I (Sg likehasbeenstudiedatCoastalpowerplantlocationsincooperation j QU 3,y with the California State Fish and Game Department, and that no i l
. .1w g bg ' deleterious effects have been detected. The applicant will continue y-ih . I' cooperation with the State authorities in such studies, and, in
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- ' addition, has contracted with Bumbol'dt State College for a study of :!
the ecology of the marine life in the vicinity and a study of the
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diffusion characteristics of the local ocean water. j
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[. The staff believes that the applicant has shown an adequate
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appreciation of the problems associated .with the management of liquid .
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. .;p wastes from the proposed facility and sees no reason why an adequata e No
. design cannot be developed in this regard. As will be discussed in I.M71 a subsequent section of this report, the possibilities of reconcentra-mm jhh tion of radioactivity are also being considered by Pacific Gas and .
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'A IS Electric.
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Meteorology
, % The meteorology of the Bodega area is not expected to be a great 4j deal different than that observed elsewhere along the northern :
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California coast. The diffusion climatology of the site is expected l \
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- _4 ~J Y, (.; to be somewhat similar to that at Rumboldt, and we, therefore, feel mt.
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that the diffusion parameters selected.by the applicant are suitable
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ci. for the purpose of scoping the design of the gaseous waste management i S i system. The applicant has initiated a program to collect meteorological
- .cf information at the site which should be useful as a basis for estimating f
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'1 operational release limits for gaseous radioactivity.
~, i III. Containment
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The containment system proposed for this facility is one which
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@~ depends upon the pressure suppression concept. Its design is similar 4:a (9 .in many respects to that used at Bumboldt Bay. Significant features of
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the Bodega Bay Plant design include the following:
77 1. Plans for the Bodega Bay Plant call for a dry well having a 60 f t. j g.g , .
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diameter spherical lower section and a 26 ft. diameter cylindrical c e ,
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- 2. There will be four reactor recirculation loops, each with a
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. A the dry well.
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- 3. The dry well will have an airlock entrance. Personnel entry is y4 .s . ..
not planned during reactor operation, but is contemplated with ^l 5,
-4 T1 e p 4 the reactor hot and pressurized.
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- 4. The suppression chamber will be in the form of a torus and will t
w have a major diameter of 93 ft. and a cross section diameter of
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26 ft.
. ' il Both the dry well and the suppression chamber will be designed and con-
, J;o structed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
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p$'j Section VIII. Piping restraints will be provided at containment penetrations to assure that failure of the pipe will not cause con- ,
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tainment rupture. A concrete building will contain the dry well and
.n suppression chamber. Pressure and leak rate specifications for these
- containment system components are as follows:
Component Design Pressure Leak Rateff. of volume in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
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Dry well 62 psig 0.5 (at design pressure) eu 0.5 (at design pressure) 7pg ,
Suppression chamber 35 psig
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Refueling building 12 in. H 2O 100 (at 1/4 in. H 2O)
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"O In order to proof test the Bodega Bay pressure suppression design, t .
d'!J]; Pacific Gas and Electric is conducting a test program at its Moss -~,
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Landing Power Plant. As in the Humboldt Bay case, the applicant has ~l
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'? a single 24' inch diameter dry well to suppression chamber vent si . .
.i nossle was used. Since the full size plant is to have 112 of these
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i2 - vent nossles, this-is a l'/112th size mockup of the containment design.
M, . .u P Tests were-conducted with this' mock-up to simulate various accident igg conditions. A flow comparable to 1/112th of the flow resulting from a yjw .
A complete circumferential break of one of the 28 in, recirculation lines ,
- f.9 t (with flow.out both sides of the break) was taken as the " maximum credible operating accident" (MCOA). Highest containment pressures a
f 1; observed in these tests were 52 psig in the dry well and 30 psig in the suppression chamber. These pressures were observed when the ,
[( mock-up dry well was preheated to'2550 F and when the mock-up reactor am Y
W vessel water was subcooled 350F. Tests at higher and lower dry well k temperatures and at higher and lower reactor water subcooling yielded
, lower dry well and suppression chamber pressures, J
j In another test a break area 2.5 times that of the MCOA was
.. 1 simulated. In this test the peak dry well pressure observed was 63 psig. Further Moss Landing tests are being conducted to determine l
- y; whether baffles are needed in the suppression chamber.
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$$ As another significant containment design feature, Pacific Gas and h-[*T.l M
' ca Electric proposes that in a number of instances a single isolation M valve will be installed at the containment wall in pipes or ducts 7 ,,,q
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4f penetrating the containment. The applicant states, however, that each
- .7.P! such line will have two isolation valves, one of which is a remotely
- i i,:m q ~ 1 operable process valve located elsewhere.
(The main steam line, for
[jf,3 instance, has turbine stop and bypass valves.) Lines which do not have I 1
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.,4.f remotely operable process valves will be provided with a second isolation
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. The. turbine stop valves will close in less than 1 second. The
- f, d main steam isolation valve closing time has not been set, but is Ol
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expected to be between 10 and 30 seconds. Main steam line isolation h
a a.5 valves are to close on a manual signal or automatically on the 25@ ~ occurrence of any of the following: .
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^1. Low condenser vacuum
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'., 2. Main steam line leak. (in the pipe tunnel)
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J,1 3. Iow-low reactor water level I
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- Although of minor concern at the construction permit stage, we feel
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. . that signals 1 and 3'above should also initiate, through a delay circuit, automatic turbine stop valve and turbine by-pass valve closure since W
these valves are to serve as back-up for the main steam line isolation 4 MM,
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We q estion the concept of having only one isolation valve in the
.I main steam line since we believe it is credible that a main steam line ,
l rupture could occur between the containment wall and the turbine stop i
l valves and concurrently a malfunction of the main steam line isolation valve could allow the escape of the water in the reactor vessel at the da time of the break. If water thus boiled away were not replaced, an FPT SN -
$$ accident worse than the MCOA suggested by the applicant would occur.
'.1 The operator will have available, however, a number of means for re-S l D.:j
.Cg placing the water thus boiled away. These are provided by the .
'p.2 . . . c. m .
y 3gy - following equipment: ,
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~ 1. The feed wate'r pump (only the auxiliary electrically driven pump) i I 5$.ilb. . .s.
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The high pressure core spray system (as presently conceived this
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system'also depends on the auxiliary feedwater pump) -
4 y 3. The low pressure core spray system p r. . ,
gi We believe it incredible to assume that all these means of replacing ,
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.!f:] ; water in the reactor vessel could fail at the same time as a main, j
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- 3-y steen line rupture outside the containment which occurs simultaneous
,wq with a main steam line isolation valve failure. , )
j .l j There is one important improvement to the refueling containment 1
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to be provided at Bodega Bay over that at Eumboldt Bay. The Bodega
, Bay design is such that durf ng refueling, the spent fuel storage pool
<ji will connect directly to the shield water above the reactor, thus
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Fermitting direct underwater transfer of fuel without the need for a -
e:n" transfer cask. 'In other respects, the refueling building design will .
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be similar to the one at Humboldt Bay..
l .
i For a reactor of the type proposed the staff believes that the
, general containment scheme proposed is adequate. We believe, however, that more specific criteria for the design of the containment features
'., yi than those proposed should be established as prerequisites to the con-r.%.O
- f struction permit in this case. These criteria involve containment testing, a j s.. % c , , .. x ~ .. ~
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g penetration design, and isolation valving.
Q'q 1. The design should permit initial integral leak rate testing j,'l e'f the dry-well and suppression chamber at their respective -
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ppj design pressure after the installation of all penetrations LI n . i
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%@:. gasketing closures) and subsequent periodic testing at
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a suppression pool design pressure. In the initial testing, the ,
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] leakage rate of the containment systemishould be determined as a ti function of pressure up to fullidesign pressure,
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{.' ' the pressure load,: the loads or deformations imposed by thermal s,-
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expansion, impact of missiles, reactions of ruptured pipes, and W
.'" disturbances incident to installation, maint2 nance or repair.
' Penetrations should be shielded from missiles to the extent q
practicable. All penetrations should be designed so as to allow 4
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.(, frequent periodic leakage rate tests of the penetrations only 1
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including points of attachment to the containment shell), at
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- .r All pipes and conduits which communicate with interior of the
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^{ primary system or the containment system, and other piping 4
'l j i (such as instrumentation and control piping) which cannot be i .
i adequately protected against accidental rupture, should contain j l
i double isolation valves. All valves performing the function of i
..f isolation valves should be provided with protection against
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materials in the system which might prevent proper closing and t .
p.
?f,% should be provided with reliable automatic and manual actuation >;
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[l, ' features. Isolation valving should be designed so as to permit l qw M1 periodic leakage rate tests. Appropriate closing times for
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- . isolation valves should be determined on the basis of analyses ,
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> of system ruptures which would release fission or activation )
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.w products outside the dry well while the valves are not fully s
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IV. Reactor .
i The nuclear reactor for the proposed facility is to be a forced
. .... circulation boiling water reactor having four recirculation loops.-
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(. ;A. .<. < ' Principal reactor design. data are ta$ulated in Table 1. Design
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features having a bearing on the' safety of the proposed plant, and D worthy of special attention, are discussed below.
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Fuel Element Desian
, The proposed fuel for the Bodega Bay reactor consists of 2.5%
enriched UO2 fuel pellets contained within stainless steel tubing.
.\
l The Preliminary Razards Summary Report indicated that this tubing i
l would have a nominal thickness of 0.011 inches and would be able to
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_ withstand an exposure of 15,000 MWD / TON. On the basis of present x
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information, the staff is not convinced that the fuel, as proposed, canbeirradiatedfortheexposurescontemplatedwithoutgrosshuel failures. However, information submitted subsequent to the submittal t
of thn Preliminary Hazards Summary Report indicate this fuel design is j a tentative selectica, and that General Electric' has a research and l development program aimed at selecting the fuel design by early 1964.
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~
Z .. 3. .
.The criteria for the heat transfer burnout ratio for the Bodega
~
.; ! Bay reactor is General Electric's correlation as given in " Burnout '
i
- h. Limit curves for Boiling Water Reactors" by E. Janssen 6 S. Levy.
O )
M
.u.n (APED 3892). This correlation is the one used as a basis for the 4 ps
+i., .' Dresden and Big Rock Point reactors. . The proposed minimum burnout ,
c.: y .
y m 1 .,
.. i
' b5h
- 2 [_. ~___;*' _ 5 Y N_ ":'?Y. 5b ' a O ^: .,a*' '
. " - &*,Y'?ly.;;:..&,.>,b,3.:
1 h 9$N N N N YNMINE$TE2Fb9In3E7M!.! Y TOE M 2107_'NEOSE M,M5KE$h
\
% e, 1 _ . ,
? .
t a
!- ratio for the Bodega Bay plant is 1.5. Presently there is little experience'with fuel operating at a calculated burnout ratio of
.[ this value; however, Big Rock Point is presently authorized'to operate ,
2: ., . . .
q,{$g . with a burnout ratio of 1.5. Accordingly, operating experience should )
yQcy) be'available prior to the ' time of startup at Bodega. Also, the Bodega
~
p,0 Bay reactor is to have a number of in-core flux monitors which should . 'I t;E I l
~
centribute to the acceptability of operations at these burnout ratios. ,'
More information regarding the heat transfer calculations
- , performed by the. applicant was requested. Specifically, we asked what
, ' a.
i power level would result in a burnout ratio of 1.5 with the power 4
generation curves expected. The applicant indicated that detailed cal-
- , culations are not sufficiently complete to answer this question. However, 2 ^ '
'{ it was estimated that the power level corresponding to a miniema burnout ratio of 1.5 would be in excess of 120% of rated power. The staff has I
calculated the'ainimum burnout ratio using the published peaking factors and assasing a cosine heat generation cyrve. The' minimum I ratio for the hottest channel was calculated to be slightly less than j 1.5 at 120 percent of rated' power. This value is in agreement with the
(( ,-
values estimated by'the applicant.
- W ' Flow Stability >
.\
1
,% Preliminary calculations indicate that at rated conditions the
.1 .
- 'l steam volume fractions are as follows:
4 .
f y Average Core Voids-371 v?.J.
ss< g
%-l - Average Exit voids-58% .-'
Gl
- ., The General Electric Company is using an analog computer model to
.I .
.a*t,
- conduct plant dynamic studies. They believe studies made with this
.4 .
- y. . . r M 40' f4 % Mqddf.g. _, , . , . . ': ,ujg., i y4 g Ag., g ,,3 , ,4
,y . p;., ,
,, , ,,.Q
'1.t.T m**: y y,My Q2%y:Mv5:g:m:qm. m g3.m;r;p +mgrr~:n.s.;.~;.L.,
- u. ..
. u* 7mta. i . _ _r.y n;
~
~. !! '
yg4) -< j .r . . :
^
,j e
- }
model will"show that the plant can be des.igned to exhibit satisfactory dynamic performance. The staff knows of no operating experience that g v.+ would confirm the acceptability of operating at void fractions this
- M. ;, , ,
S *s a
>W high. Further, we do not know whether or not calculated extrapolations
~
1
,- . ~ w.- , . .
T.., . y to higher poid fractions are valid. On the other hand, as in the case-75 '
of our approval of the high voi4 experiments at Dresden, we feel that '
w u9i .
with appropriate limitations on the stepwise approach to power and on q- the. observed flux oscillations, the health and safety of the public !
J t .
will be protected. A consequence to the operator and designer could I
be an inability to operate the plant at the intended full power level, I
i r .J
.c.
but no safety problem is' apparent,. ~
af% N ac,tivity and Control a
i x!s ,L
'~ - '
)$ T$.* .Wp] '
4
'The proposed reactor will have a cold, clean, uncontrolled k.gg of ?>
r .
- [ 1.27. The k.gf with all control rods in the reactor is calesisted to be 0.97. There are 145 control rods planned for the reactor; the combined
, ,u] worth of these rods is calculated to be 0.18. The control material will {
.J l
1 be boron carbide contained in 0.175 in. 0.D. stainless steel tubes. The i
I drive mechanism used to position the control rods is described in the
.m '
fo following section. idditional control is provided with 316 control ,
p;n. '
.a pti:
. >J.:
car'ainsMich t will be hemi-permanently located between selected fuel
'{
elements. The worth of these curtains is calculated to be 0.12. The
. .l J[C .
control curtains will be constructed of 0.1% boron stainless steel.
{,g .
6W .
jjg Oral discussions with 'the applicant indicate some of these curtains
- will be removed at p riodic intervals for reactivity control, and this
- M6 f,c will give an opportunity for an adequate surveillance program.
.E1
. , .,1
.1
-4 ,
s 1
. , 1 - .
- yr y I . ,- .
,14.a ,f 1.f g h / ,.,g;,.,'lc[ h }ca y ., ,. ,c";,4 , (( ., ,e< ,7,(. , .,,, ..].., ; q ,, ,; .
. w w. ~ m.y:.u.w m m g . n m . w w . n 3
a . .....,-..e,. - _.e u,.,s.. .~.c.-,. s. ~ ~.,c.c.; y ,...~.v..
,,. %. c...o .,..
g m .MLw'w.};:-%::t'*nAhurc L L L ~ hab.52.; ;A '>>.&f6m =<rW-WWm:
,,G;z kWWMn - , ... % :#.. .
,. if;I:'
.,q- . %- u
\ t. ..
9
- 14 -
9 The reactor design also incorporates a liquid poison system
- i t
that can be used to inject sodium pentaborate into the core in the o4 j t
event complete shutdown cannot be achieved by use of the control rods.
@g, l
The reactivity addition. rate of the liquid poison system is .005 per w , .
- ':. ,m ' minute and its total reactivity worth is 0.20 when the reactor vessel
,g f;[ .
is closed. The worth is much less when the reactor is open for !
refueling. Even though the time tp inject the liquid poison is long,
, i l (on the order of minutes), the staff believes this rate will meet the f
objectives of the system. ,,
I, ,
i +
4 8
6 $ * 'ge' O l -;U -
4 ,, 2
. E ),71 *f* 4 4 , p
,.7 -e i.
1 l
i 9
.m ,
-le ~$ * .
. . 'g*) *
~ )) ,
4
- 1
) ,
. i.
'*?.,* ,
+ w s
?. 2
- ,% ij, <
\j', ,
'ks.. ,
..c . , .
,* 7. -';
i o
4
.. , 1 .* * .
(' * . {', '4, , 44 e 4. r S ., I# , [eb .g, *j* 4 &6., g, *'b" f
[.'l '$ , ) ,k ', A'*.= '7} j ., . ' , g . , g,, g * .'
- ~..a wymy.yg m d g w e ~.+ & n-4,- +a
M m 39 pM~hsdi-M i -., k .~.- w .~ w hgn,,qg. g
.,.n e -Mn 7nhu s..$d
- - lt
- h. - .
G;;r;; af:gid -,, m# % e r E l
,, n , ,e ,,n. , ; e. . .., .
. . ~- ' .. .
i.
'i TABLE 1 REACIOR DESIGN DATA i
. l l l t i
.- 1. Operating Conditions '
. .e .!:.1
- a. Reactor power (Mwt) 1008 ;
a . .s
. ,,/$!? b. Reactor pressure (psia) 1075 h% . .
6 Dds - lc'.QReactbr steam flow (1b/hr) h.17 x 10 .
5f.:l ~
'"gg --d. Reactor steam tem)erature (OF) . 553 5 ,
a.- , . ,
- e. Totalcorecoolantflow(1b/hr) h3 5 x 10 6
- a. Design pressure (psig) 1235
. b. Hydrostatic test pressure (psig) 1853
- c. Reactor vessel inside diameter
.>. (ft-in) '
15-1
.d.& 'd. Reactor vessel'inside leogth G$ ,...i(ft-in) u -- ,
i'50-h p.4 -
. 3)
- e. Approximate vessel wall thickness . )'
- g. Clad material Type 30h Stainless Steel
{ 3. Core Description
','. a.. Numbei..of fuel assemblies 592
. . ..Q .- L . .u . . ; ,-
.Gj ,, b . Moderator to fuel. volume ratio 27
- j.
-, .9 er. .
- q
". w . . .L N@(inehes)eralllengthoffuelassemb1[.,, 150
- af
- .. 2O, d. Circumscribed core'diameteru(inches) . 1h7. ,
$m;1 e. ' Weight' of fuel assembly-(ib.)
350
- 2; -
L e - '. o ,L w J.R%f *
.a
\
>O. ?
- OJ -
- - . r m'
- q ;
1 l
2
, "**.) j .w 7* .l que .. v .[I ')e e. ) . . ,E ,7y n $[ C . .h,' ,, ,9 $ ,9. [' w . 4h ***.* A ( Zf gg k,' 9
? . I n ;y,: p1h.N TdMEr~JS.M Wlg2pg Ml,g gfp; gyp;g ggg g ggp.p g g ,,,;g,,,g.g U
{- ,- P
. y .
47f ,
.{ ' , '
- 16 -
6 ' $- .
L
- ,' j' I h. Fuel Description 11 - a. Number of fuel rods per assembly, h9 -
' f]1 - b .- Fuel' material TJ02
- s. .
! . <.: . c. Fuel enrichment ($ U-235) 2.7
,>.Q 3,a .tpi -
- d. . We .ght of uranium in core (1b) 1h8,000 l e ,s % C *9 **
NM - : e. '. Fuel pellet diamoter (in5hes)' O.h21 M .
9 g. m =dding material . '
' Stainless Steel s';) .
' cI! h. 01=dd4ng thickness 'O.011 6
.)
Fuel rod active length (inches)
] 4 1.
h.
125
- 5. Control hacription
, s
' a. Number of movable control blades lh5 I
-;. e . ' e, b. Shape of movable control blades Cruciform
- ..q.v
/
M[ , c. Control material- BC in 0.175 in.
1
- 0. . Tubes rM.r. . ,a
",T d. Tube and cover plate material 30h Stainless Steel i, e. Active length of control rods i (inches) 12h
- f. Width of control rods (inches) 6.9h
} g. Thickness of control rods (inches) 0.312
- h. Number of control curtains 316
.. W
'd ,
'i. Shape of control curtains Flat Sheets
'Ah - -. , ,
- j. Control material -
0.1% Bozen Stainless i Steel '
.t JG^d, .- k. Length of control curtains (inches) 125
.e . .
6
.,.J
$N . .
.1. Width of control curtains (inches) 9
- 33 ,
F* :d ...
s .m. . Thickness of control curtains (inches) 0.10 .
p$y aq ,
. 1 E .
. . e. ,
- e. T; i
1 E, 9 '
- [ f 6r ' 4 c. 3, J ~ f. ; ,% , , , . , , _ ,
y Wif' ' " A?,l,,O)k;!*RQ} H)g',s ?lll1&&'}',;y
- s +y ,, .l _
. .'S _ , . ;. g. ,,+ f ^ , ,.4- g, ; ,_ .; . , ,, > ,ysy} .
, , .p
- t !W, : . iT/' . I fG."? eltr?F6j@,Wyty;hpgji.?iQt- nv~rhg/gp ,. ,ggggggggg.gg.
j ,
-- . ,. m , .
7 y4p.
. . 17
. . g.
'6. Design Power Peaking Factors s a. Gross (radial x axial) 2.h0
.c
.i[d ,
- b. Local 1 30
~w
. q* ,
9 c, Overpower 1.20 *
'M
- d. ' Total , 3.'/3
,!. 9 ,..,_
'igi, 7. Core Heat Transfer ' '
tw ,
rWpl
- ,Sr a. Power density (Kw/ liter) 33
- b. Linear Heat generation * - Mard. mum
+ ,
at1008Mw(Kw/ft) 12 5 -
- c. Average heat flux (BTU /hr -ft2 ) 103,300 1 d. Min 4wnim burnout ratio 15 Average exit quality (%)
- e. 9.6 3
.w;
. ,, . g .
ag;. '
. . I, ,
m i
> b n.. , -
rr.a '
L"ff' ?** ti .f o.H,;,4
- ~y3 m., ,
I I
- mk
' 'a.:.1% .?.:
lu@)q '
.b E Q.Nf!
'.q * . As estimated by the Staff
. pp,1 ,
- *4r! .
&.m. .&
w
. \ ','.)
spg ..
~ .*$ ly e
s4 I g QNf. N.. ..
1 .. & ;;;6.;. a.y.. a ,, ,. , . ,. -, .
7 V
e g 1a/
ygymr.=mmy$wt:m:gjg15mgggaqqg:gggf;p 9;ggmm {g
. 4: , 3 f ' ;, e * ' '
'o -
N i ,' 4
.r*- W, l, , .*
,. 4' .
. ?f , .s ,
.T i.
(b. ,
'Gmc , , . ;. .r.J .
k !# - .- - 18 . -
y .?. :). - .
( ,
^,h r' .
,t V. Centrol Rod Drives i L 5'
p g /
.1
.,C ,
The control rod drives to be used in the Bodega Bay pidt ers to j
.g ,y f, .% .
- 4. - 1
'S N '
4 be' designed using the same basic concepts as hMa been employed in sf$7 ,
r
. - the drives in use at Dresden, Big Rock Point, Humboldt Bay ar.d the i
i w a . , .
f, ,
SENN Plant in Italy. Salient features of the doives include (1) i 1 t gg A g .
.The toda scram upward; ' Water is vsed as the hydraulic fluid; 1.f,,]
(3) W4ter from the hydraulic system can be applied to either side
.i, of a piston which is mechat.ically coupled to the control rod thus providing for either upwstd or downward rod motion; (4) Only one rod [
1 may be moved at a time and it may be caoved either continuously or in , , ', i
!i
, 6 inch steps; (5) Rod speed is controlled by orifices which regulate ' [j the flow of water away from the low pressure side of the piston; (6)
- h. .u n k.Mj Seds are. scrammed upwerd .by. applying pressurized water from either' the
.[6
.:;u .
o a:,<
". reactor or from accumulators to the bottom side of the drive pisteun '
t, ,,
, and simultaneously relieving the volume above the top side of .the
,, pistons to the scram dump tank; (7) At 6 inch increments, unless held open by hydractic p arsure from the withdraw piping, collet
,; i
~,
fingers support the we.ight of the rod and the downward forces due to ,
n -s
. ic g':yy reactor pressure.
31 9
$Q An assembly drawing of the drive mechanism is shown in Fig. 111-13 e
!?Qq >
and a 1%I diagram of the systat !s shown in Fig. III-14 of Exhibit C
$. ., r .
uw
~Z of the application. A more detailed description of the drives c 4 i hydre.vlic system is contained in the Final Hazards Suns.sry Japort for a
2 f the Humboldt Bay Plant. .. .
l Y
g m
.?
m% *
. . ' '. g ,
.w.6 ,.,
-'5I% ~ Ai >d E t ., [- t c, { eg eg,i-h ep b,$ g, ; sh. .,,j i ,,, .. + f. , ;,q 4 . , . , ,
, . p' g,. g .,c g ,_
f ,, , ,
., e:m .
.i 1 I -(
A; Mih...h7iNNND$NSEhh5N$,T$dNNMNfhs2FN?4Ej?8$7MGJGdTl,@dsd%$
y! ', M1 <
gp
- p. ,
- p. i 4
2 3( !
^L *
, i. .* 1 A' 7 ;
,s.
.s . .
-l g Since drives similar to these have been used at other plants
.] ,
] an important part of our evaluation of these drives is based on f.kh ' previous'esperience - -
with these drives. This includes Dresden Qi.; C,(
empuimee as well as initial Big Rock operations.
~ At Aig Rock Point, there have been two occurrences o'f rod
%.. h.
, ? drift-out". In one'of these, the cause was attributed to an in-
[91 ,
.g. , '
, ',; . ; advertent release of domineralizar resins resulting in the collet i 5 .
- ' , . fingers being jananed in the open position so that the rod was free i
<1 , .to drift as. influenced by rne forces due to gravity and hydraulic
.7 3 pressure. In the second case it is believed that a hard particle W became trapped between'the collet, piston and a sleeve which is -
ait . . ,
d located between the cellet and the index tube. This again is believed
.; s ' :,n t . . - , -
to have caused the collet fingers to be jammed in the open pos.ition, -
w$
thus permitting rod drift. The hard particle was never found. It
~j should be, noted, .howevn, that in neither of these cases nor in any
'E, . ether case has there been any apparent significant impairment of
.s ., ,;- .
a h scram capability. Also, since the drift rate was quite slow, e r (about 1 inch per minute) it is maintained by Big Rock personnel
%:h sp that at all times the operator had full control of the reactor.
I 3 _
-. - .a . a
.In discussions with General Electric it was revealad that the nh j j fw:s p
- Bodega Bay drives will not include the si'eeve which is believed to J
' yh".%. ;. ,.
PS,P, ,
- have been responsible for trapping of the hard particle in the ct. ., ,.
- b '
Censumer's drive and.the wedging of the particle between the sleeve F $d ~L tad the collet. 'Also, it was stated that consideration is being 4-1 SM
- O;hg% ,
d.Q,. given to various modifications that will minimize the possibility u
,' \ ss. . , ,
)7
'i
< .N
, , . . . , s il...
h ',' 9 l '
<. , % =@. . . . .' ; h 7s/g dj % .," j- l ,', f 5p. , " 3 c . , . .a V. '[.
- g. , ."[^ ,. ] , 4 ,W , g,:
]
- ,s ..:.m ...,. J$ n .w 4. w qW"K+r+:&,lM"43c+vw'-@- m.
.w ~
- gg .& .dn., ' MM-@D .s e, g.w .m.s ,
- n~%WM 9MerG,,JMc01ySam..s .
.~. -4
.W.4 "
Mf ,
b.g.,q . < g .: #.
. ,,3.;
' pj . -
i .
- 20 '. "
.t.
7 of forsign material accumulating in.the rod drives. The applicant has
.4 also indic,ated that functional and endurance tests will be made on the.
..: u - -
Q,3 prototype Bodega mechanisms, but the, detail.ed procedures for these testa D
' ~
Wy and the acceptability criteria have not been determined, ibm, - s .. . . .
f,h
,o It is our present'epinion that the applicant's selection of control
]Mfcy.t?;
red drive design is acceptable from a safety standpoint. On the oth.or
], .
hand, if at the operating license stage experience with these drihes has I demonstrated that present operating difficulties become reactor safety
. a p l
problems, substitution of an alternative drive mechanism may be' required.
l .
Discussions of the possible consequences of a rod dropout accident .,
! ' t.
involving a single. rod is discussed elsewhere in this report under Accident 2 },j;-
, a ,
s Evaluations.. It is our opinion that the sudden dropout of more than one rod l
. . , . ',. n
, , . . - .. 4 . .. ..
l ;> ,j at say given time is incredible with the proposed system.
l s
.i 1 '
1 1 I
! I 1
l .I
- 1
. . \
a .*
. s .
l 1
..?l ta*\ a
? ' Qi l
-r e9
- i*y?1 +- + ., ..s ,
.-wij ,
' ! D.)) t.
.. , .z.
u .;
4 , b?'*5 4 . *
.-p5'at. s< . .n 4
lll(f .
,~ -;; . , ,
4
' -l
"'.x.(@) * ~
. At -
iV,,, Mt,; l .
{'-
f*fM s.itM- s f **.[$ ) ~ ,,
v
.g.l w
,,.g
'* A
- }. .
e .c J, .
~
,.~. ** $NI- vf C .- .q s's ( :G.' J; a + K , , d~., . :-;p ; .
t-p e.; .X .. . :
[i!.[CMMMM3ENMTC'3hPMEMMTAI5ffEE!TWWMMW
- _,, 5 ?- e- . .,
,, - 21 -
3., :
l VI. Thermodynamic!and Emergency Cooling Systems '
The Bodega. Bay Reactor is a forced recirculation boiling water reactor with four recirculation loops. Each loop takes suction
,, . . i W.* from the reactor.v,essel'at the downcomer annulus and returns a-WP coolante to a vessel inlet near the bottom of the vessel. The gd..,
coolant mafces a single upward pass through the core. The. pump
- x. .,s
'M located in each loop is rated at'29,000 gpm at 100 feet of. head.
. ahtj w . .
., '; .4'1- Valves are provided in each recirculation loop to permit isolating
, 1 , .
q a pump when necessary.
Steam generated in the core passes through axial flow steam
~
separators and a steam dryer. The steam separators and the
,: [
p .r .
steam dryer are located entirely within the reactor vessel. The i
3.7 moisture content of the steam leaving the dryer is 0.1% by weight.
r;w -
}'y During full power operation steam flows at a rated flow of
- 14,170,000 pounds per hour to the turbine Steam which is exhausted l
.l from the turbine is condensed, passed through condensate demineral-i fj izers, feedwater heaters and is then returned to the reactor.
,-l 1 The feedwater pump used under normal conditions is driven by
.v"j the main turbine shaft through a step-up gear drive. A smaller
_ %q electric motor-driven pump is used as a feedwater pump during -
' " start-up and for certain emergency operations described below.
lRH
$/,,, q The main condenser is designed using materials suitable for
[j.;-)J Jg salt water service. Water is drawn from Bodega Bay and Harbor
- cJ ]
M to cool the condenser and is discharged to the Pacific Ocean. 4
. s: tQ.
i ffk W1 In addition to condensing exhausted turbine steam, the main condenser
..,a
} ' .1 i e :
! h .. t . - , -. .
l ?. _
- $ . S 'v ' Ee ' W ** Yv *
^
e . s'*
t
- M.
- u
% vw g!lyyq~nihtge1,l.%ryQQy@gXWqm@y52MMpgCWMMWC&;g..;,y;Wg3g3hni;gp f c,.y Q,,7,/. e, - 4
+,.
pp .y.4 m, . . . 3.a.s
- ,y .J.- .q.- - -
p u.
- . - 22 -
{ ,
is designed to serve as a heat sink for excess reactor steam which
^may be, dumped directly to the condenser through a steam bypasst s .
> ]:.,
2 <
system which is' rated at h0% of rated steam flow. The' condenser i.id'l , also provides for condensate ' holdup in the hot well for decay
.y..9., .
M f of short-lived radioactivity. A twin' element air ejector is m
A.e .ew j , , . .y.n.#,. ,,,
, , i. .( . . . . , , , .i ,. ,
ig?p + +
'- pmvided to remve gasses from the condensate; the air removal
.9 hk , ' '
lespacity of each unit is 52.2 scfm of dry air. The discharge j
- ,.a.() ..
"T
$!C ,
.' from the air. ejector is to the stack through a 30 minute delay
- s, . -
d :: .
, ' line and a particulate filter.
,l
'b- # In addition to the main condenser.there are other heat
- . +
j ' removal systems which may'be use'd to remove heat after shutdown u'
and during an emergency. The main feat'ures of these systems are
~ i
@N.r.e
'l
%.*:.e ,'
. described below:.
' < s.
G
' T ' Emergency Cooling System ' -
ms
/J The emergency cooling system'is a high pressure system which I
- l provides means for removing heat from the reactor in the event a
of loss of the main condenser as a heat sink. The emergency condenser in this system has tw tobe bancles located in a tank of water. The condenser is actuated by opening a valve in the _ ,
l.k '
,;cJ , , , ,; -"
return line to the reactor and flow is' maintained through the
.., r,:.j o; .,...s. . ..
'. condenser by natural circulation. The stated design heat removal
.w ?,'y) ~ ~ .
ql '
, capacity per bund 1e is 1.8% of the rated reactor power. (Decay ,
n -
i
,9 '-
heat releass rates fall to 3.6% in about 3 minutes and to 1.8%
2 -
. ;a ~~y. . .. , , >
' %gt- '
.s.J in' about 1- hour after shutdown.)
e '
i
' f.,
, ,.. '".6,,...
J .,,u . a . . ,
- l 1
I s,',"; . ;, .~ *
, s s ', *
\ .!
- n. .
~ ~
- *,,* * + *"
'L /,
i j
s
,j. .
i . .
,k . ~.
, g, - ; *
,(} .
. . , . , . . - 3 .......O r. ..s . , . . , . . a
. , (EY. - % :.,
Q, .
%' ** t ' N.* Q $ ve,hj*k ,q @ me ' !"y,-
p sgf .y;(, .Q,"; [af- f . . .+gt ? ,.y Qt N ,ht..
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Ti Bleed and Feed. System -
'J- , ;. . s. .
Steam can be vented from the main steam line to the
<.g' .
ld.d . suppression pool whenever. a solenoid operated steam dump valve
- z. e ,.. 4 .
i .
y is actuated. The valve is automatically aci;uated by high reactor
- p. ,,. ,
.f pressur , . or by operator action. ~ High pressure feed water .
': M g supplied by the electrically driven auxiliary feedwater pump a p" :
LA through the feedwater piping replaces water that is vented from 4
-.a
.; .f, the system. This pump has a flow capacity of 700 gpm; thus this
'3 .
system should have a 60 Bt heat removal capacitf.
i j Shutdown Cooling System
.a N A forced circulation system with associated heat exchanger
( x a, .,3,
, m;$ is provided for decay heat removal after shutdown. The system 1 s . -
(.7% Q . -isalowpressure(150psigisystemwithaheatremovalcapacity >
.:m - of1.8hofratedpower. The rse w r is initially cooled by controlled stert. flow to the main condenser. After initial cooling and depressurization the shutdown cooling system is placed in operation.
l
- i Core Snray System A low pressure (150 psig) core spray system is provided.
..){s.M
~. .,
- Ihis system takes suction from the suppression pool and delivers -..
'..T^7 .v v. ;
water to the reactor vessel through two vessel inlet nozzles. ,
'M, c .
The system includes two pumps rated at 1200 gpm at 150 psig. The
.c . .
$pj system is automatically started when the reactor pressure is M;g -
Qf$ less than 150 psig and the reactor water level is low. The system f.
1.
..w
.!f .5 can also be started manually. The core spray conceptual design ,
q:
1- i q) 3 t
'.4 g .4 2. .
- m. ...,., ;4;; egg.. ,, ,
, , ,, .g .c , . .,
1
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l
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.within the reactor vessel has not yet been formulated.
- j It'necessary, high pressure water fmm the andling, or vb .
startup, feedwater pump can be routed to the core spray nozzles.
- @45f'/
The applicant estimates that this mode of operation would provide
.(-
M'@p N
.j
- a 30 Mw heat removal capability even if the recirculation system '
Wfih
% 1' piping were not intact, thus allowing part of the spray water Q5pj WI n,:l.
to escape without boiling. i In our opinion these provisions for decay heat during normal and abnormal conditions are satisfactory with one reservation.
Both the high pressure feed for the bleed and feed system, and the
, ,(; high pressure feed for the emergency core spray depend upon a
%.s . .,
-single, pump. This pump, the and'in g feedwater pump, will
- r1 n.,it. w . .
ti.gS , - , s.:# experience long periods of inoperation and thus could fail to ,
q, operate when most needed. We, therefore, feel that a second
- ]
high pressure pump should be provided to serve in a backup high
,.1 pressure feed water supply system. The back-up pump should 1
1 have sufficient flow capacity to accomplish decay heat removal
+ 1 i
i' a few minutes after shutdown. Also, it would be highly desirable l I '
.epsy that the back-up system be as nearly independent of the normal T. .he. ,
feedwater system as possible.
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- - 25 -
e VII. Waste Disposal ~
+
. /'
With regard to m dioactive wast'e disposal fm m this plant, i.
,.7.-
.1 ....'
the applicant has stated %s intention to conform with' effluent 4..
1 ..
t concentration limits established in 10 CFR 20 and further, in 3 (N .
,the case of liquid wasteiIl to conform with provisions of a waste
.Wd . f disposal permit to be obtained from the North Coastal Water 4p W@n " Pollution Control Board (a State agency regulating waste discharges v m w.&.*f*.D "q .
, ',' into State waters). He'has very,briefly described tankage, *
/ .. . .
. . .y -
holdup lines, piping, instrumentation and sampling techniques
.i l that will be used to insure capability to comply with the 1
,j} appropriate limits.. We have no present cause to doubt that such l . , -
equipments will be' adequate for,the intended purpose. ,
d&( ' '
l yl2 On the other hand, since.the liquid wastes are to be mixed GQ 4 " . , ,u. ,
. .e. .c ,
- VA with a condenser cooling water effluent amounting to 250,000 .
s i
gpm, the total annual discharge at 10 CFR 20 concentration i limits amounts to a very substantial number of curies, and it is .,'
i i
conceivable that through some reconcentration process marine life l fm m the plant site area might become unsatisfactory for human .
.,q consumption. The applicant recognizes this as a poss'ible problem
}0.g.)
.: , . . .. . . .. c
~j.$ (and is conducting research and development pmgrams in oceanography 74b
.' t.
and marine biology to evaluate this matter. Thn e programs are f c.: 4 i.
f*:1 as follows:
- f. .
kk,1 desanography: The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the TM
- u. _
' - condenser cooling water and m4 nimize the
.%a _ .
'8-j .- e$ a.S - . . j effects of temperature and radioactivity
..pf . ..... .-
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- . . < g.
g -
- a. A
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.... % a 1
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- c. ", 8 on the marir.e biota is being investigated in a series of tests conducted at the e ,A UN site. Thse tests include use of drift poles and uranine dye, as well as s . r
' W1
- '-measurements of temperature and salinity.
5Y.s a They will continue through at least one .
4 TQ ..4 annual cycle of oceanographic and meteoro-f 4 logical conditions.
a
']',
Marine Biology Survey: An ecological survey is being conducted 2
to establish a basis for evaluating future
- J ~
observations of the marine fauna and 9
N e_
flora of Bodega Head and Harbor.
- \' I'
~
. Radiological Surveys
. A preoperational monitoring survey of the
- 4. ,
site and its evnirons will be initiated
- two years before commencement of operation
'l 1
of the reactor. The details of this program
) -
have not been completed for Bodega Bay.
j However, it is anticipated that it will be
.J s,
~w similar to that conducted for the Company's
- w *
-},]
- -- ' ~ '
Humboldt Bay nuclear unit. - '
[, It is our opinion that these programs can adequately indicate
.f' j'$ whether or not a hazard to the public is likely to arise out of
- f-M(].4 operations of the plant. Further, we feel that the surveys can
. 19 5 --
~
g:a- ,,
~
furnish a satisfactory fiducial so that any significant increase C.
$.1 .in marine life contamination can be observed before it becomes a
'dQ a !
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a hazard to humans.s We intend to require that the applicant submit ,
- [ .j ,-
- \. I. ,\
f,l'd. periodic progress reports.on these.research and development programs c.. . .-
.C% 5. '
so that any unfavorable iriformation developed can be used to initiate
+ a
'MM , , .
appropriate measures at the. earliest pocsible moment.
. .:u..d,,f .. ,,, , ,
r o '
. - - ,. m,- -
. . ,. i To provide some measure'of the magnitude of this problem, a rough M.w,$.
g
{;a".
comparison may bW made between the effluent from the Bodega Bay Plant jy'.p A:g . , ..
,3
.. 4 -.o,
!. h ahd that from the Hanford Plant observable in the Columbia River at
- ci the Hanford' site boundary. At the Hanford sige boundary the whole j ,
i of the Columbia River is contaminated to about half the paximum l
],
permissible concentrations set forth in 10 CFR Part 20. The flow of L4, the river at that point:is at least 25,000,000 gpm or a factor of
.v:
l .g r t%gg.? $ , 100 greater than the 250,000 gpm from' the condenser at the Boc'ega
',e . . . , *
@JfC ., , - v .. ~ , <, . s , s .. . , .
Bay Plant. Thus, the total number of curies discharged there
}'3 per year should be no more than 27. of the number released at Hanford
-l . per year. Ecological studies in the Columbia River area have
. 1-indicated, up to now, no caus,e for serious alarm over the amount
, of radioactivity contamination in the marine life of that area.
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. -28.-
t i VIII Accident Evaluation A ntaber of accidents have been evaluated by the applicant and
.l
. reported in the Preliminary Hazards Summary Report. 'Ihe accidents which
'.- . were considered included those induced by equipment malfunction or
... .~ <
. 9s gw-w operator error as listed below:
p_'.M) 1. Changing pressure regulator handwheel setting
. .J
.*f.,
44, 2. Continuous control rod wothdrawal or insertion n ',
- 3. toss of electrical load .
-i 1 4. Control rod drive malfunction .'
- 5. Recirculation pump failures
.; 6. Main steam valve closures
' a. 1 .
- 7. Failure of a reactor safety val,ve to rescat jR 8. Failure of reactor safety system
?$
- 9. Fuel cladding failure M. ,m
- 10. Loss of feedwater
.1
, { 11. loss of condenser vacuum
'21 12. Loss .of auxiliary power Instrument air failure
~
13.
i l 14 Pressure regulator failure
,q Q a
- 15. Emergency condenser tube failure
..~
- 16. Reactor system ruptures inside the dry well . .
@M3
% 17. Failure to replensih cooling water in emergency condenser.
- v. :
J
.f% 18. Startup accident Wd Fuel loading and handling accidents
....Z- 19.
N -20. Cold water accident' .,
.:4 -
4
. 21. Control rod drop accident
" i5
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- 1 3; :.. . , ,
. . A. . i i
i ,
, i 22. Main steam'line rupture outside the dry well 1
- 23. Reactor system rupture in the dry well.
,. 3 In some of the accidents presented, the evaluation is not yet completed f:M .
- py'lj . and the applicant has stated that when the analysis is complete, the 5.Edh
- results will be used s criteria in the detailed plant design (for example NE to size the pressure relief valves and set the isolation' valve closure M1
- i$< specifications) .
.d
-jl In our opinion, most of the evaluation results completed and the j
stated design objectives for plant systems and components appear to be a
satisfactory for the construction permit stage. In two of the major J
)
4 accidents, however, the Staff is not in complete agreement with some of the assumptions or conclusions made by the applicant. Namely:
]:m % ,
M i. ' Control Rod Drop Accident w,_
s . . ..?.*:P.,
'N' Preliminary calculations by the applicant indicate that the most reactive control rod will be worth no more than 3.6%.
_,[ Calcu1ations by the applicant show that if this rod were to drop
, 4..
y from the core, a minimum period of 3 milliseconds could result, and the average fuel temperature would reach 5500'F in the uncontrolled fuel zone. The applicant concludes, somewhat W in de! arbitrarily, that the total energy release is not great enough
,'4,;.t
] ;,1 to endanger the rqactor vessel.
p, y.M ' In information submitted subsequent to the Preliminary
. :.g . .
p
. .s Hazards Summary Report the General Electric Company indicated ;;
h ;.x., , they are developing analytical models for more accurate ;
'I prediction of the consequences of such a nuclear excursion. .
C.l . ,
,,ft The forthcoming Spert destructive test will be used to check the model that is being developed.
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, . t.. . In additi.on to the anal.ytical work, a rod worth minimiser
- "s! m computer and a rod dropout. velocity limiter.are being developed 4
q ,
for possible use in the Bodega Plant. The rod worth computer l{E"2 9 .': . . . , . .. :,, .
i -
would continually monitor control rod patterns to reinforce ,
1
%, w:p:-
,k re. procedural controls provided to insure that patterns causing
- dif.)
. v. individual rods to assume undesirable high reactivity worth are i t
- o. '
'l g not used. Conceptual designs for flow restricting devices that 1
y would limit potential control rod dropout velocities to safe values are also being developed. In the absence of experimental hf; r....
verification of the applicants position that a rod dropout M
447 sNeidentofthistypewillnotendangerthereactorvessel,we s
- believe that other 'de' sign features, such as the rod worth .OM
'minimiser computer or the rod dropout velocity limiter, should be incorporated into the plant design.
- 2. Maximum credible Accident 1i This accident is assumed to begin as an instantaneous severance of a reactor water recirculation line while at an overpressure
, , ,e condition of 1250 psig after extended operation at 1008 Mwr. In e t. '
']; ,' his calculations, the applicant took credit for the core spray
/
3
-Y ,,;f systou to the extent that he assumed that only one-half of the core ,
, *h'A melted. In the calculational model this was done by calculating
-3
-j 7 ;, the core heat-up and the subsequent fission product release . ~3,
....g . e
.m
'.t pq . .without the core spray, and then dividing the release at any time '
7 .. ]
j.1 q e,;-) ,
during the process by a facter of two.. It is interesting to note f
.,. R, that the release model indicates that 607. of the noble gases are a
.} released by melting 50% of the core, due to the additional release
- 1. .~., . ,
- h Q$&_. :O , . * . j&. e ..chc: # Ly :. .< :w}y W.y t h .m ~ p ,v,6 3 , lq,y;k qf .,
y &>
' hbNeu'4' 1HT2aiCG2?Mb?$1L?$$37s%
W8?;]$%%$WiUiliC'W$?YlPE&O~NSG5$51MQM'NYG i
- S.
.g ,.
. . .. 3 ,
....:-.3,. , . of -
. n
%. se ' - +
Q{ ;' .
- . from failed fuel cladding. (Calculations indicate that 'without s a- -
b,, ;:>.< .
cooling all the fuel cladding in the core fails within 20 minutes.)
- p" 0 Additional assumptions made by the applicant include
c: -
ppj -
A. Cladding fails at 1600*F and releases 20% of the noble gases yh@ . . . ..
d i h s. '
..;p 3.) . . .
f7g, B. Fuel melts at 5000*F and releases the remaining 80% of the noble u., .
,D M gases and iodines, and 1% of the solids.
A .ep ' h
,, . .a1 C. Fifty percent of the halogens and 70% of the solids remain J
- , in the reactor vessel.
D. In the dry well, plate out and fall out are assumed to occur
, as follows:
.:$ .,/.
. . .q (i) Removal half life of 30 minutes for halogens,' minimum
-n- . .,
' 0 J;.
concentration value of 10-4 times that in the water.
s (ii) Removal half life of S hours for solids, 1
E. I.eakage from the dry well to the refueling building is at 0.5%
f per day.
F. The fallout half life in the refueling building is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for halogens and solids.
Q,.;.{ G. The ventilation cleanup equipment removes 95% of the halogens
.:4h y- * ,
E and solids.
. ;. . y .
.,. H. The fans exhaust 100% of the refueling building volume per day a 01 A up the stack. .
- 3. -a _
Npaw
+[9 m,
I. The stack height is taken as 300 feet, (although it has not ,
s.
. 1.4 . .
M. . >L .
T been determined as yet.) - -
y;-[ ,s o l,',{. , '
3
- ; .%\. w s....,-
t t t )%N:*$'Yt'%k lY'NkiT % r s tl ' A$YN;t'n 's k . 'st \ )* ' \ A*ji - sE t T* 4 se v
's* * .1. k x *k s .',,j" , .
h
ll:cfy$W'!'"ti!M"Znm=M?ttMWrd%2QQ'G&WE9biDi$3MY1GITS~NT ~E$2iW .
h"...l:,rm,c E]4e 3[
. y . . .. .. . . . . .
- .; , . t.
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- b. . 32
, 9.y{
, Calculations are presented by the applicant for lapse and slightly 34.
Q;- stable conditions for certain chosen distances. The doses for the lapse 44
' $1 condition were given as .024 rem to the whole body and .019 rem to the thyroid p ..]
r.
ark 4 .' for the entire accident at a downwind distance of 0.6 mile. Th'e value of g
3
.,. X/Q used to calculte these doses was 2.08 x 10-6 sec/m . The staff feels
. q. - ~
Md -
that for an accidental elevated release it is more appropriate to consider
.?M N .
. a release under 'either lapse or inversion conditions, and that it could 4
occur with a low wind speed, such as one meter per second. With this in l mind, it seems more appropriate to utilize an equation for the value of the
.t maximum concentration as follows:
. . .X/Q = 2/enuh2 ,
y *
' i y Utilizing a 300 foot stack height and a wind speed of 1 m/see this equation y';;: '
gives a value of X/Q of $42'x'10-5, which is over 10 times as great as given by the applicant, and increases the doses accordingly. In response
. to staff questions, the applicant stated that the halogen release would
. be approximately 10 times as great if a factor of 2 credit were taken for fallout in the dry well rather than using the assumptions of fallout and plate out. Combining these factors, one would find that the doses for the
,$a pjd.l 'en re MCOA would be 0.280 rem whole body and 2.2 rem to the thyroid.
.- , , .s. - .
,,g@y y; While these values are considerably more than those reported by the w
yl% applicant, they are clearly acceptable in terms of Part 100 criteria.
- .i ,
{$,d 'Ihe nature of the calculations for this type of containment are such
- Wr '
gg - that ~they are difficult to reproduce. However, a simple method of Ngw '
f checking them without invo'Ivin'g 'so much conservatism as to make the '
1
'Mr results meaningless can be made by assuming:
J7(E.y 1). Release of 60% of the noble gases and halogen fission products 1
+=
- to the drywell. (This assumption is consistent with the i g
... .w.~~-
~ .
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- sr
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o , (. .,!bmrGww1Micd&MTitt#f?;fchg@}HXQiqQQ:?g&Ykq$tMMQMF;5pr:3l':
^ ' '
. ,- w . . .
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-u -4 , . c. ,p_
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. n 2 ,
gg:b assumption that only one-half the core will melt). -
- ,bMno;h 2). Leakage from the containment at 0.5% per' day.
.. - 3g.p
.; ;*td 3)._ Norasi cleanup system operation.
g Utilizing this method, and the diffusion equation given above, it is found QiI MM that the maximum whole body external doses for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and for the entire
@ m-accident are: 0.12 res and 0.94 rom.
- '"- ; Performing the same type of calculation for the iodines by taking a v.
60% release from the fuel, 50% plateout in the dry well, and 95% removal '
by the' cleanup system while exhausting the entire leakage (at the rate of 0.5% per day), the doses for 2' hours and for the entire accident are: 3.4 j
%gw me d res and.53 rea.
. ; s ..s
? . From the above calculations we have concluded' that the containment system
' . ^n: provided for this reactor appears to be capable of reducing the potential hazards of the maximum credible accident for this reactor to levels which
.',.._, do not present an undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. I w '
', Under the staff assumptions, the only credit taken for engineered safeguards 4
(other than the core spray system) are those which are passive, and if h
2 35:
. established by test, those that will be available to function,in the yyj w
aanner demonstrated in the test, for a reasonable time in the future. It should also be recognized that there are a large number of other factors
.%~
M D&;
which have been pointed out by the applicant which will have a strong UDt tendency to make the doses appreciably less than those calculated above. .
-$i6 .
.Taking' those into account it' becomes apparent that the safety of the 4
. m ~.
ut@f public would be protected even if some of the passive properties of the -
3(r}+
39 system were to fall below their anticipated performance values.
- i% l 3 ..
hhhw . ' , W w. ,$ aux $.w :}.f.kiM : . Sc: .ae m - . + - , m.:J., . , , - ;r . >. .u?Q,d ,$h
h E h m W W'T E 92 M M isi29 N M @f_fg4!JS MFI'7 $ h'65k D M fjF K C M R M .5 b
. ~ .. . .
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- a. :
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- 34 -
e' \ ,
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II. Summary and Conclusions f,i W *
{
'i y~ :jn In our review of this application for a construction permit, we, , ] ,,
- I.pf have identified and evaluated six areas which we feel are of prs. mary )
- ,sw .
-~ :
,h.
, . ~ . , . , . + ., ,importance.
.+.. . . ...
The areas are summarised below along'with our conclusions:
t NW .
%M as'
- 1. . Earthquake Associated Problems - The ' plant is to be located
' \
'approximately 1000 ft. from the San Andreas Fault. This is not M;;?$ > '
,d in accordance with the recommendations of Part 100. Also, the
- t.3
,j' - applicant states that he does not intend to use signals from
.q .
I t seismic shock detectors to initiate either reactor scram or 4
. n.
- ll.y containment isolation. ,
(i ,
We believe that non-existence of minor faults under the
~
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, ~ plant site should be verified during plant construction. ..Information y ,-
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e
.i developed during excavation should be carefully evaluated for evidence )
,. . y of faults, the presence of which would require a reassessment of the ;
. n. sEtabilityofthelocationproposed.
e .. '
" With respect to other seismic problems,'in view'of the applicant's expressed intention to design the plant to withstand earthquakes as
.Ik .
severe as ones rated 8.2 on the Richter scale, we feel that the M~{j . ~',
gi I difference between 1300 feet and 1000 feet is of minor concern and '
1 %3 , .
w that the proposed design is adequate. We plan to reserve judgment ":
lm$
$$ -as to whether seismic detectors should be included in the plant's l; m 7
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equipment and should initiate reactor scram and containment isolation.-
ww .
7- 2 0ur judgment of this matter will be dependent en review of the final l j,hh i plant design and an evaluation as to whether earthquake accelerations C.7lI%
W could disrupt the ability to scram the reactor and isolate the ,
- 9. n.
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ff containment.
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. 2. Location:sf Back-up Valves 1,n Containment Isolation System - While 1;;h .
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?. ., we would prefer that both of the containment isolation. valves be
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.;of the back-up valves as proposed, dees. net measurably increase the 9 ., [+
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^
consequence of the Maximum credible Accident.
~
We believe that more specific 'eriteria than those proposed i% .
j, should be established at this time with respect to containment
'N testing 2 penetration design, and iselstion valving.
- 3. Centrol Rod Drives - These drives are similar ,to those in use at Dresden and at Big Rock Point. In',our opinion, further operating l<?
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1 Qy experience 'with these type drives prior to the completion of 'cen-
- We g~~ struction of Bodega should'be adequate to resolve this matter. Based
.-:. p. . . , , , ,
k on the. results of research and' development programs, it may be * ' ~
)
4 necessary to incorporate additional design features prior to reactor j 1
eparation to preclude a serious rod dropout accident. j
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.- 4. Burnout Safety Margin - The proposed margin is 1.5; this value is I j not well.. supported by substaritial operating experience. We believe that future experience prior to the operation of Bodega should be !
y;;;pN
?.
I p i adequate to determine the acceptability of the heet transfer design l o ,
i
. ms M,r -. . . !
-criteria.
. n.
Fuel Element Design Criteria - Fuel element design criteria for this .
j(.g, . 5
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y
. , . . plant are not clearly defined at present, but consideration is being E w,q .
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'f given to the selection of a 0.011 inch cled. In our opinion, the
- . adequacy of the clad thickrzess can be verified by operating
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. should be considered. We believe, however, that the environmental, f.
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?.ftd '
/M.% conducted'by the applicant can serve to adequately monitor any'
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... effects of this nature prior to development of.a safety problem.
%D;; . -. Subject to these comments, we have concluded that the applicant and his
, c-
, ' , .!, muclear consultant are technically qualified to design and construct the facility; that the research and development programs preposed are adaquate-
. to resolve the safety matters met yet settled; that the information missing
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from the applications will be supplied;'and that there is reasonable assurance l
- 3. . . '
that a facility of 'the general type and power level proposed can be constructed *
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at Bedega Bay without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. +
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[liTO PRESERVE BQDEGANORTHERN EAD ',AND v.Y CALIFOR,NIA ASSOCIATION. O':':' dM.M . 6 )) i l . ;;3
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PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,7 L J: - -
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'Benjarnin Dreyfus
'"Q ' Donald L. A. Kerson 341 Market Street fg) 4.! ,. , San Francisco, California 94105
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
.&gg%4{j f s.4 3 . -:gr s.w?i,t't3M STATE OF CAUFORNIA
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- i,',4;; NORTHERN CAUFORNIA ASSOCIATION ) l 1 1. E TO PRESERVE BODEGA HEAD AND -
)
HARBOR, INC. , )
)
Petitioner, )
..a )
w a, mn vs. )
e,:, -a ,
)
7j%q,FZ ; PUBUC UTIUTIES COMMISSION, )
':;kso
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e~s.pgly f,j'. /. - - . - Respondent. )
. a:S. ep% M .
., )
,,, ;n. , n :.
. g..
. ,, :.v T PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW
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- l:Q.%fi 9 f#dQ1 GARRY, DREYFUS & McTERNAN
..V.< .o m %e, ] Benjamin Dreyfus
.M.GGG Donald L. A. Kerson :
',#%.#m.:i.E, 341 Market Street
,:< i,1;;, J./
- San Francisco, California 94105 l1
\
.i $o M r.M. n,g. g
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -
- Casen . Page
- s. .
. .' 7 'i w Application of Plainfield-Union Water Co.
'.. ...: 94 A. 2d 673 (N. J. 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
.. 0 % r~d 9
$.$sb. .h ?.%. Associated Freight Li'nes v.. Public Utilities Com.
ig ' 3 , 159 A. C. 6 04 (19 63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . .
..26 7:2
$f[% db' Boswell v. City of Long Beach,. L. A. Super. Ct. ,
@.*/h.yz CCH Atomic Energy Law Rptr. , para. 4045 . . . . 21 5l@!,f0i
- # .1? .
2, California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com.
- c. y..q;;-
r:a:,;37" 5 9 A. C. 2 83 (19 63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
. 2.W , ' English.v. City of Long Beach, 35 C. 2d 155 (1950) . .
s.
9 i T.I ,
La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 C. 2d 47 (1945)......................... 9
-.-. . ,T .
..;,.. y.n , ,
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. ,
' .)~,5%;I' 74 Cal. 2d' 911 (1946) . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
'e4c. ~1.
p g $.), p -Olive Proration etc. Com. v. . Agri. etc. Com. ,
45.4.~23 m - I7. C. A. 2d 204 (1941) , , , . . . . . . . . , . . . 10 '
Mrgy .
ig Pac. . Employers Ins.. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. ,
. F. il s ,. 47 C. . A . 2 d 713 ( 19 41 )' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
. C4
. f.,jdl4
- ,pg;g,g ~ Statutes cy.An ~ i. g
- / W. ~ ~
. Public Utilities Code
_. ?
Se c d on 17 0 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 {
. S e c tion 4 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 M'djig" . S e c tion 315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
,M W Sk S e c tio n 7 61 . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 25 F;,yM f, Se cti on 7 6 8 . . . ,.. ... ,. . . . . . . . 7 25 :
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- i. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)
>l i
q Other Authorities g-
<[. '.j- .
Adams, Health k. Safety in Atomic Activities, 27 Geo.
$.t.
&,e. Wash. . L., Rev. 163 (195 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
-%g.).g n
ra c,'3' P A .
Cavers, } Federal k State Regulation, 46 Calif. L.. Rev.
J e
..M 2E - (19 5 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
.x . . , . .
i 3Estep k Adelman,, State Control of Radiation Hazarda,
.P. ' 1%?q 60 Mich.. L.. Rev.- 41 (19 61) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
. a -
~ fge . Saint-Amand,. Geologic and Seismologic Study of N.g,m.
s.c,
,(,;,g) . Bodega Head (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
>s. 1 ip
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.Stason, Estep k Pierce, Atoms k The Law (1959). . . 20
' Thomas, Insurance Against Nuclear Accidents, 46 Calif.
f' L. Rev. 14 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ME!.;.y( U. S. Cong, k Ad.. News (1959) . . . . . . . . . .. . .
. i 21
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. FACTS On October 4,1961 the Pacific Gas and Electric Company
.I :
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,, file 4with the California Public Utilities Commission an
~.5 .q
.f;yf4:6B application for a. certificate of public convenience and necessi-mn:g .0 % -
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f : Sonoma County.
$NNMf- After public hearings thereon the Commission, on I$"M . ,
[.[
4., w
@DA3 November 8,1962, issued an interim certificate of public i
f;.,g .qp convenience and necessity. This interig certificate was
] made conditional upon additiorpal surveyh being made to
. . . . " , . ...c i determine that the project would not be adverse to the s .; w.
AM.. f. ,! public interest.. (Decision 64537). ,
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' Petitioner's unincorporated predecessor sought petition
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$ M .h for rehearing from this decision which was denied January ~ ' '.
Mhih
, ..y. J.y 2, 1963.
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Petitioner's predecessor thereafter filed petitions for
- e. e.. 4
',,jg0'J250 injunction alleging a violation of the interim certificate.
/>. , r.;. W.
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.i Said petitions were denied February 13, 1963.-
- x. . ] . On May 6,1963 petitioner filed a petition to reopen the s.te
- c. + -c.
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~ .
- proceedings for further hearings on the issue of safety and
' ,&&%,*l ~ . s
=
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{. p 1 i the proximity of the proposed reactor to the San Andreas j /
1/}.qq fault. The Commission denied the petition for reopening
.m .w -
M.h>.hy v on July 9,1963. .(Decision No. 65701). A petition for h-eggs.f h rehearing from this decision wat denied on August 23, 1963.
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...,a.,.
d;g"g .By the instant writ (Pub. Udl. Code sec.1756) peti-s
- ygS' g ,g' tioner seeks to review the decision denying re. opening and the g; .w .. . .<, .
. . . . .t ,
}
',TL , " decision denying a rehearing therefrom. . (Decision Nos.
y c ;,* je ,.
W 4(r * . i t;f.f'%c
(. > - 65701 and 65914)..
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I
..I .ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE
....I'
,, A a.1, h,lj;, .
At the hearings on Pacific Gas and Electric Company's
-fr%wtq4 .'% application, the Sierra Club, petitioner's unincorporated n,* * .;
gg 7 ,1
' 'predec(essor, and individual citizens vigorously opposed the X"
e, retf'4 m' ., P -Bodega. Bay reactor. .The opposition was largely on two
.D,,N$ lines: (1) that the plant would despoil a scenic Wildland of
- Ulp u.c'iPl% California and (2) that a substantial doubt existed as to
.G,, . <1 s:.q. . .
t M. the safety of this nuclear reactor located in close proximity o
.e 7 i
=
i to the San Andreas Fault, a known active earthquake fault.
, W.ll .
E** *.T Evidence of safety was presented through J. D. Worthington, f9ps.M;i
- l. .a civil engineer employed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, j gdqs.,
],, yg , -
7,.who was in turn relying on reports and studies of Drs. Tocher, -
jicdAc:.1 y;fcjl Housner, Quaide and the engineering firm of Dames and 3::77
,e.." ,; ? Moore, all of whom had been retained by Pacific Gas &
tw% Jr.s; .
, 4.1 ' " Electric Company.
M. , T. n -M M. ,p. _ At these hearings staff counsel Bricca of the Commission I
arguedthatthe experts who prepared the reports upon which
": w..
%OM cesew Worthington testified should be brought forward for cross *
+vQ?y M99 e/> ..a 4,9 examination. (Tr. 37-38)
M 9.,W.$g 7.~ $$R After the applicant expressed considerable reluctance
".LtQ e. 7.". ge 't pfg;
. ,w sm
. in submitting the reports of its experts the Hearing Examiner
.09.,3 w Mx .
requested that the experts' reports concerning the safety a e y. zy .-
f.Qg
> z- m. w
.of a nuclear reactor at Bodega Bay be furnished to the ,
T3 % gQ.If. . Commission (Tr. 1402-1413)
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.On July 9,1962, one month after the close of the hearings, p
$$,iAh,AV-" '"$ Pacific Gas and Electric submitted this report as Exhibit r -
,'y ~
,~ ,
. No. 48.
. .,.. , .w y
' ~
E.
5J 34
- E lOn December 28,1962. Pacific Gas and Electric. Company g@h M 1 submitted to the. Atomic Energy Commission a " Preliminary LEN. n ~ .h -
j,.m.M Hazards Analysis" containing the Company's data concerning PQ%34 -
d'g&n earthquake. hazards at Bodega Bay, (AEC Docket No. 50-205).
ns t
j.),jy -
.On February 26, 1963 the A.E. C. Division of Licensing
.h:n
. ... : n.'.,;b
'd and Regulation submitted certain questions to Pacific Gas and ;
s . Electric Company raiseck by the staff of that division after I,%g$ '
O.
^
.-m 34p i a ' study of the " Preliminary Hazards Analysis. " On March 4,
, mJbpi.. ...
. :e.:. : ; c ,. m .
l
\
N:em,p%,o ..n.s,n 1963 the Compan an'swered these questions:
',j.p4;,g In studying the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's m.n b.%:Q Q " Preliminary Hazards Analynia" and its March 4,1963
,'c, 53.. . ,
3$, ,?),.
,g c .. . m answers (,t petitioner recognized many inconsistencies therein
-p.yy.b 1.'
with the testimony produced before the Commission and that
- b4 a; mW,-1.u i'.p'.,, contained in Exhibit No. 48. It was also noted that certain gg.oig . reports found in Exhibit 48 were not made known to the AEC.
Om y
- Suspicious of the Company's regard for the public dM -
M,f- .s. interest, petitioner sought the services of Dr. Pierre St. .Amand,',
. i M -
22My,g If{,,}y[?
a seismologist of world-wide stature and present direetcsr of
. rMM$40 -
s
.~
?!446fj the: Astronautical Sciences. Division . Naval Ordnance Teat Station,
. ..wwb '- ' China ' Lake, C aliforni . '
We'3M.y pr 3 After extensive study, including on-the-site investi'gations,
$m$.$.
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3 . -
._ - - - - _ -- - - c n -.s.wan.
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a,-,3 . J. Dr..St. -Amand prepared a report concluding that " Bodega o
- . :.c.. . _ .
g c Head is a very poor location for a reactor .
' %N;3 fihEi f *p'
. . " Dr.
.9 tifll <
St.-Amand - ;
further concluded that a careful analysis of the y ,
g 7 a g. .. ,, ,
Pacific Gas and Electric Company's experts' reports conifrmed p+
1 ..M '
's his conclusio'n. His report states, %
MhD i
d,f;6f.3 .l "It is surprising, in view of the expert advice given by >
. y. . ev.
W.m$;.., Tocher, Quaide, and by Housner, that another site
,..o.,~
f M., t was not chosen and that construction has gone ahead".
i
.Q Qf, .
(Pierre Saint-Amand, Geologic and Seismologic Study of Bodega
- e,e y
.o-.,.<..
DNfjy Head, p. 20,1963, cited hereinafter a's ."St. -Amand". )
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.8
% %.:P . $, .- When the result e of the St..-Amand study was revealed,
, . . , . , . . .m j . @:w.,d3,4 petitioner immediately requested the Commission to reopen es '
l
."M ,
the hearinge on Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application l
.e > ,
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to afford 1 .. t; m . i
$s petitioner, and the Commission, an opportunity to cross-
- tl3;R; {.
l examine the experts who prepared Exhibit 48 and to refute
.S s their evidence by testimony of Dr. St. -Amand.
- c. w .
- r. p m a s.. .
- $48$eQ The Commission, in denying this petition, filed three ;
&v;;..Y;w D . opinions:
$l
- k....W%..
.d~an({ $ A three-member majority opinion based its denial of cw l 9,7
.W@hp%c.g.f the petition to reopen on grounds of federalpre-emption. The -
l- FM.5<h majority concluded that the Commission was precluded from 4 l
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- m. .
MM,
- considering the proximity of the proposed reactor to the mnt -
Qg 4.w. .. .
r..;.sw. g,.y 4, .
San Andreau Fault as it bears on safety because the Atomic q ' A.*
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Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has pre-empted the
.,4.n.i W. . . . . ,, ,
g <g field of reactor safety.
M y F f ;, ,
., . , . . Commissioner Mitchell filed a concurring opinion !
If
- which disagreed with the majority on the issue of federni
?? a i pre-emption. The concurring opinion thought the petition ng
@s e 6@.yr:p should be denied because petitioner had never presented to i the Commission any expert opinion on the issue of safety m,;@y:.q%
' .,]wf,j,h and therefore the petition was based on " speculation and ur , . . r. .
. _.g , ,j Conj e ctur S. "
ex.gg.i ) '
3.MiW!J A 15-page dissenting opinion filed by President Bennett of LX G.M@. M $.b , ,
y e.,
the Commission disagreed with both the majority and concurring w3 3 y .
.t i i .,
'I opinions and conclu.ded'that + *1
+}%[h
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- i. "a nuclear power unit at Bodega Bay is not compatible
- r. f.,,
N, .
j1 with the public convenience and necessity. "
.a.A ::q
$/ , Commissioner Bennett, after reviewing the record, E/s . , f stated that the public interr ,t in conservation of natural I
..g, ,.Q .
recreational sites such as Eodega Bay far outweighs the M m, a .:y,! 1
- pt#e W*;. ,.,h4 "narr.ow utilitarian cost and value" of a reactor unit. v E.q ., y
- JW +,p
.~ ,
. " Projects so distasteful and so offensive to the broad >
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standard of public aesthetics are not, nor can argument gh> y*;;
i M s'W.wQ make them, in the true public convenience and l
,4,%y,$p.h r ma-
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neces sity. " .!
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- 23,.I e -
w.' Then Commissioner Bennett reviewed the safety question,
~
il ykw%,y+. including an analysis of the evidentiary defects in Exhibit 48.
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. dh..'f m At page eight he states:
- e. u.., 4.
by@,,.;.4 'i "There is a basic proposition which must be reached here w, e a v .$.,NN )
and.we did not get to it in this case upon a complete p., g ,43 .A. 'A "
.3, j a'f record simply because of the' unwillingness of the Pacific
, y.mo ,
j,YhQ y; Gas and Electric Company to expose its experts to f%$(th
-~
' W4 f cross-examination. . This poses a fatal deficiency. The
$Z% @ y @4 complete exploration of expert opinion which was not
'"~d W nda
. permitted here has resulted.in an approval which should
- c ,
v.; ; not have been issued in the first instance in view of the t ,
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' record. Rudiments of fair play and due process
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suggest to me that there has not been a full hearing here t ,w .
WW.4
%.%.. %j.M9.
Particularly in the matter of such public importance
, agr 1;A -
-as this ".
f g g. .
The dissenting opinion concluded that Pacific Gas and p 3.. ;. .] Electric Company has not met
. s. ,
"The hi'gh burden of satisfying this Commission as to 3 , . ;, , the absolute safety of its proposal". (P. 4)
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- ( I 7 1 PETITIONER HAS BEEN DENIED.THE 5:,W OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE 9%' fjf/l # AND REFUTE EXHIBIT 48 AND THUS
. DEPRIVED OF A FAIR HEARING.
!,e On July h,. 1962,-one month after the Commission's '
n.. !
q%?" a hearings on Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application:
$;W~g. ;: .
were closed, the applicant filed. Exhibit No. 48. .This exhibit
.w . ...s.
-c?.WK y. . provided the Commission with the expert opinion upon which.
- -W
\ @phk df the applicant was relying to establish the safety and freedom
. ; .c.x.,z ~
+g .
x from appreciable earthquake hazards of the proposed Bodega .
a.. a .
J,.Os...rc Bay reactor.
. :%m.
. n -
3.jf t The experts who prepared the reports upon which QQn vT * * , '
- Exhibit
. .- t No. 48 was based did not appear at the Commission's g a ..,t , . ,
k..h.:h hearings.and have never been cross-examined as to the "9".'$ basis for their opinions.
. :w:,y
"_0
- 4,-
The Commission re:eived late filed Exhibit 48 and used L2
.J j s;
that document in granting a certificate (No. 64537) without affording petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the authors
- *J,;y/. .._.d,, of that exhibit and to refute its assertions through other experts.
Sp7jn S.M!C*
y 1.r.%
. .. . rlt.is elementary that the statutory requirements of a 4 y :'.7) w.:y
" hearing" have not been met in the instant case, and that
. .. ~ %m
$'./.* ?-$ --
petitioner has not been afforded a trial consistent with due s ~. . w & "
- ~
$y,%. .
w
. .-g 2 process guarantees.
l 2,5*r[$a ,3 The Commission's basic rule on evidence is that !
n .s.g .. u ,
i
'[h.h.Nkf ,
."although technical rules of evidence ordinarily need <
me. , aa ..
V..M24 'not be applied in hearings before the Commission,
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.'l Y substantial rights of the parties shall be preserved. "
'r a: + - $:;.
(20 Cal. Admn. Code,.Sec. 55. ) .(Emphasis added. ) Cross-6'I Y7'
'W $ examination of the adverse partv's evidence is certainly a g ,
5y
>" substantial right", and, indeed, is the essence of a fair ba. 1 hearing.
.F j n n;h,?g "The reasonable opportunity to meet and rebut the hhbk ve;4.ep , .
evidence produced by his opponent is generally 92 .
T,h, 3@.
recognized as one of the essentia1s' of tf2ese minimal
,r 7 ,?y-y; r.m ... requirements ?
@E5,N.".g r...
.I of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Massachusetts Bonding b;g,Eppp . m.
yp .
& Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n. , 74 Cal. App. 2d 911, Wpn ? -
h
~
913 (1946). -,
f4,Q .;^ , ..
, gg,
.jj p m(4 In English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155 (1950),
ifV15 J, . ( .
this court said, in setting aside an administrative decision which
'. ' y. i y. ;
>cs .
.. . e f.p,r, ..
was founded on evidence received after the hearing had closed:
DNN[$
- %;3
- <S "A hearing requires that the party be apprised of the
,.r, 3,.
, , evidence against him so that he may have an opportunity ;
w:cq i.y;@A to refute, test, and explain it, and the requirements of
.?,f .?5 h
. .? ;a hearing necessarily contemplates a decision in the light W%
, , %. m .
Ag%n "mw of the evidence there introduced. " (35 Cal. 2d at 159. )
.,f;tpWK d nap In La Prade v. . Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d
. N.m.ww 7 tfi ' -
gg#p?&tgj 47 (1945), this court held that a party was denied a " hearing"
.w.
g.
m(%+ d when the administrative tribunal based its opinion upon a report 1.n , . ,
-yA +
ig,y%g.f without giving that party the " opportunity to cross-examine the "AfbMM
. o yn 9 af;h J
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i . ,
'I j
c maker thereof and refute it. "
\~ In Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agri. etc. Com. ,1 ~ Cal.
J.WM%
fgu .,;.$ 2d 204 (1941), an order of the Commission was annulled because
.w.
4 -
.'it was based upon a survey of which the parties were not apprised hi until the order was made. At page 210 the court said 4R,i,.p:i
. .m.. . .. ., a.
4 : "As a result they were denied all right of cross-
- t> . %. .
vlx % % -)3 examination with respect thereto and also of an opportunity
'-4 .
.l to make a counter showing in rebuttal. Under such
' ' ^
{
,, circumstances, the statutory requirement of a hearing '
s M '
.. was not met. "
.cuu
,. d N1 j
'd. . ;MEsy'5' A particularly pertinent application of the foregoing
- Mjj.l.fG;gl g ,
principle is found in Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. , .j hfh .quA 47 Cal. App. 2d 713 (1941). There a report forming the basis
, 7 of the award was filed,as Exhibit 48 was here, after the hearing y :
i2 *
...g ,, f,J ' of the case. There, as here, the petitioner requested an oppor-pr Q E i4 y y,[;l '
tunity to cross-examine the authors of the report. The Commission
-1 1
denied the request and in. making its award relied on the report, as v
jp,g.;a-g the Commission did here. (See Decision No. 64537, Pages 19-20) ,
The award was annulled because the petitioner had been denied the PGn;1
@.%% gh-dj,gl opportunity to cross-examine the author of the report.
- u. A.ww 4.m 4Wsg ' An enlightening discussion of these principles is found in www )
1 G7pegar p -
3.yygfgs Application of Plainfield-Union Water Co. , 94 A, 2d 673 (N. J. -
1953). In that case the court reversed the order of a state agency
. r[$f[u.nej e.
approving the water company's request because the agency based
(..M, .E.M g: A.u.gt 10 w-0.IN'fNU M/?;th i.1.W m i _
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... n..:an g ;:-3.:&,- -e. . - e .y .m.r:q qa .v:mn~ ~
g M :;% A.v,.4 W A as % m , w sJ4.ge-u.+wn ca m n w ,-,n.t%g+Ai4+%;;y.w.~n m a gu m x.;-W.W yn.~pw w ~
N Y Y 'Y 5 ? I' b 'b
> . 7 ; c.g
-l l its decision on a' report not tested by cross-examination 8 The
.... court said, e.'.M r
> GW*41 "The requirement of a ' hearing' has reference to the
.r.W d , %
,. %4 (j.'j' M '
l .. . . .-
.E' .
.w. tradition of judicial.pr'oc.eedings!.is.which evidence -
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- e. n d.- tested for testimonial trustworthiness in the mode n
@h@.
T*jf t P. '.*!,,.
- b sanctioned by experience is received 'and weighed by the
. M.t. ,
triers of the facts to the exclusion of extraneous
- circumstances. . . . Cross-examination and rebuttal are basic elements of the hearing essential to due l
l 1 process. . . . Cross-examination is an indispensable l d,%ds 'y e instrument for assessing the evidential worth of assertions
'it6iB MA,U[ . of fact or opinion; and it is basic in due process that the A.4M
^ i,W
<y,,
.w . - . . . .
3 parties affected by testimony adduced with the specific T ;:, &
^
^-
safeguards shall be afforded the opportunity of refuting
, 'f or qualifying the force of testimonial assertions. It
.N,-.? "
]. strikes at the very foundation of justice to obtain what j purports to be factual information bearing upon the
- 4pg, substance of the issues by consulting informed persons wwee not brought into the inquiry," (94 A. 2d at p. 677) j
[W-(g2M,j'I
'J2:$p There can be no doubt but that the denial of the opportunity
- .nd..n k ,
,M to cross-examine the authors of Exhibit 48 was prejudicial not M
D,c.; E *%;.ggonly to petitioner, but to the public interest as well.
' 2:
i ~
~
c8 As noted above,. Exhibit 48 was the basis of the Commission's j h) S "
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%g
'M< 4 u;gn.
- W.k r M
,y findings on safety. In Decision No. 64537 it is said:
i w 11
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l Applicant's civil engineering witness testified that in the design of the plant special consideration was given to the affects of possible earthquakes . . . . ., The
. j.. witness testified that applicant engaged the services
%,1.j.: of eminent' consultants. . . . The'1atter,* utilizing Neb,! information made available by the other consultants Qy -
along with test boring data, advised that a plant could
$(gp@(g. . . .,pfs be safely designed and bui.It at the proposed. site, (at page 7)
,y a g;;h:: ~
f., ; 4; And again at page 19:
. . . . . Applicant's civil engineering witnesa testified that the consulting geologist engaged by applicant to 4
i specifically study the area in question reported that he could find no signs of active . faulting on Bodega
} Head and that he could find no evidence of any movement j of the Pleistocene formation overlaying the granite areas a
.... This testimony was supplemented and sub-j , %. stantiated by applicant's late-fil'ed Exhibit 48.
. . gir '
' [yy naC Exhibit 48 is itself replete with ambiguities and inconsis-c.: m.n,w; ,
'-MAG tencies which could be used upon cross-examination to demonstrate
.1 m
that P. G. & E. 's experts have not said what the company claims.
One of the main areas of inconsistencies is that relating to the distance of the proposed facility from the San Andreas fault, widely acknowledged as the earth's greatest continental fault. The
. , g, m ~ Atomic Energy Commission's ruling on prcocimity to earthquake JW.. /yQ faults was before the PUC in the form of Exhibit 23 which provided
.a e,
...m. g
~
p u.0 W p /i that no reactor should be located closer than 1/4 mile from the '
? o ..
.Je %r.l surface location of a known active earthquake fault.
,..-. .mm m
W
. wn 1. w S-id . Despite the many expert witness reports contained in Ik Exhibit 48, a consistent answer to the question of the distance
.TE%~r:
Nr .9.-rwE!.~d between the reactor and the nearby fault was never forthcoming
' ~cp. ,
n.,.
e erg -
from the applicant.
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l Witness Worthington concluded at the hearing that the site would be "approximately a mile" from the fault (Tr.169).
- .:. a, (ggg;g Witness Nutting said that it "is at least a quarter-mile away from
. m psi.
ggj .. . . .' $ 'a known active earthquake fault'". Within Exhibit 48 nuw@sm itself, structural design consultant Housner reports at Tab 12, 505llfi y,g :. "The proposed site is only about a mile or so from the fault. "
j Consulting engineering geologist Clark McHuron stated at Tab 3 of Exhibit 48 that the site was." recognized to be within and very 1
4 close to the San Andreas Fault Zone. "
The Commission concluded that"The San Andreas Fault
.: y%.bN Zone is more than 1/4 mile east of the [roposed reactor site. . . '. "
..now Wofr2
. v m .a u (Decision No. 64537, at p.19. )
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- Yet on March 4,1963, the Company, in an answer to a
,, w
,j query from the AEC's Division of Licensing and Regulation said:
, ,,m. . n. s -
2.9W The geologic map in Appendix IV which was prepared N" "~
- ' by Mr. William Quaide indicates the western margin of the San Andreas fault zone. The distance from this western margin to the reactor is approximately 1,000 yf feet. The fault zone at this point is estimated to be ifdg b
about a mile-and-a-half wide. Since there are no active branch faults on Bodega. Head the western edge of the
%;p $MM San Andreas Fault is therefore the closest known '
1M? active fault lirie to the plant site. (Amendment 1 to AEC
"$dk,'?J Docket 50-205; emphasis added.)
s,%.:3] u t . . . .
mg ZTfi ,, N.[.' Moreover, on May 16, 1963, the Company in its " Reply 4ge. y:e g y to Petition to Reopen for Further Hearing" admitted that "P. G.
.~
rg8%(g g
.,y , and E. has proposed a reactor location which is not one-fourth .
n w., ,1 flj[fh mile from the westerly trace of the San Andreas Fault zone . . . . "
- % .*;? r1; r r ' 13
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. - - - - - n- - . - -
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'I
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(See also Saint-Amand, Geologic and Seismologic Study of Bodega Head (1963). )
- l
' 5.jg ,
y:f:JP"i With such important concessions being made by P.G. & E.
.pce m :-:$M,a ' '
{f. . it seems clear that the Commission erred in not reopening the
. ..my ,
.$.% .J;.d -
hearings to at least explore the consequences of a reactor located w.4. %m
- 9 h.,7E ,
less than one-fourth mile from an earthquake fault.
.a
- q..
A second area of ambiguity and contradiction lies.in the '
testimony before the Commission regarding the nature of the
^
plant's foundation. .
- ,y Witness Worthington testified
. m.m 44.@d.4N .u The foundation will be located in solid.granodiorite (Tr.
p.. W. 4 ~ q; p. 42),
3 w .
..,-- s 3,p and:
3.$$.w'?
f . '. .
0 - The foundations of the. Bodega site are particularly suitable, since it will be possible to place the plant
, and its reactor on a solid granitic formation. This is important,since the ability to locate the plant on e i/% c rock will gre'atly reduce the effect of shaking, which 1
, '4 {< ~ ...
may occur as a result of an earthquake. (Tr. p. 528).
>1 Siniilar statements were made by witnesses Worthington enJ Y;, and Nutting at Tr. pages 169, 376, 996, and 1233.
- e.,
. .4 Q .
Lt The Commission in Decision No. 64537 concluded that
.paa "
.R' aY D e;w fe%4 the reactor site enjoyed "a solid granitic type of rock providing
%\1 1
- .m $uC+yy =+1 an excellent foundation. "
9:w.m .
M@@6-
,a, .
Exhibit 48's version of the same story is considerably
>:k g d U _.
different. At one point therein, experts Tocher and Quaide I
N 4t .$
.apa,p v.1 w report:
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5 &.hM$~&%M Ys &,...--~~~.-. #&EAM$i$ ,M1l.M.%iin L 3dWM, tM. sQ~#W.WC3_5W#gQ4M-)&iIiUQ@W- Mis- -@. ~.;;+.: -~pv+4@?$h- n.-e. ,m.ky&@
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- The quartz-diorite at Bodega Head is extensively fractured, sheared, and jointed. . as are. all the .
4 other granitic rocks lying west of the San Andreas
- gj9c. fault system. . The rock is not penetratively sheared m!M. but is cut by. innumerable discrete shear surfaces
' M2%yb .with breccia (broken rock) and mylonite (milled rock)
%!/;M .
'1 sones ranging from a feather: edge to a foot.*Mek . . . . .
Wy@%#
Many cases were observed, however, where large Qi N a%??MM dikes were cut off by faults and not observed again on the other side of the fault, indicating movements '
Qlyshf. of tens of feet or more' . The intensity of the faulting M and jointing in the rock is so great that the formerly in massive rock is now broken into a mosaic of blocks
.ync with average dimensions of approximately one foot.
(Emphasis .added. ) (Ex. 48, Tab 8, p. 5. )
An even more conflicting version of the story is told in a letter from witness.Worthington to expert Housner on 4pA.-
OP February 27,.1962 and contained in Exhibit 48 at. Tab 15:
.y 3 .
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. The quality of theaock is inferior to our original :
^ : assumption of ' solid rock'.' . Actually, the granite
'M rock.is highly weathered at the earth-rock contact
,y. .. g and is highly jointed at lower elevations.
gy n' $. ,
Applicant's own soils experts, the firm of Dames and 1
g.1. .,. s. ,..h. Moore controvert the representation that the reactor is to i V* be placed on even the poor quality rock found in Bodega Head.
2 g ., Plans for the turbine generator show its slab is founded 5 feet
.y, m. ,rc igh 3) below yard level, 20 feet above sea level. According to boring 1; ,
w a .. .
gg.;
- c. . v ,.~
14 by Dames.and Moore.(Ex. 48, Tab 17) at the juncture of the ,
'M4$ ;, reactor and the turbine-generator buildings, the slab is underlain r.?*:Lf.FtM@ +. i M..f.&yf( y% by approximate 1y'65 feet of sands and clays.
.{
kI[
b= N 1
Dr. Saint-Amand's recent study concludes- I S..;u.f@. , . "The extensive faulting on the Head has rendered the rock pp q%
nW a.h4 a poor foundational material.' The combination of an AWp,rf;*
, g,Qj.. 15
%lW wyism
&l%fQOW:uaR.w.m +ankomewimw a.m ~. r . v.. - -
man ~ ~ " * * ~ - -c , . .w -
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unstable alluvium and crushed rock is especially unsuited to heavy. construction. "- (St. -Amand, p. 20)
. :mn A p,.
jfjpgMTC . A third and most vital area of serious question lies in w
. u.a un J i,,,,; h assessment of plant safety by the. applicant's experts.
[ 4'n,pfi
< x al -'
s.,y NlR, kk '
Athorough searchofExhibit481snecessary to find the dis-Jp,,$j
,n il;tp G crepancies here. .It should be noted that Exhibit 48 is a large
? group of interdependent reports and letters by different exper.ts.
T s.
- In a. letter dated "3 January 1961" to Worthington expert Housner states, 1
Y-. ^
"In my opinion a power plant of the nature.and location
.l' shown as. Scheme 7 can be safely built to withstand '
$e. pb,p;: *
. earthquake in thin area if the design and construction
- ? 5 >
'are done in accordance with proper seismic specifications. "
j
$.,q$NJ . , ,
, ',;;w(Tab
- 13) . ;.
- e.
S'Dh,gf # " But in Tab 12 a strangely dated report also by Housner n.-
,r raises some questions about the tone of certainty in the other report. - Here, in a report dated only " January 1961" - without
- n. <
., , any day of the month being stated - Housner says:
"Since it is quit $ impossible to desigb a power plant to survive without damage the large permanent ground rjg Q,.. ,;h surface displacements that might occur if the earth-
- quake fault slippage occurred on the site, this qrgg n y , , possibility must be given special consideration. " . -
j'
- p
?(&p: inh As is pointed out by Commissioner Bennett in his dissent Il Mg&t -
. y:?;;.O.d#i in Decision No. 65701, one can only speculate what examination
.+ t.ma m i g p Jyg& . . ,
,4k j g4 .might have done with these two reports. If the report in Tab 12 yp.g . -.j j
..ec. 2,. - -
.. 3 I - - was written in one of the 27 final days of January, Housner's t%u,4d,.)
f ,
~ .m..- --
j
- ~
jf($
,.9
% c.
confidence must be disregarded.
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A further perusal of the reports of Dames and Moore suggests additional questions. On January 25, 1960 and December 2,1960
,;Q)"4""
. Dames and Moore reported the site was safe and ."The probability
.~.. r, r-;. w.m .
TN3M ~ - ' of significant structural damage from the San Andreas Fault System ~~
a%lw s W. 4 y}: tg..$i is remote during the life of the proposed construction". (Tabs 5 and
- M Q"ye ,
M*:!f 10) y But at Tab 17, the same firm makes a different report as of April 30,1962:
9 We do not know of any sound method of interpretation for this case, therefore, we conclude that at this site the results of the seismic studies should be disregarded.
.s .
$3 % . Again, as Commissioner. Bennett notes, the revised opinion '
- . W
- %. ,
r%g y Lof Dames and Moore comes over a year afte'r the January 3 report .
Y
~
of Housner in which he said that a plant could be built safely "in accordance with proper seismic specifications". Here Dames and Moore say the r'esults of seismic studies should be disregarded.
i -
Such conflict should not be left unresolved by the Commission.
Another letter of Dr. Housner's indicates that by one of v.: :.. .
,.jp,7jy;,;
.T j,.4 f.h his own standards, the site should be abandoned. In a letter of -
[h:.5yN"M k . June 30,1960, to-Worthington, he states: . - Ui MNh "As regards gross ground movement prod'uced by faulting, '
)
'"N$d I would say that if there appeared even a small likelihood !
I WA# of this happening, then the site should not be used. The
,.j2Q[iyf?j'
,Q ' . investigation of Dr. Tocher and Dr. Quaid(sic) should be aimed at assessing the likelihood of faulting occurring on, 1
ynd;El pdj f .. or near the site. " (Ex, 48, Tab 7, emphasis added. ) . I
, . %g 1.2 l ygg.g -
. ' Two and 'one-half months later, Tocher and Qualde, in reply -
.M:..p,p .
- $p;f
- l ff to the question from Dr. Housner, reported as follows (Ex. 48, l
,/.r, , : . n.r Q , ., . 47 MK b.
w@ML .. - .
l it i M Ec h h b. n + w x m l M u r b r S W h AW&sNh"" **"^" " '" ---
.~
'^ ~~ *
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c yh.,,pMUM8MMW&MMtM@h m .
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a' j
.ic
. Tab 8, p. 9):
s,
...' "Within the probable lifetime of a large power plant (on g@d.'._g the order of a ' century) there is a strong likelihood that J.ggh! Lactive movement will occur in the San Andreas fault zone h30 ' 4 n f,s ,i:near the site on Bodega Head i . . . " .(Emphasis added) .. =
\. . - ':.2 -' ~
. -f,.,. , ,..~ e,v . It is true that approximately ten months elapsed between fthe filing of Nxhibit 48 and petitioners' request for cross-
,,,.m .
7.0 c .s examination. No issue has been raised in this connection and
" ' - , .. w i, f,' none could be since the waiver of the right to cross-examination
"#cannothe establish,dwithout a clear showing of an intent to relinquish such right, and doubtful cases will be decided against
. : v:a ' .
1.j:'.,Gjyj r.. , >.+ n.
a waiver' . . . . " Caesar's Restaurant v. Ind. Acc. Com. ,
- s , .
1 . . 175 Cal.'. . App. 2d 850, 856 (1959). No'such showing can be 14 c:.4.c. ;
+& ,
4 .
. 1.F.y .c ~.: -
3AQgg made here. . At all times that petitioner has been aware of
,3 .~,t
- ]![ the critical need for cross-examination it has insisted upon its
, right.' .Moreover, the Commission in its rejection of petitioner's
- . tag,m attempt to reopen this proceeding made no attempt to base its decision on any delay by petitioner in asserting its rights.
JySQ . Although the cases above discussed indicate that the y, , ,
4 mg .
,m i
hp QM 1 (. Proper relief in this situation would be to annul the Commission's '
! N 24 o
yng $ T.< ' rder in No. 64537, petitioner is simply requesting that the j
..g.m.ln it w " y;f ll n%r.( A,.: . proceedings be reopened to allow the necessary cross-examination'
.w i q.gp
.l o
.g ,m and refutation of Pacific Gas & Electric Company's experts and I N, , ? '
s . Exhibit 48.- -
Wi '1 . , ' ,
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i.W- Q:Sk4(2%,,M&.a u,s..,.,1.n.m.n.4,w*Q:. %:Aii'%i.Q*Q: .. $4 n5. u.
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.+ ,,
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~
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY IN DENYING
' REOPENING IS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW.
~.'O.
t"M$g In Decision No. 65701 the majority opinion clearly
,hh 4h
'g. 3.M inificates that three inembers of the' Commission 'have con-
. , . c,... -;y% -
<w>?$j2, j@i .. .
cluded that Federal law has so preempted the field of nuclear
. %{h" , reactor safety that the Commission cannot consider proximity
, of the Bodega reactor to the San Andreas Fault Zone in passing
.i on Pacific Gas 8e Electric Company's application for a certificate
... sy of public convenience and necessity. At page 2 of the majority opinion it is stated thatt
- ..J .;:,e J. .
qk W d'pi
" Congress has enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USCA 2011 et sej. ) which provides a complete scheme Q,6 y. of regulation of nuclear materials and of their utilization
>cf9.1t ,wy for research and development and industrial uses. "
"O The majority opinion then quotes several passages from the legislative history of the 1959 amendments to the Act of 1954
," <7 , which " summarize the intent of Congress to preempt the legis-
. c-lative field. " The majority opinion concludes ('at page 3) "It
.Ji would seem that petitioner's expert testimony might better be
%w.,m.k,; w,. , ;
4w.My
.u ,
considered by the AEC than this Commission. "
9 mig
%MF(w,. Commissioner Mitchell!s. concurring opinion in No. 65701 f-,.M., - ,tM,
,,Mdfjj
- Ci'.{.4,5 was filed precisely because the majority opinion espouses this it* I $S. n .
93 ?
'E, ',M,y';7.@ -federal preemption position. The concurring opinion "does not
- .,t .
ys,- $}
Q-p)M iresult from any belief on my part, " wrote Commissioner Mitchell,
~ - ~
ffh
- ""that this Commission does not have a responsibility to pass upon l
'.$mW;
- a . So ts d.v". 19
\
,fd ? @
-. '$. _..,W<.
p
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i
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'W%F,,t.n ' ' 1 thkW*%&uh61'."" w'&%AA & dicitiw G A.M M 5 %" M s , . . . . . .. -,
e'"" ^ ^**" ** .
' ^ * ' * ' - ~~~ , f
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4 b.k. ~ byyaMunw~~~m ~~.r.w
.wm W.+&k - E+ -~
a.
M gpM,As.- 6%LWs y M.a r. 5&%A Mh'.?Qpkh5%%&i%5k&~M$1lWE4?k. ~.- -KW)$M
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c . - .. x
- ,~... . ,
f .
.' public utility matters affecting the safety,- health, and general
- v. . . .. .
f.pi g y well-being of the citizens of California. " .
-Q'hiik'W
- h The concurring' opinion then states:
./. -.
3,1 8 .r . g _ , .
1 . . .
! , "It in tine that the Atomic Energy Cammission has been
? gIJ vested by Congress with the power to license.and regulate 9.m nuclear reactors. It is not true, however, that the Kt '
California Public Utilities Commission is automatically
+ ?4)y%,@(
h."%;
j divested therebyofits duty and obligation to protect the welfare of the inhabitants of this state. . Action by the Q di . Federal Government herein is not exclusive. The Atomic fg*' Energy Commission does not occupy the entire field of *-
. power regulation to the preclusion of the state. .It is
' 9'l. -' patently obvious that California interest in this plant is
. j.c . equal to if, indeed,it does not outweigh, any national
,, sh' y .
interest. To espouse the majority opinion would logically
. Myp .
- make impotent any future orders by this Commission in
.$Kh .
the field of power regulation. "
/ . *
%iENg(1 "
The' dissenting opinion in No. 6570l by Commissioner Bennett,
,,~ .k
- m. a. ? .x a :a , +z .. ... + . - ..
l also disagrees with the majority opinion on the issue of federal
,-Q;;...6g '. ..~.
.e;y: c, preemption. In fact, Commissioner Bennett believed that because
..N ["..w.. ..
of the proximity of the reactor to the San Andreas Fault, the
+ pm,. W.g .
%.c
- v. > g;p ,fp6 appl,1 cant Pacific Gas and Electric Company had a "high burden of satisfying this Commission as to the absolute.. safety of its
?.s;.e.,: u..w 4Q Q proposal",. which burden it failed to meet.
Qgy ggs
. - 2 Q 3
_f ,, , J"Whether 'or not Congress intended to preempt the field' +-
- ifh.
- .pM JJ o f radiation; health and safety regulations of Atomic Energy Commission licensees from state control, and
'ggi 'h'@% 4 the extent to which it may do so, are questions for which no very clear answers exist at this present time",
a .
9.w .
s concluded the auth' ors of a comprehensive study in 1959. Stason, m
F'.e. . .
y Estep and Pierce, Atoms and the Law, p. 881 (1959).
ti yl ;..+ '
3
, p .It is true that in 42 U.S.C. A. section 2021, enacted in am swv 20 2 tu;; an
+ h. . 5;g.. . .
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ej y f r ~
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E , ,M.M-mJ.~tw.m.u.,+d@'
iMEJWrhiy Sedgy v.a-he pF494d w g Vpe c~ty. @-<
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.1-
.1959, Congress indicated an intent to place certain supervisory g)..' L ,,, \ powers over nuclear reactors solely within the jurisdiction of
. ac;.M.
ggj _ the AEC. The statute is clear,'h'owever, that this regulatory y
M
, . pow.ee reserved toi the- AEC is only with reference to the " control -
.,, g .
3jk of radiation hazards by r'egulating byproduct, source, or .
N;%;.)h) special nuclear materiahs, ";U.S. Cong. & Ad. News, page 2879
- , f, y '
j m %. ,
(1959). Thns it is clear that the state could not impose additional 1 s '.j-q ;
- 1. '
requirements on persons already licensed by t$e AEC to dispose !
1
[ ,4 of nuclear waste (Boswell v. City of Long Beach, L. A. Super. Ct. ,
1
- p j;c Ci C.H. Atomic Energy Law Rptr. Para. 4045. ) nor could g 6 9eeg .
hhk MidE,4W e
the state authorize nuclear exposure levels hig5er than those sffg
.: - set by the AEC (Atoms & The Law,p.1063).
i M gt pp However, the instant case is concerned only with the 1 3.ej.~. 1
^
,w. reactor site. The question is, does the California Public Utilities
. ~ , ,
.g y Commission have the power to exclude a reactor from a site e.9 g a ..
' 9' " , lying in close proximity to an active earthquake fault zone ?
...~r.,
" Categorically" the Commission has this responsibility.
ddM$ (Concurring Opinion, No. 65701, page 1. )
$[bW
~-
. ;w% rv ? In 42 U. S, C. A. section 2021 subd. (k) it is provided that ,
W -
% Jg'.7d'9fl "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of
. .s m%-mm ',
k.yg any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes . !
L.f2WD D9EP other than protection'against radiation hazards. " The. Senate _:
.,@D$%]
.; - i Report on:this provision explains that "This subsection is i j
d, P.N% R intended to maxe it clear that the bill does not impair the State i .I?;Qk. m D;.
m ;g t;- , 21 rl#,iv'. .
%'-dpf
.M.W i bM- ;
$iNi&Bjksx2mit-Tmh = % 2&#f A&MMWWWtM&.d kMM* ******' "' # .. , - . -=
- q. 4.. ,s ,, g_.
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.y..x.-._...
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1 i
authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the manifold 4
health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation
- h , @ .
g.fp' g;..p.3}j; protection. " U. S. Cong. & Ad. . News, .page 2882 (1959). .(Emphasis j
,Md'h
' H"" '
radded.)
~
%C % L lL/ Wh Exclusion of a reactor from a site in close proximity to 49
' M.88f e h?
..w an active earthquake fault zone, on the ground, inter alia, that
- .A
...6 , ,. its location there is inconsistent with public convenience and
. ' ' i. necessity is for a health and safety purpose other than radiation protection.
. ; . nap The legal commentators are in general agreement that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a's amended, does not preempt from A'fcM w% <. the state's decision the question of site location. -
O In Adams, Health & Safety i' n Atomic Activities, 27 Geo.
au ,+
, Wash. L. Rev. 163 (1958) it is said that as to reactor location, 42;w "There must be a delicate balancing of federal and state responsi-y ' ' "
bility - for neither can occupy this field alone. " (p.188. } The 4
author then states,
...c.,.
d.?dd{,$
.y ?'The location of a reactor evokes a more substantial
"*'/l ' interest on the part of local agencies, and.it is also !
3 W, rbetter fitted for diversified control - thus, the voice 7' y(
.@h+;;f f.jf() of the state deserves a hearing and its courts should be able to exercise some control over reactor sites
,, ;fs. '
' through the law of nuisance. ".(At page 203. )
- ,b;W.M, . ,
t.'jsM LProfessor Cavers of Harvard, currently a consultant to MM
. q. the AEC, has written .
1
- pu;,g4g ,-
.ma .x.., m G?Rg "If, however, federal control over reactor safety remained 9 10.1 -exclusive as it now appears, would that deprive the states
&*[4, Y .of all authority with respect to reactor location ? Suppose 4-o d'.. -
s.s s 22
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the state - or a city - were to take the. position that regardless of findings of safety by federal experts, it u.c . $.-
wanted no reactors within its bounds, at least until the M art had more fully matured. Should it be free to exercise Qg]7dd{ $l this power to regulate the use of its own land?
4.wf,, .
- s. .,
- g. j:, ,. ;+.
m, "My own view is that, as a matter of policy, this question
%t m should be answered 'yes' - and I do not believe the act, i.1: p' .as it stands, precludes a state or a subdivision of a state f*!.]Qlgh. ~from taking such a position". Cavers, Federal and State brJ Regulation, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 22, 36 (1958). Accord,
,a.; v{ I.. $. Stason et al. , Atoms and the Law, page 1057.
Both Cavers and the Stason study agree that this ' decision cannot be based on radiation hazard factors alone.
.~.e The local interest of California in deciding' whether a
, . . . ~ ,
gNC reactor should be placed near the . San Andreas fault cannot be me .. , L. , . -
- 1'? .
Q 4_ , _. j ' : doubted. m. -..A.',, -
g @J .
A: ~ .: . ./ '. " 9 .~ >
' W.1"It'could scardriy?. N asserted that the national intei est
/, .,g:g.:;5,p in promoting the development and utilization of atomic
+'33 .
- energy by private persons is so great as to preclude state
,' V. % regulation of the very substantial hazards to life and
, . . property involved. " Stason, et al. , Atoms and the Law, page 1002.
$$?& r .
~. , n?',.~/
In fact, the Health Departments of Michigan and Massachusetts (
l
, have officially taken the position that agreements with the AEC under
+7 government cannot constitutionally remove the health and safety ,
M,h}!
wbE; powers residing in the states as part of the police power. Estep
\
M' me%.; and. Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards, 60 Mich. L. Rev.
.. y-fjf n
, 41,43 (1961); (Concurring opinion in No. 65701, p.1).
1 k
N@yg.:k . . +f. ,y, 7
In a'ddition to the Commission's constitutional responsibility
~.w .f 4.
Mif.UU ,
. to rule on the public health and safety considerations stemming from
- m ;:g::
mo. s
's.sQ 3j. . the location of this facility, the Commission has a firmly established fet * '. --
, h, , w,, -
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1
, ' duty to insure that utility facilities will remain in service.
. N. g;.fi. -
Clearly, the potential for this facility to be rendered inoperative M....,w::. N.G r
nynt.c.<w by a major earthquakiis present. To accept the majority opinion s 9, '
w *
'@%, M %ah6 .
i would erase even this traditional power from the Commission's a P: V.
- w. 4 !
17.pn 5C .1,w .
broad constitutional objectives in determining what constitutes
'.... ', , y w: . ;3.rn.
y
- n,.-
public convenience and necessity. .
. tc Nuclear power reactors are fast becoming more than merely O
experimental. To have effective regulation of this blossoming industry the majority opinion cannot be all. owed to stand. As Commissioner Mitchell ' stated, ;<
.* ~*
4 l,y*>p;g % .
"To espouse the majority opinion would logically make l@,Dil/,$*s ' impotent any futuie order by this Commission in the -
T.* '
field of power regulation.," (Concurring Opinion, No.
7 a "r -.., '? 65701, p.1) ,
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THE DECISION IN NO. 65701. REVEALS FOR THE
, 'e f( FIRST TIME THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED TO -
i.5/ :dgy MAKE FINDINGS ON ALL OF THE MATERIAL ISSUES
,g. jgg .7 jj IN ITS INTERIM OPINION (No. 64537).
~
.L.g. . j @The power and duty of.the'ComEnission to consider safety g ar
.c - - . .
~
?.U., c lyg SN,- 4 iMaw factors when passing on an application for. a certificate of public *
-l
.q i
I,$Nhh convenience and necessityl is broa'd.
- z %: '[
~~w ,
- :s y', , Section 451 of the Public Utilities Code provides, in part, -
'O
'"Every public utility shan furnish and maintain.%r. instrumenttW ll equipment and facilities as are necessary to promote the '
safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and the public. " i 1
3 .,s
~j$ b See also Public Utilities Code section 315, 761, 768. Couns el I 1g. . .. .. .' '
i@:w'Md?.
wa d . for the Commission has stated that .l I Tk $9 $ 1"Br d1[s l -
1b , the Commission's many and ' varied Y.l2.f,.;C powers and duties relate to the fixing of rates and
,r; .% supervision of service, including matters involving
~
public safety . . . . " Cassidy, 57. West Annot. Calif.
. Codes, page 3.
l.C ~. 1 E. .
At the hearing on application for a certificate of public I
convenience and necessity "The issue of safety loomed.large . . . . "
(Dissenting Opinion, No. 65701, p. 6). In the Interim Order t.~$hi:A:., ~
A# .
(No. 64537) the Commission stated that safety was not "irrele-
$l
,-wp&s.7 ., e 6+. ~p- .. s .< - ..
i "M W - vant to the determination of public convenience and necessity" /
.: .t..?.%o o t .*.
g(t,ggi and that "a,11 of the evidence has been considered. " (Decision
? wm;;g:. ,3 ;~. tNo. _64537, p.' 23; emphasis added. ) Under the heading " Safety"
- g%g.g 1,.. . - , m.co _ . ,.
. 4
- gg;yg .,.Jgin. .
- the Commission said, at page 19,
' ^
.~
' .- \,
'. " Concrne.. .n expressed
. .n.>. by a number of ~ witnesses as to the fA y,w,r,Gflri' , was ,\
'I
.5,
- serious consequences which could ensue to Bodega Bay, '
llEn@cM
, ::,: 2. .: .
to Sonoma County, or to an even larger area, if high-level
" #5-4 *.. .*
.m , 25
' l-
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D Md.M Md'dNMbbMEM* 5 DdNNNSN 1- _ _ _ _ _
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A $ : $.,..h,hk: ht Y $ k,$ k kh w YY Y kkh5b Yk5k$?hkYb Y
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+ ,. ,
radioactive materials were relased.as a result of.
. damage to the plant from earthquake. "
Q y.: .Thus, from the InterimLOpinion (No. 64537) petitioner was Mj;)2 Y: cm y-eme, .
- led to believe that the issue of safety and the relationship of the
{ig* gig . ,,. . q @ r
,L,- , ,* ,,is .. e
-,wgp a reactor to the San Andreas Fault had been fully considered by the.
p qy*;
b.)GkI . Commis '
sion. It now appears that petitioner was misled by the
- pyp[f 1 Interim. Opinion.
.c f, .Section.1705 of the Public Utilities Code requires the Commission to' .
1 4
" separately state findings and conclusions upon' material issues of fact and law that determine the ultimate issue of pyblic convenience.and necessity. " California Motor 7 e.3% _
. Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 59. A. C. 283, dM.
d::;i;hif 3 288 (1963); Associated Freight Lines v. Public Utilities
!!c Com. ,159. A. C. 604 (1963).
2N%I%.' m. 2m g. c ^'& Ls.. .^ c
~ %3y !
From the majority opinion in No. 65701 petitioner has learned for the first time that the Commission did not consider safety in pas sing on the application, since that issue was erroneously believed to be preempted by federal law.
1 The Commission's failure to state thin material finding 97 . . . . _ of law in its opinion represents a complete abandonment of the .i bf;?$
w :< W -
mandate d section 1705 of the Public Utilities Code as interpreted st wdiJ -
C
- T,ey by th's i court in the California Motor _ Transport and Associat'ed4
....?~, a.
D ,;, '
Freigh* cases,' and deprived petitioner of a hearing upon a funda-a.%. l
- ?.. ?.%.. .
. ;.-:l 1< "."; mental issue in the case.. .
'. -L xx l
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vA CONCLUSION
- 7.' ?.
- .
The need for a full hearing before the Commission
.., '4r e.,
j g(iPg+w addressed to safety is great. The people of this state have
- y y - . . . . . .
4 L;;:
g ; .7. an interest in this matter which cannot be overstated. In I
- t.; . . . -
- cgW May,- 1956, at hearings on indemnity insurance for commercial C@695@ Md -
, reactors the AEC studies indicated that in the event of a g ,
u runaway reactor and the consequent relea'se of 100% of fission !
Y products the resultant property damage alone could run as high 1
as $900,000,000. Thomas, Insurance Against Nuclear Incidents,
.e:
46 Calif. L. Rev. 14 (1958). i
%E[h*h,'s .. The]ompany will undoubtedly take the position that x: 7.s , .
. :. " r ~ -
M mhym W4E "
^ petitioner has accumulated its evidence too late and that the ~ '
N-(- jg., e
,t a; Company can . rely on a purported finality of the Commission's decisions. Such arguments cannot be heard from a public utility.
- e. It is to be remembered that the certificate under which Pacific Gas and Electric will build and operate its plant is premised on the "public convenience and necessity", not the utility convenience R. .
- $ and necessity. Moreover, the certificate granted the Company
., ;7'7/y4 "M 7 ,. " " .
g f.s . %. c . ,
in Decision No. 64537 is only a conditional one in which the g JL
, , %@ Commission reserved the power to grant the final certificate wy 7,r.l :, ;M,
- 1. m :: only .
ih "the project is not adverse to the public interest. " ,
.. .s
$7wp
. , . s. u, , . , ,.
@p .,
J(Decision No. 64537, p. 25. ) ._
ec's c y . -.< f ' ', * * ,w,./cv
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, %a@d,.e*'
- .Ly,y -
. ..; - 9,y'..,r.
cit .s l's. respectfully submitted that the writ should issue and
~:r "aM@i '
' cygp .e. r
- cthat the Commission should be ordered to hold a full hearing on g
. *J. '
- p. [ -
,4, '27 4
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y the issue of reactor safety in the chosen site, i
, c M, 4* q .N . Dated: September 17, 1963.
, ;,>.s.w.w~ip
. wpe I,.
^
. . , < p .y e.-.. .,'[ i.,~;~./ [..~f.. 1 . ; s. .. -GARRY, DREYFUS & McTERNAN . , .
. !lkgy,**: %' .
...~: ~ . .-.~*> 'S
. 1
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03%3g -
By .
t g/p.yy!.; . Ben,jamin Dreyfus ?
u,,, .- enA:A f,*1M*n
%s .. D.onald L. A. Kerson
. , 7.:;,7 -
Attorneys for Petitioner
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,. - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL j
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.. I, DOROTHY GUADALUPE, declare under penalty of MP mLA -
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. y gj., : - m... ~ . - y u..rny m.
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ny.g._dg. . 7 %I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of yS..a.. .
%qhj. . eighteen years, and not a party to or interested in the within g+:1.a.vr<
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@mji . entitled action; my business address is 341 Market Street, 3 qu;pl '
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San Franci'sco, California; I served the within PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW by placing a copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
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. California-Public Utilities Commiesion
, Jj 38 h -(;g. State Building .
, f 8,A .,: 9 w 3m i San Francisco, California 94102.
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,76%,%p, Gas and Electric Company '
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245 Me.rket.Strcet a %. ;. ,.
. San Francisco, California 94105 S
which envelopes were then sealed and postage fully prepaid
, g, thereon, and thereafter were on September 17, 1963, deposited y.
. in the United States mail at San Francisco, California,
- p. Executed on September 17, 1963, at San Francisco,
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. -M'F - California. -
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NORTHERN, CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION TO PRESERVE BODEGA HEAD AND HARBOR 2820 Telegraph Ave.
N'f l Berkeley 5, California
- 1. Tel: (San Francisco) EX 2-1320 FOR RELEASE l.d (Mr. Kerson) (P.M., Tues., Sept. 17, '63)
? SUPREME COURT APPEAL MM ON BODEGA A-PLANT FILED
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$$ wm San Francisco (Sept.13)--An appeal filed today with the t'alifornia Supreme 4
. ::: h Court charged that the state Public Utilities Commission unconstitutionally .?
-( g delegated its duties to the US Atomic Energy Commission in ruling on the con-jy m,.d troversial PG&E atomic power plant at scenic Bodega Head in Sonoma County.
-l The " petition for writ of review" shows that expert legal' opinion is q
] unclear on the division between State and Federal powers to control radiation -
hazards. But.the question here is not radiation hazards;?it is "does the i
, California Public Utilities Commission have the power to exclude a reactor from a site lying in close proximity to an active earthquake fault?"
.) Categorically, it does, the pe tition asser t;s.
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. s., The petition, filed by the conservation group which has organized opposition
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'to the propcsed 325 pagawatt nuclear planti asks the court to order the CPUC "to hold' a full' he aring on the issue' of reactor safety in the chosen site."
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The petition analyssa a late filed Exhibit 48, submitted by PGLE after the
] close of earlier CPUC. hearings on a certificate of public convenience and EN necessity--and finds that "it is surprising" that the company has continued
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g excavation at the site despite the advice of its own e::perts.
(A petition to the CPUC was denied on July 9th, over the objections of I
the commission's president, William Bennett. Bennett found that PGLE has -
,.;R.. not met "the high burden of satisfying this Commission as to the, absolute ."
yQ safety of its proposal" and that PGLE .si -" unwillingness. . .to expos'e its experts
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to cross-examination.. .suggest to' me that there has not been a full hearing IM
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here...") "
(1 A1 David Pesonen, spokesman for the Northern Calif ornia Association to a Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, which filed the pet'ition, said that "thiere J
%v u,. ' is more at issue here than conservation. The basic power of a state.to rule ns
",. ,I on the welfare of'its own citizens in utility regulation is also at stake-- 9
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besides a very lod.ti7 te question of due process."
{.'j . He added that he did not know what effect the Supreme Court action would
'l have on the scheduling of AEC hearings, which have not yet been announced. l]
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SUMMARY
ANALYSIS
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.- BODEGA HEAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
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(.) Inourreviewoftheapplicatfo from Pacific Gas andi Electric Company,
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, l. we have taken into account the reports of the Commission's. Advisory a Conunittee on Reactor Safeguards, and information supplied by.our consultants
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in geology, seismology and structural engineering. .We also have had numerous 1
discussions with representatives of the Company and with PG&E's consultants.
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We believe that in all respects except one the proposed design of the f.) -l ..,.
Bodega Nuclear Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can
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be built and operat'dd without undue risk to che health and safety of the
.d public. The one exception is the uncertainty associated with the proposed I
design concept to safeguard the reactor against the effects of a major earth-
'l 1 quake involving substantisi shear movement of the foundation rock. 1
.I i The proposed reactor site is approximately 1000 feet west of the li
['.d .] -western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. The location has necessitated
~ % .3 M prolonged and. intensive study of factors affecting the safety of the in- i N
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1, sta11ation in the event of the occurrence of a severe earthquake at or near 1 e
,ij. the location of the plant.
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The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault .
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. :- n M sone makes it almost certain that it will be subjected to one or more severe
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the vibrational stresses of even a very large earthquake without damage,.
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it must be recognized that if such an earth k h ld also involve several ir I@g > feet of shear. ground. movement oundas well as.gr(qua accelerations as high ase s ou
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for predict.ing_.the extent. of damage that might .be incurred..by the reactor i 1
- j containment. structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety i
of the reactor.
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A novel method is proposed for safeguarding the Bodega Head reactor 4 .
1 against differential ground movement of its foundation rock. .This is not
'., in itself.a cause for concern.
What is of. concern is the lack of any experi-
+:4 l mental or experience proof-test of the proposed novel method that could form an acceptable. basis for the required safety s. valuation.
i Because of the magnitude of possible consequences of a major rupture in i
I the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of emergency equipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor should be the subject of l
"i a pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles,
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. however sound they may appear to be.
. o1 For these reasons, it is our conclusi6n that Bodega Head is not a j p.m! ,
..P., 1q suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the present state
. of our knowledge.
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l:J-n; History f i s
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.r. The Pacific Cas .and Electric Company of San Francisco on December 28, 1962,
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ubmitted ,an tjpli ation to the Atomic Energy Corsnission (AEC) for a permit to q q - ,.,
T. construct and operate a nuclear power plant at. Bodega Bay, California, pursuant.
f??flj to the provisions of Title 10, Chapter 1. Code of Federal Regulations, Par,t 50
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$ed i (10 CFR 50). The application, which includes a " Preliminary Hazards Sumary
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Report," deced December 28, 1962, and Amendments 1 through 9, received during
' s t 5 i the period March 4,'1963, c' trough September 16, 1964, has been reviewed by the AEC'c Division of Reactor Licensing and other members of the Regulatory Staff.
Technical consultants assisted the, staff in specialized areas. Ihe application' a
. was also considered by the AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).
gj The recommendations of the ACRS were expressed in.. letters to the Chairman' of the
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AEC dated April 18, 1963, and October 20, 1964. >
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1 Site 1, ,
(t The nuclear power plant is proposed for construction on Bodega Head, a small peninsula in Sonoma County on the Coast of Cai.ifornia about 50 miles northwest of San Francisco.' The property owned by Pacific Gas and Electric j s
Company at the site consists of approximately 225 acres and includes the entire i
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i southern end of the peninsula. The proposed reactor site is approximately
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'O} 1000 feet west of the Western edge of the San Andreas fault zone.
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, , , The nearest res'idence to the site is approximately 1-1/2 miles away.
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Bodega Bay (population 350) is the nearest village and is located approxi- i
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ef4' mately 2 miles north-northeast of the reactor site. The total populacion E ,9 i 4.. m y ";; Within 5 miles is about 500 add within 25 miles is about 114,000, w- 2, i
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_1 Plant Description' i
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f The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head is a q
direct. cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Reactors of the boiling
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4 water type have been operated successfully at Dresden, Illiuois, Big Rock, 1 Q,f. L
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,4 , Michigan, and Humboldt Bay, California. Design power at Bodega is 1008 them1'
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- ,t fC megawatts (Mwt), compared with 700 ht for bresden, 240 ht for Big Rock Point
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? and E.i Mwt.for Humboldt Bay.
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fans which discharge air through particulate and halogen removal -filters to dt
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a stack, thereby minimizing the possibility-of direct out-leakage from the buil' ding . .
9 ' Radioactive liquid wastes from the Bodega plant /are to be mixed with l
condenser effluent (about 250,000 gpm) prior to discharge to the Pacific
, Ocean. All solid wastes with radioactive contamination are to be transferred
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'Q to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. Radioactive gases
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Q /r, are to be vented to a special stack the height of which is to be ppecified
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.J on the' basis of results of a meteorological survey now in progress. The dis-posal of both liquid and gaseous radioactive., wastes resulting from plant operations will be. monitored and contro11ed4ao.that at any off-site location
~l the concentration of radioactive contaminants .will not exceed the ,11; nits set r -
forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regul,ations, Part.20.
,.,. Import 33t Safety Considerations wa .
-] In our evaluation of this application,,we.have given.special consideration h', .
c j to a number of site and design features-which .have .important safety implica-
. i
.['i tions. The more important.of these..eafety considerations.are discussed in lb i
., ( .the following paragrpphs.
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., 1. Suitability of the Proposed Site 4
Based on considerations of-potentiale.hezards to:public health pad 3
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j safety, this reactor site is an excellent one in all respects except
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,, ? one - the possibility of a severe earthquake involving substantial shear T::.
d5' ! earth movement at the site. Earthquake problems posed by this l'ocation
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y;. gg . are considered in a later section of this report.
- f!?1 vd u Q;;,j By virtue of property ownership by PG&E, as enhanced by the water
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areas on three sides of the peninsula, the applicant can exert positive control over an area having a minimum radius of about 450. feet from the reactor, and can exert substantial control over an. area extending
'j out to a radius of about 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach
?
,,' .) across the harbor entrance channel.
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N:: -.The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the iso-lation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The meteorology is.as good as or better than that in California generally. The site is not upstream from any drinking water intakes.
l 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Desien
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.g., The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant
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' [; . ! is of a type that has been operated safely at a number of other j
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- locations including Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. It is .
- j expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficients of 4 7,.
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f,] -reactivity at operating conditions. Further, the reactor will be
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brought to. full. power through a step-wise approach so that any i
.i unforeseen instability would be detected before a damaging nuclear 1
( excursion could result.
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The Bodega Bay reactor is to be designed so that at any time 9,$ during core life with all control rods inserted the k-effective of
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l' the core will.not exceed 0.97. With the most reactive rod fully withdrawn and the other rods fully inserted, the k-effective of the l .
core will be 0.99 or less.. Thus, the reactor will remain sub-critical if one rod is inadvertently withdrawn, or it can be shut down even if i
i one rod should become stuck in the fully withdrawn position. In
., addition, a soluble poison control material can be injected into the
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. .' i reactor vessel if needed to hold the reactor sub-critical.
.I The control rod drives proposed for this reactor are similar to, l
but include certain improvements over, the locking-piston type rod 1
drives that have been used at other plants.. The applicant has stated that prototype and production drives will be subjected to functional t
2.d and endurance tests before reactor startup.
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, G,} 3. Suitability of Fuel Handling Facilities 1
j The fuel-handling concept for this facility has f avorable safety C) ip characteristics. During refueling operations the fuel storage pool
, ')[ 3 is connected by a water channel to the reactor vessel, thus providing (4, -
, for visual observation and underwater cooling of all operations, and 6 eliminating the potential hazards. associated with fuel handling casks.
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- 4. . Adequacy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal Plans and Desi.gns Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with j condenaar effluent prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. No problem is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of radionuclides in the
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-F inixture.below the maximum permissible concentrations specified in
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?Q., 10 CFR 20. In addition, the applicant has stated that a radiological e
'lj , monitoring survey of this site and its environs will be initiated two
- :)
1 years before operation of the reactor and will continue after operation ,
commences. Details of the sampling program have not been completed,
, but it is expected that quarterly samples would be tak'en of marine I
- waters, plankton, bottom sediments, invertebrates, shellfish, resident
- } fishes and of the intertidal algae and eel grass. Thus, the applicant
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s~ would be able to determine any reconcentration of radionuclides that J might occur before it became a potential safety problem.
All solid wastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal.
The applicant has stated that gaseous wastes disposal will be j monitored and controlled so that a maximum annual exposure at any T4 i
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_ w1 off-site location will not exceed permissible limits. There appears )
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'y to be no reason to believe that this objective cannot be met. The a
- diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory and a j meteorological facility is being installed at the site to develop h a better understanding of the local meteorology, so that an appropriate t .j
, radioactive gaseous waste stack height may be selected. A radiological
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.i survey pr.ogram.at the site is planned for initiation two years in ,
advance of reactor operation. Quarterly sampling of soil, vegetation,
'. ! local agricultural products, well water, streem water and stream mud, 1 '
- c. , and' weekly sampling of air particulate and air background are also v.. a 49= planned.
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$5Y 5. Adequacy of Emergency Systems 4.Kj
' #'Fg The applicant proposes to equip the plant with a substantial
.1 l number of facilities for the safe handling of emergencies. An
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. emergency feedwater pump is provided to assure that the reactor core
.j is always kept submerged in water so long as the reactor vessel and J
l piping beneath it remain intact. Core spray systems are provided to
'S a fi.B cool the core if, for some reason, such as pipe failure, the core cannot ypj
. m.ff be kept submerged. An emergency condenser with a large water storage T ~fd capacity and provisions for make-up from the fire system is provided
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', to serve as a heat sink in case the main condenser is damaged. A i
m fi bleed-and-feed system is available as a backup to the emergency condenser. This system providee for bleeding steam from the main steam line to the suppression pool, and making up water thus lost
'1 41A through action of the auxiliary feed water pump or its backup. A
. p%.v J1 r liquid poison injection system is available to keep the reactor sub-
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gy critical if such action becomes necessary for any reason.
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,[li ;-)Q Several sources, of emergency electric power.are available. A q startup-standby transformer is provided to supply station service
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. power during plant startup, or in emergencies, from the 220 KV trans-
_f6 mission system. An auxiliary standby transformer can supply sufficient 21 9-
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power..for orderly shutdown from a 12 KV distribution Line from a
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l- j nearby substation.. If both these sources fail, an engine driven
.. generator.can supply power for safe shutdown and decay heat removal, j[ In adclition to these sources a substantial station battery will
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...c.- supply. power _for control instruments and, through an inverter, Y I:; '
e .) essential.AC loads.
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. 99 6. Adecuacy of the Containment Concept This plant is to utilize the pressure suppression concept in its containment design. Mockup tests have been conducted by the appli-
} cant to determine the maximum pressure the containment would experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the
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,h., 28-inch recirculation loop lines under a variety of reactor coolant t
.p pressures and temperatures, and dry well temperatures. These tests
- r e.. -
T have provided a suitable basis for designing the system and have also
}
shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely
! condensed beneath the pool surface.
~.
li The applicant has proposed a number of special provisions to assure reliable containment performance in the event of an accident.
5 74 ...
Redundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines.
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,p g,q} of all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the r
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completed dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the
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',f ._ completed suppression chamber. The containment leaktightness will be c.N . tested at periodic intervals throughout the life of the plant.
,: Specifications for containment design pressure .and leak rate will
, limit potential accident consequences to acceptable levels.
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i 7. Acceptability of Potential Exposure to the Maximum Credible Accident "I The applicant has evaluated the consequences of a number of credible accidents, based on the assumption that the containment and other safe-
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'gj.y. . . guards function as designed. In most cases they would create no w
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.significantahaz'ard to the. health and saf.ety of the public. Of 'those 3 credible accidents which were considered by the applicant to have a d
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%.) - potential fer si mificant 6 releases of' radioactivity to the environment, kf$
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the accident.. categorized as the refueling accident resulted in the highest 2;
'U potential off-site deses. It was assumed in the refueling accident .
analysis that a fuel bundle was dropped .into a near-critical reactor, causing a nuclear excursion which releases fission products into the re-
. .j
.. fueling building. .Using standard calculation procedures and realistic
,.2 Q y numbers, the applicant calculated that the maximum off-site potential
. . whole body. dose for the duration.of this accident would be less than 1.0
$w72
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- rem. Noble gases are the major contributor to the potential whole body doses from such an accident. Potential thyroid doses from this assumed 1 accident would not result in potential whole body or thyroid exposures
- in excess of Part 100 guidelines for reactor site criteria.
Research and Development Programs
.t;> Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its contractors are planning a e.. e .
D h.
pey' number of research and development programs, the results of which will be
. 49
, .h utilized in final design of the plant. They include the following:
,? '. '.'~;,(
h 1. Radiological Survey 94s I.$ A preoperational monitoring survey of the site and its environs '
3 04 l M/ to be initiated two years before commencement of operation of.the
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j reactor. Although the deteils of this program have not been completed,
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, company's Humboldt Bay nuclear unit.
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[$b 2. . Meteorology. '
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'v ; A meteorological facility.is being installed at the site to pro-
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b.!@2 vide necessary data for. atmospheric diffusion studies. Instruments ndP.
- I will be mounted at three.. levels on a 250 ft. tower and wi11 measure k,'NNh y?
temperature and wind speed and direction. - All readings will be digitized and recorded on paper _ tape. The results of this program will be used in calculating the potential dilution of radioactive
. gases, and.in selecting a suitable stack height.
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.fi,: 3. Oceanography
- q; .x 38 The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling
.j water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on the marine biota is being' investigated in a series of experiments at the site. These tests include pse of drift poles and uranine dye
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as well as measurements of temperature and salinity. They will continue through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological 6' conditions.
.M.-
- y.y 4, Marine Biology Survey mr An ecological survey is being conducted to prepare lists of
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the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor.
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,%. ,- .- .5. Pressure Suppression Tests
- 4 kj sy Extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been conducted at the Company's test facility at its Moss Landing Power
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'D'2 Plant. Additional tests will be conducted at the company's plant to determine whether or not baffles between vent pipes are required in the Bodega' suppression pool.
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, ,' %g 6. Fuel Development or *,
I .
fy.s Results.from fuel element development tests and experience with
{ , -
fuel designs now employed in existing' reactors will form the basis for 9
n;. .
the selection of.the Bodega fuel cladding and its thickness.
s J 7. Instrumentation Development _
q
.f In-core startup range neutron detectors are being developed as 1
.' j a possible substitute for the presently planned out-of-core detectors.
,t 2, ..y t;;gy{ 8. Control System Development i,M A prototype Bodega control rod drive will be subjected to extensive 9d developmental testing before the final drive design is released for u
manufacture. Several devices which would reduce the liklihood or magnitude of a control rod dropout accident are being developed for i possible use in the Bodega control system.
1 l Seismic Considerations ON.J The proposed location of the Bodega Nuclear Power Reactor is approxi-py eto::
atp:j mately 1000 feet west of the Western edge of the San An,dreas fault zone, a 3dk '
.f( prominent band of seismic activity running generally north and south along tb4 if#j most of the State of California. The choice of this location by the applicant has necessitated prolonged and intensive study of factors affecting y the safety of the installation in the event of the occurrence of a severe 4
_. $d earthquake at or near the location of the plant.
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Since~the fields of geology, seismology and earthquake structural design
-are highly specialized, it has been necessary to call:upon the services of .j cc ') ' expert consultants'for help in analyzing the various problems involved in I US arriving et a decision on the technical feasibility of building the Bodega.
.- kk i -
-plant at the proposed location with reasonable assurance that it will safely l 2 withstand the maximum earthquake that might credibly occur during the life of 7 -
ld[ the plant.
The consultants employed by the applicant (PG&E) include Dr. George W.
h...p Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the California Institute.of Technology, Dr. Hugo Benioff, prominent West Coast
! Engineering Seismologist, and Mr. E. C. Mar 11 ave, Consulting Geologist.
.o 3 p:
I;% The AgC Regulatory Staff has retained the services of Dr. N. M. Newmark, ,
i,l ::.
jj Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Illinois and Mr. Robert myy i 7. A. Williamson of Holmes & Narver. The staff has been assisted by the U. S.
L 5', Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and the,U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) 7
- on seismicity and geology.
a There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant
+i and that of the USC&GS and USGS with respect to the maximum credible earth-
.%L
% quake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant.
h j The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that the maximum ground '
I acceleration to be expected during any credible earthquake at or near the
.Y b ,
. pu.dl plant site is 0.33g, and they consider it incredible that there should eve'r.
' - be more than a few inches of differential ground motion under the site. The
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. uSC&GS, on the other hand, has reco ended that the reactor and its 1 n
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<t m.i containment structure be. designed to withstand a ground response spectrum of tal j 3. . .
2/3g, with peak accelerations up to 1.0g, together with possible differentia 1'
- . j - shear ground motion of up to 2-1/2 feet. The USGS, pointing out that the
..j v.y f;;7 geologic setting of Bodega Head is similar to that of Point Reyes Periinsula d
1*'N@. where bedrock ruptures did occur in the 1906 California earthquake, feels MG .
that there is' a possibility of a. comparable rupture of up to 3 feet at the w .a .
el;gj proposed reactor site in the event of a severe earthquake in that area.
g Nf$l -l There is also a wide difference of opinion respecting the size of the
. . .'y}
c[1 tsunamis (seismic induced ocean waves) that may be expected to result from d
1 off-shore earthquakes. Consultants to the applicant are firm in their-q-
,! opinion, based on all available records along the West Coast, that no
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Gr* tsunami will ever push water more than 15 feet above mean water level at the lL. s"M l$y , plant site. However, the USC&GS has recommended that protection against h+2 . .. . v-p . . .. ,. ..
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50-foot tsunamis be provided in the design of the plant.
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4 The applicant was made aware of the recommendations of the USC&GS and f:j j USGS, and was asked a number of questions designed to determine whether the Aq;j i company considered it feasible to design the Bodega plant so as to provide
- .1
. .j reasonable assurance that the integrity of the reactor containment would be
,1 preserved and that the reactor would be shut down and maintained in a safe dk*: d c4 .
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- condition in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake of the severity -
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{d,p+y postulated by the USC6C,S and USGS. The technical basis for their conclusion
,a was also requesteli. ,,
vly ._. .. ,
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.e .While continuing to disagree strongly with the credibility of such an a i d,g.j
- extreme earthquake, the applicant has nevertheless proposed a design which D M
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.." H the company.and its consultants feel confident will safely ride through a f ;!/3g earthquake, with peak ground acceleration up to 1.0g, which is T, accompanied by differential shear ground displacement under the reactor s.}
l,$.k y A containment of up to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical. If such an earth- 1
.i n
') 3 quake should occur, the containment might be tipped or Totated slightly, but
?[ there would be.'no breach in.its leak-tightness and no release of fission '
, @,,~.b.[i products, in the opinion of the applicant.
yyy- . .
The postulated earthquake involves a pattern of ground motion generally similar to that recorded by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the El Centro y
'l - Earthquake of May. 18, 1940, but with approximately twice the intensity,
'j corresponding to a maximum acceleration of two-thirds gravity, a maximum lb
.h n velocity of 2.5 ft/sec, and a maximum ground displacement of 3 feet, and
.;( ,.: ' .
'h Mbi with occasional intermittent pulses of acceleration up to 1.0g. The j structures are considered to be subjected to simultaneous shear displace-ments ranging up to 3 feet, along lines extending under the containment
.. t
,J structure or other parts of the plant, with motions in either horizontal or vertical directions along the fault. It is also assumed that aftershocks
- of intensity equal to the El Centro quake might be suffered before remedial
.a LW action could be taken.
[sp 79d There a're two major problems posed by the postulated earthquake. The i
.s Sif s% most unusual one is that of providing for shear ground displacement of as P ,8 ny .
N.M much as three feet underneath the reactor building. The other is that of
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O , l C ; Although there is a substantial design effort involved in computing
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'j the vibrational stresses, and judgment has to be exercised as to the proper z y ;. vibrational spectrum and structural damping factors to use in assuring
.J
.9 that the reactor containment structure and all the vital equipment shV4 jIjE inside it will safely withstand the vibrational aspects of the earthquake, kW hsgyh the technology is well understood. The critical area here is the ability gg
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of vital structural components to withstand the stresses put on them by N.? 8 e
the simultaneous occurrence of the maximum postulated accident (rupture
) of reactor coolant system) and maximum postulated earthquake. Under these extreme conditions the question focuses on the maximum allowable '
stresses that should be used in the design computation relative to
.y...
the yield stress of the various materials under consideration. While many
.e t, l d? of'these det. ails have not yet been resolved for the Bodega reactor, par- l l y%
l Wa;c cticularly with regard to the vibrational stress criteria, there appears to ,
~,'
Mk l ; be no reason to believe that anything of a fundamental nature with respect to vibrational problems will arise that cannot be successfully handled.
d Building the reactor structure and its foundation in such a way that it will safely survive a shear ground movement underneath it of as much as 3 feet poses a more troublesome problem. The applicant proposes to Ik$$n accomplish this by a design which provides for a 3 foot unobstructed '
$j{l radial clearance between the outside of the reinforced concrete contain- 1[
k.x S,M ment structure and the inside of a containment pit, completely around the '
y,w circumference, from elevation -73 feet to yard elevation at +25 feet. The .
ID walls of the reactor containment pit will be lined with reinforced concrete N a\
to prevent possible spalling of material into the pit. The annular space -l N{$l:
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43 -
will be permitted to fill with water. The reactor containment structure will be founded on a layer of carefully selected sand of characteristics which the
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I applicant believes will permit horizontal movements up to 3 feet without
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j 3j impairing the . function of the containment structure, although the structure !
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,J might be shifted or rotated. Differential vertical motions up to 3 feet may .
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?dB cause the containment structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the l 3'y
( '! , applicant, in no case will the containment function be impaired.
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m It is proposed that the plant be designed with no rigid structural T%; interconnection between any major components. The reactor containment c .w r .
y structure will be structurally independent of the turbine generator founda-
{ tion, the plant control building, the radwaste facility, the stack, and the !
I i plant service buildings. Piping and wiring interconnections important to
- 'l
,M safety between.the reactor containment structure, the control building and
/
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the turbine generator will have sufficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet I
,- 4
/q, . , ,W w of relative movement. In order to prevent.overstress at point of penetration for piping connecting the dry well with the turbine, the' company proposes to I provide adequate anchors and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and )
.i beyond the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to I
j i
withstand all piping loads due to differential motion in any direction up :
to 3 feet between the reactor containment structure and the turbine generator l
'g
. foundation. l o 'l u;;d 6 . 1 -~ l s.wg teef The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bode 8a Reactor and its
$3 containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground g.{
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$U motion embodies concepts which are in many respects novel and for which KW m.c
!,g little or no precedent exists. The Regulatory Staff Consultants, Dr. N. M. ,
NSg 4.l
%. ~Novmark and Mr. Robert Williamson have come to the conclusion after carefully l 1
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, studying the. basis of.the proposal, that the structural integrity and
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-leak-tightness.of the containment. building can be maintained under the
- h. i$ i.;l earthquake conditions. postulated.
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.lThey.. point out, however, that certain precautions must be considered 3
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especially.in the design of umbilicals and of penetrations to the
,I containment. building. All attachments and primary system piping must be l Nfc
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arranged to prevent. failure by shearing or crushing due to contact with walls, rock, earth, etc., in the event of major earthquake motions. The 1 '
piping would have to be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate a
'9.,.
-g relative movement of 3' feet without failure, and at the same time be damped to reduce its dynam N response to earthquake oscillations. -
" ,4 c% f red 4
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'The sand layer under the containment building is intended to act in I two ways: (1) to isolate in part the containment structure from the high peaks of acceleration that might be transmitted to it from the ground beneath it;.and (2) to permit either horizontal or vertical faulting to
+
tcLe place.in the rock beneath the containment structure without damaging Y:. the structure. Dr. Newmark feels that the effectiveness of the sand layer i
~~Md@O in reducing the peak accelerations may be questionable, but that its
- 1 ,
- effectiveness in reducing the consequences of faulting will be substantial.
d'n d
(, .,
Protection of the plant against the possible occurrence of large 9 -
tsunamis has not yet been completely resolved but does not appear to offer
+i J
y , any unsurmountable design barriers.
E s .
[k'j ; It is difficult to evaluate the public safety risks involved in a new
'ra
~. type of construction for which there is little or no experience background.
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. Other reactor installations have presented seismic design problems, .but _not in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake postulated ;
hw
- by_ the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. One problem k$h t*gph which the. Bodega plant has in consnon with all other nuclear power plants wen l ,
, subject toL.Speci.41 seismic design Considerations iS the inability to Conduct
- .. e any sort of performance test on the finished structure that will demonstrate Ry.Sj m W.; that the design objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty presented by wb
, e ,s c -
,; #!c., this situation has been accepted as a reasonable risk in the seismic design 7.g a ..
at other-locations-where the only problem involved is the ability to withstand
- f vibrational stresses, since this aspect of earthquake design is well under-stood and has a considerable amount of experience background. There is
~4 difficulty..in. applying the seme philosophy at Bodega Head, however, because 24
- 3
- 3 ,
hir4 of the necessity. of considering the additional. problem of designing the i
reactor structure to safely withstand differential ground motion as well as high vibrational stresses, and because there is no realistic way of
{
evaluating..the proposed solution to the problem.
The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault zone makes it almost certain that it will be subjected to one or more severe 2, seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a high 1.k'%
. $b' probability.that the plant under the proposed design could survive the
~
vibrations.from even a very large earthquake without damage, it must be 4 O l
n y recognized that :if such an earthquake should also involve several feet of v%n
.ina s WT3h -
shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to An d 1.0g there is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for
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- predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor con-SN "P.j tainment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of l
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The fact that a noval method is proposed for' safeguarding the Bodega !
4 iQ '; .
@9 j Head reactor.against. differential-ground movement of its foundation rock is-not in itself a cause for. concern. The nuclear power industry is-replete
};,4 with.new methods of coping with a large variety of problems never previously i if encountered until the arrival-of the atomic age. What-is of concern is the I s , -
f, lack of any experimental or experience proof-test of the~ proposed novel method pf, '
ph
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that could form an acceptable basis for the required safety evaluation.
,- gg u?
ec The pressure-suppression concept of reactor containment was completely
, v,
{g novel when it was first proposed for use at the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power pn
.J,u j ,5 Plant. In many respects it was much simpler than the pedestal concept for.
a , ,
E safeguarding against shear movement of foundation rock proposed for the
.. Bodega Head reactor. 'But 'it' was not approved for use as reactor containment '"
w re JMg until after the successful conclusion of a long series of engineering tests p
[ .at the PG&E's Moss Landing power generation plant which proved beyond M
W@, reasonable doubt that the concept could be utilized safely for boiling water
' p* . . .3 lif reactors. Similar proof-test standards have consistently been applied to
. M,.
other new and previously untried features incorporated from time to time in 2
"g'ff? nuclear power plants.
WM
~ ,
s ' ll fg;g The fact that meaningful proof tests are difficult to achieve in the 0
i case of seismic safeguards does not, in our opinion, constitute a valid
.h 5 .
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- reason for accepting these safeguards in critical areas on the basis of
- 3. .i
, : theoretical reasons alone. Nor does it justify relying on opinions as to ;lt
'4 ; . -
1; gy the feasibility of the proposed seismic safeguards unless these are supported Q:::
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, ;1 by somewhere.near the same kind of experimental evidence required of all.other
. safeguards. We do not see such evidence in support of the pedestal concept w y,_ for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor.against differential-ground motion, w.
-ph .Whether the public benefits to be . gained from operation of the Bodega f E1 . ,
1 Nuclear Power Plant.are..high enough to justify acceptance of the added e , .!
- (
uncertainties. involved in.the seismic. design of the plant to withstand et ) several feet of shear ground movement _is, of course, a matter of judgment.
'f; y pg
.i.
c'- The regulatory requirement that there be " reasonable assurance" that l ! any licensed nuclear reactor can be built and operated without undue risk I
- to the health and safety of the public recognizes that there is no way of sq r
.t
+
,' eliminating.all of the uncertainties;. experienced judgment is therefore A.N I iAp.4 required. The standaea Bt"resa'ohablec assursiscs" !istmorsf difficult toc. meet 4.!P
- /W Qj'# { when it becomes necessary to take into consideration external forces having a
'fh o
- Q-l the potential of invalidating some of the safeguards built into the reactor i i I
} installation. Thedifficultyisenpargedwhenthereareuncertaintiesin the design measures intended to counteract the external forces. Somewhere along the line enough uncertainties will create a situation in which the a, s " assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable." We believe that this
'% 4 j j'N., situation would exist if the proposed pedestal concept of seismic design l
- 9. Tin 1!
Q r .2 were to be approved without more convincing evidence of its validity than l l
' e. ..$ is afforded by presently available information.
idT., f
": " ...;; ,1 N 2 tr.4 Conclusions [ .
we ay, m e
. o.
/-f.@ . The containment and all of the emergency equipment for shutting down i
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the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in a safe condition in 9.: .
- 22 -
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Q the' absence..of seismic disturbances are designed.on.the.' basis of well-established engineering principles. They can also be tested to ascertain
- . .. v
~f; ; that the design objectives have been achieved. Consequently, there is a
. high degree.of assurance that the reactor can be built.and operated without
.% undue risk to the health and safety of the public in the absence of seismic
};h h
.A .
icy 1 disturbances.
j.g ' The seismic design of the reactor structure to withstand purely
,. y
,G , vibrational effects is also based on well-established engineering principles
' $ which in some cases at least have been verified in the presenca of earthquakes.
si Thus, while it is not possible to carry out any measurements on the finished 3$
. . n.
,, structure.to
<v assure that the seismic design objectives have been accomplished,
- yy .
.f ?$ z , there is sufficient experience background to justify a conclusion that the h.kC -
specified.=4==4c. vibrational criteria can be achieved and that the plant can
-'4 therefore.he safeguarded against any credible earthquake that does not rupture the foundation rock, i.
- i
.',{ We believe there is room for reasonable doubt, however, that a comparable .
i; situation exists with respect to that particular aspect of the proposed seismic design of the Bodega reactor structure intended to assure that the containment b?
4,y and reactor shutdown functions will remain intact in the event of a shear
.L sI d[. displacement of its foundation bedrock as great as three feet in any direction.
'.s:d.
r .t .While the proposed engineering principles appear reasonable, experimental sw.
j{If verification and experience background on the proposed novel construction a7% s;lp,3 method are lacking. If approved, this would, to the best of our. knowledge, 5 -
i MC[!M..y be the first attempt on record to design a building structure and its p.
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associated vital equipment to withstand the effects of substantial movement 4 i
ll in its' foundation simultaneously with the vibration accompanying a severe -1 1
earthquake. Because of the magnitude of the possible consequences of a l l
t
- 3. .;Jy: ,
major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of \
- %w .
u.r;.4 emergency.quipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor {
,h
,. g n
?should be the-subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified d
g%m. engineering principles, however sound they may appear to be.
m:N
, The Advisory. Committee. on Reactor Safeguards has reached cl$e conclusion
/ that the reactor can be constructed and operated at the p'roposed location i
' I without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.l We have carefully considered the views- of 'thi.---ACRS. We have the highest respect for those
.. g views and we do not lightly reach an opposite conclusion. This is a kind
- .r ,
MY.,.;1 ,y of case, however, on which reasonable men may differ. In our view, the t.M, Qx
.M v;a .jj) proposal.to rely ~on unproven and perhaps unprovable design measures to cope
~
\ ;
, with forces as great as would be produced by several feet of shear ground
. .?
i l movement under a large reactor building in a severe earthquake raises a
- i I substantialsafetyquestionf.
i .
In all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega Nuclear !
i l
i Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can be built and 1 l
l 4
., e l operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. However,
'T I T' ,.
the single exception is quite important if one accepts the credibility of an --.1}-l l[.I earthquake of sufficient magnitude to cause a major displacement of
...xf: '
l
,.;d foundation rock underneath the plant. Although there is a wide difference of s:n
'.;I. ,' expert opinion on the credibility of such an earthquake, prudent judgment fM ,
G,, - .
favors accepting the conservative recommendations of the USC&GS and the USGS. ,'
e . .;
f- N .
On this basis and for reasons I;iven above, it is our conclusion that Bodega d "
Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the j
' l present stage of our knowledge.
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-.} . Comments on J. P. Eaton's "Part II - Seismic Hazard Evaluation".
F
.1 '
(Appearing in U. S. Geological Bu: vey's report entitled " Geologic.
j .
g,Q ,,. . : .-
. Sei.smic Investigation of .a,Porpoaad Nuclear Power Plant Site on
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..Q;c;9p.yl;9*,.p..i.,.g.Wy:-}Av3odegaHead,'SonomaCo.,~.
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California"...DatedSeptember,1963)
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a a.q 4 % . -- ..
fif(fh. . , ./ . [' . " . ..' W Frank He,mstnn ,-
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M In its' broad conclusions Dr. ta%.'s report supports the maximum
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^
intensity and the maximum acceleration ; suggested by the writer in various i
.,j drafts on the Bodega Head seismic ; rob..em. It is a valuable commentary on r
9,j - reports submitted by other seismologi:r;s and points up the differences W.s'j ..
M
.;'f. : m ; 6that exist in the thinHng of some of this country's leading seismologists
. fin
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'.r,o,n - problems
- of
.e the Bodega
- . '# , ,, _. y .
1' Head type.
. . . - .es,jy.,
To the writer the outstanding foaqure of all the reports (by, Housner,-
~
,t
.'3
-I ' Tocher and Quaide, St. Amand, and Eatoa) is that all of them write as though l- s .
the solution were solely a matter of cm rect " judgment" on the part of the i
.i writer. Not one of them has drawn adequately on the vast amount of data
, a 1
. (instrumental and descriptive) collect d by the U.S. Coast & Geodetic 1} .
Q,.; .
Survey over a 30-year period to back u> his judgment. The fact is that s
m,:p[ -.+i.+. . . , . . . , . ,
,A *, . . . , . a' Q 7,gd. < although these data' vere collected to . 2olve problems of the type AEC now e mp o - - - ,y
.gd faces seismologists in general tend to ignore them. The writer's report is
../3
-mm vv c fM.,
. 1 + e., 1< different from all others in that factual information rather than personal e,wg -~~~
- n. . -
.Y :
y n;~ ~ . .x .;. . x.. .
. a .. . e s : ., . . ..,.1 h i 9 - y opinion or judgment is the foundation on which the conclusions are based.
- .i!
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.D .mE gwQ. . :w.. . .' , .c., T,he charts summarizing
!-te . , .
. g . these" 7 , ., ,, factual, ,data, are
)
4
. furnished so that the reader . .c ,
. f., '
..M,, .y.'jp -l as well as the writer is in }a position to exerciso his judgment as to the
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. degree of validity. . .
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.:1 n!j It is for this reason that the writ er. is not in sympathy with Eaton's - l y ,7
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t cotments (p. 44, par. 2)(stressing "the tenuous nature of some of the [
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r.cientific judgments that must be made. (As far as the writer knows Mi n ,
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&n. ...h.,w$pEston has not yet pean the charts in[the writer's AEC pre 14=4=y report T' M W+ .
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.hs.c.; A. T W @.. ,<hougfLcertain'new and'fundamentarielationships concerning' earthquake -
g o- Id . . ., <J- s
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- ) khkk - -; # dintensity and y.,j .
e related, ground motions 1; ave been developed in the last 30 4 . c .
.f 9, 4.
. years at the Coast & Geodetic Survey cnf. the University of Washington
. u. f '
.M. y i' other investigators either do not knov ubout them or are reluctant to
<.i.
7 Q.
necept them as authoritative. They sirrily offer their judgments on out- .
'0 :
.noded seismological knowledge.and Eaton is commendably honest in admitting
. ]/ - .
.mWAst such ' judgments are indeed tenuous. .
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, ,af"a M :;Q tj M ?,d@kM@d, fon"page'45 Eaten? takes tup Saint-An C W M M NO M N.M N?$ 3 $ 4 D L w I .M i . '
ed; f Permanenti fault displacement being a " fling". and, perhapsj a source -
2 +
' ~
i ^
T
/
M'NM J..k3' Y, of danger to be considered. From the 2. Centro record, where a limited A, .
degree of " fling" was registered on a o sismograph, from photographs of s.
l little damaged houses setting only a fe r yards from fault displacements '
- .iboving many feet of displacement er ? .ing", and from the intensities
- j found along faulted areas there is li, ..e reason to believe that this
.%. .., .s m
.; gqsoJcalled fling is any more significant as a vibrational phenomenon than <
--e'
.?'"y ' , R 3p'M:&:vhu, :-*:Lwn;9.M2' an;d observed vibration.w s a m .Contrary 4m .f. 4
~,% . . .. ,y
' ".hny other type of recorded to the writer's i4
.tq r$. 3 5,;( f,@.)elie'f Housner ' argues that the intensity is actually less along a fault .
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T.7,y ,+a..,3+ h , , . On page 45. (hst ny par.)' .St. Arani andt,,Eaton refer to Richter's- ,,ag - (1958) .. a; .~
.8 . ,v .. w,m . ., e,. .,
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~ -
?.%,: . m.a. ..- ';
i . Relationship between' magnitude and int u sity which covers certain " average
.x
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);j' conditions". ' The writer suggests that fig. 4 in his report now under reviev .
. t
.a -
in the L & R Division is more informative than the Richter relationship O. *
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.: quoted by St.- Amand because it coverc ext reme as well as average conditions.
Fig. 4 shows directly.the range of intensities that could be expected in a
119')6 type of shock; the mirfmum is M-10 on granitic rock '(not E-9 as
' N. . ,
w-..-'.,.- . , . . . . . . . , - o... ,...v. - .
.y,3. :
- :w :
.. ' < suggested by Eaton as a possibility)and if the basement rock were of the ' - ~ ' v'
";j .
,[j ' California Central Valley type' it could Es to M-11. Eaton suggests that ;
O ;g' '
-becc.use of " local conditions" and other factors along the fault W-lO cannot 11 I
1 be ruled out. The Fig. 4 chart argues that m-10 is a basic minimum intensity fcr a 1906 type shock on granitic baser.ert and there is no reason for reducing i
it .
i The peak accelerations suggested by Eaton (par. 2, p. 46) do not differ
- .C,)
t Q
- $.L
- appreciably from the'vrit'er's. The a' ave.r tage of the writer's treatment of ,
r.?z uf ? i " .
- ~;
j this subject.is~that Figure 5 (of the vriter's Bodega Head report now in . .; jj y$ -
W , m .
2 .,,
.f preparation) shows all of the expectable deviations from average values in ..
tl e intensity-acceleration relatier. ship.
i
- The criticisms of Housner's approt.c!. to the maximum acceleration problem
'l i
1 (pp. 46 and 47) reflect in general the witer's views. As stated in previous 1
correspondence Housner's theory that ear.ahquake energy is radiated from a 1 7, ' completely planar source has receivei orc.y very questionable acceptance in
'I
,m s
~
I
. seismological ~ circles. Some engineers are likely to cater to it because it r,. .
, :l,. i
' 7.: . provides arguments for underestimating carthquake forces.
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- Eaton's' discussion '(pp. 47 to 50) of possible fault dislocations on ,
j
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m ..
. Badega Head 'should in my ' opinion be takea seriously. All I might add by way
- 0' l- ~ )
?
- c ot suggesting another approach to the prablem is this: Geologists can
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' m
' ,] ' eridently show' that' the faulting so appa- ent on Bodega Head must have a .
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,j o:curredthousands(38,0007) of years a33. On the Point Reyes Peninsula
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Survey of the Peninsula also reveal caly faulting that was.at least 38,000
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j vould establish the fact that even the abr:ence. of active faulting over a 38,000 year period does not-establish perpetual immunity from future faniting.
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