ML20151G380
| ML20151G380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1988 |
| From: | Everett R, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G378 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-88-20, NUDOCS 8807280323 | |
| Download: ML20151G380 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1988020
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APPENDIX
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U.S., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-REGION IV.
NRC Inspection Report:
50-285/88-20
Operating License: OPR-40
Docket:
50-285
Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD)
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)
Inspection' At:
Inspection Conducted:
June 21-23, 1988
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Inspector:
. N. M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Ar41yst
Date
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NRCTeamLeader, Security.andEmergepcy
Preparedness Section
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Acccmpanying
Personnel:
J. Everett, Chief, Security and Emergency
Preparedness Section, NRC Region IV
M. Murphy, NRC Reactor Inspector, NRC, RIV
J. MacLellan, Pacific Northwest' Laboratories
D. Schultz, Comex Corporation
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Approved:
[9. vd
7/po/SS
II. J. Everett., Chief, Security and Emergency
Date
dreparedness Section
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted June 21-23, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-20)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance
and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
Fifteen deficiencies were identified (paragraphs 4- 10).
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DETAILS'
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1.
Persons' Contacted
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OPPD-
- H..F. Sterba, Division Manager, Corporation Comm;ttee
- . C. -.F. Simmons, Onsite Licensing Engineer
- C. A. Carlson, Shift Supervisor
- A. G. Christensen, Health Physicist
- R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services
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- L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations
- J.. Gasper, Manager, Administration and Training
- W. G. Gates, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
- W. Nehrenz, Emergency Planning Coordinator, Offsite
- B. Bibbins, Technical Services Secretary
- K. J. Morris,. Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- C. W. Norris, Supervisor, Radiological Services
- R, L.'Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Fioduction
- R. K. Stultz, Supervisor, Radiological and Environmental
- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs
- S. Gebers, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator
- F. Franco, Manager, Radiation Health and Emergency Planning
- G. L. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Protection
NRC.
- T. Reis, Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station
The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training,
and emergency response.
- Denotes!those present at the exit interview on June 23, 1988.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-01):
Deficient Information Flow - The NRC
inspector opened a new item (285/8820-06).
See paragraph 4.f.
(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-02):
Inadequate Procedure - The NRC
inspector noted that the licensee had corrected internal inconsistencies
in the procedure.
(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-03):
Failure to Follow Notifications
Procedure - The NRC inspector opened a new item (285/8820-02).
See
paragraph 4.b.
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(Closed) Deficiency.(285/8719-04):
Failure of Doors ~- The NRC inspector
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verified that airlock doors in the Technical Support Center (TSC) now-
close-tightly.
(Ciosed) Deficiency (285/8719-05). ~Inade
inspector opened:a new item (285/8820-11)quate Briefings.- The NRC
See paragraph 7.a.
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(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-06):
Inadequate Recordkeeping - The
inspector noted that the licensee had im) roved recordkeeping by providing
a stenographer to maintain records for t1e Recovery Manager.~
(Closed) Deficiency (285/8719-07):
Inadequate Inplant Radiological
Controls - The NRC inspector opened a new item (285/8820-13).
See.
paragraph 8.
3.
Program Areas Inspected
TheNRCinspectorobservedlicenseeactivitiesintheControlRoom(CR),
Technical Support. Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and -
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) during the exercise.
The NRC
inspector also observed emergency response organization staffing, facility
activation, detection, classification, and operational assessment,
notifications of licensee personnel, notifications of offsite agencies,
formulation of protective action recommendations, offsite dose assessment,
in plant corrective actions and rescue, security / accountability activities,
and recovery operations.
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4.
Control Room (82301(1))
a.
The site director (SD) (the ' shift supervisor in the control room) did
not recognize existing plant conditions demanding-an Alert
classification existing.at 7:15 a.m. until prompted at 7:35 a.m. by a
contingency message.
This is a deficiency (285/8820-01).
b.
There were five instances of failure to follow notification
procedures as follows:
The communicator in the control room did not complete the
7:20 a.m. Notification of Unusual Event (N0VE) message form
correctly, i.e., did not indicate in the "Remacks" block that an
exercise was taking place, and did not complete the "Report
Received by" for the state of Nebraska Emergency Operations
Center.
.The above message did not show wind speed, wind direction,
affected sectors and recommended protective action
recommendations for the radioactive release in progress.
While the release of radioactivity to the environment was going
on during the NOVE, the shift supervisor (who was acting as the
site director) instructed the control room communicator to tell
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officers of the states of Nebraska and Iowa there was no current
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dose assessment at_the time, and did not provide information
'about the current release.
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At 7:42 a.m., the control room staff did not prepare a
-Notification Message according to written procedures for the
Alert declaration.
The above is a repeat deficiency (285/8820-02).
c.
The reliability'of the primary communication link of the Control
Room (CR) with the other Emergency-Response Facilities _(ERF) was
q'uestionable.
The telephone system with conference capabilities was
interrupted several times during the exercise.
This-interruption was
caused by the inadvertent removal of the handset from its closed
-position. .This is a deficiency (285/8820-03).
d.
The control room staff did not' follow Procedure A0P-2 '"Reactor
Coolant'SystemHighActivity,"andasaconsequencedIdnotstart
reactor shutdown urtil 7:54 a.m., 12 minutes after the Alert.
declaration.
This is a. deficiency (285/8820-04).
e.
Control room personnel did,not advise plant personnel of adverse
radiological conditions in containment.~ When~the Alert was declared,
the control room: staff announced it on the Gaitronics system without
explaining the reasons for'the emergency classification.' The NRC
inspector noted that the written procedure was inadequate because it
did not instruct the shift supervisor on how long to sound the siren,
how to inform personnel of hazards, and how to instruct personnel to
evacuate hazardous areas. This is a deficiency (285/8820-05),
f.
Information flow was deficient because critical plant conditiens were
not promptly communicated to the TSC.
Reactor coolant radiochemistry
sample results showed a large increase in radioactivity at 6 a.m.,
but the chemist did not communicate results to the TSC until 8 a.m.
The site director at the TSC recognized the need for improved
communications, and requested at 9:10 a.m. that an additional
communication link be established with the control room.
This is a
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repeat deficiency (285/8820-06).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
(82301(2))
a.
The TSC staff, daring the 8:10 a.m. update report to offsite
authorities, did not reflect the radioactive release in progress.
At
that time, the stack release rate was more than Technical
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Specification requirements.
This is a repeat deficiency (see
item 285/8820-02).
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b.
The following findings indicated that the TSC staff was not effective
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in their evaluation of plant conditions and in providing technical
support to operations:
The Technical Support Staff (TSS) did not promptly differentiate
between the reactor coolant leak rate through the pressurizer to
the containment atmosphere and the primary to secondary leak in
the steam generator.
As a consequence, the TSS did not
recognize that it was the steam generator safety valve failure
which caused Room 81 to be filled with steam.
At 9:17 a.m. , the TSS could not determine the location and
extent of the steam generator tube rupture in spite of existing
plant conditions.
At 9:22 a.m., the TSS erroneously concluded that there was a
steam generator tube rupture and a stea:. iine break.
At 9:25 a.m. , the TSS was unable to give any information to the
SD at the TSC when he asked the status of the steam generator.
This occurred after the SD received a report from the on-site
monitoring team iaforming him that the facade of the containment
had blown off.
The TSS should have been aware that the location
of the steam generator's safety relief valves was such that a
steam release could cause the containment facade to be blown
off.
At 9:32 a.m., the TSS confirmed that there was no increase in
containment sump level nor containment pressure.
However, they
did not notice significant increases in the main steam line
radiation monitor readings while the containment radiation
monitors remained relatively constant.
The TSS had not
recognized that a large release of radioactivity to the
environment was taking place.
The TSS's lack of understanding of plant conditions during the
release delayed input data (e.g., mass flow rate) required to
perform dose assessment calculations.
The staff did not
complete the first mass flow calculation until 9:38 a.m., that
is 38 minutes after plant conditions indicated that the steam
generator tube rupture and failure of a safety. valve had
occurred.
At that time the steam generator was losing about 800
gallons per minute.
The above is a deficiency (285/8820-07).
c.
While the site director was coordinating and directing the emergency
organization from the TSC, the recovery manager at the E0F made an
inadequate appropriation of responsibilities.
The recovery mana
took over Dose Assessment and Offsite Monituring Team functions.ger
This was a source of confusion for the TSC dose assessment staff.
This is a deficiency (285/8820-08).
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The dose assessor in the TSC made several inappro
d.
-resulted in inaccurate ~offsite' dose projections. priate entries which
The estimated time
of release duration at 9:10 'a.m. was about one hour.
Instead, ion, he
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dose assessor entered a release duration of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
In addit
erroneously entered containment stack and condenser as-the release
location.
The main steam isolation valves were shut making-the
condenser not applicable.
This is a deficiency (285/8820-09).
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No violations or deviations were. identified.
6.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) (82301(3))
The Recovery Manager did not classify the General'Emer ency until about
44 minutes after the conditions warranting-the classif. cation were-in
alace, and 33 minutes after dose assessment results supported a General
Emergency classification. Thisisadeficiency.(285/8820-10).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.-
0p'erations Support Center (0SC) (82301(4))
a.
Briefings and debriefings of in plant repair teams dis)atched from
the OSC were inadequate.
The radiation protection tec1nicians did
not provide in plant teams with-information mandated by
Procedure EPIP-0SC-9, "Emergency Repairs,' Corrective Actions, and
Damage Control." Briefers did not provide repair teams with
diagrams, procedures, floor plans, nor give specific instructions on
how to perfora complex tasks.
This is a repeat deficiency
(285/8820-11).
b.
The OSC staff did not have a method to maintain continuous personnel
accountability of in plant teams.
This is a deficiency
(285/8820-12).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Corrective Actions / Rescue and Medical Team (82301(7)(10))
The rescue team was'not well equipped and their practices were poor in the
areas of radiation protection and first aid (e.g.,ited about 5 minutes
cross-contaminated
accidentvictim,areasadjacenttoRoom81,andwa
before takin] vital signs or giving shock treatment).
In addition, a
member of tie-medical team was not trained in First-Aid Multi-Media nor
decontaminution practices.
Only one steam suit was available and the
internal face shield was damaged.
The other rescue team member entered
the room where a steam leak was going on without a steam suit.
The
lio r ee did not have a communication device to be used while wearing the
st- an suit.
This is a deficiency (285/8820-13).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Security / Accountability (82301(8))
The. licensee did not perform personnel accountability during the site.
evacuation within~the 30-minute guidelines of NUREG 0654. :The~ evacuation
alarm sounded at 7:39 a.m.
The licensee could not complete accountability
until 8:18 a.m.
The above is a deficiency (285/8820-14).
No violation's or deviations were identified.
10.
Scenario
The NRC inspector noted that since the last exercise, the licensee has
devoted substantial resources.to the development of an adequate scenario.
For the most'part,.the scenario developed for the observed annual exercise
was technically sound and challenging to the players, hwever, the NRC-
' inspector found some scenario incongruencies during the exercise which
detracted from the realism and free. play of the exercise,
Some examples
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Some controllers prompted players and did not provide data that would
normally be accessible to the players _under actual accident
conditions.
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At 8:50 a.m. (10 minutes before the scenario major event of a eteam
generator tube rupture), the controller in the control. room r
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that the initial conditions of.the scenario did not include a a ight
increase in radioactivity in the B steam generator.
He gave this
information directly to the players, prompting them to vital scenario
information that would not have been readily accessible to them at
that time.
The scenario did not provide information to the TSC staff that would
be accessible to them during normal operations.
For example, the
maintenance manager was not told by the scenario or by the
controllers that maintenance work was being planned on leaking
containment purge valves.
As a consequence, he was forced to
dispatch a team to learn about the valve status.
The scenario did not anticipate plant conditions that would result
from control room operators' actions under Emergency Operations
Procedures and Recovery Procedures.
For example, the TSS directed
isolation of the steam generator in question.
After this isolation,
there should be no pressure differential within the primary system.
Scenario data, however, showed a large pressure differential between
the primary system and the steam generator.
Data on instrument readings presented to the TSC staff was ambiguous
because various ranges could be implied.
This caused artificial
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delays and hesitations that would not have existed under more
realistic conditions.
The above is a repeat deficiency (285/8820-15).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspector met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee
representatives indicated in paragraph 1 on June 23, 1988, and summarized
the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
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