ML20149K703

Insp Repts 50-324/88-05 & 50-325/88-05 on 880201-29.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Enforcement Matters,Maint Observation,Surveillance Observation & Hydrogen Leak/Unusual Event

ML20149K703
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/30/1988
From:	Fredrickson P, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148M128	List: ML20149K703
References
50-324-88-05, 50-324-88-5, 50-325-88-05, 50-325-88-5, NUDOCS 8804050354
Download: ML20149K703 (14)

See also: IR 05000324/1988005

Text

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UNIT ED ST ATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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h* [l 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.

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H e ATLAN TA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-325/88-05 and 50-324/88 05

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: OPR-71 and DPR-62

Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: February 1-29, 1988

Inspector:. \ l

3 l #*N -

W. H. RJ&nd Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: S. M. Shaeffer

Approved b : M7k

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/ P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine safety inspection by the resident inspector involved the

areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance observation,

surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite Licensee

Event Reports (LER) review, Q-List Review concerns, Diesel Generator air system

seismic qualification, silicon bronze bus bar bolts, hydrogen leak / unusual

event, ESF System walkdown, inerting line failure, and plant modifications.

Results: In the areas inspected, no programmatic weaknesses, violations or

deviations were identified. Two Unresolved Items were identified: service

water system operating mode concerns, and containment atmosphere dilution

system discrepancies.

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8004050354 880330

.PDR ADOCK 05000324

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

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• B. Altman, Principal Engineer

• E. Bishop, Manager - Operations

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• J. Brown, Res. Engineer - Engineering

• S. Callis, Onsite Licensing Engineer - Licensing & Nuclear Fuel

• G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control

R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

• C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA

• R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support

• K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance

• W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security

A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations

• R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP

J. Holder, Manager - Outages

• P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project

"L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)

R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

• G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control

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• J. O'Sullivan, Man >ger - Maintenance

. B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor

• R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist

• J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support

R. Warden I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

D. Warren, Acting Engineering Supervisor

B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor

• T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

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engineers, technicians, operators, of fice personnel, and security force i

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• Attended the exit interview

Joy Industrial Equipment Company

Ralph L. Susey, Manager, Administration and Development

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 4,1988, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed

below.

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Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Proprietary

information is not contained in this report.

Item Number Description / Reference Paragraph

325/88-05-01 & "URI - Service Water System Operating Mode

324/88-05-01 Concerns (paragraph 8.b).

325/88-05-05 & URI - CAD System Discrepancies (paragraph 12).

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324/88-05-05

325/88-05-02 & IFI - DG Air Compressor Seismic Testing Performed

324/88-05-02 Without Compressor Running (paragraph 9).

325/88-05-03 & IFI - Sand Introduced Into Torus / Vacuum Breakers

324/88-05-03 from Failed Inerting Line (paragraph 13).

325/88-05-04 & IFI - Hydrogen Leak in Turbine Building Pipe

324/88-05-04 Tunnel (paragraph 11).

Note: Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in para-

graph 15.

3. Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(CLOSED) Violation 324/87-03-01, Failure to Maintain Fuel Pool Storage

Capacity Within Technical Specification Limits.

The inspector revievied the licen:ee's response dated April 29, 1987. The

licensee has completed modification work (PM-83-004) involved with the

installation of the Unit 2 high density fuel storage racks. A request for

license amendment was submitted on June 23, 1987, regarding number of

assemblies allowed in the spent fuel pool for both units.

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and

reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with

approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry

codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that: redundant compon-

ents were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were

'An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. ,

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adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used;

radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality

control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance

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testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were

implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equip-

ment was properly returned to service.

Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave

priority to safety-related maintenance.

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The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance

activities:

88-ABJN1 Installation of Snubber 2-E51-40SS84. i

88-BAPH1 Installation and Removal of MSIV Pit HVAC Discharge

Check Valve 1-VA-CV-RB.

SP-87-082, Rev. O Temporary Power Package for 2-832-F0238 Suction Valve.

SP-88-006, Rev. O' Reactor Vessel Water Level Adjustment for Repair of 12 i

Inch Recirculation Nozzle.

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

! 5. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical

4 Specifications. Through observation, interviews, and record review, the

inspectors verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification

requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were

qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and '

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complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and

proper return to service of equipment.

i The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activi-  ;

i ties:

01-3.1 Unit 1 Control Operator Daily Surveillance.

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01-3.2 Unit 2 Control Operator Daily Surveillance.

Other surveillance activities were observed or reviewed throughout the

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No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance

l with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct

observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,

reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.

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The inspectors verified that centrol room manning requirements of 10 CFR

50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shif t

supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper /

bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating

trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no

conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Opera-

tions. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instru-

mentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability

and that operating parameters were within Technical Specif uation limits.

The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of

system status was maintained. The inspectors verified the status of

selected control room annunciators.

Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified

weekly by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in

its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed for compon-

ents that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem cross-

tie valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the valve

operator; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper

lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist

which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.

Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified

operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve

lineup, if accessible.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /

procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and a

review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument

calibration.

The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly

manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned

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functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the

l protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted

I within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification

badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized and effective compen-

satory measures were employed when required.

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The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified

position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and

verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.

The inspector toured the Unit 1 torus and reviewed the results of the

newly implemented AI-96, Rev. O, Drywell Closecut, for Unit 1 drywell

prior to Unit I startup after a maintenance outage. The licensee resolved

all problems identified during the inspection prior to startup. Problem

resolution, per procedure, was presented to PNSC for approval . The

problems found included a misaligned RWCU snubber pipe clamp (1-G31-1553)

and sand in the torus inerting penetration (see paragraph 8). Maintenance

replaced the snubber and included the problem as caused by a system

transient in the RWCU system. The system had been placed back in service

during unit operation and the gasket on the 1A F/0 had failed. This event

was reported in LER 88-04. Any followup on the event will be inspected as

part of the LER closecut,

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. No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

7. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports Unit 2(92700)

The listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met

., NRC reporting requirements. The verification included adequacy of event

description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential

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generic problems and the relative safety significance of the event.

Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective

actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, licensee-

i- conditions and commitments. The following reports are considered closed.

(CLOSED) LER 2-86-08, Automatic Closure of Reactor Water Cleanup System

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Due to Erroneous Area High Temperature Signal. The licensee replaced the

i failed module and calibrated the new module as per MI-03-03. The

! inspector reviewed the licensee's TS compliance and the completed work

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package.

(CLOSED) LER 2-86-15, Autoactuation of Control Building Emergency Air

' Filtration Trains 2A and 2B. The cause for the intermittent system

actuation was due to failure of an area radiation monitor / indicator trip

unit for the Control Building common air intake supply duct. The licensee

replaced the failed part and returned the unit to service. The licensee

is also submitting a revision to the LER to include specific component

0 information on the failed part as pertaining to NPRDS reportability

Q requirements. The inspector reviewed the Instrument and Calibration

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Failure Analysis and the completed work package.

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

l 8. Q-List Review Concerns (71707)

l Sargent & Lundy raised questions by letter dated February 3, 1988,

i concerning the classification of certain relays in safety related

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circuits. S&L was under contract with the licensee to develop a Q-list to

the component level. Two potentially significant issues were raised:

l a. 80P-27-1 Undervoltage Relay

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S&L postulated a failure of a normally energized undervoltage relay

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(27-1) on each non-safety related bus feeding each emergency bus.

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Should the relay fail to drop out or certain contacts fail to open,

) the core spray pump and RHR pump on the associated bus would start

{ simultaneously (block start) vice sequential start during a LOCA with

a loss of off-site power.

The licensee concluded that startup of Unit I was allowed because

their preliminary review of the design showed no common mode failure

and that the design met the originci design basis. The inspector

concluded that no immediate safety issue existed since the licensee

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had tested the diesel generators with block starting the LOCA loads

during startup testing. The inspector reviewed Pre-Operational Test

PO-47, Integrated ECCS Test, performed September 4, 1976, that

-documented that voltage and frequency on the E busses met the Regula-

tory Guide 1.9, March 10,1971, voltage and frequency requirements

during the starting transient. Also, the inspector verified that the

27-1 relays in the BOP busses appeared installed in-a satisfactory -

manner and that the DG overcurrent relay with voltage restraint

appeared correctly set. By letter dated February 19, 1988, UE&C

informed the licensee that:

(1) the 27-1 relays were considered safety related in the original

plant design,

(2) relays were purchased to the same specification as other safety

related relays,

(3) both the safety related and BOP switch gear were purchased to

the same specification,

(4) these relays were listed in FSAh table 8.3.1-17, including their

location, showing review by NRC.

Based on the documents provided to the inspector and further inter-

views with plant personnel, the inspector has no further questions at

this time. A Licensee Identified Item: BOP 27-1 Relays Treated as

Safety Related (325/88-05-06 and 324/88-05-06), will be opened and

closed for documentation.

See paragraph 14 for additional inspection performed in the area.

b. Service Water V106 Valve

S&L also identified four "non-safety" relays whose failure would

prevent 1-SW-V106 or 2-SW-V106, SW Header to Reactor Building Closed

Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Primary Isolation Valve, from closing

during an accident. The four relays fed the loss of off-site power

signal to the V106 closing circuit. Normally, on a LOCA with a LOSP,

V10( receives a close signal, isolating the SW to the RB CCW HXs.

However, since V106 does not have a redundant valve, its failure must

already be assumed during a LOCA with LOSP. Therefore, the logic

failure modes assumed by S&L are bounded by a DG failure. For

example, if DG No. 3 failed during a LOCA/LOSP, the E-3 bus would be

dead, resulting in no power to Unit 2 V106 and Nuclear Service Water

Pump 2A and Conventional Service Water Pump 2A. This results in a

failed open V106 and only NSW pump 2B running on the Unit 2 NSW

header. The licensee has documented how they were operating the SW

pumps in Enclosure 2 to the report. Per Enclosure 2, the licensee

would permit operation of the SW system, for example with NSW pumps

2A and 2B operable together with CSW pumps IB,1C, 2C and 28. Thus

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with a failed DG No. 3, Unit 2 V106 and NSW pump 2A, NSW pump 2B

would be required to supply SW to all four diesels (3,000 GPM) the

vital header loads (470 GPM), SW pump bearing lubrication (150 GPM)

and the RB CCW HXs (7200 GPM). This total (10,820 GPM) exceeds the

capacity of the single NSW pump 2A (8,000 GPM). All flow numbers are

taken from Table 9.2.1-1 of the FSAR.

The licensee issued a standing instruction to operations to restrict

RB CCW HX flow to 5,000 GPM during normal operation, This flow,

together with the other flow requirements, would limit the flow on

one NSW pump to 8,620 GPM, or 7.2% above the design flow of the pump.

The licensee reported to the inspector that one NSW pump could handle

the excess flow requirements.

The licensee .has issued engineering work order (PID) to have BESU

evaluate the impact of these questions. Further, the licensee is in

the process of accepting design basis information from UE&C. Once

that information is in hand, it should be easier to explain the

design rational for the current design. The licensee will continue

to limit flow to the RB CCW HXs to 5,000 GPM until the issue is

resolved further.

The inspector interviewed the system engineer and discussed the issue

with plant management to ascertain whether the licensee had adequ-

ately addressed the issue. Results of the document review will be

covered in next month's Inspection Report Nos. 325,324/88-14. The.

inspector also verified that the RB CCW flow transmitter had been

replaced on January 24, 1988, and it was successfully calibrated

under WR/JO 87-ANPL1. This matter remains unresolved pending further

inspector review and NRR review of the acceptability of the design

and current CP&L SW pump operating modes: Service Water System

Operating Mode Concerns (325/88-05-01 and 324/88-05-01).

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

9. Diesel Generator Air System Seismic Qualification (71707)

During a review of NUREG-1275, Volume 2, Operating Experience Feedback

Report - Air Systems Problems, the inspector came across a statement

regarding a problem identified in the report referring to Brunswick. On

pages 36 and 37, the report stated that, "as of March 1987, the

licensee... for Brunswick station could not confirm that the EDG pneumatic

control systems would continue to operate following a design basis event."

The licensee showed the inspector an internal memorandum where the

licensee agreed to supply the information to the author of NUREG-1275.

However, the licensee failed to supply the information to AE00. When

asked by the inspector, the licensee had still not obtained the informa-

tion.

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Since the question was re-asked, the licensee has completed a JC0 on the

starting air system (EER-88-0071). DG No. 4 three inch control air line

has been qualified with the other 3 DGs systems deemed qualified by

similarity until the verification can be completed by BESU.

Documentation was found on seismic testing for the air compressors but

only with the air compressors not running. No seismic qualification data

exists with the air compressors running. The licensee rational for

continued operation included the following points:

• Failure of the air compressors would not prevent DG start. The

seismic Class I air receivers would provide the starting air.

The long term control air requirements are necessary to keep the

run/stop cylinders pressurized. Loss of air to these cylinders would

shut tne fuel racks, stopping the diesel.

Assuming a 5 psig pressure loss in the air receiver and only 1 of 2 ,

air receivers operable, the licensee calculated that the DG could

operate for 20.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after a simultaneous DG start and Operating

Basis Earthquake. Damage assessment teams are directed by emergency

procedure to inspect plant equipment subsequent to an OBE (0.089 ).

Measures could then be taken to supply air to the DG Control Air

system.

Similar air compressors have been qualified with the compressor

running.

The licensee has established an internal action item to permanently

resolve the DG air compressor issue within one year. P

The inspector will follow the licensee's complete resolution of this issue

in an Inspector Followup Item: DG Air Compressor Seismic Testing Per-

formed Without Compressor Running (325/88-05-02 and 324/88-05-02).

A significant safety matter regarding qualification of the DG air

compressors was identified; no violations or deviations were identified.

10. Silicon Bronze Bus Bar Bolts (93702)

The licensee founc a potential common mode failure of DC switchgear.

Multiple failures of 5/16 inch silicon bronze bolts were found in the four

site DC switchboards. The bolts are used to make the electrical connec-

tions for the switchgear bus bars. An incorrect torque specification (18

f t.-lbs.) had been supplied by GE early in construction of the plant (in

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1974). The problem had been identified by UE&C at that time and GE

revised the drawing, specifying 9 f t.-lbs. Re-inspection of the switch-

l gear was done at that time. In mid 1986, the licensee discovered 1 or 2

silicon bronze bolts with cracked or detached heads in 480V and DC MCCs.

i Each bus bar connection is made with two silicon bronze bolts. The

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licensee found only 1 or 2 bolts broken per MCC, and never found both

bolts broken at the same connection. At that time, the licensee performed

a record review of previous problems, and discovered the construction

problem reported above. They also found that the Maintenance Instruction

used to perform preventative maintenance on the MCCs did not include any

torque valve for the 5/16 inch silicon bronze bolts. Licensee review of

old construction records during the mid 1986 time did not reveal any

correlation between construction documented torque valves with bolt

failures found. Based on a lack of correlation and the small number of

bolt failures per MCC, the licensee elected to use MI-10-2K1 and MI-10-211

performed over the next outages to inspect and replace the silicon bronze

bolts. The DC switchboards,1A,18, 2A, 28, were inspected this month

with over 50 damaged bolts found, including both bolts broken for the

safety related battery connections for battery 1A-2 and 2B-2.

The licensee had replaced all silicon bronze bolts on safety related

switchgear, on Unit 1, prior to startup. All Unit 2 MCCs except 2xDA and

2xDB have had the silicon bronze bolts inspected and replaced.

The two remaining switchgear's bolts will be replaced prior to startup of

Unit 2. The inspector will continue followup on this item after the LER

is issued. NRR Vendor Branch has been informed of the event. They have

been in contact with GE concerning the bolting material and wfil continue

to address generic aspects of the event.

The inspection was conducted through interviews with plant engineers,

review of recent and construction documentation, and in plant examination

of hardware.

A significant safety matter related to silicon bronze bolts was identi-

fied; no violations or deviations were identified.

11. Hydrogen Leak / Unusual Event (93702)

The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 4:49 p. m on January 4,1988,

when hydrogen gas concentrations of 8% to 10% were reported in the

electrical cable tunnel and breezeway. Unit I was defueled in a refueling

outage while Unit 2 was in cold shutdown for maintenance. The licensee

had unisolated the hydrogen gas banks about 3:00 p. m. the same day after

f completion of a modification for hydrogen gas water chemistry addition.

At 4:00 p. m. , during a hydrogen gas system walkdown in the electrical

cable tunnel between the reactor building and turbine building, a techni-

cian discovered a packing leak on a newly installed hydrogen gas valve,

0-HWCH-V012. The hydrogen gas banks were isolated at about 4:20 p. m.

The area was evacuated and all sources of ignition were secured. Normal

ventilation was maintained to remove the hydrogen gas. HP measurements of

the hydrogen gas concentration in the breezeway were reported to the

control room as 5% hydrogen gas in the breezeway and 8% hydrogen gas in

the electrical tunnel general area, with local hydrogen gas concentrations

near the leak as 16% hydrogen gas. After the UE declaration, the Emer-

gency Director (Shif t Operating Supervisor) found that the reports of

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hydrogen gas concentration in the breezeway and electrical tunnel were

actually in percent of the lower explosive limit of hydrogen gas (4'4) and

not actual concentrations. The leaking valve was tightened at 5:45 p. m.

The UE was terminated when no detectable hydrogen gas was found.

The inspector verified through observation during the event, subsequent

interviews and record review, that the licensee implemented the applicable

portions of their emergency plan. Initial licensee actions included

evacuation of the area, isolation of the hydrogen tanks, stopping all hot

work, and pre-positioning the fire brigade in the Unit I cable spreading

room. Two mechanics equipped with spark-resistant tools tightened the

valve oacking nut, stopping the leak. The licensee used PEP-010, Fires

Involving Flammable Gases, Rev. O, to respond to the event.

The inspector will review the licensee's permanent corrective action and

root cause when the OER is issued. This is an Inspector Followup Item:

Hydrogen Leak in Turbine Building Pipe Tunnel (325/88-05-04 and 324/

88-05-04).

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

12. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector performed an inspection of the accessible components of the

Unit 1 and 2 Containment Atmospheric Dilution System to verify system

operability. The inspection included verification of: integrity of the

CAD vessel and system piping up to the drywell penetrations, proper valve

alignment, condition of seismic supports and hangers, power availability

to major components and instrumentation, and proper component labeling.

Nitrogen lines through the HPCI rooms of both units were not observed

because of accessibility. The inspector reviewed the monthly surveillance

of Periodic Test Procedure PT-16.1, Rev.12, System Checklists, in OP-24,

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Rev. 22, Containment Atmosphere Control System Ooerating Procedure, and

numerous plant drawings.

The inspector found several problems that were identified late in the

reporting period. These items will be addressed in Inspection Report

Nos. 325,324/88-14. This item remains Unresolved: CAD System Discre-

pancies (325/88-05-05 and 324/88-05-05).

No significant safety matters, violations or deviations were identified.

13. Inerting Pipe Failure (93702)

The licensee found sand in both units' torus inerting lines. Unit 1 was

in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was defueled. On January 4, 1988, the under-

ground inerting line (non-safety) between the liquid nitrogen tank and the

reactor buildings cracked, removing four feet of earth that covered the

pipe. The licensee performed a temporary repair on the 8 inch pipe the

same day using a pipe clamp. On January 10, both Unit 2 reactor building-

to-torus vacuum breakers failed their local leak rate tests. On

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February 7. maintenance personnel found sand in the bottom of the vacuum

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breaker pipe in Unit 2. The sand had apparently gotten into the inerting

line and been carried by the nitrogen gas into the torus and on one side

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of the butterfly valve vacuum breakers. The licensee removed the sand and

performed additional inspections to determine the scope of the problem.

The licensee had adjusted the stops on the vacuum breakers, re performed

the Unit 2 LLRTs, with one penetration passing and the other f ailing.

Unit 1 LLRTs were performed successfully on February 11, 1988, without

removing any sand. The licensee replaced the carbon steel underground

inerting line with Plexco, a polyethelyene pipe that is resistant to

corrosion and brittle fracture. The licensee is writing an OER on the

event. The inspector will review the OER after its issuance to verify the

adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. A regional inspector

reviewed the licensee's documentation of repair activities; that review

will be included in Inspection Report Nos. 325,324/88-14.

This is an Inspector Followup Item: Sand Introduced Into Torus / Vacuum

Breakers f rom Failed Inerting Line (325/88-05-03 and 324/88-05-03).

No violations or deviations were identified. A safety concern regarding a

non-safety system failure affecting safety related components was identi-

fied and resolved short-term since all valves were tested satisfactorily

prior to startup.

14. Plant Modifications - Unit 2 (37700)

Reviewed plant modification PM-86-025 which concern eliminates block

loading of emergency loads on the emergency buses if a LOCA signal is

received and offsite power is available. As of March 4, 1988, all modifi-

cation work has been completed. Acceptance testing has been completed for

core spray loops A & B and RHR loop A, and interim operability estab-

lished. Acceptance test for RHR loop B is scheduled to be completed week

of March 7, 1988. See paragraph 8.a for a related issue.

The inspector reviewed and observed the acceptance test for PM-84-017,

) (Rev. 7), Local Control and Circuit Enhancement for 4SOV Switchgear. The

test was conducted in accordance with procedure, QC sign-offs were

completed as necessary, and the acceptance criteria was met. The

a

responsible engineer supervised the test with operations personnel

operating the equipment.

No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.

.

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15, List of Abbreviations for Unit 1 and 2

AE00 Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

AI Administrative Instruction

BESU Brunswick Engineering Sub Unit

BOP Balance of Plant

BSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

CAD Containment Atmospheric Dilution

CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company

CSW Conventional Service Water -

OC Direct Current

DG Diesel Generator

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EER Engineering Evaluation Report

ESF Engineered Safety Feature

F/D Filter Demineralizer

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

g Acceleration of Gravity

GE General Electric

GPM Gallons Per Minute

HP Health Physics

.,VAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning System

HX Heat Exchanger

I&C Instrumentation and Control

IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement

IFI Inspector Followup Item

JC0 Justification for Continued Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

LLRT Local Leak Rate Test

LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident

LOSP Loss of Off-Site Power ,

MCC Motor Control Center  :

MI Maintenance Instruction

MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve

NPRDS Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NSW Nuclear Service Water

NUREG Nuclear Regulation

OBE Operating Basis Earthquake

OER Operating Experience Report

OP Operating Procedure

PA Protected Area

PEP Plant Emergency Procedure

PID Project Identification

PM Plant Modification

PNSC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee

P0 Pre-Operational

PT Procedure Test

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QA Quality Assurance

QC Quality Control

RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup

S&L Sargent & Lundy

SW Service Water

TS Technical Specification

UE Unusual Event

UE&C United Engineers & Constructors

URI Unresolved Item

V Volt

WR/JO Work Request / Job Order