IR 05000341/1987034

Insp Rept 50-341/87-34 on 870817-21 & 0901-03.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions Re Generic Ltr 84-11 & Implementation of USI A-7,Mark I Containment Long Term Program

ML20234F022
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/16/1987
From:	Danielson D, David Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234F014	List: IR 05000341/1987034 ML20234F012
References
REF-GTECI-A-07, REF-GTECI-CO, TASK-A-07, TASK-A-7, TASK-OR 50-341-87-34, GL-84-11, NUDOCS 8709230005
Download: ML20234F022 (9)

Text

,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/87034(DRS)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48224 Facility Name: Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 Inspection At: Enrico Fermi 2 Site, Monroe, Michigan Inspection Conducted: August 17-21, and September 1-3, 1987 w& l Inspector: Jones 9 /6/87 Date '

Wb Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief Th6/47 Materials and Processes Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 17-21, and September 1-3, 1987 (Report No. 50-341/87034(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's action concerning Generic Letter 84-11 (Temporary Instruction 2515/89)(25589), and of the licenser. ' actiop to implement Unresolved Safety Issue A-7, Mark I containment long term pmgram (Teniporary Instruction 2515/85)(25585).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

~

8709230005 070916 DR ADOCK 0500 1

__

-

.

A DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company (DECO)

F. Agosti, VP, Nuclear Engineering and Services L. Fron, Supervisor, Mechanical / Fluid Systems

• A. Lim, Lead Plant Engineer M. Williams, Senior Engineer, Engineering Design B. Lennert, Engineering Manager

• S. Cashell, Licensing Engineer M. Rhodes, Auditor, Quality Program Assurance B. Sheffel, ISI/ PEP Program Manager

• J. Wald, Supervisor, PQA

• R. Raisanen, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering

• W. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector M. Parker, Resident Inspector P. Pelke, Project Inspector The NRC inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those present at the final exit interview on September 3, 198 . Licensee Action on Generic Letters (Closed TI 2515/89) Licensee Action On NRC Generic Letter 84-11 Inspection of Licensee Actions Taken to Implement NRC Generic Letter 84-11: " Inspections of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)

Stainless Steel Piping".

(1) Inspection Program In a July 13, 1984, licensee letter to the NRC (Jens to Youngblood) it was stated in Paragraph D that, " Stainless steel piping in the recirculation, reactor water cleanup and residual heat removal piping systems will be inspected (NDE) in accordance with the rules of the applicable edition of ASME Section XI, to the extent possible and within design limitations. Further, welds selected in accordance with the rules of Section XI will receive an increased frequency of examination in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0313, Revision 1." Furthermore,

" examination of the welds is scheduled to be completed in an eighty-month cycle. The examination of these welds is to be spaced ovar the 80 month cycle."

__ - _-_--_- ___ __

.

.%

f/, '

T (2)_ Competence of UT Examiners r

In a July 13, 1984' licensee letter to the NRC (Jens to.Youngblood)

'it was stated that, "All future contracts.for NDE at Fermi 2 will

. require that personnel be qualified in accordance with IEB 83-02."

(3) Leak Detection and Leakage Limits The NRC' inspector reviewed-the Technical Specifications for leak detection and leakage limit criteria. The review revealed

-

.

Lthat the Technical Specifications reflected.the leakage limits and operability requirements of Generic Letter 84-1 (4)- Performance of Inspection

~At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not performed an' outage'related inservice inspection. This attribute will remain an Open Item-(341/87-34-01).

b .- (0 pen) Generic Letter 87-05: Degradation of Steel Containments The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response, dated June 15, 1987, to the referenced Generic Letter. Further investigation revealed that the response was under review by NRR. Pending the outcome of this review, this will. remain an Open Item (341/87034-02). (Closed TI 2515/85) Mark I Modification General Additional suppression pool hydrodynamic loads associated with a postulated Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) were identified during large-scale testing of an advanced design pressure-suppression containment (Mark III). These additional loads, which had not-explicitly been included in the original Mark I containment desigri,-

result from the dynamic effects of drywell air.and steam being rapidly. forced into the suppression pool (torus). Because these hydrodynamic loads had not been considered in-the original design of the Mark I containment, a detailed reevaluation of-the Mark I containment system was required. As a result of the reevaluation, structural modifications were required to restore the originally intended design-safety margins. These structural modifications included the following items:

Drywell-to-Wetwell (Torus) Di1serential Pressure Contro Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring Syste Downcomer Bracin Vent Header Deflecto _ - _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ - - _ - - - .- _--

- - - - - - - . - - _ - - _ - - - - _ - _ - - - - _ - - - - . - - - - - - _

.

.

Safety-Relief Valve (SRV) Quencher Stiffening of Torus Attached Pipin Torus Support Reinforcemen The following paragraphs address the inspection requirements of NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/85, which was issued to verify satisfactory completion of licensee action concerning the Mark I Progra b. Programmatic Review The NRC inspector reviewed previous inspection reports covering-programmatic inspections performed durin, the modifications. The reports were reviewed to verify the inspection coverage of the following areas:

Torus Support. Reinforcemen Torus Internal Modificatio Torus Attached Pipin The result of the review is outlined in the following matrix:

TORUS SUPPORT REINFORCEMENT

REPORT NO. 50-341/ l l l l l l l l l INSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS X DESIGN DOCUMENTS X X CONTRACT & PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS X DRAWINGS X PROCEDURES X X X PERSONNEL CERTIFICATIONS & QUALIFICATIONS X X MATERIAL CERTIFICATIONS X OBSERVATIONS FABRILhi10N/ INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES X X X X INSTALLATION, INSPECTIONS & OTHER QUALITY RELATED 00CUMEN15 X X

• NOT PREVIOUSLY ?.NSPEC~ED

- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

_

.

,

.

TORUS INTERNALS MODIFICATIONS b l b REPORT N0. 50-341/ l l l l l l l l l

INSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS X l DESIGN DOCUMENTS X X l CONTRACT & PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS X l DRAWINGS X l PROCEDURES X l PERSONNEL CERTIFICATIONS & QUALIFICATIONS X l MATERIAL CERTIFICATIONS X X l OBSERVATIONS FABRICATION / INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES X X X l INSTALLATION, INSPECTIONS & OTHER QUALITY RELATED DOCUMENTS X X l

• NOT PREVIOUSLY ;;NSPEC"ED TORUS ATTACHED PIPING lu lw lw 12 l l l l REPORT N0. 50-341/

lI!slElillll l l l l l l l l INSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS X DESIGN DOCUMENTS X l CONTRACT & PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS X i DRAWINGS X l PROCEDURES X l PERSONNEL CERTIFICATIONS & QUALIFICATIONS X l MATERIAL CERTIFICATIONS X l

'

OBSERVATIONS FABRICATION / INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES X l INSTALLATION, INSPECTIONS & OTHER QUALITY RELATED DOCUMENTS X l

• NOT PREVIOUSLY ;;NSPECED Technical Specification Review (1) Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System (SPTMS)

The licensee did not modify the SPTMS, during the Mark I program. The system was adequate to satisfy the criteria of NUREG-0661, Appendix A, "Supp: nsion Pool Temperature Limits for BWR Containment."

(2) Drywell to Wetwell Differential Pressure Control Fermi 2, does not utilize a pressure differential between the drywell and wetwell (Torus).

5

-_-_ . _ _ _ _ .

-

t d. Design Modification Review (1) Downcomer Bracing i

The modification consisted of reinforcing the intersection of the downcomers and the vent header with a system of stiffener plates and bracing member In the plane of the downcomers, the' intersections are stiffened by a 1/2" thick crotch plate located between pairs of downcomers. The connection of the top side of each downcomer to the vent header is reinforced by 1/2" thick outer stiffener plate Downcomer ring plates which are 1" thick connect the associated crotch plate with the outer stiffener plates. In the direction normal to the plane of the downcomer pair, the intersections are braced by 4" diameter schedule 80 pipes. One pipe member is located on each side of the vent header. The upper ends of these pip members are connected to a built-up tee-section.and 3/4" thick pad plates attached to the vent header. The lower ends of the pipe members are connected to the downcomer ring plates. The ring plates are stiffened locally with a 3/4" thick gusset plate and pad plate assembl In addition, the adjacent downcomer pairs in the non-vent line bay are joined by 2" diameter rods, one of either side of the vent header. The ends of these rods are connected to the downcomer ring The system of stiffener plates and bracing members on the downcomer to vent header intersection provides a highly redundant mechanism for the transfer of loads acting on the downcomers. This effectively reduces the magnitude of loads which pass directly through the intersectio The NRC inspector reviewed the following NUTECH drawing and Reactor Controls, Inc (RCI) drawings to verify that the modifications met the Plant Unique Analysis Report (PUAR)

commitments:  ;

I Drawing N Title j D-10 (NUTECH) Downcomer Stiffening D-4110 (RCI) Downcomer Stiffening ,

The NRC inspector also reviewed the following QA records to assure that the appropriate procedures were used during the installatinr:

Operation Process Travele Magnetic Particle Examination Recor (2) Vent Header Deflector The modification consisted of the installation of 12" diameter schedule 120 pipe with 6" rolled tee-sections attached to

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- _ _ _ _ .-_ . -. - -

.

.

either side in the non-vent line bays and 1 1/2" thick rolled plate in the vent line bays. The non-vent line bay deflectors are supported by the crotch plates at each vent header to downcomer intersection. The vent line bay deflectors.are supported by the ring plates on the vent line to vent header intersections; by the SRV piping support plates on the vent header; and by the crotch plates at each downcomer to vent header intersection location. The vent header deflectors are designed to completely mitigate pool swell impact loads which occur during the initial phase of a DBA even The NRC inspector reviewed the following NUTECH and RCI drawings to verify that the modification met the PUAR commitments:

Drawing N Title D-31 (NUTECH) Vent Line Bay Vent Header Deflector D-25 (NUTECH) Vent Header Deflector D-4125 (RCI) Vent Header Deflector The NRC inspector also reviewed the following QA records to assure that the appropriate procedures were used during the installation:

Operation Process Travele Liquid Penetrant Examination Recor Magnetic Particle Examination Recor Weld Process Control Sheet Travele (3) SRV Quenchers The modification consisted of the installation of 15 T-Quenchers with ramsheads at the end of the SRV pipin Each T-Quencher consists of a ramshead assembly, two 20" diameter perforated stainless steel pipes with end caps, and the associated supports. The T-Quenchers provide an effective means of mitigating air clearing loads during an SRV discharge.

l The NRC inspector reviewed the following NUTECH drawings to verify that the modifications met the PUAR commitments:

Drawing N Title 0-28 SRV Discharge T-Quencher Device D-29 SRV Discharge T-Quencher l Supports

, _ . .. _

_-

.

.

The NRC inspector also reviewed the following QA records to assure that the appropriate procedures were used during the installation:

Operation Process Travele Liquid Penetrant Examination Recor Weld Process Control Sheet Travele (4) Torus Attached Piping (TAP) Penetration Stiffeners The modification consisted of external and internal reinforcement of the penetration nozzles. The external reinforcement included two, 1" thick saddle plates welded to the penetration nozzle and four, 1 1/4" thick support arms which extend radially from the saddle plates to pad plates attached to the suppression chamber shell. Additional external gusset plates which connect to the support arms and the insert plate are inserted at selected penetrations. The internal reinforcement consists of four 1 1/4" thick plates attached to the insert plate and two 1" thick saddle plates welded to the penetration nozzl Each penetration is designed to resist TAP reaction load These loads are produced by normal suppression chamber motions as well as hydrodynamic motion of the suppression chamber itself and the portion of the piping inside the suppression chambe The NRC inspector reviewed the following NUTECH drawing to verify that the modification met the PUAR commitments:

Drawing N Title D-32 Torus Penetrations Modification The NRC inspector also reviewed the following QA records to assure that the appropriate procedures were used during the installation:

Record Drawing Table Record Drawing Repair Check Lis e. Visual Inspection l The NRC inspector inspected the final installation of the following modifications to the requirements of the design drawings:

L _-----__------_-__J

_ _ .- - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ..

.

w (1) Downcomer Bracin (2) Vent Header Deflecto (3) Torus Attached Piping Penetration Stiffener Although the torus contained water at the time of the inspection, the NRC inspector was able to verify the installation of the SRV T-Quenchers and suppor . Onen Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involves some action

.on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph . Exit Meeting The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted

. Paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection-report with regard to documents of processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents /

processes as proprietar m____.___ _ ._ _ 1