ML20141G223

Forwards Info Resolving Deficiencies Described in App D to Sser 7 Re Cable Separation,Including Reactor Protection Sys Cable Separation Analysis for Unit 1 & App B to Fsar.Unit 2 Analysis Should Be Complete by May 1986

ML20141G223
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	02/21/1986
From:	Allen C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1326K, NUDOCS 8602260183
Download: ML20141G223 (14)

Text

.

. w x Commonwealth Edison

/ ) One First Nationti Plfzt, Chic 5go, Ilhnois k ~; Address Reply to Post Office Box 767

( / Chicago, Illinois 60690 February 21, 1986 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Cable ?sparation Concerns NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 References (a): November 15, 1983 letter from C. W.

Schroeder to H. R. Denton.

(b): Section 7.3.3.2 and Appendix D LaSalle SSER #7, dated December, 1983.

Dear Mr. Denton:

This letter is to resolve the deficiencies described in Appendix D to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report #7 regarding cable separation in Unit 1. The concern for cable separation in Unit 1 comes out of the License Condition for Unit 2. Item 2.c(10).

A detailed review and analysis was performed of the cable separation for enclosures containing reactor protection system cables.

Enclosed is Attachment A which contains a report of the analysis for Unit

1. Attachment A includes the criteria that has been used in the analysis and the justification on a panel-by-panel basis that the independence of the RPS circuits and channelization is not jeopardized.

Commonwealth Edison committed in Reference (a) to review the " Trip Report concerning cable separation concerns at LaSalle, Unit 2 (TIA-83-76)"

and address Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5 of that report. The review and analyses contained in Attachment A address the concerns of Sections 4.1 and 4.3.

Section 4.2 of Appendix D to LaSalle SSER #7 has been carefully reviewed. The concerns within this section have been identified, analyzed and accepted in the Regulatory Guide 1.75 response found in Appendix B of the LaSalle County Station FSAR. Attachment B to this letter identifies the applicable portion of the Reg Guide 1.75 response which covers Section 4.2 of Appendix D to the LaSalle SSER.

I gg22ggyg g 3 E l

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1 H. R. Denton February 21, 1986 l

Section 4.5 of Appendix D of SSER discusses redundant division cable separation for the solenoids mounted on the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valves. The initial cable design for the ADS valves required one division cabling to be enclosed in zipper tubing and the redundant division cabling terminated to the solenoid with no additional barrier. Commonwealth Edison has resolved this concern by the addition of zipper tubing to all divisional cabling associated with the ADS valves. We feel that this satisfactorily addresses the concerns identified in Section 4.5 of the SSER. The Unit 2 analysis is in progress and should be completed by May, 1986.

If you have any further questions on this matter, please contact this office.

One signed original and ten (10) copies of this letter and its attachments are being sent for your review.

Very truly yours, C. M. Allen Nuclear Licensing Administrator im Attachments A: Reactor Protection System (RPS) Cable Separation Analyses B: LaSalle County Station FSAR, Appendix B. Response'to Reg Guide 1.75, Pages B1-95 and B1-95a ec: Dr. A. Bournia - NRR LaSalle Resident Inspector 1326K a

ATTACHMENT A Pace 1 o'f'8 Reactor Protection Svatem (RP9)

Cable Senaration Analvsis Tne followino is a discussion of the analysis that was performed te justify the NRC Trip Report, concerning cable separation, dated November 4, 1983. Specifically, this discussion addresses Items 4.1(2)b, 4.l(2)c, 4.3(2):

TheindependenceofReactorProhectionSystem (RPS) circuits / channelization is not compromised for the fcllowing reasons:

A. RPS caoles of each channel are routed in separate raceways outside of control panels. The separation criteria for these raceways is provided on Sargent & Lundy Drawing IE-0-3333.

The separation of RPS cables from cables associated with safety-related divisions and non-safety-related cables inside control panels may be less than that dictated by IEEE-36*.

An analysis was performed to justify tne lesser separatior. of RPS cables from other cables inside of control panels. Th is analysis is discussed later.

B. All cables used to interconnect RPS are the same high cuality as that used in Class IE circuits, associated circuits, and non-safety related circuits. These types of cable comply with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974 and have been proven to be highly fire retardent by testing.

C. The cables that are a concern to the NRC are constrained to control and instrumentation circuits which, by their very nature, are low energy circuits. Control circuits are generally 120Vac or 125Vdc, whereas the- insulation rating of the cable utilized at LSCS for these applications is 600V.

D. There are no power cables in contact with the control and instrumentation cables that are in quest' ion. Also, there are no high energy sources located within control panels that contain RPS cables.

The independence of RPS circuits / channelization is not jeopardized inside control panels as demonstrated by an analysis which was performed for LSCS Unit 1. The following procedure was used to analyze all cables of the RPS systems 6

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Cable Separation Analysis Page 2 of 8 Type 1 Identify non-safety-related cablea (both those that are routed in non-safety raceways and those that are routed in safety raceways) that are terminated in the same enclosure as an RPS channels cables and verify that they are not terminated with any redundant RPS channels cables on the other end.

Type 2 Identify Class LE cables that are terminated in the same enclosure as an RPS channels cable and verify that they are not terminated with any redundant RPS channels cables on the other end.

If in either Types 1 or 2 above, redundant RPS channels are potentially jeopardized by the presence of a non-safety or Class, LE cable, a specific review was performed taking into consideration the function of the circuits, location of the circuits, and items A, B, C and D above, regarding the types of cables used for these circuits.

In the La Salle County FSAR Appendix B response to Regulatory Guide 1.75, the separation of non-RPS cables is discussed. As indicated the types, ratings, energy limitations are discussed for the control and instrumentation cables that are a' part of this analysis. For the reasons provided in the La Salle response to Regulatory Guide 1.75, cables that are routed with non-safety and Class lE cables (that are Type 1 or 2) are not required to be analyzed. Only cables, which are terminated in the same -

enclosure with RPS cables and have the potential of bridging redundant RPS subchannels, were reviewed in the analyals. See Figure 1 for an example of the analysis that was performed.

The results of this analysis are summarized as follows:

I. Reactor Buildinq NRC Trip Report Items 4.l(2)b, 4.l(2)c

1. 1H22-P004 Local Instrument Rack RPS Subchannel - Al The single Type 1 cable in this panel is not terminated with RPS cables at its other end.

2. 1H22-P005 Local Instrument Rack RPS Subchannel - A2 The single Type 1 cable in this panel is not terminated with RPS cables at its other end.

O

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Cable Separation Analysis Page 3 of d

3. lil22-P010 Local _J n st rument Rack RDS Subchannel - 32 The single Type 1 cable in this panel is not terminated with RPS cables at its other end.

4. lH22-P026_. Local Instrument Rack [

RPS Subchannel - B2 The single Type 1 cable in this panel is not terminated with RPS cables at itc other end.

5, 1H22-P027 Local Instrument Rack RPS Subchannel - B1 The Type 2 cables in this panel are not terminated with RPS cables at their other ends.

6. 1PLF5J Suporession Pool Temperature Monitorinq Power Suoply Cabinet RPS Subchannels - Al and B1 There are no Type 1 and/or Type 2 cables in this panel.

7. IPLF6J Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring Power Suoply Cabinet RPS Subchannels - A2 and B2 There are no Type 1 and/or Type 2 cables in this panel.

II. Auxiliary Building - Auxiliary Electrical Eculement Room and Control Room NRC Trip Report Item 4.3 (2)

1. IPA 13J Div. 1 Isolation Logic Cabinet RPS Subchannel - B1 Many cables in this panel are Type 1 because a single RPS cable (No.1PCl42) is terminated in this panel. However, none of these Type 1 cables are terminated with the cable containing the redundant function which is cable No. IPC143.

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Cable Separation Analysis Pale 4 af 9

2. I P A 14.1 D i '.' . ? Isolation Loc'c Cabin?'-.

RPS Succnannel - 82 The Typo i cables in this panel are not terminated with RPS cables at their other ends.

3. 11113-P 601 noactor Coro coolin, Ppnal RPS subchannels - Al and A2 ( .N a t e 1) t The Type 1 cables in thic panol are not terniaated with RPS cables at their ethar ends.

4. 1H13-P603 Reactor Contrni Panel l RPS Subcnannels - AL, A2, BL,.and 32 (Note 2)

The Type 1 cables in this panol are not terminated with RPS cables at their other ends.

5. lH13-P608 Power Rance ?tonitortnq Cabinet O r's 1-5 RPS Subcnannels - A1, A2, B1, and B2 (Note 3)

Thoro are Typo 1 cables that torninate at 1913-P601 with redundant division RPS cables, however, all RPS cables at 1H13-P60 3 a re totminated in a' separate metallic onclosuro. ,

. 6. 1H13-P409 Ronctor Protection Svstom Channel Al ~~

i RPS Sunchannois - A1, et, and A2 (Note 4) 4 i

l Thore is a single cable (Type 1) that on the other

! end terminatos with cables of the redundant RPS j Divisions A2 and B2. However, this 125Vdc control

! circuit is protected by a fuse as well as a redundant circuit breaker. These panels are located in a protected area (main control room).

I 7. 1H13-P609 Roactor Protection System Channel A2 RPS Subchannels - A2 and B2 Thero is a single cablo (Type 1) terminated at the other end with a single RPS cable of redundant division (B1), however, this cable is not rodundant in function to those of this panol.

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! Reactor Protection System (RPE)

Cable Separation Analysis Page 5 of 8 t

i l 8. lH13-P611 Reactor Protection System Chrin?1 D1

! RPS Subchannels - Al and D1 1

) a. There is. a single cable (Type 2) terminated at l the other end.with a Single RPS cablo of i

redundant division (B2) , howeiter, this cablo l is not redundant in function to those of this panel. .

) b. There are 4 cables (Type 1) terminated at the ,

j other end with redundant division RPS ca51os (Al and A2). However, these are alar.n ,

circuits which are low energy, and the panel:  !

! are located in the control room which la l considered to be a protected area.  !

)

j 9. 1H13-P611 Reactor Protection System Channel H2 '

RPS Subchannels - A2 and D2 i a. There is 'a single cable (Typo 2) terminated at

! the other end with a single RP3 cable of the

redundant division (BL), however,.thic cable j i is not redundant in function to those of.;his '

{ panel.

! b. There are 4 cables (Type.1) terminated at the 3

other end with redundant division RPS cablas i (Al and A2) . However, these are alarm j circuits which are low energy, and the panels i

are located in the control room which in '

l considered to be a protected area.

l

} c. There is a single cable (Type 1) terminated at 1

the other end with RPS cables of redundant I '

division (A1) . However, this 125Vdc control l circuit is protected by a fune as well as a  ;

i redundant circuit breaker. These panels are also located in the control room which is considered to be a protected area.

i

10. 1H13-P632 Leak Detection Div.1 Panel

,' RP8 Subchannels - Al and A2 (Note $)

. The Type 1 and/or Type 2 cables in this panel are

, not terminated with RPS cables at their other ends.

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o Reactor Protection Systcm (RPS)

Cablo Separation Analysis Paqe 6 of 3

11. 1Hl3-Pd42 Leak Detoction Div. 2 Panal RPS Subchannels - 81 and Di (Note 5) ,

The Type 1 and/or Typo 2 cables in this panel are not terminated with RPS cables at their other ends.

12. 1H13-P635 Rad. Monitorina Div. 1 Panet RPS Subchannels - Al and Bl There are many Typo 1 and/or Type 2 cables in this panel that are not terminated with HPS cablos at their other ends. Also, there are 8 cables (Type 1) terminated at the other end with redundant RPS cables ( A2 and B2). The other end for all of theno cables is panol 1H13-P636, the Division 2 radiation monitoring panel. Six of thoso cables are 21 Vdc used for neutron monitoring alarms.

Those circuits are protected by a fuso as well as a circuit breaker. The other 2 circuits are also low eneray used for alarms fed f rom the main annunci9 tor Cabinet IPA 03J. Both thoso nanels tro located in the control room which is considered to be a protected area.

13. 1H13-P636 Red. Monitorin, Oiv. 2 Panni RPS Subchannels - A2 and BT Soo panel 1H13-P635.

Notost

1. These redundant subchannels exist in separate soctions of this main control panel.

2. These redundant RPS subchannels are terminated in separate metallic enclosures.

3. These redundant RPS subchannels have physical separation by their termination in 5 separate bays and separation within each bay.

4. A single A2 cable is terminated with redundant subchannels At and B1; however, this cable is required for the backup scram valves which is not redundant to any Al and si cable terminated at this panel section.

5. The redundant RPG channels terminated in this panel are used for the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) control circuits.

This is acceptable per General Electric Separation Document No. 22A2988, Rev. 6.

. . .o. ,

Ifcactor Protection System (RPS)

Cablo Separation Analysis Pa ;c 7 c.' t:

1 o

i i

Control Room Panel Annunciator Cabinet j till3-PXXX I PAX.u h

0 No RPS 1

Cables

. +

1 1

1 I f Separate gr Division 1 i Conduit Safety-Related j Channel Tray & Conduit.

! B2 i

l i

! < r Type 1 Cable

j. _. ..

I Cables terminated j Nunbel Sea Codo ,

! LPPXXX B2C 1

j .

i

! 1RSXXX 11K

. i 1RDXXX 12C i

I l j 1H22-P0XX i I

j Figure 1 Example RPS Separation Analysis i

e Reactor suilding 1.ocal Instrument Rack 1H22-P0XX

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a

. 1 of 2 (rigure 1)

\

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Cable Separation Analysis Paqe 3 of 3 Discussian: In this example, 2 non-sa fety related cables are terminated with a RPS subchannel B2 Cable 1RPXXX.

Cable IRDXXX seg. Code 12C is of the same nume ri'ca l division as of 1RPXXX and will not be considered because loss of a single division will not be capable of preventing a required RPS action. Cable IRSXXX Sea. Code 11K is opposite numerical diviaton to 1RPXXX (B2C) and for purposes of this analysis will be considered a Type 1 cable.

Result: The Type 1 cable in this panel is not terminated with RPS cablos at its other end. RPS channelization has not been denraded. (i.e. a fault in this cable cannot affect two redundant RPS subchannels) h 2 of 2 ( Figure 1)

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LSCS-FSAR AMENDMENT 55 l

- ATTACHMENT 8 0

MARCH 1981 IEEE-384, Class lE circuits are not degraded below an '

acceptable level for the following reasons:

1

a. Cables associated with one safety-related division are never routed in cable trays or conduit containing cables of a redundant safety-related division. This is true for all general. plant areas. Lesser separation than that dictated by IEEE-384 occurs only within control panels located in the control room and auxiliary equipment room.

b.

All cables used to interconnect associated circuits are the same high quality as that utilized in Class lE circuits, i.e., all associated cables comply with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974.

Therefore, this cable has been proven to be highly fire retardant by testing. ,

c. Cables with separation less than that dictated by Sections 5.1.3 and 5.6. 2 of IEEE-384 are constrained to control and instrumentation circuits which, by their very nature, are low energy circuits. Control circuits are generally 120-Vac or 125-Vde, whereas, the insulation rating of the cable utilized at LSCS is 600-V.

d. There are no power cables in contact with the control and instrumentation cables in the cable spreading area or in the control room and auxiliary equipment room. Also, there are no high energy sources located within control panels installed in these areas.

e. Fire stops are installed in the. bottom entrances of all control panels.

With respect to the separation of non-Class lE from Class lE control and instrumentation circuits, LSCS complies with Section 4.6.2 of IEEE-384. Although the separation of non-Class lE from Class lE control and instrumentation circuits is in some cases, less than that required by Sections 5.1.3 and 5.6.2 of IEEE-384, these circuits have been analyzed to show that Class lE circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level because:

a. Non-Class lE cables are routed in separate cable trays from Class 1E and associated cables in general plant areas.

b. Non-Class lE cables which come in close proximity to Class lE and associated cables at one end do not come in contact with redundant Class lE or associated circuits at their other end.

This has been confirmed by a study of installed cables at LSCS.

B.1-95

1 LSCS-FSAR AMENDMENT 56 MAY 1981

' c. All cables u?ed to interconnect non-Class lE circuits are the same high quality as that utilized in Class lE circuits, i.e. , all asso-ciated cables comply with the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Therefore, this cable has been proven to be highly fire retardant by testing.

d. Cable separation less than that required by Sections 5.1 and 5.6 of IEEE-384 is limited to control and instrumentation circuits which by their very nature are low energy circuits. Control circuits are generally 120-Vac or 125-Vde, whereas, the insulation rating of the cable uti,lized at LSCS is 600-V.

e. There are no power cables in contact with the control and instrumentation cables in the cable spreading area or in the control room.and auxiliary equipment room. Also, there are no high energy sources located within control panels installed in these areas.

f. Fire stops are installed in the bottom entrances of all control panels.

Position cable and10raceway refers toidentification.

Section 5.1.2 of IEEE 384-1974 concerning The LSCS design utilizes cable trays with permanent colored-identification markers at each routing point which are assigned and alphanumeric code per Table 8.3-6 of the LSCS-FSAR. Each cable is assigned a number and segregation code. This information is placed on a colored tag, of permanent design, which is affixed to each end of the cable. A similar tag is also affixed to the cable where it enters and exits a penetration.

The LSCS 15, and 16. design complies with Positions 11, 12, 13, 14, IEEE 384-1974, Section 4.6, requires that Non-Class lE cable trays be separated from Class lE cable trays by the following minimum separation requirements:

a. 1 ft horizuntally and 3 ft vertically in cable spreading areas,

b. 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically in general plant areas.

The La Salle County Station (LSCS) criteria specifies that the minimum distance between safety-related and non-safety-related cable trays shall be 3 inches horizontally and 1 foot vertically.

Cable trays at LSCS were installed to this specific criterion prior to issuance of IEEE-384.

B.1-95a