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Insp Rept 50-285/88-20 on 880621-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance & Capabilities During Annual Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures
	ML20151G380
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	07/20/1988
From:	Everett R, Terc N; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
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ML20151G378	List: ML20151G376; ML20151G380;
References
	50-285-88-20, NUDOCS 8807280323
	Download: ML20151G380 (8)
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APPENDIX

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U.S., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

-REGION IV.

NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/88-20 Operating License: OPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD)

1623 Harney Street

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection' At: FCS, Fort Calhoun, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: June 21-23, 1988

Inspector: .

T 7b

. N. M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Ar41yst Date

NRCTeamLeader, Security.andEmergepcy

Preparedness Section (

Acccmpanying

Personnel: J. Everett, Chief, Security and Emergency

Preparedness Section, NRC Region IV

M. Murphy, NRC Reactor Inspector, NRC, RIV

J. MacLellan, Pacific Northwest' Laboratories

D. Schultz, Comex Corporation

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Approved: [9. vd

II. J. Everett., Chief, Security and Emergency

7/po/SS

Date

dreparedness Section

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted June 21-23, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance

and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

identified. Fifteen deficiencies were identified (paragraphs 4- 10).

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DETAILS'

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1. Persons' Contacted

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OPPD-

H..F. Sterba, Division Manager, Corporation Comm;ttee

. C. -.F. Simmons, Onsite Licensing Engineer

C. A. Carlson, Shift Supervisor

A. G. Christensen, Health Physicist

R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services t

L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations

J.. Gasper, Manager, Administration and Training

W. G. Gates, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station

W. Nehrenz, Emergency Planning Coordinator, Offsite

B. Bibbins, Technical Services Secretary

K. J. Morris,. Division Manager, Nuclear Operations

C. W. Norris, Supervisor, Radiological Services

R, L.'Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Fioduction

R. K. Stultz, Supervisor, Radiological and Environmental

J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs

S. Gebers, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator

F. Franco, Manager, Radiation Health and Emergency Planning

G. L. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Protection

NRC.

T. Reis, Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station

The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training,

and emergency response.

Denotes!those present at the exit interview on June 23, 1988.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-01): Deficient Information Flow - The NRC

inspector opened a new item (285/8820-06). See paragraph 4.f.

(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-02): Inadequate Procedure - The NRC

inspector noted that the licensee had corrected internal inconsistencies

in the procedure.

(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-03): Failure to Follow Notifications

Procedure - The NRC inspector opened a new item (285/8820-02). See

paragraph 4.b.

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c (Closed) Deficiency.(285/8719-04): Failure of Doors ~- The NRC inspector

verified that airlock doors in the Technical Support Center (TSC) now-

close-tightly.

(Ciosed) Deficiency (285/8719-05). ~Inade

inspector opened:a new item (285/8820-11)quate.

Briefings.-

See paragraph 7.a. The NRC

(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-06): Inadequate Recordkeeping - The

inspector noted that the licensee had im) roved recordkeeping by providing

a stenographer to maintain records for t1e Recovery Manager.~

(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-07): Inadequate Inplant Radiological

Controls - The NRC inspector opened a new item (285/8820-13). See.

paragraph 8.

3. Program Areas Inspected

TheNRCinspectorobservedlicenseeactivitiesintheControlRoom(CR),

Technical Support. Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and -

Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) during the exercise. The NRC

inspector also observed emergency response organization staffing, facility

activation, detection, classification, and operational assessment,

notifications of licensee personnel, notifications of offsite agencies,

formulation of protective action recommendations, offsite dose assessment,

in plant corrective actions and rescue, security / accountability activities,

and recovery operations. ,

4. Control Room (82301(1))

a. The site director (SD) (the ' shift supervisor in the control room) did

not recognize existing plant conditions demanding-an Alert

classification existing.at 7:15 a.m. until prompted at 7:35 a.m. by a

contingency message. This is a deficiency (285/8820-01).

b. There were five instances of failure to follow notification

procedures as follows:

The communicator in the control room did not complete the

7:20 a.m. Notification of Unusual Event (N0VE) message form

correctly, i.e., did not indicate in the "Remacks" block that an

exercise was taking place, and did not complete the "Report

Received by" for the state of Nebraska Emergency Operations

Center.

.The above message did not show wind speed, wind direction,

affected sectors and recommended protective action

recommendations for the radioactive release in progress.

While the release of radioactivity to the environment was going

on during the NOVE, the shift supervisor (who was acting as the

site director) instructed the control room communicator to tell

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officers of the states of Nebraska and Iowa there was no current

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dose assessment at_the time, and did not provide information

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'about the current release.

At 7:42 a.m., the control room staff did not prepare a

-Notification Message according to written procedures for the

Alert declaration.

The above is a repeat deficiency (285/8820-02).

c. The reliability'of the primary communication link of the Control

Room (CR) with the other Emergency-Response Facilities _(ERF) was

q'uestionable. The telephone system with conference capabilities was

interrupted several times during the exercise. This-interruption was

caused by the inadvertent removal of the handset from its closed

-position. .This is a deficiency (285/8820-03).

d. The control room staff did not' follow Procedure A0P-2 '"Reactor

Coolant'SystemHighActivity,"andasaconsequencedIdnotstart

reactor shutdown urtil 7:54 a.m., 12 minutes after the Alert.

declaration. This is a. deficiency (285/8820-04).

e. Control room personnel did,not advise plant personnel of adverse

radiological conditions in containment.~ When~the Alert was declared,

the control room: staff announced it on the Gaitronics system without

explaining the reasons for'the emergency classification.' The NRC

inspector noted that the written procedure was inadequate because it

did not instruct the shift supervisor on how long to sound the siren,

how to inform personnel of hazards, and how to instruct personnel to

evacuate hazardous areas. This is a deficiency (285/8820-05),

f. Information flow was deficient because critical plant conditiens were

not promptly communicated to the TSC. Reactor coolant radiochemistry

sample results showed a large increase in radioactivity at 6 a.m.,

but the chemist did not communicate results to the TSC until 8 a.m.

The site director at the TSC recognized the need for improved

communications, and requested at 9:10 a.m. that an additional

communication link be established with the control room. This is a >

repeat deficiency (285/8820-06).

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Technical Support Center (TSC) (82301(2))

a. The TSC staff, daring the 8:10 a.m. update report to offsite

authorities, did not reflect the radioactive release in progress. At

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that time, the stack release rate was more than Technical

Specification requirements. This is a repeat deficiency (see

, item 285/8820-02). ,

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b. The following findings indicated that the TSC staff was not effective -

in their evaluation of plant conditions and in providing technical

support to operations:

The Technical Support Staff (TSS) did not promptly differentiate

between the reactor coolant leak rate through the pressurizer to

the containment atmosphere and the primary to secondary leak in

the steam generator. As a consequence, the TSS did not

recognize that it was the steam generator safety valve failure

which caused Room 81 to be filled with steam.

At 9:17 a.m. , the TSS could not determine the location and

extent of the steam generator tube rupture in spite of existing

plant conditions.

At 9:22 a.m., the TSS erroneously concluded that there was a

steam generator tube rupture and a stea:. iine break.

At 9:25 a.m. , the TSS was unable to give any information to the

SD at the TSC when he asked the status of the steam generator.

This occurred after the SD received a report from the on-site

monitoring team iaforming him that the facade of the containment

had blown off. The TSS should have been aware that the location

of the steam generator's safety relief valves was such that a

steam release could cause the containment facade to be blown

off.

At 9:32 a.m., the TSS confirmed that there was no increase in

containment sump level nor containment pressure. However, they

did not notice significant increases in the main steam line

radiation monitor readings while the containment radiation

monitors remained relatively constant. The TSS had not

recognized that a large release of radioactivity to the

environment was taking place.

The TSS's lack of understanding of plant conditions during the

release delayed input data (e.g., mass flow rate) required to

perform dose assessment calculations. The staff did not

complete the first mass flow calculation until 9:38 a.m., that

is 38 minutes after plant conditions indicated that the steam

generator tube rupture and failure of a safety. valve had

occurred. At that time the steam generator was losing about 800

gallons per minute.

The above is a deficiency (285/8820-07).

c. While the site director was coordinating and directing the emergency

organization from the TSC, the recovery manager at the E0F made an

inadequate appropriation of responsibilities. The recovery mana

took over Dose Assessment and Offsite Monituring Team functions.ger

This was a source of confusion for the TSC dose assessment staff.

This is a deficiency (285/8820-08).

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d. The dose assessor in the TSC made several inappro

-resulted in inaccurate ~offsite' dose projections. Thepriate entries

estimated timewhich

of release duration at 9:10 'a.m. was about one hour. the

dose assessor entered a release duration of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. In Instead,

addit ion, he

erroneously entered containment stack and condenser as-the release

location. The main steam isolation valves were shut making-the

condenser not applicable. This is a deficiency (285/8820-09).

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No violations or deviations were. identified.

6. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) (82301(3))

The Recovery Manager did not classify the General'Emer ency until about

44 minutes after the conditions warranting-the classif. cation were-in

alace, and 33 minutes after dose assessment results supported a General

Emergency classification. Thisisadeficiency.(285/8820-10).

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.- 0p'erations Support Center (0SC) (82301(4))

a. Briefings and debriefings of in plant repair teams dis)atched from

the OSC were inadequate. The radiation protection tec1nicians did

not provide in plant teams with-information mandated by

Procedure EPIP-0SC-9, "Emergency Repairs,' Corrective Actions, and

Damage Control." Briefers did not provide repair teams with

diagrams, procedures, floor plans, nor give specific instructions on

how to perfora complex tasks. This is a repeat deficiency

(285/8820-11).

b. The OSC staff did not have a method to maintain continuous personnel

accountability of in plant teams. This is a deficiency

(285/8820-12).

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Corrective Actions / Rescue and Medical Team (82301(7)(10))

The rescue team was'not well equipped and their practices were poor in the

cross-contaminated

areas of radiation protection and first aid (e.g.,ited about 5 minutes

accidentvictim,areasadjacenttoRoom81,andwa

before takin] vital signs or giving shock treatment). In addition, a

member of tie-medical team was not trained in First-Aid Multi-Media nor

decontaminution practices. Only one steam suit was available and the

internal face shield was damaged. The other rescue team member entered

the room where a steam leak was going on without a steam suit. The

lio r ee did not have a communication device to be used while wearing the l

st- an suit. This is a deficiency (285/8820-13).

No violations or deviations were identified. l

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9. Security / Accountability (82301(8))

The. licensee did not perform personnel accountability during the site.

evacuation within~the 30-minute guidelines of NUREG 0654. :The~ evacuation

alarm sounded at 7:39 a.m. The licensee could not complete accountability

until 8:18 a.m.

The above is a deficiency (285/8820-14).

No violation's or deviations were identified.

10. Scenario

The NRC inspector noted that since the last exercise, the licensee has

devoted substantial resources.to the development of an adequate scenario.

For the most'part,.the scenario developed for the observed annual exercise

was technically sound and challenging to the players, hwever, the NRC-

' inspector found some scenario incongruencies during the exercise which

detracted from the realism and free. play of the exercise, Some examples ,

follow:

Some controllers prompted players and did not provide data that would

normally be accessible to the players _under actual accident

conditions. ,

At 8:50 a.m. (10 minutes before the scenario major event of a eteam

generator tube rupture), the controller in the control. room r i

that the initial conditions of.the scenario did not include a a ight

increase in radioactivity in the B steam generator. He gave this

information directly to the players, prompting them to vital scenario

information that would not have been readily accessible to them at

that time.

The scenario did not provide information to the TSC staff that would

be accessible to them during normal operations. For example, the

maintenance manager was not told by the scenario or by the

controllers that maintenance work was being planned on leaking

containment purge valves. As a consequence, he was forced to

dispatch a team to learn about the valve status.

The scenario did not anticipate plant conditions that would result

from control room operators' actions under Emergency Operations

Procedures and Recovery Procedures. For example, the TSS directed

isolation of the steam generator in question. After this isolation,

there should be no pressure differential within the primary system.

Scenario data, however, showed a large pressure differential between

the primary system and the steam generator.

Data on instrument readings presented to the TSC staff was ambiguous

because various ranges could be implied. This caused artificial

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delays and hesitations that would not have existed under more

realistic conditions.

The above is a repeat deficiency (285/8820-15).

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee

representatives indicated in paragraph 1 on June 23, 1988, and summarized

the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.

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ML20151G380

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