ML20150E350
| ML20150E350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1988 |
| From: | Harrell P, Mullikin R, Reis T, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150E345 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-88-07, 50-285-88-7, NUDOCS 8803310101 | |
| Download: ML20150E350 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1988007
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-285/88-07
License:
Docket:
50-285
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station
Inspection At:
Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted:
February 1-29, 1988
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Inspector:
E H. tiajreW,~ Senio'r Resident Reactor
Dath /
Inspe'ctor
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3-7-88
T. Reis, Residentr' Reactor Inspector
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R. Mullikin, Project Engineer
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2/25/ 2
Approved:
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T' F.
rlesterman, Chief, Projects
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8803310101 880325
ADOCK 05000285
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted February 1-29, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including followup on
previously identified items, licensee event report fellowup, operational safety
verification, plant tours, safety-related system walkdown, monthly maintenance
observations, monthly surveillance observations, security observations,
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radiological protection observations, and in-office review of periodic and
special reports.
Results:
Within the 10 areas inspected, 2 violations (failure to meet the fire
brigade manning requirements, paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedures,
paragraph 8) were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Production
- W. Gates, Plant Manager
- W. Bateman, Supervisor, Procurement Quality Assurance
C. Brunnert, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
- M. Core, Supervisor, Maintenance
T. Dexter, Supervisor, Security
- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs.
J. Foley, Supervisor, I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance
- L. Gundrum, Plant Licensing Engineer
- B. Hansher, Plant Licensing Engineer
- H. Hendrickson, Manager, Civil Engineering, Generating Station Engineering
- R. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services
J. Kecy, Reactor Engineer
L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations
- J. Lechner, Acting Plant Engineer
T. McIvor, Supervisor, Technical
- K
Morris, Division Manager, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs
- T. Patterson, Supervisor, Technical
- G. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Protection
- J. Spilker, Senior Nuclear Production Engineer
- S. Willrett, Supervisor, Administrative Services and Security
- Denotes attendance at the monthly exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including
operators, technicians, and administrative personnel,
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items
a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 4.5-3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22:
Fuse block enclosure not addressed by the fire hazards analysis.
This item identified a wooden fuse block enclosure installed in each
battery room that was not addressed by the fire hazards analysis.
No
determination could be made as to the significance of the enclosure
on the overall combustible loading for each battery rocm as the
enclosures had not been included in the fire hazards analysis.
The licensee painted the untreated wooden enclosures with a
fire-retardant paint to minimize the affect of the combustible
enclosure on the overall combustible loading in the battery rooms.
The NRC inspectors toured the battery rooms and verified the
enclosures were painted.
Based on this action, it appeared that the
enclosures did not significantly increase the combustible loading for
these rooms.
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In October 1987, the licensee issued an updated fire hazards analysis
to reflect changes in the plant since the last fire hazards analysis
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was issued.
However, the updated analysis did not include the
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enclosures as combustible materials in the battery room fire areas.
This item remains open pending a revision to the fire hazards
analysis to evaluate the significance of the enclosures as
combustibles in the battery room fire areas,
b.
(Closed) Severity Level IV violation II.F.2.1 (Deficiency 5.2-1) of
NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22:
Failure to check and verify a
computer calculation.
This item involved the failure of the licensee to verify a computer
calculation generated by a contractor fcr the derating of electrical
cables that were enclosed in a fire protection wrapping system.
The
cables were wrapped to meet the separation criteria specified in
Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
The NRC inspectors reviewed Calculation MR-FC-85-25, "Cable Ampacity
Derating." This calculation was prepared by the licensee to verify
that the wrapped cables were capable of performing their intended
safety function.
The calculation indicated that the cables were
satisfactory for continued plant operation.
In discussions with licensee personnel, it was determined that the
calculation provided by the contractor was intended for preliminary
analysis only and was not intended to be a part of the design basis.
The contractor's calculation was only to be used as an independent
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verification of the licensee's calculation.
The NRC inspectors reviewed Calculation MR FC-85-25 and noted no
problems.
Based on the review, it appeared that the licensee had
adequately established that the cables would adequately perform their
intended function.
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c.
(Closed) Severity Level IV violation 285/8702-03:
Failure to
maintain the procedure for alignment of the breakers on the 480-volt
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motor control centers (MCC) in an up-to-date condition.
This violation was related to the licensee's failure to maintain the
procedure used for alignment of the breakers on the 480-volt MCCs in
an up-to-date condition.
In response to this violation, the licensee
revised and reissued Checklist E of Procedure 01-EE-2, "480-Volt
System (Normal Operation)," in May 1987 to correct the discrepancies
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noted during the walkdown performed by the NRC inspectors in
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January 1987.
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During the July through August 1987 inspection period, the NRC
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inspectors performed a walkdown of the 480-volt electrical system
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using the revised chec 4 st.
As documented in NRC Inspection
Report 50-285/87-20, this violation remained open pending the
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issuance of another revision to Checklist E.
The revision issued in
May 1987 still contained deficiencies identified in January 1987 that
had not been corrected.
The licensee issued another revision to Procedure OI-EE-2 in
November 1987.
This revision incorporated Checklists B, C, D, and E
of Procedure 01-CE-2 Into a single comprehensive checklist,
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designated as Checklist B.
In December 1987, the NRC inspectors
reviewed the revised Checklist B in conjunction with Figure 8.1-1 of
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the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and performed walkdowns of
various MCCs.
The NRC inspectors found that the revised checklist
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still did not provide adequate instructions for all the electrical
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breakers on the MCCs.
The NRC inspectors noted that some
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safety-related loads were not included on the checklist and there was
no overall defined scope as to what should be included on the
checklist for normal operation of the 480-volt system.
The licensee performed a walkdown to determine the loads served by
each MCC.
Based on this walkdown, Checklist B of Procedure OI-EE-2
was re-revised and issued on January 29, 1988.
The NRC inspectors
reviewed the revision to Procedure 01-EE-2 and noted the
safety-related loads that were omitted during the December 1987
review were included.
The NRC inspectors also verified, by a review
of selected loads, that the licensee had also included other loads in
Procedure OI-EE-2, as appropriate.
Based on the review of the
revised procedure, it appears that the licensee has adequately
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addressed the concerns noted by the NRC inspectors during the
previous procedure reviews and system walkdowns.
d.
(Closed) Severity Level IV violation 285/8710-06:
Failure to
maintain containment integrity.
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This item involved the failure of the licensee to maintain
containment integrity during refueling activities.
Containment
integrity was not reestablished after performing Procedure ST-DC-3,
"0C Transfer Switches," in that containment isolation valves were
automatically opened during transfer of the dc power supply and were
not subsequently manually reclosed by the control room operators.
To prevent recurrence of this problem, the licer,see issued a revision
to Procedure ST-DC-3.
Tne revision required that the test not be
performed when containment integrity is required.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the procedure change made by the licensee
to verify that the change adequately implemented appropriate
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corrective actions.
By establishing a requirement that
Procedure ST-DC-3 can not be performed when containment isolation is
required, it appears that the licensee had taken appropriate actions
to prevent recurrence of this problem related to loss of containment
integrity.
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e.
(0 pen) Open Item 285/8733-06:
Freezing point of the antifreeze
solution in the cooling water system for the security and technical
suppart center (TSC) diesels was unknown.
This item was identified during the performance of a review to verify
cold weather preparations had been established.
During the review,
the NKC inspectors noted that the licensee had not determined the
freezing point of antifreeze solution in the TSC and security
diesels.
In response to this concern, the licensee issued Maintenance
Orders (MO) 875927 and 875928 to check the freezing point in the
security and TSC diesels, respectively.
In addition, the licensee
issued M0s 875835 and 875836 to check the freezing points in
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Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) 1 and 2, respectively.
The results
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of the determination of the freezing point indicated the following:
TSC diesel, -39 F; security diesel, -60 F; EDG 1 -28 F; and EDG 2,
-33*F.
The licensee's engineering staff reviewed the data and
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determined that the results obtained indicated the operability of the
four diesels was satisfactory.
The licensee had established requirements for routinely sampling and
testing the antifreeze solution in EDG 1 and 2; however, no
requirements exist for routine testing of the antifreeze solution in
the security and TSC diesels.
This item remains open pending the
establishment of a routine testing program for the security and TSC
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diesels.
3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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that reportebility requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplithed, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS).
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The LERs listed below are closed:
87-001
Surveillance test performance error
87-018
Inadequate sizing of the air accumulators for Valves
HCV-385 and HCV-386
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A discussion of the review performed by the NRC inspectors for ea&. LER is
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provided below.
a.
LER 87-001 reported an event where two raw water pumps were out of
service at the same time due to the performance of a surveillance
test.
The surveillance test removed one raw water pump from service
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when another pump was already out of service due to maintenance.
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This event caused entry into a TS limiting condition for operation.
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As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-15, the NRC
inspectors performed a review of this event to address the specific
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concerns related to this event.
During tbc review, the NRC
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inspectors noted that the licensee had not properly addressed the
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generic aspects of this event.
The generic aspects were related to
the need to review other surveillance tests to verify thLt the tests
were adequate to prevent a recurrence of the event.
The licensee revien d other surveillance procedures to cetermine
whether or not changes should be made.
Based on the review, the
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licensee issued a revision to Procedures ST-ESF-6, "Diesel Start and
Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump," ST-ESF-12, "SIRVT Temperature
Indication and Alarm," and 01-51-1, "Safety Injection-Normal
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Operation."
The NRC inspectors reviewed seleded surveillance procedures to
determine if a change was required and reviewed the procedure
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revisions issued by the licensee.
Based on this review, it appeared
that the licensee had taken appropriate actions to address the
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generic aspects of this event.
b.
LER 87-018 reported an event where it wu discovered, during followup
of a violation issued in NRC Inspection v.eport 50-285/85-22, that
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Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 did not meet the defined operating
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criteria.
The operating criteria was not met in that a single air
accumulator supplied both valves causing the valves to be susceptible
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to a single failure, and the air accumulator may not have shut the
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valves within the 45-second time criteria specifited in the accident
analysis.
The licensee performed testing to determine the stroke
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time of the valves.
The test data indicated that the valve closing
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time was at or near 45 seconds.
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The function of Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 is to shut when the
safety-injection system is automatically aligned to operate in the
containment recirculation mode.
The valves shut to prevent the
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radioactive water in containment from entering ti.e safety injection
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and refueling water tank (SIRWT).
If the valves failed to shut, the
water entering the SIRWT would be contained within the auyiliary
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building.
The auxiliary building ventilation radiation detectors
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would alarm to alert the operator to the presence of airborne
contamination in the auxiliary building.
The auxiliary bui' ding can
be secured to prevent the discharge of the contamination to the
environment.
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To correct this apparent design deficiency, the licensee installed a
separate air accumulator for each v 've.
The additional air
accumulator was installed for Valve h;V-386 in accurdance with Safety
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Related Design Change Order (SRDCO) 87-35, "Instellation Procedure
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for ar, Air Accumulator for HCV-386." The e:cumulator size was
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verified to be adequate by performance of Calcelation FC-00507
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"Accumulator Sizing and Seismic Support for Subsystem IA-4407 and
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IA-4408." The licensee tested the accumulator installation and
verified that the closing times for both valves were approximately
35 seconds.
The NRC inspectors reviewed selected portions of SRDC0 87-35 and
Calculation FC-00507.
During review of this documentation, the NRC
noted that the air accumulator had been seismically mounted, the
tubing used to connect the valve and the accumulator was seismically
supported, the size of the air accumulator was adequate, system
components were purchased in accordance with the appropriate quality
assurance requirements, and testing was performed to verify proper
performance of the accumulator installation.
The NRC inspectors also noted that the licensee's assumption for
proper operation of Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 within the stated
accident analysis required operator action.
Operator action is
required to manually shut Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 to ensure that
the valves stay shut for 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> af ter initiation of the
containment recirculation.
The licensee was in the process of
issuing a revision to Procedure E0P-20 "Functional Recovery
Procedure" to provide instructions for operations personnel at the
end of this inspection period.
Because the licensee had not
completed the revision to Procedure E0P-20, this item remains open
pending approval and issuance of the procedure change.
(285/8807-01)
To ensure that the air accumulators and associated valves continue to
perform their intended function, the licensee issued a revision to
Procedure ST-ISI-SI-1, "Safety Injection Valve Inservice Testing."
This procedure requires a regularly scheduled surveillance test be
performed to verify the adequacy of the installation by confirming
that valve stroke time is less than 35 seconds.
The NRC inspectors
reviewed Procedure ST-ISI-SI-1 and determined that the procedure was
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adequate.
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Based on the reviews performed by the NRC inspectors, as discussed
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above, it appeared that the licensee had taken appropriate action to
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correct the design deficiency for the air accumulators for
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Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386.
The licensee is continuing to review the adequacy of air accumulators
for other safety-related valves.
The results of the reviews
performed by the licensee will be evaluated during close out cf
Deficiency 2.1-1 in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Operational Safety Verification
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The NRC inspectors conducted reviews and observations of selected
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activities to verify that facility operations were performed in
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conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative
procedures, and the TS.
The NRC inspectors made several. control room
observations to verify the following:
Proper shift staffing
Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requirements
Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards
equipment
Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and
switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements
Proper return to service of components
Maintenance orders (M0) initiated for equipment in need of
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maintenance
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Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators
Management personnel toured the control room on a regular basis
During a review of the level of the licensee's staffing to meet the
requirements for manning the fire brigade, the NRC inspectors noted that
the onsite staff was not adequate.
TS 5.2.2.e states that a fire brigade
consisting of five members shall be maintained on site at all times.
Amendment 40 to the TS issued the fire protection safety evaluation report
as part of the licensee's operating license.
Section 6.1 of Amendment 40
states, in part, that a 5-man brigade be available onsite during all
shifts and independent of demands placed on operating personnel and the
security force in a fire situation.
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The licensee's staffing included eight security guards and seven operators
per shift that were qualified fire brigade members.
The adequacy of
staffing was reviewed by the NRC inspectors based on the assumption that a
fire occurred in the control room.
The duties of each onshift individual
were:
three operators to shut down the plant from remote locations, one
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operator to man the emergency notification system telephone as the
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declaration of an alert is required when evacuating the control room, five
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guards as an armed emergency response force, one guard to assist in plant
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shutdown, and one guard stationed on a compensatory measures post.
With
these individuals assigned duties other than the fire brigade, the
remaining individuals, three operators and one security guard, were
available for fire brigade duties.
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By having only four individuals available for fire brigade duties, as
discussed above, the licensee failed to meet the TS requirement for
staffing of the fire brigade.
This is an apparent violation.
(285/8807-02)
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During review of this item, the NRC inspectors and licensee personnel
determined that the establishment of a compensatory measures post for a
security guard' caused the fire brigade to be one member short of its
required complement.-
When the compensatory post was established in
approximately June 1987, licensee personnel did not realize ~that the
action affected fire brigade staffing and did not add an additional fire
brigade member to each shift.
When the NRC inspectors notified the licensee of this problem, the
licensee took immediate actions to ensure that fire brigade was staffed to
meet TS requirements.
This was done by reassigning the duties required of
the security guard in the event the control room is evacuated to another
individual.
This allowed the security guard to participate in fire
brigade activities without having concurrent duties.
The NRC inspectors
reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and it appeared that the fire
brigade was fully staffed.
5.
Plant Tours
The NRC inspectors conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant
and equipment conditions.
The following items were observed during the
tours:
General plant conditions', including operability of standby equipment,
were satisfactory.
Equipment was being maintained in proper condition, without fluid
leaks and excessive vibration.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices were observed, including
no fire hazards and the control of combustible material.
Performance of work activities was in accordance with approved
procedures.
Portable gas cylinders were properly stored to prevent possible
missile hazards.
Tag out of equipment was performed properly.
Management personnel toured the operating spaces on a regular basis.
No violations or deviations were identified,
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6.
Safety-Related System Walkdown
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The NRC inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
safety-related system to verify system cperability.
Operability was
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determined by verification of selected valve and switch positions.
The
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system was walked down using the drawings and procedure noted.
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Auxiliary feedwater system (Procedure 01-FW-4, Checklist 'A,
Revision 31, and Drawings _ 11405-M-254, Revision 63, and 11405-M-253,
Revision 58)
During the walkdown, the NRC inspectors noted no discrepancies between the
drawings, procedure, and plant as-built conditions for the selected areas
checked.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observations
The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed seier,ted station maintenance
activities on safety-related systems and components to verify the
maintenance was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
regulatory requirements, and the TS.
The following items were considered
during the reviews and/or observations:
The TS limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or
components were removed from service.
Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work.
Activities were accompli;hed using approved M0s and were inspected,
as applicable.
Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service.
Quality control records were maintained.
Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
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Parts and materials used were properly certified.
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Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
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The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following maintenance
activities:
M0 880525, "Charging Pump CH-1A Breaker Not Working Properly." This
M0 was initiated because CH-1A had been tripping off line for no
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apparent reason.
The problem was presumed to be associated with the
breaker itself.
On February 10, 1988, the NRC inspectors observed
portions of the troubleshooting performed on the CH-1A breaker.
The
NRC inspectors noted that the work was being performed in an approved
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critical quality equipment storage area.
The personnel performing
the work were qualified electrical maintenance technicians and a
maintenance engineer was present to assist in the troubleshooting.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the M0 and verified proper authorization
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had been obtained to perform the work.
The NRC inspectors also
verified that proper tags had been hung to identify that the
equipment was out of service.
Preventative Maintenance (PM) 880930, "Raw Water Pump Vibration
Testing." On February 8, 1988, the NRC inspectors observed an
electrician taking: vibration readings on raw water pump C.
The
inspectors noted that the technician was using an approved procedure
and had a calibrated instrument to take readings.
M0 880340, "Repair Latches, Knobs, and Closures on Station Doors for
the Month of February." The NRC inspectors witnessed maintenance
personnel repairing a key card lock on the door that provided access
from the northeast turbine building to the switchgear room.
The NRC
inspectors reviewed the M0 and noted it was properly filled out and
authorized.
The NRC inspectors also noted that a security guard was
properly posted as a compensatory measure while the door was
undergoing repair.
M0 880579, "Remove and Repair VA-12A Fan / Motor Assembly." The
neutron detector well cooling fan, VA-12A, failed in early February.
The licensee decided to remove the fan from containment, and to
repair and reinstall it to minimize the risk of exceeding the
temperature limits specified in TS 2.13 for the concrete surrounding
the neutron detector cooling wells.
Prior to performing the task,
the licensee surveyed the area for gamma and neutron dose rates to
develop man-rem estimates.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the man-rem
estimates with appropriate licensee personnel.
Based on the review,
it appeared the licensee employed appropriate measures to obtain
reliable dose rates.
Reactor power was reduced to 35 percent to remove the unit.
The area
was shielded with water bottles to reduce the neutron flux at the
work site.
The unit was removed, repaired per an approved procedure,
reinstalled, and returned to service the following day.
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MO 880467, "Leaking Air Regulator to HCV-2893." The NRC inspectors
witnessed an instrumentation and control technician remove a leaking
air regulator in the instrument air system for Valve HCV-2893, the
raw water backup inlet isolation valve.
The NRC inspectors noted
that the technician had a properly authorized M0 and completed the
work in accordance with the instruction provided by the M0.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Monthly Surveillance Observations
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of and/or
reviewed completed documentation for the TS-required surveillance testing
on safety-related systems and components.
The NRC inspectors verified the
following items uuring the testing:
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Testing was performed by qualified personnel using approved
procedures.
Test instrumentation was calibrated.
The TS limiting conditions for operation were met.
Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were
accomplished.
Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements.
Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
directing the test.
Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The NRC inspecto ; observed and/or reviewed the documentation for the
following surveillance test activities.
The procedures used for the test
activities are noted in parenthesis.
Monthly testing of the pressurizer pressure channel check (ST-ESF-1)
Quarterly inservice testing of the raw water system valves
(ST-ISI-RW-1)
Biannual testing and loading of the emergency diesel generator
(ST-ESF-6)
Monthly test of the station battery chargers (ST-DC-2)
Quarterly inservice testing of the main steam isolation valves to the
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (ST-ISI-MS-1)
Quarterly inservice testing of the chemical and volume control system
valves (ST-ISI-CVCS-1)
During observation of the above surveillance tests, the NRC inspectors
noted three examples where licensee personnel did not strictly adhere to
approved station procedures.
The examples are discussed below.
The NRC inspectors observed a water plant operator timing the stroke cycle
of raw water Valve HCV-2853 per ST-ISI-RW-1.
Procedurally, the operator
was required to use a stopwatch.
Instead, the operator used his personal
wristwatch which did not have a stop function.
The NRC inspectors noted
that, upon realizing the noncompliance, the operator stopped, obtained a
stopwatch, and reperformed the test on Valve HCV-2853 as well as other
valves he had timed prior to the arrival of the NRC inspectors.
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The NRC inspectors witnesse'd the performance of ST-ESF-6.
During the
portion of the procedure where the operator was required to unload the
diesel generator, the operator temporarily set aside the procedure while
concentrating on the control board.
By doing this, he inadvertently
skipped over Step 17 which performed a checkout of the fuel oil transfer
pumps.
The NRC inspectors alerted the operator of the omitted step and
they were subsequently performed prior to shutting down the diesel.
The
NRC inspectors noted that performing these steps just prior to shutting
down the diesel is allowed by procedure.
However,- it is apparent from the
scenario that the steps were simply overlooked.
'
During observation of ST-DC-2, the NRC inspectors noted that an
,
electrician performed a portion of Step 1.b.(5) prior to performing
Step 1.b.(4).
This action was not allowed by procedure.
The NRC
inspectors noted that the performance of these steps out-of-sequence posed
-
no safety significance.
Section 5.8.1 of the TS states, in part, that written procedures shall be
established, implemented, and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum
requirements of ANSI 18.7-1972.
,
Section 5.1.2 of ANSI 18.7-1972 states, in part, that procedures shall be
followed and the requirements for use of procedures shall be prescribed in
writing.
,
Section 2.4 of Procedure 50-G-7 states, in part, that it is the
,
i
responsibility of every individual performing activities to follow
procedures exactly as written and strict adherence to all procedures is
j
absolutely required.
i
Contrary to the above, as described in the three examples discussed above,
individuals failed to follow surveillance test procedures exactly as'
written.
This is an apparent violation.
(285/8807-03)
The preceding three examples of procedural noncompliance did not affect
the safe operation of the plant.
However, they are illustrative of what
was perceived as frequent inattention to detail and failure to follow
procedures.
Four operations personnel were questioned and it was noted
that they were unfamiliar with the stringent requirement of Section 2.4 of
Procedure 50-G-7, which states that strict adherence to all procedures is
absolutely required.
Upon notification of the three problems by the NRC inspectors, the
licensee issued a memo, dated February 16, 1988, to all department heads
to stress that verbatim compliance with all procedures is mandatory.
Each
department head then discussed the philosophy issued by the plant manager
with the individuals assigned to their departments.
'
[
1
. . - - . . . - . ,
.,__ - __ _ _ ,_r.
.
_ _ _ _ _____,_ ._ -,__.._.-..___ . _ , _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ - , -
--
.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.,
.
15
9.
Security Observations
The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan was being
implemented by selected observation of the following items:
The security organization was properly manned.
Personnel within the protected area (PA) displayed their
identification badges.
Vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted or
controlled within the PA.
Persons and packages were properly cleared and checked before entry
into the PA was permitted.
The e'. '9ctiveness of the security program was maintained when
securi .y equipment failure or impairment required compensatory
measures to be employed.
The PA barrier was maintained and the isolation zone kept free of
transient material.
The vital area barriers were maintained and not compromised by
breaches or weaknesses.
Illumination in the PA was adequate to observe the appropriate areas
at night.
Security monitors at the secondary and central alarm stations were
functioning properly for assessment of possible intrusions.
On February 27, 1988, the licensee identified an event where a loss of
compensatory measures occurred due to a nuclear watch officer (NWO)
sleeping on watch.
The NW0 was immediately relieved of his duties and
replaced with another qualified individual.
The licensee took action to
prevent recurrence t'v reducing the frequency of watchstander radio checks
from 30 to 15 minutcs.
In addition, the licensee also established a
program where the security officer-in-charge performs random tours of all
compensatory posts.
The licensee reported the event to the NRC in
accordance with the requirements of the physical security plan.
No prior
violations had been identified by the NRC that were similar to this event.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee.
Based on
this review, it appeared that the licensee had taken actions to correct
the event and had taken actions to prevent recurrence.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
-
.
16
10.
Radiological Protection Observations
,
The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's
radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with the
facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory
requirements.
The activities listed below were observed and/or reviewed:
Health physics (HP) supervisory personnel conducted plant tours to
check on activities in prcgress.
Radiation work permits contained the appropriate information to
ensure work was performed in a safe and controlled manner.
Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA) were wearing the
required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothing.
Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and
controlled based on the activity levels within the area.
Personnel properly frisked prior to exiting an RCA.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
In-office Review of Periodic and Special Reports
In-office review of periodic and special reports was performed by the NRC
resident inspectors and/or the NRC Fort Calhoun project engineer to verify
the following, as appropriate:
Correspondence included the information required by appropriate NRC
requirements.
Test results and supporting information were consistent with design
predictions and specifications.
Determination that planned corrective actions were adequate for
resolution of identified problems.
Determination as to whether any information contained in the
correspondence should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
Correspondence did not contain incorrect, inadequate, or incomplete
information.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following:
Additional questions on OPPD response to Generic Letter 86-06, dated
February 4, 1988
Monthly operations report for January 1988, undated
--.
.
-
.
0
17
January monthly operating report, dated February 12, 1988
Threshold levels for the Fort Calhoun internals vibration monitoring
system dated February 25, 1988
During review of reports, NRC personnel identified a 10 CFR Part 21 report
submitted by a utility that appeared to be applicable to the licensee's
facility.
The NRC resident inspectocs provided a copy of the report to
the plant licensing engineer for review of applicability by the licensee.
The report (Reference 87-74) was issued by the Northern States Power
Company and discussed problems with abrasive damage to the leads of
Limitorque valves.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with you and other members of your staff at the end
of this inspection.
At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the
scope of the inspection and the findings.