IR 05000443/1985030

Insp Rept 50-443/85-30 on 851028-1127.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Hot Functional Preoperational Test Witnessing & Test Procedure Review & Verification & QA Interface W/Preoperational Testing

ML20136E519
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/27/1985
From:	Briggs L, Dev M, Eselgroth P, Marilyn Evans, Hunter J, Oliviera W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136E514	List: IR 05000443/1985030 ML20136E511
References
50-443-85-30, NUDOCS 8601070040
Download: ML20136E519 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAJORY COMMISSION

REGION I

-Report N /85-30 Docket N License N CPPR-135 Category B Licensee: _ Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: October 28 - November 27, 1985 Inspectors- /2-[2 7/!Trf Lf rig s, Reactor Engineer ~date

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12 24 25 M. Dev, Reactor Engineer date M. Evans', Re . or Engineer

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Q) Hunter, Reactor Engineer nakr' date Y &

()f. Oliveira, Reactor E#g neer O f> Y f

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P. Eselgroth(/ Chief, Test Programs ' date Section, OB, DRS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 28 - November 27, 1985 (Report No. 50-443/83-30)

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O ADOCK 05000443 PDR

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a c Areas' Inspecte'd: ,Special unannounced inspection by five region-base . inspectors (401.-hours) of hot functional preoperational test witnessing and test'precedure review and verification, preoperational and acceptance

, test results evaluation review, QA interface with preoperational testing, independent verification, and facility tour J

. 'Results: No violations'were identifie ,

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1.0 Persons Contacted J. Azzopardi, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer J. Burson, Hot Functional Test (HFT) Coordinator

• T. Feigenbaum, Independent Review Team Manager (NHY)

R. Guillette, Assistant Construction QA Manager (NHY)

R. Gwinn, Shift Test Director D. Jaquette, Engineer, Licensing (NHY)

• G. Kann, Phase 2-6 Test Group Manager (NHY)

G. Kingston, Compliance Manager (NHY)

D. Lambert, Principal Field Quality Control (QC) Manager (UE&C)

R. Leclerc, Shift Test Director W. MacKenson,- Preoperational Test Supervisor (NHY)

• J. Marchi, Startup QC Manager (NHY)

• D.-_ McLain, Startup Manager (NHY)

• W. Middleton, QA Staff Engineer (YAEC)

• D. Perkins, QA Engineer (YAEC)

• W. Sanchez, Engineer, Licensing (NHY)

• J. Singleton, Assistant QA Manager (YAEC)

• J. Tefft, Startup and Test Department (STD) Project Engineer (NHY)

• W. Temple, STD QA Supervisor (NHY)

• D. Turner, QA Engineer (YAEC)

L. Walsh, Operations Manager (NHY)

Other NRC Personnel Present

• R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer

• A. Cerne, Senior Resident In:pector D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector The inspectors also contacted other operational, startup, technical and QA/QC personnel of the licensee's staf .0 Summary of Hot Functional Testing, Test Witnessing and Procedure Review On October 28, 1985, the licensee began a heat up of the plant using Reactor Coolant Pump heat to achieve normal operating temperature and pressure (557*F at 2235 psig) for the performance of Hot Functional Testing. Heat up from the 250 F plateau to the 557 F plateau was begun on November 1, 1985 and completed on November 4, 1985. The initial turbine generator synchronization to the grid was conducted on November 7, 198 Plant cooldown to 350 F from the remote shutdown panel was begun on the evening of Noveraber 26, 1985 and completed on November 27, 1985. Primary system temperature was.less than 100 F at 5:30 p.m. on November 29, 198 All tests conducted during Hot Functional Testing are listed in >

Attachment 'The heatup sequence, testing at normal operating temperature and subsequent cool down were witnessed by Regional NRC inspectors from October 28 through November 27, 1985 (excluding November 2-3,1985). Portions of the tests listed in Attachment A were witnessed by the inspectors. In preparation

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for the test witnessing, the latest revisions of these test procedures were reviewed. Only those tests that experienced system hardware problems requiring licensee resolution are discussed in this repor .1 Test Witnessing Scope Testing witnessed by the inspectors included the following observa-tions, including the crew's overall performance:

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Approved procedure with latest revision available and in use by test personnel;

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A designated person in-charge and conducting the test;

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Minimum test personnel requirements met;

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Qualified personnel performing the test;

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Test precautions followed and prerequisites met;

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QA/QC notification and witness requirements met (QA engineer present);

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Proper plant supporting systems in service;

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Special test and measuring equipment required by the test procedure,.its calibration and use;

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Procedure is technically adequate for the test;

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Testing being performed as required by the test procedure;

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Test personnel actions were correct and timely during perform-ance of the test; and

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Adequate communications established for test performanc .2 Discussion 2. PT(I)-9 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

The inspector observed several portions of 1-PT(I)-9 on November 13, 14 and 15, 1985. The portions observed included Hot Leg Injection and RHR Backup Check Valve Leak Checks, Accumulator Backup Check Valve Leak Checks and Cold Leg Injection and RHR Backup Check Valve Leak Check Three Hot Leg Injection Backup Check Valves experienced leakage greater than the maximum leakage allowed. These valves and their leak rates follow:

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Maximum Allowable Valve N Leak Rate Leak Rate SI-V-110 .38 gpm 4cc/h r SI-V-106 .1 gpm 4cc/h r SI-V-81 .44 gpm 20cc/h r At the conclusion of the inspection on November 27, 1985, all check valve leakage _was within specification except SI-V-106 which had a final leakage rate of 0.04 gpm. The licensee issued RFI 99/112326 for engineering evaluatio .2.2 1-PT(I)-40.7 Condenser Steam Dump System The twelve air operated steam dump valves are split into four groups to ensure even distribution of heat into each condenser. They are designed to fail closed on loss of control signal and are capable of a rapid trip actuation or a modulating operation. The steam dump valves actuation characteristics as listed in the FSAR are: The valves are capable of going from full-closed to full-open within three seconds after receiving a trip open signal. This includes the time required to actuate the solenoid valves associated with each dump valv . The valves are capable of going from full-open to full-closed in five seconds after de-energization of the solenoid valve . The valves are capable of being modulated with a maximum full. stroke time of 20~ second The inspector witnessed various portions of the test and reviewed the preliminary results and test exceptions generated. The first test exception involved a relay which would not seal-in. NCR 82/924 was issued and traced by IIL MS-1140 to address the problem. The second test exception dealt with the failure of the dump valves to meet the acceptance criteria for going from full-closed to full-open within three seconds. The problem was determined to be generic and NCR 82/973A was issued and tracked by IIL MS-1320 to address it. Valve 3015 was retested after a minor modification and found to still be out of specifica-tion. A modification was made to valve 3020 by adding a volume booster, a regulator and a feedback loop to the air E 1

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lin The inspector witnessed two trials of testing the modified valve operation and noted a decrease in the opening

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time; however, it was not sufficient enough to meet the '

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criteri .A second modification on valve 3020 was made.by bypassing all flow restrictions, check valves and isolation valves in the air line,- and running a line directly from the volume booster to the top of the valve. Two trials of opening time testing produced results within the acceptance criteria. A third test exception involved the modulation of the valves with a maximum full stroke time of twenty seconds. During this portion of the test, valve 3020's full open voltage values for two trials exceeded the stated value in the procedure (step 6.4.13).

Corrective action taken involved recalibration and minor adjustments prior to retesting. The valves met the cri-teria for going full-closed from full-open in less than Efive seconds in all cases including the modified system The results of all testirg will be given to Engineering to evaluate and develop a final design which will meet the acceptance criteria. The new design will be installed and tested without steam pressure by performing PT-40.7 once again in its entirety. The rapid opening operation will also be tested with steam pressure prior to criticalit The capability of the condenser steam dump valves to operate from full-closed to full-open within three seconds will be carried as part of unresolved item (443/85-30-01)

until retesting before criticalit . PT(I)-6.2 CVCS Boron Thermal Regeneration System (BTRS)

The borate operation of the system could not meet the prescribed acceptance criteria in PT-6.2 of reaching 180 ppm Boron from 110 ppm Boron in less than or equal to four hours. The inability to achieve the 180 ppm concentration 4 was due to the pressurizer level being raised in antici-pation of feed pump operation and then subsequently lowered during boration causing Boron to be diluted, then lost from the system through letdown. Test personnel determined that during boration, the effluent out of the BTRS was greater than or equal to 280 ppm Boron for approximately three hours and 260 ppm for another two hours and that under normal (stable) conditions, the above concentrations would be sufficient to increase the reactor coolant system Boron level from 110 ppm to greater than or equal to 180 ppm in less than or equal to four hours. The mechanical and ther-mal operation of the BTRS was deemed acceptable by test t I

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personnel and a test exception addressing the " borate" mode l

problem was written witn a recommendation to use the BTRS as is. Final resolution will be evaluated during NRC v results evaluation review in a subsequent inspectio . Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Bypass Valves After the plant reached an average temperature (Tave) of approximately 557 F and secondary plant chemistry was

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brought into specification, the licensee attempted to open L the MSIV Bypass Valves to warm the main steam lines and j equalize pressure across the MSIV's. The licensee could not open the bypass valves from the control room with 1080 psi differential pressure (AP) across the valves. The valves.were manually opened. The' torque switches were subsequently set at their maximum position and tested. The valves would still not operato with 1080 psi AP. Several tests were made to determire required torque values and motor operator start and'run currents. The licensee deter-mined that required start (breakaway- torque) and run currents were in excess of the valve motor operator current-specification Nonconformance report (NCR) 82-0009378 was issued to obtain engineering evaluation and resolutio This item is part of unresolved item 443/85-30-01 pending licensee action to repair, retest (prior to initial criti-cality) and NRC revie . PT(Ij-14.2 Emergency Feedwater System HFT During performance of this test, the licensee experienced several problems as discussed below. These items are part N

of unresolved item 443/85-30-01 until licensee corrective action, retesting and NRC review, prior to initial criti-cality, are complet Water hammer during initial cold start of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump (EFWP). The steam driven EFWP has approximately 225 feet of piping between the stcam supply isolation valves and the turbine. During the initial start from ambient tem-perature conditions, water hammer occurred which damaged several pipe supports. Several Requests for Information (RFI's) and NCR's were issued to evaluate and repair the damaged supports. In addition, the licensee issued RFI 99/109088 to request engineering evaluation and proposals to remedy the water hammer problem in the future. Subsequent testing was con-ducted with hot (450 to 505 F) steam lines and no hdter hammer problems occurre In addition, the licensee experienced problems with the air operated steam supply valves (MS-V-127 and 128) failing to open

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(their failed position) on a loss of power with 1080 l psi AP. This problem is being addressed under NCR 82/967 During EFWP testing (prior to the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> endurance run), the licensee noted above normal suction tem-peratures on the EFWP's. This was determined to be the result of the configuration of the ASME Class 3 ,

minimum flow (min-flow) recirculation line. The min- '

flow recirculation line is a criss-cross configuration J with the discharge of each pump returning to the suction of the opposite pump through an orifice and a normally open isolation valve. Minimum recirculation i flow is set in accordance with the vendors recommen-dation of 222 gallons per minute (GPM). The licensee determined that the above heating problem would limit long term recirculation to about 20 minutes with both EFWP's runnin The existing full flow recirculation line to the condensate storage tank (CST) could not be used for normal plant operation because it is not ASME Class 3. The non-ASME recirculation line was used to conduct the full flow 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> endurance run with both EFWP's running and verified that overheating did not occur. The licensee issued NCR 82/994 to document the deficiency and to initiate engineering evaluation of the problem. Current licensee plans are to install a new ASME Class 3 minimum flow recirculation line to the CS ,

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Failure of EFW system to meet the most limiting FSAR requirement. Section 15.2.8.2 of the FSAR (Page 15.2-20) requires one EFW pump to supply 235 gpm to each of two intact steam generators at approximately 1220 psig. The licensee calculated that 315 gpm to each steam generator was required to satisfy the FSAR requirement at 1050 psig. NCR 82/994A was issued for engineering evaluation when FW-P-378, the electric EFW pump, supplied 292 gpm to 'C' steam generator and 301 gpm to 'D' steam generator and 230 gpm minimum recir-culation flow. Two subsequent tests fully satisfied the criteria when minimum recirculation flow was reduced to 125 gpm. The licensee intends to modify ,

the minimum recirculation flow system (previous para-garaph) and may install an automatic recirculation flow control system to regulate recirculation flow based on actual system flow to the steam generator A contributing factor in the above problem was the failure of both EFW pumps to meet the manufacturer's pump curve This item was documented in NCR 82/993A and Incomplete Item List (IIL) No. FW-0122 !

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9 2.3 Findings The inspectors noted that all testing observed was conducted in a controlled manner and met the criteria stated in Paragraph above. The problems encountered by the licensee involving condenser steam dump valves, MSIV bypass valves and the EFW System are part of unresolved item 443/85-30-01, as discussed abov .0 Preoperational and Acceptance Test Results Evaluation Review 3.1 Scope The completed test procedures listed below were reviewed during this inspection to verify that adequate testing had been conducted to satisfy regulatory guidance, licensee commitments and FSAR require-ments and to verify that uniform criteria are being applied for evaluation of completed test results in order to assure technical and administrative adequac The inspector reviewed the test results and verified the licensee's evaluation of test results by review of test changes, test excep' -

tions, test deficiencies, "As-Run" copy of test procedure, acoeptance criteria, performance verification, recording conduct of test, QC inspection records, restoration of system to normal after test, inde-pendent verification of critical steps or parameters, identification of personnel conducting and evaluating test data, and verification that the test results have been approve PT-5.1, CVCS Charging System Operation Test, Revision 2, Results Approved October 9, 1985;

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1-PT-5.2, CVCS, Boric Acid Transfer Subsystem, Revision 2, Results Approved September 30, 1985;

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1-PT-6.1, CVCS, Boron Thermal Regeneration System, Revision 0, Results Approved September 30, 1985;

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1-PT-13.1, Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Cold Plant Con-ditions Test, Revision 1, Results Approved October 25, 1985;

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1-PT-14.1, Emergency Feedwater System, Revision 0, Results Approved October 25, 1985;

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1-AT(I)-29, Primary Plant Instrumentation, Revision 1, Results Approved November 21, 1985;

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1-PT;33.3, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Revision 1, Results approved September 25, 1985;

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1-FT-14.3, Emergency Pumphouse Ventilation System, Revision 1, Resu':s Approved October 9, 1985;

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1-PT(I)-40.3, Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves, Revision 1, Results Approved November 19, 1985;

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1-PT(I)-41, Integrated Plant Heatup for Hot Functional Testing, Revision 1, Results Approved November 19, 1985;

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1-PT(I)-40.2, RCS Leak Detection Test, Revision 0, Results Approved November 21, 1985;

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1-PT(I)-5.3, CVCS - Hot Functional Test, Revision 1, Results Approved November 20, 1985;

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1-PT(I)-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pumps - Hot Functional, Revision 0, Results Approved November 24, 1985; and,

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1-AT(I)-21.2, Containment Structure Cooling Systems Hat Func-tional Test, Revision 0, Results Approved November 22, 198 .2 Findings No discrepancies or violations were identified during the above review; however, there were several test exceptions that require licensee corrective action. These test exceptions were assigned to the incomplete items list (IIL) by the licensee for tracking purposes (normal method at this facility). Once transferred to the IIL, the test exception is closed by the licensee with correc-tive action implemented via the II The following IIL numbers correspond to incomplete test exceptions and collectively constitute unresolved Item 443/85-30-0 Procedure N Short Title ILL N PT- CVCS Charging System ILL-CS-1012 1-PT- CVCS, Boron Thermal Regeneration ILL-CS-1450 4.0 QA/QC Interface 4.1 Scope The inspector verified that the Seabrook HFT procedures have provisions for QA witnessing of certain test steps. The station QA group issues witness numbers and a field QA engineer is assigned for the activities. The inspector also reviewed QA Surveillance reports for the activities listed below (surveillance dates are in paren-theses) and determined that QA involvement was adequate:

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Boundary Identification Package (BIP) Walkdown, CGC-M-2, (10/22/85)

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1-PT(I)-40.7, Condenser Steam Dump, (10/27/85)

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1-PT(I)-40,(10/31/85)

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BIP Turnover CC-H-3, BRs-H-1, (11/6/85)

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4.2 Findings

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x No. unacceptable conditions were identifie ' Independent Verification

,Y' During the results evaluation review of 1-PT-5.1 and 1-PT-5.2 (Paragraph 3.1) the inspector performed independent calculations of pump head to verify ~the licensee's calculations-. In addition, the inspectors, during test witnessing, independently observed and verified numerous instrument readings taken by the licensee throughout Hot Functional Testing.

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~ Plant Tours 6.1 Scope-The inspectors made numerous tours of the facility to observe test activities in progress,. housekeeping and cleanliness controls. Tours were conducted during normal and backshift hour .2 Findings No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Unresolved Items-Unresolved items are matters which require additional information in order to determine if they are acceptable, violations or deviations. The unre-solved items: identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.2 and 3.2 of this repor .0 Exit Interview

'A final management meeting was held at the conclusion of the inspection on November 27, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings as detailed in this report (see Paragraph I for attendees). In addition, several informal briefings were held with the licensee during the inspectio No written 'information was provided to the licensee at any time during the inspection. -The licensee indicated that no proprietary information was contained within the scopelof this inspectio .

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ATTACHMENT A HFT PROCEDURES-1-PT(I)-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pumps - Hot Functional, Revision 0

- 1-PT(I)-2.2, Pressurizer Relief Tank Hot Functional Test (HFT), Revision 3

- 1-PT(I)-3.1, Reactor Coolant System Vibration Test, Revision 0

'1-PT(I)-3.2, Piping Vibration Testing (HFT) , Revision 0

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. 1-PT(I)-3.3, Power Conversion and ECCS System Dynamic Test, Revision 0 1-PT(I)-4.1, RCS Thermal Expansion, Revision 0

' 1-PT(I)-4.2, Fower Conversion and ECCS Thermal Expansion Test, Revision 0

' l-PT(I)-5.3,.CVCS - HFT, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-6.2, Boron Thermal Regeneration System HFT, Revision 2 1-PT(I)-9, ECCS HFT, Revision 2 1-PT(I)-13.2, Main Steam Line Isolation Valves HFT, Revision 0 1-PT(I)-14.2, Emergency Feedwater System HFT, Revision 0 1-PT(I)-15.3, Service Water Cooling Tower Thermal Performance Test Unit No. 1 only, Revision 1

[ . 1-PT(I)-22.2, Containment Enclosure Ventilation System HFT, Revision 0 1-PT-30.1, Voltage Model Verification, Revision 0 1-Pt(I)-40, Hot Functional Testing, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-40.1, Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control, Revision 1

' l-PT(I)-40.2, RCS Leak Detection Test, Revision 0 1-PT(I)-40.3, Steam Generator Water Level Instrumentation Verifications, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-40.4, Instrument Cross Verification Check and Reactor Coolant Pump Operating Record, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-40.5, Remote Shutdown Panel, Revision 0

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Attachment'A 2 1-PT(I)-40.6, Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Verification, Revision 1

'l-PT(I)40.7, Condenser Steam Dump System, Revision 0

'1-PT(I)-40.8, Steam Generator Atmospheric Steam Relief Valves', Revis;on 1 1-PT(I)-40.9, Service Water and Component Cooling Water Performance Test During Hot Functional, Pevision 1

1-PT(I)-40.10, Heat Removal Demonstration Test, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-40.11, Containment Penetration Cooling Capacity, Revision 1

.1-PT(I)-40.12, RTD Cross-Calibration, hvision 2-1-PT(I)-40.13, Loose Parts Monitoring Sy stem, Revision 0 1-PT(I)-41, Integrated Plant Heatup for iFT, Revision 1-1-PT(I)-42, Integrated Plant Cooldown from HFT, Revision 1 1-PT(I)-42.1, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Test, Revision 1

'l-AT(I)-1.4, Feedwater System HFT, Revision 0 1-AT(I)-3.2, Condensate System HFT, Revision 0 1-AT-10.1, Sampling System: Reactor Coolant, Revision 1 1-AT-10.2, Sampling System: Steam Generators, Revision 1 F 1-AT-10.3, Sampling System: Auxiliaries, Revision 1

'1-AT(I)-10.4,' Sampling System: Secondary Steam and Water Sample Flow Path Flow Verification, Revision 1 1-AT(I)-19.1, Steam Generator Blowdown System Flash Tank, Revision 1 1-AT(I)-19.2, Steam Generator Blowdown System HFT, Revision 1 l

1-AT(I)-19.3, Steam Generator Blowdown Recovery, Revision 0 1-AT(I)-21.2, Containment Structure Cooling Systems HFT, Revision 0 1-AT(I)-24.2, Electrical Penetration Area HFT, Revision 1 1-AT(I)-63, Initial Turbine Roll, Revision 1

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