IR 05000443/1985022
| ML20135E480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1985 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135E474 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-85-22, NUDOCS 8509160411 | |
| Download: ML20135E480 (7) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
Report No.
50-443/85-22 Docket No.
50-443 License No. CPPR-135 Priority
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Category B
Licensee:
Public Service of New Hampshire EO. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 l
Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: July 22-26, 1985
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'N-Inspectors:
lib lde (1u~~
ineer date F.
P.~ Phulitz, Rsactor f
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Approved by:
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TW IS C.J.An@rson,,ChiefPlantSystemsSection, date DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on July 22-26, 1985 (Inspection Report No.
50-443/85-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of activities pertaining to the testing of safety-related electrical equipment and the status of previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> on site by one region-based inspector.
Results: No violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 New Hampshire Ytnkee
- J. Marchi, Site QC Manager
- L. Monteith, Field QC Engineer
- W. Middleton, Staff QA Engineer
- D. Covil, Field QA Surveillance Manager S. Baldacci, QA Engineer M. Toule, I&C Test Engineer R. Guthrie, I&C Specialist (VOLT)
F. Bean, Field QA Engineer G. Desrochers, Electrical Maintenance J. Brown, Motor Operated Valve Specialist (IMPELL)
K. Muirhead, QA Engineer (VOLT)
L. Fritz, Operation Shift Supervisor
- G. Kingston, Station Staff Compliance Manager
- J. Singleton, Assistant QA Manager
- G. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager
- L. Massicotte, Staff Engineer
- W. Sanchez, Licensing Engineer
- J. Tefft, Startup Test Department 1.2 Yankee Atomic Engineering Corporation
- 0. Turner, Field QA Engineer R. Tucker, Mechanical Engineer 1.3 United Engineering and Construction, Inc.
B. O'Connor, Field Site QC C. Pletcher, Startup Electrical Test Supervisor M. Sadollah, Startup Electrical System Lead Engineer
- D. Lambert, Project Field QC Manager 1.4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
- 0. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector
- R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer
- denotes personnel present at exit meeting
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2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (0 pen) Unresolved Item (83-03-01) Cable Raceway Fill The cable schedule program (CASP) did not account for cable fill for all raceways.
The concern was the cable fill may exceed that which the licensee committed to in the FSAR.
The CASP program has been modified to account for the proper cable raceway fill for all raceways, including exposed paths.
The licensee proposes to present this modification to the NRC on August 1, 1985. This item remains open pending NRC review.
2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (84-03-01) Vertical wireway attached to horizontal tray Most vertical wireways have separate supports and are not attached directly to the horizontal trays. However, there are a few that are attached directly, using unistruts, with no additional supports.
There was a seismic and cable tray fill concern with this design.
The licensee has presented a cable schedule program (CASP) print readout for two of the above cases. This printout demonstrates that cables going into and from vertical wireways into and from horizontal trays are identified and factored into the cable tray fill.
The licensee also presented the Technical Guide for the Design and Analysis of Seismic Category 1 Cable Tray Support Systems, Revision 0, PIN No. 9763-SQ-00121-32025, dated July 1983 which states that in the analysis of the cable tray system, the wireway (vertical) is included in the mathematical model as a lumped mass, which is distributed to the wireway support and the cable tray.
It was concluded that the CASP program and the seismic analysis are adequately considered when vertical wireways are attached directly to horizontal trays without an additional support systems.
This item is closed.
2.3 (0 pen) Unresolved Item (85-11-01) Engineered Safety Features System (ESFS) permissive interlock P-4 The reactor trip breaker (RTB) auxiliary switch contact is used as a permissive for resetting the ESFS safety injection accident signal af ter the RTB is open (reactor shut down).
Improper operation of this auxiliary switch contact could either prevent resetting the ESFS or prevent actuation of the ESFS. This improper operation of the RTB auxiliary switch is undetectable. The problem was reported to the NRC by Westinghouse, November 19, 1979. The licensee also informed the NRC on December 6,1979 of this deficiency which was identified as unresolved item 79-00-04.
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The Westinghouse proposed corrective action was to measure the voltage across the auxiliary switch contact using a portable voltmeter. A zero i
volts measurement would indicate the contact was closed. A 48 volts measurement would indicate the contact was open. This measurement was to be made for the individual. RTB contacts separately and in series after the
RTB monthly functional test. The licensee advised Westinghouse that a permanent design should be provided.
Based upon this commitment this item was closed in Inspection Report 82-01, i
l A review by the licensee of the permanent design identified that some of l.
the functions discussed in the procedures using the portable voltmeter
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were not being achieved. This problem was reported to the NRC in PSNH l
letter, SBN-794, dated April 23, 1985.
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The Westinghouse design has been revised and is presently going through a final design review.
The hardware for this contact verification will be mounted in the upper front reactor trip breaker enclosure.
I This item remains open pending NRC review of the design and procedure proposed by Westinghouse for the P-4 interlock contact verification.
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3.0 Reactor protection and Engineered Safety Features System The inspector reviewed the preoperational test procedure for the reactor
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protection system, test number 1-PT-19.1, Revision 0, dated June 6, i
1985.
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The purpose of the test was to verify the proper operation and response time of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip logic and Engineered i
Safety Features (ESF) actuation logic.
The test was conducted to verify the RPS trip logic and ESF actuation logic by process variable channel trip simulation. Any two of four
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channel trips causes a reactor trip. Three of six channel trip simulation per_ process variable were witnessed by the inspector.
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The reactor trip signal removes the 48 volt power from the reactor trip
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breakers undervoltage trip devices.
This was also witnessed by the i
j inspector by observing the 48 volt power circuit voltmeter, located on the l
logic train panels.
l All of the above reactor trip effects were verified and documented, in
accordance with the procedure by the test personnel.
I The inspector discussed this test with those personnel conducting it and with the QA personnel who witnessed the hold points. The-inspector con-
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l cluded that they understood how the test was to be conducted, results were l
properly documented and hold points were observed. The inspector also
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i reviewed a selected number of Field Quality Assurance Group Surveillance
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Reports which were conducted during this test. No deficiencies were
identified.
No violations were observed.
4.0 Manual Reactor Trip Switch Circuit Location
The Information Notice No. 85-18 identified that in the design of Westing-house Solid State Protection System a failure of output transistors Q3 and i
Q4 (short circuit) would prevent an automatic reactor trip.
There existed drawings at some facilities.that showed the location of the manual trip to be upstream of these transistors. Should these transistors short circuit the manual trip would be ineffective.
This inspection was to determine whether the licensee was using controlled
drawings that depict correctly the actual location of the manual trip circuit, and to confirm that the manual trip circuits are located down-stream of the output transistors Q3 and Q4 in the undervoltage (UV) output
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circuit.
The following drawings were obtained from the Document Control Center for i
this review:
l Westinghouse Solid State Protection System Schematic Diagram 1295H89
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sheet 13 of 30, figure 9-9 i
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Westinghouse Solid State Protection System Undervoltage Board Schemtic Diagram 6058090, figure 9-2
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Westinghouse Solid State Protection System Interconnection Diagram 7247D91 sheets 16 and 17
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United Engineers Solid State Protection System Cabinet MM-CP-12
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Schematic Diagram 9763-M-310949 sheet FB 6f
United Engineers Solid State Protection System Cabinet
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MM-CP-13 Schematic Diagram 9763-M-310949 Sheet FB9f The inspector concluded that the manual trip switches are located down
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j stream from the output transistors Q3 and Q4 as shown on controlled draw-
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ings. However the inspector noted that information, shown on Westinghouse Interconnection Diagrams, for the manual trips differed from the United j
Engineers drawings both in wiring and components. A licensee task team i
has been established to review the existing interface between Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the Nuclear Steam System Supplier (NSSS), and United
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Engineers, the Architect Engineer. The licensee provided the inspector I
with Administrative Procedure No. 6 (AP-6), Revision 6, " Foreign Print i
System-NSSS Vendor ~ Documents" for review.
The inspector concluded from
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this review that a deficiency exists in the control of drawings having conflicting information. This is an unresolved issue (443/85-22-01)
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pending NRC review of licensee actions to address conflicting information
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in drawings.
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5.0 Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Operator Inspection The licensee identified a need for a complete reinspection program for one hundred ten (110) motor operated valves. The bases for this program were a number of problems identified in NRC I&E Information Notice 79-04, i
85-22 and Circular No. 79-04. Additional problems had been identified by the licensee, valve manufacture and valve operator manufacture.
This one time inspection was conducted by two teams.
Each team was
represented by a Valve Operator Specialist, Electrical Maintenance, and i
Quality Assurance personnel.
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The licensee inspection was conducted in accordance with Test Procedure j
for Inspection of Motor Operated Valves, Number GT-E-113, Revision 0, Field Change 1.
This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and found
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i acceptable to identify and document the above problems. The inspector i
discussed this inspection with team members and witnessed an inspection i
on motor operated valve RC-V-22. At this time sixty percent of the valves
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had been inspected. A Nonconformance Report 82-649B was reviewed by the
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inspector. This report was written to cover generic deficiencies found l
during the licensee inspection.
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No violations were identified.
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6.0 Facility Tour i
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The inspector toured the following plant areas:
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Control Room
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l Cable Spreading Room
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Emergency Switchgear Rooms
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j Emergency Battery Rooms l
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l Cable Tunnels between Emergency Switchgear Rooms and Containment
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Outside Containment Electrical Penetration Areas
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Emergency Cooling ~ Towers
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Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms
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Engineered Safety Features Pump Areas
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During this tour the inspector observed that electrical equipment was protected from dirt and potential physical damage which could result from ongoing construction activities. The licensee was informed of two areas i
concerning the potential of dirt getting into electrical equipment.
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I protective covers, on the grating, above the vertical RHR pump motors had been partially removed. Also, the temporary filters for the battery a
l rooms inlet air supply needed replacement. The inspector observed that
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the dirt from the control room floor core drilling was being controlled.
The inspector verified that the licensee's inplace storage and maintenance requirements for electrical equipment (i.e. electrical space heaters energized, electrical penetration nitrogen pressure maintained)
was being implemented. The inspector verified that electrical equipment had the proper permanent identification. The exceptions noted, were the four safety batteries, which are proposed to have permanent identification applied by November 1985 as part of the licensee's noncompliance correc-tive actions. The inspector questioned the licensee about the lack cf readily identified electrical mechanical equipment such as motor operated valves and pump / pump motors. The construction and startup personnel stated that the only requirement was a small stainless steel name tag to be attached to the equipment.
Further discussion with the licensee opera-tion staff revealed that an extensive study is being conducted for this identification.
This identification in addition to readily identified tags and nameplates is to include system color codes.
No violations were identified.
7.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.
8.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representative (denoted in paragraph 1) on July 26, 1985, and summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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