ML20140E389
| ML20140E389 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1986 |
| From: | Craig Harbuck, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140E283 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-TM 50-313-85-27, 50-368-85-28, GL-82-33, NUDOCS 8602030237 | |
| Download: ML20140E389 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1985027
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APPENDIX C
U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-313/85-27
Licenses:
50-368/85-28
' Dockets: 50-313
50-368
Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted:
December 1-31, 1985
Inspectors:
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W. ~D. Jotp%W. Senior Resident
Date ~
Reactor 16spector
(pars.2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11)
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C.~ C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor
Date
Inspector
(pars. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
Approved:
7/7 d m hog-
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D..M. Hunhicutt, Acting Chief,
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Project Section B, Reactor Project
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Branch
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Inspect' ion 3ummary
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Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-27)
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AreasIbspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety
verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified
items, fo1,lowup on Three Mile Island Action Plan requirements, IE Circular
review, precurement program implementation, and control room ventilation.
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The inspection involved 68 inspector-hours (including 4 backshift hours) onsite
by two NRC inspectors.
Results: . Within the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified
(control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2) and one deviation was
identified (control room isolation, paragraph 11).
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Recort 50-368/85-28)
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. Areas Inspec_ted;
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety
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verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified
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= items, followup on licensee event reports, followup on Three Mile Island Action
Plan requirements, IE Circular review, procurement program implementation,
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containment purge, and control room ventilation.
The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours (including 8 backshift hours) onsite
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by two NRC inspectors.
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Resul!It
Within the ten areas inspected, two violations were identified
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(control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2, and failure to maintain a
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manual valve locked as required, paragraph 6) and one deviation was identified
(control room isolation, paragraph 11).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J.
Levine, ANO General Manager
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R. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
- B. Baker, Operations Manager
C. Bates, Shift Maintenance Supervisor
M. Bolants, Health Physics Superintendent
- P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer
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H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor
T. Cogburn, General Manager, Nuclear Services
A. Cox, Operations Technical Support
L. Dugger, Acting I&C Maintenance Superintendent
- E. Ewing, Engineering & Technical Support Manager
G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor
M. Frala, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor
M. Goodson, Civil Engineer
L. Gulick, Unit 2~0perations Superintendent
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C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
H. Hollis, Security Coordinator
D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager
- L. Humphrey, Administrative Manager
D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer
- H. Jones, Field Construction Manager
- D..Lomax, Licensing Supervisor
B. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer
W. McKelvey, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor
J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent
M. Pendergrass, Acting Engineering & Technical Support Manager
- D. Provencher, Quality Engineering Supervisor
R. Poole, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor
P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer
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L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager
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- L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control Manager
C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent
.R. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
S. Strasner, Quality Control Engineer
C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support
B. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment Supervisor
R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
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D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor
- R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager
G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor
S. Yancy,. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support
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- Present at exit interview..
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including
operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
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_(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8118-02; 368/8116-03:
Control room
ventilation.
This item was identified in. June of 1981 and identified a lack
of knowledge of the design basis for, and a lack of plant
procedures relative to operation of, the outside air dampers on
the control room emergency recirculation and filtration units
(VSF-9 and 2VSF-9).
The item and the licensee's resolution
attempts were discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-313/8232;
50-368/8231 and 50-313/8418; 50-368/8418.
The licensee has
recently revised the control room ventilation procedures
(1104.34, Revision 9 and 2104.34, Revision 4) to. include
instructions on closing the outside air dampers if the emergency
ventilation unit fails to start or fails after starting.
In
addition, a check of the reserve air bottle pressure and an
operability check on the outside air dampers have been added to
the monthly surveillance tests.
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However, these procedures provide inconsistent guidance on
operation of the outside air dampers in a chlorine event. The
Unit 2 procedure recommends closing the outside air damper on
2VSF-9 during a chlorine event, but the Unit 1 procedure does
not provide similar' guidance for the outside air damper on
VSF-9.
Discussions with operations department personnel of both
units indicated that no clear design basis information was
available to'them with respect to-operation of the outside air
dampers during a chlorine event.
The licensee's failure to
establish adequate procedures.for the operation of the control
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room ventilation system'is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 for both units.
(313/8527-01; 368/8528-01).
(0 pen)
Open Item 313/8017-03:
Reactor building purge alarm setpoint.
The licensee has performed a calibration of RE-7400, the reactor
building purge monitor, using Xenon 133.
The results of this
calibration will be used in the calculation of the monitor
expacted count rate and the monitor alarm setpoint prior to the
next Unit 1 reactor building purge.
This is expected to result
in a more useful alarm setpoint, since the major isotope
discharged during a reactor building purge is Xenon 133.
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The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 1104.33, Revision
24, dated October 16, 1985.
This procedure provides
instructions for conducting a reactor building purge, and
Attachment C of this procedure is provided for documenting the
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release.
Review of this procedure and discussions with
radiochemistry and operations personnel indicated that several
improvements have been made to enhance control of a reactor
building purge.
These include:
The recalibration of RE-7400 discussed above.
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The determination of a realistic setpoint for the special
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particulate fodine noble gas (SPING) monitor by
radiochemistry and the inclusion of this setpoint in the
pre-release permit.
Instructions in~ Procedure 1104.33 for lining up sample
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flow to RE-7400 prior to the release.
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Instructions in Procedure 1104.33 for verifying the
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operability of SPING No. 1 (RX9820)' prior to the release.
Software changes to reduce the likelihood of an error when
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entering reactor building pressure, as was discussed in NRC
Inspection Report 50-313/85-07.
The following further actions remain to be completed prior to
closing this item:
Development and implementation of a procedure to enable
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operations personnel to adjust the setpoint of the SPING
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monitor before and.after a release.
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Provision of procedural guidance,to operations personnel
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on the use of the SPING monitor during a release,
including the required response if the alarm setpoint is
reached.
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Provision of proceddral guidance to operations personnel
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on resetting the RE-7400 setpoint after the release.
Determination of whether the Xenon 133 calibration curve
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for RE-7400 results in.a useful monitor alarm setpoint for
the next reactor building purge.
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3.
Licensee Event Report (LER)-Followup (Unit 2)
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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that reportabi ity requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has
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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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84-010-01
'Nonconservative constants used in core protection
calculators and core operating limit supervisory system
84-012-00
Primary overcurrent protection device for containment
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85-006-01
Fire door found open
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85-008-00
Blockout in fire barrier wall not sealed properly
85-009-00
Inadvertent engineered safeguards (ES) actuation
during design change modification
85-010-00
Remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation range not
in accordance with Technical Specifications
85-020-00
Reactor trip while in Mode 5
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85-021-00
Fire barrier penetration not completely sealed
LER 84-010 reported an error in the CECOR code which was identified by
Combustion Engineering (CE).
The licensee verified that CE had identified
the cause of the error, had verified that no other similar errors exist,
and had taken appropriate action to prevent recurrence.
LER 85-009 reported an inadvertent ES actuation with the unit shut down
and the core unloaded.
The actuation was determined to be caused by
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inadequate design modification installation instructions.
These
instructions were revised and the design change was completed without
further incidents.
LER 85-020 reported a reactor trip while performing a monthly surveillance
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test of the reactor protective system in cold shutdown.
The licensee's
review of the incident found that the technician had failed to properly
follow the test procedure.
A counseling' session was conducted, addressing
procedure compliance and attention to detail.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector is reviewing, on a continuing basis, the licensee's
actions in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic Letter 82-33.
The inspector's review of certain of the licensee's actions in
this regard is summarized below.
The numbering system and short titles
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correspond to those used in NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737
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-I.C.1 Upgrade Emergency Operating Procedures
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The licensee has performed the necessary analyses, developed
technical guidelines, prepared procedures writer's guides and
published human factored, function oriented, emergency operating
procedures.
These procedures are designated Emergency Operating
Procedures (E0P) 1202.01 and 2202.01 for Unit 1 and Unit 2,
respectively.
Extensive simulator validation of the procedures and
operator training on the procedures was conducted prior to procedure
implementation.
The NRC inspector's review of these procedures
indicated that the procedures should improve the operator's ability
to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Discussions with
licensed operators revealed good operator familiarity with and
confidence in the procedures.
I.D.2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
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The licensee has developed and installed a SPDS for each unit.
These
systems provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the
control room operators to aid them in determining the safety status
of the plant.
Use of the SPDS has been incorporated into the E0Ps
discussed above, but the E0Ps do not depend upon the SPDS being
operable. The SPDS has proved to be useful during plant transients
and has been highly reliable.
In addition to the control room
displays, the SPDS for both units in the primary technical support
center and in the secondary technical support center have been
declared fully operational.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
IE Circular Review (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed the documented actions taken by the licensee to
address the concern of IE Circular 81-13, " Torque Switch Electrical Bypass
Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors," dated September 25, 1981.
This IE Circular was reissued in August 1984 because the original had
omitted the first two of the four recommended actions.
These four actions
were:
Verify that all valves important to safety, which are required by
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the design to have torque switch bypass circuits installed, do in
fact have these circuits installed.
Verify that all applicable electrical drawings correctly reflect
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these electrical bypass circuits.
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If inspection reveals that required bypass circuits are not
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installed, installation should be done as soon as practicable.
Establish controls to assure that torque switch bypass circuits are
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not inadvertently removed and that they are restored if they are
removed for maintenance or test.
The licensee determined that the scope of the investigation at ANO was
limited to safety-related motor operated vahes in Unit 2.
Most valves
.were found to have been wired correctly.with the 100% torque bypass as
indicated by the design drawings.
Only four valves were found which had
been incorrectly designed to not have the 100% torque bypass (service
water to the containment unit coolers isolation valves).
Several other
valves were found to have improper wiring.
The NRC inspector verified
that these problems had been corrected.
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The licensee instituted administrative controls to prevent the inadvertent
removal of the torque bypass function by adding suitable precautions to
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the following licensee procedures:
1403.03, "Limitorque Motor 0perated Valves Inspection and Setup,"
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(step 5.9)
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2403.55, "Limitorque Motor Operated Valve SMB-000 Inspection and
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Setup," (step 7.8.9)
Based upon the above, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee
appears to have adequately performed the recommended actions of this IE
Circular.
Therefore, IE Circular 81-13 is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The
inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affected
components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors made spot checks to
verify that.the physical security plan was being implemented in
accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors verified
implementation of radiation protection controls 'during observation of
plant activities.
The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant
equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
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excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and
cleanliness conditions during the tour.
The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2
high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system.
The walkdown was performed
using Procedure 2104.39 and Drawing M-2232.
The following problems were
noted:
Insulation on electrical power cable to the motor operator for
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2CV-5126-1, HPSI pump 2P89A mini-flow recirculation control valve was
gapped.
One link on the locking chain for 2SI-11B, HPSI pumps discharge
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cross-connect valve, was severed rendering the lock ineffective.
This is an apparent violation (368/8528-02).
Upon being notified of
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this condition, the licensee promptly installed a new chain on the
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valve handwheel and conducted a position verification and chain
inspection on all locked manual valves outside containment in both
units.
No similar discrepancies were identified.
The licensee
conducted an investigation to determine how and when the chain on
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-this valve was severed, but the investigation yielded no solid
conclusions.
A tensioned wire connecting the bonnet of a vent valve and the HPSI
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hot leg injection header by penetrations 2P34 and 2P13 was found.
Several valves were either not labeled or had an incorrect label:
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2SI-5115A
2SI-5054C and D
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The support for the motor operator on 2CV-5075 was not properly
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installed.
There was boric acid crystal buildup on 2SI-5054D and on 2CV-5128-1.
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The pipe through centainment penetration 2P35 was supported by a
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wooden block and shims in the penetration cutout.
Parts of the handwheel mechanism for 2SI-1070A had fallen out and
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were resting on the bonnet around the stem.
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. These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required
surveillance testing on the security diesel generator (Procedure 1305.10),
and a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1),
and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate
procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for
operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were
accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and
procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than
the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during
the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 2 plant protection system channel 'A' monthly test,
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Section 7.23, reactor trip breaker trip tests (Procedure 2304.38)
Unit 1 steam driven emergency feedwater pump test (Procedure
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1106.06, Supplement II)
Unit 1 hydrogen purge standby system test (Procedure 1104.33,
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Supplement II)
Unit 2 plant protection system channel
'C' monthly test
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(Procedure 2304.39)
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes
or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
activith r, were accomplished using approved praedures and were inspected
as applicEble; functional testing and/or ca!ibrations were performed prior
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to returning components or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls
were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
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which may affect system performance.
The requests were reviewe'd to
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determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned
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to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The NRC inspector observed that an average of 10 to 15% (5 to 7) of the
instruments or recorders on the Unit-2 radiation monitoring panel (2C25)
were inoperable at a given time during the month.
Some of these
instruments bore deficiency tags which' referred to Job Orders as Job
Requests.
Others had informal tags indicating " detector on order." The
NRC inspector expressed concern that the process and area radiation
monitoring systems were not being maintained in a high condition of
readiness.
This is an open item pending licensee action to improve the.
operability status of these instruments.
(0 pen Item 368/8528-03)
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Unit 2 corrective maintenance to CV-1404, shutdown cooling suction
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isolation valve motor operator (JR 0141)
Replacement of transition piece on VSF-9 (JO 704160)
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Repair of steam generator level meter 2LI-1031-2 (JO 705174)
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Installation and testing of trip circuit breakers
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(Procedure 2405.17)
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Testing spare reactor trip breaker for Unit 1 (JO 99000014)
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Adjustment of packing on the Unit 1 steam driven emergency
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feedwater pump (JO 70872)
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-Changing oil on the inboard pump bearing for the Unit 1 emergency
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feedwater pump (JO 705637)
Repair of control element drive mechanism control system
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'(JO 705723)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Procurement Program Implementation
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.The purpose of this area of_the inspection was to ascertain whether the
. licensee is implementing its quality assurance program relating to the
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control of procurement activities in conformance with regulatory ~
requirements, SAR commitments, and industry guides and standards. The NRC
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inspector reviewed the following chapters of the ANO Quality Assurance
Manual for Operations, Revision 7 of May 31, 1985, pertaining to
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procurement:
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4.0
Procurement Document Control
7. 0
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services
8.0
Identification and Control of Materials, and Components
15.4 Supplier Nonconformances
The NRC inspector also reviewed the following licensee procedures:
1000.10
Control of Procurement, Rev 9, 11/1/85
1000.11
Purchase Requisition Preparation and Control,
Rev 4, 11/1/85
1025.007 EQ Listed Equipment's Approved Lubricants,
Rev 1. 4/19/85
1033.01
Receipt Inspection, Rev 12, 11/1/85
1032.06
Procurement Technical Assistance, Rev 6, 10/31/85
The NRC inspector concluded from this review that the licensee appears to
have adequate administrative controls and procedures to implement the
requirements of the following guides and standards committed to by the
licensee:
Regulatory Guide 1.123, Rev 1, July 1977
ANSI N45.2.13-1976, " Quality Assurance Requirements for
Control of Procurement of Items and Services for
Nuclear Power Plants"
Regulatory Guide 1.38, Rev 2, May 1977
ANSI N45.2.2-1971,~" Quality Assurance Requirements for
Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling
of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Pcwer Plants"
ANSI N18.7-1976, " Administrative Controls and Quality
Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear
Power Plants," (Sections 5.2.13 through 5.2.15)
The NRC inspector reviewed 27 procurement packages from 1984 and 1985 to
verify that the licensee is implementing its procurement program in
accordance with the foregoing procedures.
Components were selected from
the following general system areas:
Reactivity Control and Power Distribution
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Instrumentation
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Engineered Safety Features Systems
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Containment System
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Electrical Distribution Systems
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Examples of components included were pump bearings, fasteners, electronic
components, valves and valve parts, electrical cable, emergency diesel
generator parts, nuclear instrumentation detectors and associated
electronics, breakers including spare reactor trip breakers, valve motor
operators, power supplies, protective coatings, welding material, and
limit switches.
The NRC inspector found that the procurement documents (purchase
requisitions, purcha n orders, material receipt inspection reports, and
material tickets), associated with the procurement packages reviewed, had
been prepared in accordance with the approved procedures.
The NRC
inspector also verified:
That the material purchased was obtained from qualified
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vendors, and
That the licensee specified to each vendor the documentation
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requirements for quality and traceability and took appropriate
action when the documentation was not supplied, or was in error.
Based upon this review, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee
appears to be implementing its procurement program in accordance with
regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Containment Purge (Unit 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 2104.33, Revision 14,
dated November 21, 1985.
This procedure provides instructions for
conductir.g a containment building purge, and Supplement 1 of this
procedure is provided for documenting the release.
The NRC inspector
also reviewed the records of containment purge release No. 2GR-85-179,
conducted on December 7, 1985.
The following discrepancies were noted:
The multipoint chart recorder (2RR-0645) used to record the response
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of the containment purge monitor (2RE-8233) during the release was
in very poor operating condition, and produced a chart which was
almost completely illegible.
The alarm setpoint for 2RE-8233 used during the purge was about
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three decades above the actual count rate reached by the monitor
during the release.
No procedural guidance has been provided to operations personnel for
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adjusting the SPING monitor (SPING No. 5, RX 9820) setpoint before or
after a release.
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This~ item will remain open pending correction of these discrepancies.
(0 pen Item 368/8528-04)
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' No violations or deviations were identified.
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Control Room Ventilation (Units 1 and 2)
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368/8116-03, the NRC inspector reviewed the control room air flow
drawings and the' appropriate sections of the Safety Analysis Reports
(SAR).
Discussions were also conducted with various licensee personnel
to determine which ventilation systems supply the control room and
adjacent' areas.
Two areas of concern are discussed below.
a.
Control Room Isolation
The ventilation for the Unit 2 shift supervisor's office is supplied
by the elevator-machine room ventilation system (2VEH-5 and
2VSF-28).
The ventilation for the Unit 1 shift supervisor's office
is supplied by VUC-14.
The Unit 1 kitchen and restroom area is
supplied by VSF-41.
None of these three systems are isolated upon
detection of high radiation or high chlorine, and prior to
December 17, 1985, the doors between these areas and the main part
of the control room were normally open. Signs had been attached to
the doors indicating that they should be closed in the event of
control room isolation, but no procedures included instructions to
shut the doors upon control room isolation.
The NRC inspector
concluded that there was no assurance that these three doors could
be closed within 5 seconds of control room isolation actuation on
high radiation or chlorine.
Section 9.7.2.1 of the Unit 1 SAR and Section 9.4.1.1.2 of the
Unit 2 SAR indicate that the control room is completely isolated from
its normal ventilation systems and from adjacent areas within
5 seconds following detection of high radiation or high chlorine
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concentration.
This is an apparent deviation from the commitments
in the SARs.
(313/8527-02; 368/8528-05)
On December 17, 1985, the NRC inspector observed that these three
doors were being maintained closed.
b.
Unit 2 Air Flow and Control Diagrams
Several discrepancies were noted on the air flow and control
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diagrams for the Unit 2 control room and adjacent areas.
(Drawings
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M2263 Sheet 1, Revision 15, and M2263 Sheet 2, Revision 11).
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. . , .
-15-
M2263 Sheet.1 shows no ventilation system supplying the'.
.
visitors viewing room (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office).
Duct
drawings and licensee personnel indicated this area is served
by the elevator-machine room ventilation system.
M2263 Sheet 2 shows a ve'ntilation duct from the normal Unit 2
.
control room, ventilation system (2VSF-8A/B) supplying the
_
viewing gallery (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office).
Licensee
personnel stated that this duct has been' blanked and no longer
supplies this area.
M2263 Sheet 2, Note 9 states, "2VSF-9 is located in Unit 1 and
.
is presently powered from' Unit 1 for Unit 1 startup.
This unit
will eventually be powered from Unit 2 power source for Unit 2
startup." This note is outdated and in error with respect to
the power supply for 2 VSF-9.
The above errors were not bubbled on the drawings to indicate
.
-
pending design changes.
This item will remain open pending correction of the Unit 2 control
room air flow and control diagrams.
(368/8528-06)
12.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine (ANO General Manager) and
other members of the AP&L staff at-the end of this inspection. At
this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection
'
and the findings.
,
t