ML20235C931
| ML20235C931 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Humboldt Bay, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1987 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234E460 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-40 NUDOCS 8707090586 | |
| Download: ML20235C931 (27) | |
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'". S. AiOMIC ENERGY CCHiISSJ ON LlVISION OF REACTOR LICENSING '
F0Af 'O s h SOAY CO:241TTEE .O..N.RE ACTOR. sal ?
- ~ - . D.S-JN THE MA1IER OF 2- ^ ' 1 ) T C r *, s
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L.>T h0. 3 _ Cor<E II
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8707090586 070623 PDR FOIA PDR THOMASe7-40 *
, t t e c t n. .g i :rg I. Introduction The Facific Ges and Electric Company (PGLE) has requested authorization, by 1ctter dated April 9,1965, to use zirconium clad fuel rods for subsequent i c fuel f ng o f t.bn Po boldt Bay Unit No. 3 reactor plant. The new fuel cm A11es util be decier. ted as Type II fuel ascenblics, in contrast to the stairless .
1 steci cled Type I r.sccmblies currently in use. l PGAE
.baitted additional information in Addendum A, dated June 15, 1965, in ant aat te cr rt!cas prepared by the staff concerning the safety sspects of using the Tyce 11 foci asscablies. The nost itportant espect of the stwif's quer tions tc s r eleted to the metal-us ter reacden that could result fc ) .1 c: :rg a rajor loss of cuolant cccident.
In ccajunction with the use of the Type II fuel assachlies, the 16 c - rel control rods tre to be icplaced with sirilar rods contcining less pelien to atintain cc ptrcble ecximum rod vorths as they exist for the Type I cc.re.
PGLE has rtst ed that certain modifications to several systens will be usde to provide E6ditional safety features. Included would be provisions for an additionel seurce of core flooding by connecting the yard fire water systet icop to the rcactor vessel. This system will supplement the existing core spray j
and the fc edva tcr and condensate systecs which presently provide an af ter-hea t cooling capability for the core in tbc event of a czjor pipe rupture 1cading to a loss of pri try ecriant. PGLE contends tha t the ccp3bility of any ore of * 'te systens is suf ficicnt to safely limit t he exten t o f cxc es sive cere h<.s ti'ng, subscquc -t n e ;r l o u t tr tve tien, snd r < 1:ing so that cont aim ent integri ty w . ' d he aintsired t r. the event of r tcjer reci/ent. PG&E tas suppor ted i ts ir si *.icn !
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wi th an cualysis of a loss of coolrot occident ender sdvcrse coadi t.f ens tring the 1 cast ef fective engineering sa feguard syc,t em. The ccupany c7co has indiccted that periodic tests will be unde to confirm the epcritionc1 thility of the various systnes. PGSE does not prcpose to provide r.n inert s trosphere in ti.c dry well and suppression chacher to r educe the crycen cenirnt of the ci ac.' ere to preclude the possibility of a fire due to tha pretence of hydrogra is n Ly-product of cny eetal-water reaction.
F5E proposts to perform the first refueling with Type II - .511es,
' 'th vill involve e; proximately 257 of the < ore, scos titc : fa '
, t 1M 5. /t tif s tirae the 16 central control rods cill clso be repirced. E' :t r c-folings will be mde dating which the re. mining Type I fuel rill !c _ q'; ed vith Type II arstr511as. In all, four :: fecling cycles are < ,:t<' to ic performed before the ecre contains cleost c11 Type II fuel a e n '? f .: (f.e. t 169 Type II and 3 Type I) .
II. Discussion A. General i
Type II fuel cssemblies, as do the Type I, will centain 49 fuel rods 1 j
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arranged in a square (7 x 7) array. The Type II fuel rods are 1crger in l 1
0,D. than Type I (i.e. , 0.486 cospared to 0.463) due to iricrci. sed clad ~
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thickness (0.033 ccepared to 0.019) . The use of zirccniun fer cladding t'Jcas a decrease in fuel er.richnent frc= 2.57 v/o te :pp::. -
ly 2.3 /c.
Tr derign cverage h rrup for Type II feel is 14000 D .'/T, .: -- ' m d to j 1
- '0000 KD/T for thc Type I, while the cc r:c sp nding - ..;; -- ' :1 f c1 4
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I I od burner 4,r 7ues t r e 23,000 end 17,000 cr pt e tively. Cc . ': t? ;de t? st i
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. cre to be used fc,r both Type I end Type II fuel esenablics will be de
<c.ne in rmchanical design. Ik.vever, the ner.ber of poison tubes in the 16 central control rods will be reduced from 60 tubes per blede. to 28 l
t Jer p< r H ede with Type II fuel asser.blies. The 28 poison tubes vill ,
1 5e 1er.tre d in the outer re3f ons of the cruciform blade. The reeainir.g 32
- abes : re Lollow stainless steel tubes open to the reactor water.
ME pleas to replace 43 of the 172 fuel at. calics in the core with
~; pe II fuel asscablies at each of the 4 refueling cycles. The cencro.1
,1 . re for the first r e fecling is to dischtsc 43 of th.s M @
- mp l Tyra I uni.t.s and reerrante the icmining ecstablics so that t'a e uw T);:e II cuits ccn be Ica.'ed in t sc a t ter ed "one in fcur" er ' u- t.
E.1. : uj ant rcactor peer opct n'ien, following verifica tion u s t 'ng , will be at < ;. pre d a, t ely 2 20 1:'s't for t.b cu t 4 to 5 r. on th s f a l l e ., e d b y a ga A al re'oction in power until the reactor can no longer be cperated at 1 ( 5 m.'t .
At this tina another ' quar ter' core refueling will take placc ic,1 ! c', ed by a rie f ler power c.perating cycle.
B. Ti nrr.ql_ a;3d_ Hydraulic Characteristics PGLE reports that' a reduction in core flow will result with Type II foci c.r s anblies due to the larger fuel pin disr,cter as ccmpared to the Type I fuel. The decrease in flow (,v107.) Iceds to a decrease in
.arr, mder .pd c.n incre a se in F.'b tooli ig.
' c local t.nd gress p o. king facters are expu ted to ci, ce tith o ch 1" fu rl f 7 cycic. On F. cc ;.p rE ti V e 17 ' t " t".:C cn t h e ' r e U ' ;. f r. i r. g t i t * . e f
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.4 Type I or Ts pe II fuci ::: ; M f os, the total p<lking fse tor et o.mr36.er condi ticas would den ease c rom 3.59 with Type I fuel, to 3. 38 'with Type II. !
fual due to' the use of the zirconiua cledding and lowcr era f ebent corner 1
rods. Fo r t '. e r ' x .d c or e ca s e , i.e., af ter the firct refueling, the tetal '
- p. king factor is ;u edicted by PGS.E to be 3.02 tad is bue d on t:aintaining -
a Ltoss pcating ' fac tor. of 1.93 by use of control rods for flux shaping.
TLn .liriti.ng c- se for detenr.ining the Minfrem Eancut Ra tio (M30R) c.ccurs af ter the fir st refueling with the reactor opere. ting et overpower 1
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- ii I:ns end the ca.ter level Im1 0w tire rtorr r.1 co n u al i r e1 IG!E : ,ats that the !?OR is 1.54, which is jus t s. Love the epcrating J f ' t of 1.5 ? 2d ca the cocrc7atien given in F/O 2592. j 1
C. :ac1 csr Cht ~:o c s e c! u ci.c..s PG' E tv_.r ts tha t under cuc.di tions varying from the #' r c t partial refueling .to the firal refueling wherein the core will be co .pc s.ed of f i
169 Type, II as n blies end 3 Type I, Ke g g vill b e 6 0. 99 wi th t.h e s t rc :.Lu c control rod wi thdr evn.
There are t.inor dif ferenc es betwecn the Icectivity coef ficier.ts for the core corpcsed of ei'ther Type I and/or Type II fuel assec.blics. The !
naderator and feel tenpercture coef ficients, as well as the void coefficient, ;
are all negative at the operating te. tperature.
initial verifiention testieg ro c:nfir:: derirn nuc1ccr characteristics is to b e per forte.d s t G. E. T::e t a s, ting inch. .cs ceni e ticr of crit 1 ct l 2 ceding , u s ur <. v.t of t're - A : tepnt :c u : 3 f f c i c '. t , i n d ^. e l 3
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'y l 9, . ,j ' J* L <I A r.cwbly redistribution to determine uni.formf ty of the e viru t ui < d s w.ablies. In addition, the relative red worths of the dif fe) .nt ccintrol rods will be deternined. TmE rcports that pre-power testing will be ccr.docted af t r-r ;5e fir st rarnalf"3 vith Type II_ fuel 5sceablies. The test ing will be per fer cd to c Mira nocicar, thertaal and hydraulic ptm s t .n s . Full pc,wcr creretien w3 ll '.' ~ 5.ieved on a step-wise basis with e/Mi t enal testing to be pa rcrr ed at w:h inercased power plateau. Uc '.we reviwed the miclear, thcric al t nd * ; :' t ie l i c - ,
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te cf Type II fuel neser.blies cnd have found no rz f wcy p c51e u e' ta mil cperation of the rcccior. The br a ds ce nsi c +.r r ei r .:c i
'c the cca< equences of u sing ris conium clsoding under s ci& ~.r. <, mr te discmed in the fo11ceit.3 o ctions of t M s report.
JII. Accident Evaluation A. General The use of zirconium in the Type II fuel case-blics, al tt. . ih ~ .- r r cJ 1 c - fi c.ra an operational viewpoint due to the increas ed rcactor lifet e. '-t is realized, presents an additional potential hczcrd not atterdant with the stain!rss r. teel clad Type I fuel asse:blies. The source of the eddirichal ha:srd is the consequences of a metal-water reaction that could occur fellneir; a rajcr pipe rupture lesding to a loss of cociant accid et. I
~e: +tal-water teaction provides tuo a6ditiensi energy s.: re n :<t
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c- sd en aircady serieu: occidcnt. One s cur ce of ener gy i c IF-* '
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1 1: ic t ly cres te-d during the t+tal t:c t er rccc ticn. Thi s c r. ;r; - :e
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*9)L 6-ccu as the cladding to hect up at a tare foster than that due to r.f ter-heat aloue. Since the reaction is temperature dependent, the increase in i
c!cdding te :perstur e results in sn increcsed reaction le: ding to hi;her clad t co;>cra tut es . e s leng as rater or st.-:m is present, the reaction ;&n be-celf-rustai.dng r,d leads to cled :.el ting and cubseque.nt fi ccion proacet relccee. Tbc < 0cc,d o. ergy source is the by-prcduct of the r
.t cl-tater r eac tion
.hich is h).1n2en. Since it would not be condensed in the suppression pcol, i
it4- 'ls to t he precsure increase resulting from a cvhir ed los s of U 't,t atcident. In the prescace of on air environment, the h;Jcc;,en could k an es it is c. s a rn t +d or it could . sccpe to the conrei-
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'.cre, if a pcper c orposition of hydrogen and oxypn cemld occur,1 : 'y
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.t for a fic :b1c or explosive mi.sture for a cetbustible ges. These !ir:ts terre s pend to the ninitum cnd taxitum c:mun ts of c c bu s tible gases in c mixture necessary for burning. Any mixture of hydregan and air within t': se limits can turn or explode. A relatively ens 11 volume of hydrogen in air i
(-s 4 "/o) would constitute the tinimum ti:.:ture for flar ability for an upward flanc prc.pagntion, whereas the rintrum amount of hydregen ree,uired for cn explesive tinture is in the order of 16 "/o. These are narginal ec: vsitica mix:res and therefore co plete corbus tion usuld be !:ub:fo: . Tec pres ence of e;;r up to tpp::xire t ely 60 '/c hcs little ein-ct c, *Se
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of *,i t em i s to cau ce the op;.nr. lir.i ts t o O.ct < tr,e and ,;r a. th the lever limits. No cer.bustibio raixture can be fvced wi th the s tsin ccm.'c.t:a tion in e:. cess of 60 /o. In the event that the hydrogen Icr . es the reac tor n u al . ,d cn tets the cer'tciv. ant vessel and then isLI citcd by wne tscha;.im, th additional caugy libcrated would ct.use further inuccco in the internal prescate of the e itsfrmant versel. The concetn in this r eu er is that the a rtiel pi enure that could result frera the liberated by'drec.n or its burning could ! it ti t in a Frcu ure in excces of the /ct ' ;n cq a bili ty cf c',e '
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In the case of. the Humboldt Iay plent, i.? e 11 -i ting re ?ul e of *
..e r< " .r i - it i rp tcm is the zers c sica chr. der s ' i ch -s s drei;n< d fer r 10 iz ; 'n: =.1 prcasure; howcver, initit.1 pec-cp m..innal tasting ur.s pn '; d-t : 11.5 ;ci;.
Post-acciGnt pre .res r ar' i ting Sc; t'. . pd- ry ce;cl .L . Sinn 'e ne vary in the rr.nge frca 2 to 9 psig occr a three bour period felic.'ing r.he . bicedown. Thus, li ttle margin is ev[ilchle to accor: codate ...,j v -i riceal energy tource that would increase centti: cent internal pressure. Pr4E propoces to protect the to, e gvinst major reltdcc. and e ccer.;=y-ing octal-vater resetioh by prcviding three independent core cooling systenar. It is to be noted that two of the c;-stcre are e.1 ready in existance, while the third is identified as a nedificction to an aircady existing systes that I' has been rnde n.ailchle for post-iccidc.c ccre cooling. Tn e three syste t i
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- 1. Core Spray rad Supp usicn Sel Coc71q Eysten J
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- 2. :Mgh Frcsr.ure Core T1,.c oing Syr. tem
- 3. Low Fressure Core Flooding Systen T1.e Core Sprcy and Cupprest, ton Tool Cooling System ror.sicts of tuo
- p. ...ps .t h t t Ae me tion from the r :;p e e sion pool. Tbc c'!.scharge fr e: t'ic ym:ps pr.ws rhn och a heat exch:.nger and then into the ore spray rirg locr_ted inside t'.e reactor vessel :.Leve the core. Each pump is rated at N 0 g;~ ft 0 psi g dis chcrge pret. cure. Emergency perer is available for
<. f i.%. r r t . ; cator. Eufficient water is available in the suppression p-aol rc fill tha dry vcil up to the level of the 40-inch vent pipes and e d 11 la cc 2-feet duttergence for the 14-f och vertical vent pipes. 0; e- a .* ; n of the -:c) e opn.y sys t em is ratm arf.c en the ocuu re.nce of icw r r r < f or veter lem1, bigh dry ve.11 perture, min steam line bred c r Icts af Iwcr te tho *.afe:y cyste.a with Icw (d 150 psig) .rcacter ; es s cre.
The High Free sur e Cor e F1 coding Sys tem is in reality ti e f.-e 6.'r i er c r'd ec>nhnu t e t.ys ters . Cae feed and condentato pump cs.n rupply 1600 ;;r. The ve ter st2pply system consists of the hot well, the cenh' ra n te and dar'.neralf sd water storage tenk, and rekeup from the condentate storste tenh. Collectively, these systems ccn provide suf ficient water to ficod the dry vc11'up t.o the level of the LO" vent pipes. Er rsen:y pc-ver to the feeNater and cendensste pump ectors is available either frc:. the cer , s.ntienal pJ ar re (Uni ts 1 and 2) or free the co .peny'+ traner'.esien ryt t _ .. ~he opart tien of the syster. is t c,uel inc2 ;dini Ac ir?.e 'nter-CC"' _ : .' E !.O ~hi V5riOuS L*c t er 1';pp ly r y 5 ' CS .
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( 9 The Low Frer. Arc Cor s Fl oudf r.g Sys te-', which I C'.E y ar vor+s to ircvide as a backup to the other cystcrs, consists of a cor.,ettion tet, m. a the yzird fire system loop cnd the rm cf or v asel via LFe simf town o s tem 1' supiay line. Three pwrps cre provided in the systen. Two tu e. e?<ctrically drivon z.ad the third is diesel driven. TI.e elrictrically driven pa ;s are fed from dif ferent 480 volt tuses. The purps are reied et 500 gpm at 740 <cig. Two p.v.ps are cz patie of delivering M 00 gpn to the reertor vctrel t end-of-blowdewn conditions. The system can be placed in cieretion Ly 'I o r e conditf onc tt.a t 4f tiste the cccc rper.y syster. 1 N m e the core e pray e; s t cc and the ;st d ff re cyr-te.n.tre 1 oth icw gr<r arc sysicas, rF E ; r:y- _s to p: cride r; ecisi re} ief .r.b . r. ;' e t 21d l~ be cpm:d to allcw t.1 e p ;c cur e in the reretor vessel to rap!dly A r se by w tf ng to tbc s ; 7: ' doa , col in the s unt of c p:! .uy :,, x t .'.ah. It picns to replace er.e of the e::isting t elief valves with a pair cf half-ca r. city alees that would be paeur.atically operst ed en hf;.h dry tell ! l pressure, i.e. 2 psig. This would enable either the c<.n c : pray or the Icw prcr f ore tore cooling sys ten s to operate a t ecpacity in a shot t er t f c.: Efter the start of blowdown doe to the incrcased pressure relieving ccpability. TGLE hcs also preposed to provide an addf tional p:.s t-accident cooling sys t c= fer af t er-test rer.: val . Air cperated by-pest vsives vould be added to the P.eac ter Cicanup Syste:- to /c trur th e el ect.t p (~ ' t ralin :r :md rcLu.t.:e riva bca t excl anscre . ;r 3."; .:nc.; nr rr.rce er=Nr'.2 tO t 3 CIcfDJp purp rrt;; IF t o l' c ' ' L t i l e. / O i fr \ ' -)d - Ds;Lt ; ;. : .: p capAility. r 7 ! [ c y' .. _ ha I '
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3 f(, 10 - The systers cnd plant mdifievtions dnscrNd ' ne re to '.c provf dad for the purpose of mir.imizing the extent of ccx e tm3 t A w <.id acccipsnying c etal-water reaction by rccovering the ore e:th .et r es i rapidly es is persible af ter a t ajor accident. IL m ar, in the ccant .%t a significant i+tal-water rescrien did occur, lanc c. cn t s c f hydm:,on would be IL: e ted. The hydrogen tcy burn in the r+.-cf or vestc1 cs it is sem reted (Lc , ;er, this is ques t!cnable due to t' a M ;h ' quality e t..-a r-.d i i Iow air et. nphere that would exist in the reactor - al af ter blen'rn) i er the E, ?: c. gen could be vented frca the reector . s c -1 rd int e '
- e ecmta!n. ent vessel via the rupture or the spech.1 re'lef 1!ne. :i hy drc en is relcesed to the centeim ent it would incrc. c de i ' t il precrure. If the hydrogen 3 r.nct ed wi th oxygen a C,n:th e 's.c t :c u
- pr e: rer : :1d recult. Th,e persibility of any hy drcger c .nzn :: *
' occurring can be eliminated by reducing the oxygen ccntent of the cc- 'n-V mant ette:phere to lees than 5 /o. This can be accc:cp11 % d by p . se ' r. ;
an ef fectively inert atmosphcre using either nitregen or carbon di: :!c. The rii:.inetien of any persible hydrogen-oxygen r eaction indica t e s '" st a higher ar.: aunt of metal-water reaction can be tolerated before tyste: design limits vould be approcched. k'e estima te that the tolerchl e t e:al-ua t er rcn tion yithout any subsequent hydrosen-exygen react'.on vau: d t e at 1 ccct C tires grat tcr then thtt vi.ich could be toler ated vith a sub - ' : h; #.c c . .- f n r e a c ti c n for th : r 4cidt Iay reactor. T r4E hs s rn prop 2 pad, 14bciCT, to pi evide E n f nE rt fttaEphcre in l'ho dr,' VC11 End _e u ., e e' r ,,. - . nm . yn il . ! ' =?,
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k.. 3 5 da ll _ il .. n p;a.u r f en dader to preclude the i.ossibility of any LydrcL'r.-aqgen - 4.coction as they believe e.uch a t setion is not pessibic at the Humboldt Lay rew tor plant.
- 3. Dise maf on of Desim of Enginee ring Sniccan ds t'c hnco red s.:ed the design end ope. rational charectoristics of the ent' Auring safttuard sytems censidered by PGLE and believe that the y t .. hne the design cr.pability of e.initi2.ing the extent of core melt-down nd ::,etal-t.ct er rcaction in the event of a r.ajor to:s of ecclant w: 5 ? ,m t . L*c belicyc thet adequate power sout ces cre evnf irble Er x3 cither llc r.-cite conventional Units 1 cnd 2, the ccc:pany 's t rar t + r. f c n r ys t e ,,
or in a me cas es, e prcpanc driven ,rfh.rt ter, k's t er s uppli e s h e r, t i tl er tLa sqprcesion pool, storage tanks, .nd uc11s provide su r :d unt r'. cup
. c ter for fleedi:.g the dry well ed i nctor vessel. PG!-E p rper cs to perfera periodic tcsts to ensure the operational capcbility of the cy s t ctas . Testing perfc,rmed to date has indicated tha t the Cm e Spray cnd 4
Fire Systems have elways been operational. Th e Fe ed '..'a t er ad Cc n b.s a t e { 4 gu ns will be cperating continuously during reactor pcwer Leae16.ticn. l l PGLE states that three independent systems would be available for either. core cooling or flooding fol:cving a otjor accident involving a 1 loss cf coolant. Ho cver, removal (for r.aintenance) of some of the rajor cc-- ents identified in these syrte ns vould reduce the crer all re?irtili"- en: . . :. effects. ars. In par ti:t_st , ths Core Sprty a;w t se.ui ns 1 1 tr 7 : s: , b;t FC47 r::,: tes thet rly cre c f ther be r eqrf ed to be c; : :ul / arin;; r u c e: r oper s t' on i f d e s e_rvic..- 52 : 7 .. . r. i s " r :d
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wi thou t redandancy. The ' Low Presrero Fire Sys t em censicts of O rce p. ps, whereas PGLE propescs that reactor ope-ration be puoltted to u ttr,uc tith . two pt =ps in service and those ' o pn: ps r.re r eg;it ed for cn ef f> ct ive core fino<'ing capability. Collect! ely, thr te indegndent sptc:ns cc.n be f a.r tified as cngine.n ing ;fetusrds which nc a;pable of -ir ':! Ir ; e..cre wi t C:vn and u=.tsi-water reaction in the event of a nzjor rccidc:.t. ibwever, t!. e feilore of the mviceabic pump i.n the cere :puy 5,, e .m p uid p.a? 'e opera tion of tlat tystem. The fri!ure of ei ther of *Le two s ;rii '?c - p=ps in the fire systm vooid s u'uce that ty tez's effu ti c- es. It :s pas r.it3 e the t the fire q tc:a r sy i.at Le coup 3 c:.ely 2.uilcb:e f: re floodf r.g in the event of 2n en cit e fir e w h
- ch f.ndi ca' cs thit - .
s's full cepability is open to sc:re e,usstien. Vith a porrible pt.:.p s i:a e in the core spray system and either a reduce.d cf fe:ti ceners c4.peH1':y or even an unavailability of the fire eys tem, the Eig< h Fr u stre tyr t e (i.a., fndwater and condensate) would then be cvtiltble for ecre flooding. Mt.vever, one has only to postule te thc t the ini tial rupture ves a break in the S-inch feedwater line to make this tyrter t.nc.vcilable for core flooding. In view of the feregoing, it tecce:s cppt. rent that the relitMiiry cf U.e c.gf ueer i ng sc feguard sy s t ce s c .0 d M im p: _ : e c' 'ry th e r e a :1 c f ar t i :. .
. . ' or e v: pen ent s for .i.ni t entac e. Tt vm.1d be i dc c1 t o ? . e : - ~c ,s for triundancy in all sys te .,s so 0.ct r ' r.i c: ' r c e t c o n:- cc r- -
t
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( e . 6 " a [( 33 - 1 in any system uauld not reduce the ef fectivcncss of the udit o system. ! Ev..ver, an alternate requiteacnt, which is equally ef fective and which still 'uould provide for redundancy in the engineering ca fegecrd sys te r s,
.mnld be to allow a n intenance espability during reactor c.y dien to any one system at a t!ne. Thus, if a pur.p tere to be re :,ned fcom the
. + e cprety system for ruintenance, the fu A: ster and condensate and the if a rysters wuld have to be fully opet t rional with all cotew,ts es. ice:ble. This same criterion would also apply to the maintenance cr. M 1fty for % cd cr systecs. In brief, only one sys t en e f ite ^' : te U *iried vould be permitted a t.aintentnce cr.pability during i .ec tar r cp:n s tien, the ot.her two would be required to be fully cpa r t ical d th all ccaponcnts functional. Ue have discussed this with WE :.d they haec ogreed that raint.cnz-nce wculd be t estricted to only cnc c e t := nt a tine during periods of reactor operation.
For the special case whercin a break in the Feeduater line 'c L t
.ed to occur ceincident at a tioe when a pu: p hcs been re:2cved frem one of the other sefegucrd systems for r.aintenance, the question of redendency of r ajc.r cetpcnents for the engineering safeguard systems arises. Hewever, IG5E reports that a rupture of the feedester line causes an accident with
; ester cenceeuences than the extrere cases studied. Thus, it would not cppscr to b: necerscry to require full redundtn:y of rt:ajor cc cnents in the n:o : :12 rbl e r; s t+. s.
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- 1. /. x. . l.v.r i s b)r PGGE FG&E has analyzed the eccidents that could be aneciat ed with t.be T)pe II fuel cesembif es. In general, t he use of ths Type II fuel n 3 a N ms bns lit cle of feet en the conc eque r. css of s nc:31 s:ci ': nt s ;
' rady .aalyzed by PG!.E for the Humbcidt Ery teactor pisnt. Tb t :- c
'r-7t,h the startup accident end control rod v!thdrawal or drop ,
I
+ 12 c e. Howaver, the cearequences of a r;.r.jor 4ccident involving a j im-:r of ecolent becete considerably verse for t he core fueled v! th
;;m 71. = ther thin Type I fuel ass etblics by vf:. tus of t bs ( c: d '
c f ft.ct c,f r ny r i gni f f r.r nt t e r cl-vetcr re e- ef f en. ; e a N r the rter r up cr rod withdriwc1 type of reactivity n ;: t i , l iGsE c oeludes, c..d a gree, that the consequences theuld ic r: i cc c l r ev re LLrn prcviev31y cntlyisd cnd from which it v+s v.s vg*rlhhi d ';Nt the picnt refccucrds ute edequate. This conclusion :sn be rr.echd on thc. brsis 1. hat the nr.::irum control red vorth would r.ot Le it.cre t s d. The fuc1 loeding accident was reevaluated by FGLE Smuse the
?/pe II fect suc bly could be orth n:re thtn a Type I (i.e. 27. L k ccup: red to 1.7 A k) in an of f-norral lotding pattern assuitsd for t.he j t re l */ s ic . The configurctie:: fer this s itue.tien ves that 2 edjs. cnt i
control rode vart a s s uind t o be r e.rt.ove d f: cm a 2 x 4 fu el a s s e nt ly
- r<y. ' t <:ri r.; i N t rhs cr;; >' t3:<n P inisn iruld be t', d: ::
' l i L;7plEr, FC= E er.ticttes tic 3 00 fuel teds c:Uld ful
- rd re lc c c '
S 0: 2 - * :.; : D fi s ct icr;r i fir ico prrou:.: S v t.. _ ::y. 3GEr es j j 5:t -
- c.rui t en t . - f ot ogical cr.;;: gre v: uld ce r a: -r 7 i<
l i I I
* ,g* # M g I g F 3
. . ,= u*e o e * .-,"* cf**-
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h.d .1 .h< 9 bb.* - d .' .s L.M N J a JJId I i 1
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. 13 dis tance of e ppa c>.f u t e ly 0. 6 c <1e. Tte cocr: , ; i tg. :d dne i
w.s 0. 26 rem, whe.t eas t.he done for the t o : pea M c .
- M at .+ ' ng Type I fuel esscu.blies was report ed in tha n:Sr to 1 a 0. 05 ren.
PG6E has cnalyzed the Mc x! mum Cr t-dible Opere t he b tic'ent (b ON.) wher ein a r.2jor pipe ruptute f s ; e . r ..d to c.. ar visbin the dry ;c11 co n t a inm n t . Two limiting c n es ure t :.lya.d by W. s c'; (1) t Ecc-k of the 12-inch main stcam line, end (2) a bu k of the 3-inch s uctor coolent c1ctnup line. The s tecm line breck r i . - :c t 5 the 14rgest pipe stove the core, whereas the coolant cic - :. : f ? em t ;.cr h t o the Ittres t pipe below the core. Tle e? lyses for the two roses wrc p r f- ' -1 f% t j l effective' c. ore floedir.g syc t er, h'ar.tified Ly :C - I :e 1 Core 71cmding Sys tem (i.e. , the yard fire cyt t 1). FR i cc 1 4' is i i l this rystcm to be 'l tast e f fec t ive' because c; u - .a.t *;.veity is ! i' necessarily delayed until the t rector pr e' cure ' ;! ci ci :: rd t.e it least 150 ps ig during blot.dcrn. The tins inten ti r: t h pre s_:+ re reduce to this value for the break of the cic:.recp line, a t t urir g c:.e of the two special relief valvs failed to open, is tip:cdct rely L c.inutes, The rer uits of the entlyses by FGLE f ridica re that the core t G e: ding esp =bility of the low pres.sure sys tem tiene is s ufficient t o l i c.i t t h e.rcnt o f cle dding fA ilur e and n: tal-v= :c: - - r etr t:e eth r r.e yielding of the cete s truct.ure rey occur .: r i r .; ; rn el l L v_b;e c f tbc nccul ( co: eat che rasis n,d c.i: ":; iv _e
-ye pcths. In ty acnt, PGGC re pa ts thrt the r;rt .
- t . < d b e.
-w r e< e o o e. - _e .. c., 7 l' ,O,uud l! W, (+m ,- - a,
((sy.'(u a .p,((m oN a~ .< .a a
g, ){ 16'- cs ;;ble of tv bg folly f u crted in the eccnt of such i epturce so i ba t a 1.econdacy cr it icality f ac ht ve.uld not occur. For the ci:tm ifae break, PG6E reports that the re.ximut cladding terpera tut e vould r.o t 0 eses.ed 2100 F, whereas, for the cle3nup If rie break, appicxfx a t ely 0.17. of tie fuel rc.ds vould crp.rf ence cit ading tervere tut es ch:ve 3Mr. Cl ad f a ilure was se r.u:ad t.o ca. cur a t 15000F. This would res ul t in i r y ;.ru ' :.* tely 707. of t he fuel rods eith clad failure for the cicevup I
!! n.
trctk cnd 477. of the fuel rod with clad fu flure for the t: sin sf nn Ifne break. The correspcoding fis s ion p: c.duc t r:1 css e fi e.c t. ion - for th=. failed fuel r e ds ecs rest wd by PGLE to be 1.7 of the recble ' g:res and hr.lo; ens in the core for eith2r breck. In a c* r' f t i on , fc r t ?.c cle wp line brcr.k, it e:,s ar tur.2d thr.t 17. o f the fue l v: ul d i c . '. o c e
?.GD0"F and would Iclea<e the TID fra ctions. Thus , for the r t c :m lhe break PG&E assues.d that 1% of the tori 1 noble gas and hclepn ' .< r.t uy vanid be relecsed from the fuel, whereas the eletnup If na breek, t he r:re crount plus 1% of total core inventory based on the TID fractions vauld be available for release.
The a:>:iram cmount of ints1-vater reaction tha t would occur for LL: pestulated accident vcs reported by FG&E to be in the order of I 0.57., which corre.sponds to cpproximstely 70 lbs. of rircenium. This l v:uld yield 1.5 lb-roles hyd:cten for the cleanup lir.e break. If sli h d.o y . crc .sntzd to t.Et :q;rusic perl ch t- 't : r - 1. y ri: e d vi t h t he E f r , t he. m c! r.= cem.t r tr c ' n var i d be i t :s *.tn
- V/ o .
I r i.E t e ; ert e t 'r r t it is ot pu ' hic f-r 'hc Ey' ..j n j s to e i ti er tellect or s t a t i fy in ! c.cr1 t ries to fcrm c c: ': us :bic r'- t uv .
~..m1 m, ., . , . - -- -m-.,
e\ 4l ' \ ' .j ' ,.( ; k i {j j Q-1 4' ,' i g !$
.s
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,, 1 y
17 It cont <iAs ih.t the F;i re v,, 6 e Io its 1cu : 5i
<c -!;ht .d .1. ; o -
be:cause the evnraf ramt vc s sel de,s not Ic e s ay ec c7.zeb ats in it to allow localired collr-etico trce.s , vould wix with air a nd s.t e em atemphr.re in the containment vetcel. The t r t ult s nt Ir diole;f eni c'.: r r s for t he M004, as de te r:f ra d by l PG%E, care e>1(ult.ted on en etrun d Icektge 2cte 1.7% per day snd 107. per h y at 10 psig from the dry 511 end er, pre sica chcr.ber respec- . tively. (Tis.t e leakage rates corrcepond to thos e prepsed earlf er by PG# E bet he.ve rot been cutteria.ed pendf rig th: r,solts of the'in' w *:cd co .t r ir.:n nt Ic'kcce rete tet ting s cheduled fc r pu ft. 'nce this . ). The em:fram dos.es calcultt 2d by ?0&E at a dic ' e c c f C . f r.f l e s c e as fc12c n: Fte.cm Line CI: 5 up L!r.e 3rcak . Iresk ..
" hole Body (rr d) 0.37 0.069 Thyroid (rem) 0.025 0.022 i FG',E rcports that the doses for the s teem if nc break are gre a tcr bectus e r.:'s t of the fis ticn p:oducts vould be ver.ted to t he s up t c s -
sion char.ber wher.e the leakege is greatcr. PG&E h9s ncv identi fied the 100a. in ts::s of litited fuc1 dirtge cnd fir.sion product relcase. This is in s ht:p cortras t to its previous enslyser vhettin c:. plete core me)tdo. red be<n strured. The
.eces sity for redefinf r g 0 2 1:A nit er fran ti c , d'ri: t1 it.a.d M EOciated Vith thE r?thl*~'#tu ifbeticn.
- 2. 1.r21 v r. f s by. t_ M T ;_r f f_
Uc Fis c : c v h t he i .a 3 y er p:u t:.t ed iy r ME c believe th+. g- . - - , p - 3 _ y7 m., e-k.w- ,j: ' .s ~' , b,=b hww Y
~ .s . ~ . . .' f.; .
. /
e ., U.
, W, t he it.sde l a w d v a a ld 1.c n. c .:.c ;. s' . t e i f i . 2 u,u l d i'o , 'ntity for a comp 1cte cad accu ute unden tsa m g of the '_L. sit.r :;f 711 the praraaters involved in the analysis of this kind of wrf ces e ci?ent.
1:e do not belicve we have reccl.ad this nillenium. Fo r ti c. r , s 5 n " :.e ocasiders the results of PG6E's e r.:lys,cs .
..rcin caly ,c.c.'- tely 0,57. of the zirconium in the core is c.;1c.d e.t ed to sc= c t n d nl y 17.
of the total firecion p roduc ts is calc.nh f...d t o be i cir u ed fr a t he fuel in the e. vent of a trajor loes of coc? e .t a::ident, the 6, : s of e rs crvi.tism which has been applied by PO!I in its r.w! m. .'- ,
* -s c m icus prob 1cm. .
Of rai c bas ic c cern is the Tc e t that the cnrl; : ty. 7 - e
.c c : de in the rcnn:.r that has htt ct ofore im r1= bly : ':.:
'r :vf rum credible accidu nt' evaluer.io:s. The usual e;7:_. .
d is to estus,c thst cny enginscred safegurd providing ec ce hi :s not e f fec tive in preventing core 1,el t down, and then de : c -f n:. 15:. vs! Ts of the irepcrtant design paraceters of the centtf r: .snt unn c :f &nt ecoditions folicwing there assumptions. This ra t hod is n:-ed , for irticnce, to determine the design prusu:e End le dip rate cf a containr,ent vessel by assuming a major pipe rupture which results in a relesse of the high anergy primary c:'olant fellowed by a r :pic t e cor e mel td:wn. The resultant peak pressere that wruld subcequer.*13
.m. .c u r i t tcrn ,~2 in :h e. c. _ r '. t i: - :nt vestel is :Len o rd: --
i t c To f r i- '.' S d er . :' ; n 7 7 6 ! ! U T F , c'd tha 1 ' _ - ,; O F. l ' Orf b 3 5 't: ,i ?! .
- 'eterm ud !y a re q . 2. t t he fir e s:n 7:c6u;ts :r'. -
- 1. +
CC~. IT .T40 I9 h*EfS?hle t o I C E.h to th2 c r v i r r , r.t .
' I'
({m . - . , , ,al;: al[ai ,v, .'k'.'<~- es .i lI
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L__ - _ - _ _ -__ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - .--- .- - - -
a
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I f this v e thod u.-re fo)1c -d : in this cr.se, the P Midt ?cy c ont # f r Int sh;.uld peeves the capability for ce rcly scw: ; & ting the courequences from both the effects of a major pipe rupture ar.d the 3uYquent netal-veter reuction. Init.1:11y, PGr.E did est4blish t he d t Qn of the cent.;innent s ys tem in a cerw.rv4 t ive tranner er .be bo!s of tha total cricrgy cont dhution frca the prf .ry system due to a Ic'c s of wolant accident. Houver, with its requsst.to use the af r cn. f u a clad Type II fuel ass erblies, an s 3d! tic: 41 energy scurce ret,v h sd cer.tideration. The degree to which tb. c c.-tributing of cr.y rc:mi , ' tcr resction to the ever-all conMirt s.it pi cs r ut e vcs ' > ' e n into a ccour.t by FGLE rrpcars to be consider bly Ie r s thcn that .^ .; h
. . :7 d r m ul t if all core cooling rystems vtze e zeu d to be dne rft-4. . f .v .
The s esif hcs roide analy.5 es which show the e f fec t of t he e t+ r t of :s td .:e ter s cccticr.s en intcznal pressure in ths suppre s s iar. cher.her o f the containroen t sys tem. Thes e analyse s s how tha t ths dcsign pre < sure (10 psig) would be reached ender the fellcw!ng condi t ict:s : Petsl-water rcr.ction only 67. L'etti-vster 'rcaction with subsequent exidtt$on of hydrogen 1% It can bc secr that the above vtltes s e quits low due to the low . dcrign preu ere of the suppierrier cht-hcr and the sr.w'1 ever-all v:lt.?3 o f t be c e ntt i rcc c s t v a t- t 1. (FGLE -tports rh:t thc cor =d- :-- could . r c '. c : t ty.ir m t : r t.1 -vit e r r u c ricr. vi t h t . x e : m . - nid? - - O f t h i ." .7!g: P O f U, , % i! 4.1 h e l'e d C*.
- S '.ppi 'J 1 r I C D
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,c m . .s ,2,, ('m ,N.*=.,.
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4 3 y y
. /0-11 it of 12.5 prig, , T iht 152 c :.s i?- w t f oi of<ny '
- 1 <.._r-precsere tFat would be present due to the iritf al b7ce't . n. ME i elso indicates that its en=1yses show that the r.rxit.1.n . m eticn cMpected in the e. vent of an l ';0's vuld be in the order of 0.5%) .
"c have attsc%d a g. :ph (pig 1 ) d ' wi n g t he v r- 7 e ' !(. ; sh!p fttu.cn contains.lut i.,:nsure vs per cent rctal-Urter te ction for tv0 c ondi tions ; i.e., (1) tr.c tal -v:- t er l u c t i c n ci cne , a nd ( 2) = c t s i -vate r 1
r ea c tion and subse.quent hydrov n-c. yt;,c n r , cca bine tic,n. ' ,at c.p: ia t e 1 i pressure lir.,i.ts for vericus accident cc /1tions 5.tve b _n i d :,ti fi ed, ve have rit o cva7 anted the ( cr4 :cu res of a ccr: ,
-'- ;t ,
vel failure due t o r.n e.r o m.s ive . '.tcl-va t er rn e tion. Tcr - :r djsft, ve essui.ad ths e ne a < . ple.te core r citCc n end e -'1 - a . ! f i - S:.., preducts to the contcir:nnt in accordtnce with TID . ' - ' c :. : . re sleo creened th:t the hy dregen libera ted frca a nc.nal-n. ; e: re eti:n reaction incte r.w.d the pres sure in the cor.tainment ver :+1 to the utent 4 {! thct the rut pressicn chs.mber fciled. We e s s uned , for a:a. :sce, that the rupture of the suppression chamber vaald result in an ritdal l releas e of appreninately 3% of t he firs.tc n pr rdu:t3 in L .c c.rm in- " raent atmosphere to the refueling building. This corresponds to the mole f raction rcquired to bs u n:cd frca the supp:es sior. cht bar to l reduce internal pr es s ure to 2.: bier.t conditions. For the r ecend case , we escumd that all of the fir . f c- . pt: ioc r in the cert: '-- -- w rsthere vere relused t o ' he :c fuel'rg r uilditq. ~r. '-
.sd for t y r c-gw.t ts th .r,51 r u e < cr p rvir ., .: tion v:.c . . rs l 5.officient t ir.1 to ; vo:'a : >- y ' i . . :: w1vt f:r t' : s :r+~ :,
The rele + s e of t ha fi c. r ien pt : - ..: u ." 01 thz re furl;r; - J :; to J:.c g c. ., n .
- e. n
- 'd 't :;~ .
c.
.;.N l ' O ' l1 % su " l- -! .
, :.. %. s ,4 La
o p o o n > f
*nh 21 -
cu te. ide e r;v ir maant was by qy o f t he si n ck. Y:,:, . '7 is of cor entlysis, wherein the riidfological dese to the thyre!d .are ca7culc-
'l ted, are as fo11cus:
1 I' 397. Release 1007. - - r- e.1. .+ : e.
.I n. _i t .i.a .l C..o~n t r ibu t.i. o. n_
Tot _il .Ef N e.. l 2 hr c.ax (90 rem 1.M 0 ;c en l i
.1 30 dcy-nax 1780 rem 4950 ter.
(?'e l ;um dose occurs a t a dis tance of s p;>.cs'n.a tely 0.5 ra i ct) . d If va assume a filter ef ficiency of 957., the sbeve doses v:mid be re&ce:d by a fs.cLor of 20. This teductica v:uid piece L1c ? .s 1 vithin the li: its of Tart 100. However, if a ciaficr celeu3 r * *;n I esing IID .a teorology f.s nede where in the plume 'ntem tcu v1: i hilltide rq proximately 1 : rile cvay, the 2 hr. ' Lot >1 c Cer.t' J c i vauld ba cpr i cxir.ately a frc tor of 25 gres.ter than tM t .' < t - ed for t he <leve ted release cese (i.e. , 3.6 x 104 rent) . I f t h e c P. tr doses were secled up accordingly, they also would be in m et cf the guidelines suggested in Per: 100 regardless of Er.y rv_: caaM e e f fec t due to the filter, sys t em. i i 1 l IV. . Conclusions
- J The s taf f s<es no important safety problens not adequately taken into I
- nside ration by P0&E in normal opcretion bf the Eurboldt Bay rcactor with ;
1 Type II fuel cic: nts. Eovever, in c miderction o f the t':AJ and the pes t ible
- n tit .es ef a ; ir cenium- n t er rc 4
- .t 5 : n, . ? c:nne t i e c+.pt rhe ri: p-i- n ci f F P'd th E t the re licbf li ty of 'the. f r e . < : t er.:y cooling s ys' e:r.: 17 ach as t c. pr e:: ad e i.ny s ;4 - i fi er.nt core re l t de m; '. : e, there is et ett +: n ;
f r signfi:t t t in-:". cu.nt of rirconion-vc t er re action, so it.=.11 fn f s .: IFnt )
~s ,
u : - - - j < :. y p ~y,e b :c J sp ((w h< S.%.s_ t
% u,w % s . te yJ k.
i e Y O d,,. '
)[
- ;2 -
thare is no i,eed even to in+.rt the cm tain: : nt. This is in basic ccaflict
. i th t he pr e.d s e se ,verning the design of every containne.nt s tructur e; nuely, i
the t- urgency ecoling systers fail to functicn t.nd core :nitfcm c::suas if 1
)
1!, .re b a ajor rupt ure in the coolcnt rys t em. The Harboldt cnM.= f nnt
- f sd en the b.s # s of this pret119e.
*rs.
Eut tha precise is dcnfed in thsir e c - '- - t. of t.he pa t<.ntir.1 zir conium-vs te.r rca.t ion. In a cbunce of an acceptable saclysis u t ening co:plete locs of coc1cnt
- db d c>n s ea r:chinism concept which would limit the zir conium-water
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Docket-50-133 _ ti j i
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Pacific Cas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Frederick T. Searle Vice President and General Counsel 77 Beale Street
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)" I San Francisco, California 94106 Gentlemen:
This letter refers to the inspections of your activities authorized rnder AEC Facility License No. DPR-7 conducted by Mr. J. L. Creus of cur Region V Regulato 7 Operations Office and other Regulatory Operations personnel on June 20-!2, 1972, at the humboldt Bay Nuclear Generating Station in Eureka, Ca.ifornia and on July 12-13, 1972, at the Corporate / Engineering Offices in San Francisco, California. Eased on the results of these inspections, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with AEC require-ments. These matters, which Messrs. Engelken, Smith and Crcws of this Directorate discussed with Messrs. Bonner, Braun and Matthew and which Messrs isolan, Spencer and Crews discussed with other members of your senior staff, at the PG6E Offices in San Francisco, California on October 19, 1972, are identified in the enclosure to this letter. This notice is sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the AEC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office within twenty (20) days of your receipt of this notice a written statement or explanation in reply including: (1) corrective steps which have been taken by you and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full com-pliance will be achieved. We note that written procedures were generated and issued during the coursa of the inspection for the two anticipated abnormal operating conditions discussed in Ites 1 of the enclosure. Our contin,ang concarn, hcuever, is there r.ay bc other anticipated ainormal operating conciticas which require the preparation of additional written procedures. It is requested thst, in your reply to this item, you discuss the s teps taken by PGLE to cr sore that detad 2ed written procedures exist and are adecustc to cope with anticipated abnormal operating conditions. 4 e
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i S ln ore PACIFIC CAS AhD EL6CIRIC COM?AliY DOCKET No. 50-133 Items of h* noncompliance with Regulatory Requirements:
- 1. Paragraph IX.D. of the Technical Specifications requires that writ ten procedures be available and adhered to in conducting normal operations involving systems and components having nuclear safety implications, and that these procedures contain information to provide guidance to operations personnel in the event of abnormal operating conditions.
Contrary to the requirements of Paragraph IX.D. of the Technical Specifications, written procedures had not been generated to provide guidance to operations personnel in the event of antic-ipated abnormal operating conditions involving evacuation of the control room and the loss of instrument air.
- 2. Paragraph IX.D. of the Technical Specifications also requires operating procedures to be revised periodically by the plant staff in light of operating experiences.
Contrary to the requirements of Paragraph IX.D. of the Technical. Specifications, facility records did not show that revicus of operating procedures to determine their adequacy have been conducted periodically. The majority of the facility procedures were observed to have issue or revision dates of 1962-1963.
- 3. Paragraph 50.59 of Title 10, Part 50, Code of Federal Regulations, requires in part that the licensee maintain records of chcnges to the f acility made without prior Commission approval, and further requires that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve,an unreviewed safety question.
Contrary to the requirements of 30 CFR 50.59, the written safety evaluation relating to the installation in 1971 of additional lateral restraints for reactor internal components did not contain the complete bases for the determination that this cha'n ge does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Substantial discussions with PCtE engineering representatives as well as the examination of sevcral engineering documencs were necessary in order for our inspectors to deter:ine the extent to which your staf f had evaluated the safety significance of this ci.ange.
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license and sks for a plan of correct'.ve action < ' t!.in /0 d:ys. l
??o AC'.S actica is re:co. er ded.
T!.e arelesed r.aterial should 're rctatued as part of the l +
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