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Insp Repts 50-313/85-27 & 50-368/85-28 on 851201-31. Violations & Deviations Noted:Control Room Ventilation Procedures Not Developed,Failure to Maintain Manual Valve Locked & No Automatic Control Room Isolation Capability
	ML20140E389
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	01/27/1986
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20140E283	List: ML20140E279; ML20140E345; ML20140E361; ML20140E389;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-TM 50-313-85-27, 50-368-85-28, GL-82-33, NUDOCS 8602030237
	Download: ML20140E389 (15)
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APPENDIX C

U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/85-27 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/85-28 NPF-6

' Dockets: 50-313

50-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

P. O. Box 551

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1985

Inspectors: / //O

W. ~D. Jotp%W. Senior Resident

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Reactor 16spector

(pars.2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11)

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C.~ C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor

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Inspector

(pars. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

Approved: 7/7 d m hog-

D..M. Hunhicutt, Acting Chief,

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Inspect' ion 3ummary

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Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-27)

AreasIbspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety

verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified

items, fo1,lowup on Three Mile Island Action Plan requirements, IE Circular

review, precurement program implementation, and control room ventilation.

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The inspection involved 68 inspector-hours (including 4 backshift hours) onsite

by two NRC inspectors.

Results: . Within the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified

(control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2) and one deviation was

identified (control room isolation, paragraph 11).

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Inspection Summary

, Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Recort 50-368/85-28)

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. Areas Inspec_ted; Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety

g verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified

= items, followup on licensee event reports, followup on Three Mile Island Action

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Plan requirements, IE Circular review, procurement program implementation,

containment purge, and control room ventilation.

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The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours (including 8 backshift hours) onsite

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by two NRC inspectors.

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Resul!It Within the ten areas inspected, two violations were identified

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. (control room ventilation procedure, paragraph 2, and failure to maintain a

manual valve locked as required, paragraph 6) and one deviation was identified

(control room isolation, paragraph 11).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

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J. Levine, ANO General Manager

R. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

B. Baker, Operations Manager

C. Bates, Shift Maintenance Supervisor

M. Bolants, Health Physics Superintendent

P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer

i H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor

T. Cogburn, General Manager, Nuclear Services

A. Cox, Operations Technical Support

L. Dugger, Acting I&C Maintenance Superintendent

E. Ewing, Engineering & Technical Support Manager

G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor

M. Frala, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor

M. Goodson, Civil Engineer

L. Gulick, Unit 2~0perations Superintendent

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C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor

H. Hollis, Security Coordinator

D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager

L. Humphrey, Administrative Manager

D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer

H. Jones, Field Construction Manager

D..Lomax, Licensing Supervisor

B. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer

W. McKelvey, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor

J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent

M. Pendergrass, Acting Engineering & Technical Support Manager

D. Provencher, Quality Engineering Supervisor

R. Poole, Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor

P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer ,

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L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager

)' *L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control Manager

C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent

.R. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor

S. Strasner, Quality Control Engineer

C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support

B. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment Supervisor

e R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

7 D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor

R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager

G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor *

S. Yancy,. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support

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Present at exit interview..

The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including

operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)

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_(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8118-02; 368/8116-03: Control room

ventilation.

This item was identified in. June of 1981 and identified a lack

of knowledge of the design basis for, and a lack of plant

procedures relative to operation of, the outside air dampers on

the control room emergency recirculation and filtration units

(VSF-9 and 2VSF-9). The item and the licensee's resolution

attempts were discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-313/8232;

50-368/8231 and 50-313/8418; 50-368/8418. The licensee has

recently revised the control room ventilation procedures

(1104.34, Revision 9 and 2104.34, Revision 4) to. include

instructions on closing the outside air dampers if the emergency

ventilation unit fails to start or fails after starting. In

addition, a check of the reserve air bottle pressure and an

operability check on the outside air dampers have been added to

the monthly surveillance tests.

However, these procedures provide inconsistent guidance on

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operation of the outside air dampers in a chlorine event. The

Unit 2 procedure recommends closing the outside air damper on

2VSF-9 during a chlorine event, but the Unit 1 procedure does

not provide similar' guidance for the outside air damper on

VSF-9. Discussions with operations department personnel of both

units indicated that no clear design basis information was

available to'them with respect to-operation of the outside air

dampers during a chlorine event. The licensee's failure to

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establish adequate procedures.for the operation of the control

room ventilation system'is an apparent violation of Technical

Specification 6.8.1 for both units. (313/8527-01; 368/8528-01).

(0 pen) Open Item 313/8017-03: Reactor building purge alarm setpoint.

The licensee has performed a calibration of RE-7400, the reactor

building purge monitor, using Xenon 133. The results of this

calibration will be used in the calculation of the monitor

expacted count rate and the monitor alarm setpoint prior to the

next Unit 1 reactor building purge. This is expected to result

in a more useful alarm setpoint, since the major isotope

discharged during a reactor building purge is Xenon 133.

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The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 1104.33, Revision

24, dated October 16, 1985. This procedure provides

instructions for conducting a reactor building purge, and

Attachment C of this procedure is provided for documenting the

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release. Review of this procedure and discussions with

radiochemistry and operations personnel indicated that several

improvements have been made to enhance control of a reactor

building purge. These include:

. The recalibration of RE-7400 discussed above.

. The determination of a realistic setpoint for the special

particulate fodine noble gas (SPING) monitor by

radiochemistry and the inclusion of this setpoint in the

pre-release permit.

, . Instructions in~ Procedure 1104.33 for lining up sample

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flow to RE-7400 prior to the release.

. Instructions in Procedure 1104.33 for verifying the

operability of SPING No. 1 (RX9820)' prior to the release.

. Software changes to reduce the likelihood of an error when

entering reactor building pressure, as was discussed in NRC

Inspection Report 50-313/85-07.

The following further actions remain to be completed prior to

closing this item:

. Development and implementation of a procedure to enable

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operations personnel to adjust the setpoint of the SPING

- a monitor before and.after a release.

. Provision of procedural guidance,to operations personnel

on the use of the SPING monitor during a release,

including the required response if the alarm setpoint is

reached. ,

. Provision of proceddral guidance to operations personnel

on resetting the RE-7400 setpoint after the release.

. Determination of whether the Xenon 133 calibration curve

for RE-7400 results in.a useful monitor alarm setpoint for

the next reactor building purge.

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3. Licensee Event Report (LER)-Followup (Unit 2)

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

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that reportabi ity requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has

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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

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84-010-01 'Nonconservative constants used in core protection

calculators and core operating limit supervisory system

84-012-00 Primary overcurrent protection device for containment

penetration inoperable

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85-006-01 Fire door found open

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85-008-00 Blockout in fire barrier wall not sealed properly

85-009-00 Inadvertent engineered safeguards (ES) actuation

during design change modification

85-010-00 Remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation range not

in accordance with Technical Specifications

85-020-00 Reactor trip while in Mode 5 '

85-021-00 Fire barrier penetration not completely sealed

LER 84-010 reported an error in the CECOR code which was identified by

Combustion Engineering (CE). The licensee verified that CE had identified

the cause of the error, had verified that no other similar errors exist,

and had taken appropriate action to prevent recurrence.

LER 85-009 reported an inadvertent ES actuation with the unit shut down

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and the core unloaded. The actuation was determined to be caused by

inadequate design modification installation instructions. These

instructions were revised and the design change was completed without

further incidents.

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LER 85-020 reported a reactor trip while performing a monthly surveillance

test of the reactor protective system in cold shutdown. The licensee's

review of the incident found that the technician had failed to properly

follow the test procedure. A counseling' session was conducted, addressing

procedure compliance and attention to detail.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Followup on Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector is reviewing, on a continuing basis, the licensee's

actions in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic Letter 82-33. The inspector's review of certain of the licensee's actions in

this regard is summarized below. The numbering system and short titles

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, correspond to those used in NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737

'(Generic Letter 82-33).

. . -I.C.1 Upgrade Emergency Operating Procedures

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The licensee has performed the necessary analyses, developed

technical guidelines, prepared procedures writer's guides and

published human factored, function oriented, emergency operating

procedures. These procedures are designated Emergency Operating

Procedures (E0P) 1202.01 and 2202.01 for Unit 1 and Unit 2,

respectively. Extensive simulator validation of the procedures and

operator training on the procedures was conducted prior to procedure

implementation. The NRC inspector's review of these procedures

indicated that the procedures should improve the operator's ability

to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Discussions with

licensed operators revealed good operator familiarity with and

confidence in the procedures.

. I.D.2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

The licensee has developed and installed a SPDS for each unit. These

systems provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the

control room operators to aid them in determining the safety status

of the plant. Use of the SPDS has been incorporated into the E0Ps

discussed above, but the E0Ps do not depend upon the SPDS being

operable. The SPDS has proved to be useful during plant transients

and has been highly reliable. In addition to the control room

displays, the SPDS for both units in the primary technical support

center and in the secondary technical support center have been

declared fully operational.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. IE Circular Review (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed the documented actions taken by the licensee to

address the concern of IE Circular 81-13, " Torque Switch Electrical Bypass

Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors," dated September 25, 1981.

This IE Circular was reissued in August 1984 because the original had

omitted the first two of the four recommended actions. These four actions

were:

. Verify that all valves important to safety, which are required by

the design to have torque switch bypass circuits installed, do in

fact have these circuits installed.

. Verify that all applicable electrical drawings correctly reflect

these electrical bypass circuits.

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. If inspection reveals that required bypass circuits are not

installed, installation should be done as soon as practicable.

. Establish controls to assure that torque switch bypass circuits are

not inadvertently removed and that they are restored if they are

removed for maintenance or test.

The licensee determined that the scope of the investigation at ANO was

limited to safety-related motor operated vahes in Unit 2. Most valves

.were found to have been wired correctly.with the 100% torque bypass as

indicated by the design drawings. Only four valves were found which had

been incorrectly designed to not have the 100% torque bypass (service

water to the containment unit coolers isolation valves). Several other

valves were found to have improper wiring. The NRC inspector verified

that these problems had been corrected.

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The licensee instituted administrative controls to prevent the inadvertent

removal of the torque bypass function by adding suitable precautions to

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the following licensee procedures:

1403.03, "Limitorque Motor 0perated Valves Inspection and Setup,"

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2403.55, "Limitorque Motor Operated Valve SMB-000 Inspection and

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Setup," (step 7.8.9)

Based upon the above, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee

appears to have adequately performed the recommended actions of this IE

Circular. Therefore, IE Circular 81-13 is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The

inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,

reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affected

components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for

equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks to

verify that.the physical security plan was being implemented in

accordance with the station security plan. The inspectors verified

implementation of radiation protection controls 'during observation of

plant activities.

The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant

equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and

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excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and

cleanliness conditions during the tour.

The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2

high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system. The walkdown was performed

using Procedure 2104.39 and Drawing M-2232. The following problems were

noted:

. Insulation on electrical power cable to the motor operator for

2CV-5126-1, HPSI pump 2P89A mini-flow recirculation control valve was

gapped.

. One link on the locking chain for 2SI-11B, HPSI pumps discharge

cross-connect valve, was severed rendering the lock ineffective.

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This is an apparent violation (368/8528-02). Upon being notified of

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this condition, the licensee promptly installed a new chain on the

valve handwheel and conducted a position verification and chain

inspection on all locked manual valves outside containment in both

units. No similar discrepancies were identified. The licensee

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conducted an investigation to determine how and when the chain on

-this valve was severed, but the investigation yielded no solid

conclusions.

. A tensioned wire connecting the bonnet of a vent valve and the HPSI

hot leg injection header by penetrations 2P34 and 2P13 was found.

. Several valves were either not labeled or had an incorrect label:

2SI-5014C

2SI-5115A

2SI-5054C and D

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. The support for the motor operator on 2CV-5075 was not properly

installed.

. There was boric acid crystal buildup on 2SI-5054D and on 2CV-5128-1.

. The pipe through centainment penetration 2P35 was supported by a

wooden block and shims in the penetration cutout.

. Parts of the handwheel mechanism for 2SI-1070A had fallen out and

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were resting on the bonnet around the stem.

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. These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

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7. Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required

surveillance testing on the security diesel generator (Procedure 1305.10),

and a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1),

and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate

procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for

operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were

accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and

procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than

the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during

the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management

personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

. Unit 2 plant protection system channel 'A' monthly test,

Section 7.23, reactor trip breaker trip tests (Procedure 2304.38)

. Unit 1 steam driven emergency feedwater pump test (Procedure

1106.06, Supplement II)

. Unit 1 hydrogen purge standby system test (Procedure 1104.33,

Supplement II)

. Unit 2 plant protection system channel 'C' monthly test

(Procedure 2304.39)

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components

listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in

accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes

or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

activith r, were accomplished using approved praedures and were inspected

. as applicEble; functional testing and/or ca!ibrations were performed prior

to returning components or systems to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls

were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

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which may affect system performance. The requests were reviewe'd to

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determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned

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to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The NRC inspector observed that an average of 10 to 15% (5 to 7) of the

instruments or recorders on the Unit-2 radiation monitoring panel (2C25)

were inoperable at a given time during the month. Some of these

instruments bore deficiency tags which' referred to Job Orders as Job

Requests. Others had informal tags indicating " detector on order." The

NRC inspector expressed concern that the process and area radiation

monitoring systems were not being maintained in a high condition of

readiness. This is an open item pending licensee action to improve the.

operability status of these instruments. (0 pen Item 368/8528-03)

The following maintenance activities were observed:

. Unit 2 corrective maintenance to CV-1404, shutdown cooling suction

isolation valve motor operator (JR 0141)

. Replacement of transition piece on VSF-9 (JO 704160)

. . Repair of steam generator level meter 2LI-1031-2 (JO 705174)

. Installation and testing of trip circuit breakers

, (Procedure 2405.17)

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. Testing spare reactor trip breaker for Unit 1 (JO 99000014)

. Adjustment of packing on the Unit 1 steam driven emergency

feedwater pump (JO 70872)

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. -Changing oil on the inboard pump bearing for the Unit 1 emergency

feedwater pump (JO 705637)

. Repair of control element drive mechanism control system

J. '(JO 705723)

c No violations or deviations were identified.

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9. Procurement Program Implementation

.The purpose of this area of_the inspection was to ascertain whether the

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. licensee is implementing its quality assurance program relating to the

control of procurement activities in conformance with regulatory ~

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requirements, SAR commitments, and industry guides and standards. The NRC

inspector reviewed the following chapters of the ANO Quality Assurance

Manual for Operations, Revision 7 of May 31, 1985, pertaining to -

e procurement: ,

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4.0 Procurement Document Control

7. 0 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services

8.0 Identification and Control of Materials, and Components

15.4 Supplier Nonconformances

The NRC inspector also reviewed the following licensee procedures:

1000.10 Control of Procurement, Rev 9, 11/1/85

1000.11 Purchase Requisition Preparation and Control,

Rev 4, 11/1/85

1025.007 EQ Listed Equipment's Approved Lubricants,

Rev 1. 4/19/85

1033.01 Receipt Inspection, Rev 12, 11/1/85

1032.06 Procurement Technical Assistance, Rev 6, 10/31/85

The NRC inspector concluded from this review that the licensee appears to

have adequate administrative controls and procedures to implement the

requirements of the following guides and standards committed to by the

licensee:

Regulatory Guide 1.123, Rev 1, July 1977

ANSI N45.2.13-1976, " Quality Assurance Requirements for

Control of Procurement of Items and Services for

Nuclear Power Plants"

Regulatory Guide 1.38, Rev 2, May 1977

ANSI N45.2.2-1971,~" Quality Assurance Requirements for

Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling

of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Pcwer Plants"

ANSI N18.7-1976, " Administrative Controls and Quality

Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear

Power Plants," (Sections 5.2.13 through 5.2.15)

The NRC inspector reviewed 27 procurement packages from 1984 and 1985 to

verify that the licensee is implementing its procurement program in

accordance with the foregoing procedures. Components were selected from

the following general system areas:

. Reactivity Control and Power Distribution

. Instrumentation

. Reactor Coolant System

. Engineered Safety Features Systems

. Containment System

. Electrical Distribution Systems

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Examples of components included were pump bearings, fasteners, electronic

components, valves and valve parts, electrical cable, emergency diesel

generator parts, nuclear instrumentation detectors and associated

electronics, breakers including spare reactor trip breakers, valve motor

operators, power supplies, protective coatings, welding material, and

limit switches.

The NRC inspector found that the procurement documents (purchase

requisitions, purcha n orders, material receipt inspection reports, and

material tickets), associated with the procurement packages reviewed, had

been prepared in accordance with the approved procedures. The NRC

inspector also verified:

. That the material purchased was obtained from qualified

vendors, and

. That the licensee specified to each vendor the documentation

requirements for quality and traceability and took appropriate

action when the documentation was not supplied, or was in error.

Based upon this review, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee

appears to be implementing its procurement program in accordance with

regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Containment Purge (Unit 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed Operating Procedure 2104.33, Revision 14,

dated November 21, 1985. This procedure provides instructions for

conductir.g a containment building purge, and Supplement 1 of this

procedure is provided for documenting the release. The NRC inspector

also reviewed the records of containment purge release No. 2GR-85-179,

conducted on December 7, 1985. The following discrepancies were noted:

. The multipoint chart recorder (2RR-0645) used to record the response

of the containment purge monitor (2RE-8233) during the release was

in very poor operating condition, and produced a chart which was

almost completely illegible.

. The alarm setpoint for 2RE-8233 used during the purge was about

three decades above the actual count rate reached by the monitor

during the release.

. No procedural guidance has been provided to operations personnel for

adjusting the SPING monitor (SPING No. 5, RX 9820) setpoint before or

after a release.

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[- This~ item will remain open pending correction of these discrepancies.

(0 pen Item 368/8528-04)

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' No violations or deviations were identified. '

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11. Control Room Ventilation (Units 1 and 2)

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- In' conjunction with the followup of Unresolved Item 313/8118-02;

368/8116-03, the NRC inspector reviewed the control room air flow

drawings and the' appropriate sections of the Safety Analysis Reports

(SAR). Discussions were also conducted with various licensee personnel

to determine which ventilation systems supply the control room and

adjacent' areas. Two areas of concern are discussed below.

a. Control Room Isolation

The ventilation for the Unit 2 shift supervisor's office is supplied

by the elevator-machine room ventilation system (2VEH-5 and

2VSF-28). The ventilation for the Unit 1 shift supervisor's office

is supplied by VUC-14. The Unit 1 kitchen and restroom area is

supplied by VSF-41. None of these three systems are isolated upon

detection of high radiation or high chlorine, and prior to

December 17, 1985, the doors between these areas and the main part

of the control room were normally open. Signs had been attached to

the doors indicating that they should be closed in the event of

control room isolation, but no procedures included instructions to

shut the doors upon control room isolation. The NRC inspector

concluded that there was no assurance that these three doors could

be closed within 5 seconds of control room isolation actuation on

high radiation or chlorine.

Section 9.7.2.1 of the Unit 1 SAR and Section 9.4.1.1.2 of the

Unit 2 SAR indicate that the control room is completely isolated from

its normal ventilation systems and from adjacent areas within

5 seconds following detection of high radiation or high chlorine

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concentration. This is an apparent deviation from the commitments

in the SARs. (313/8527-02; 368/8528-05)

On December 17, 1985, the NRC inspector observed that these three

doors were being maintained closed.

b. Unit 2 Air Flow and Control Diagrams

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Several discrepancies were noted on the air flow and control

diagrams for the Unit 2 control room and adjacent areas. (Drawings

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M2263 Sheet 1, Revision 15, and M2263 Sheet 2, Revision 11).

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. M2263 Sheet.1 shows no ventilation system supplying the'.

visitors viewing room (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office). Duct

drawings and licensee personnel indicated this area is served

by the elevator-machine room ventilation system.

. M2263 Sheet 2 shows a ve'ntilation duct from the normal Unit 2

control room, ventilation system (2VSF-8A/B) supplying the

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viewing gallery (Unit 2 shift supervisor's office). Licensee

personnel stated that this duct has been' blanked and no longer

supplies this area.

. M2263 Sheet 2, Note 9 states, "2VSF-9 is located in Unit 1 and

is presently powered from' Unit 1 for Unit 1 startup. This unit

will eventually be powered from Unit 2 power source for Unit 2

startup." This note is outdated and in error with respect to

the power supply for 2 VSF-9.

. The above errors were not bubbled on the drawings to indicate

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pending design changes.

This item will remain open pending correction of the Unit 2 control

room air flow and control diagrams. (368/8528-06)

12. Exit Interview

The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine (ANO General Manager) and

other members of the AP&L staff at-the end of this inspection. At

this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection '

and the findings.

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ML20140E389

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