IR 05000443/1985021

Insp Rept 50-443/85-21 on 850708-12.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Witnessing,Test Procedure Review & Verification,Test Results Evaluation Review & Independent Calculations/Verifications

ML20137C192
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/12/1985
From:	Briggs L, Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137C159	List: IR 05000443/1985021 ML20137C152
References
50-443-85-21, NUDOCS 8508220218
Download: ML20137C192 (9)

Text

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-21 Docket N License No. CPpR-135 Licensee: Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: July 8-12, 1985 Inspectors: @ /2-ST L. Briggs, L Reactor Engineer date Approved by: 8 - /2- Bf P. Eselgroty/ Chief, Test Programs date Section, OK, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on July 8-12, 1985 (Report No. 50-443/85-21)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by one region-based inspector (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) of follow-up of previous inspection finding, preoperational test witnessing, preoperational test procedure review and verification, preopera-tional test results evaluation review, QA/QC interface with the preoperational test program, independent calculations / verifications and facility tours.

-

,

Results: No violations were identifie .

8508220218 850815 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O PDR U

.

.

DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted S. Baldacci, QA Engineer (YAEC)

P. Brangiel, I&C Technician (PSNH)

• J. Grusetski, Site Engineering (UE&C)

R. Guthrie, Technical Specialist

• G. Kann, Phase 2-6 Test Grcup Manager (NHY)

J. Kavalley, Unit Shift Supervisor D. Lambert, Principal Field Quality Control (QC) Manager (UE&C)

R. Leclerc, Shift Test Director J. Marchi, Startup QC Manager (NHY)

D. McLain, Startup Manager (NHY)

• W. Middleton, QA Staff Engineer (NHY)

J. Mumford, Startup Test Engineer (Rod Control System)

• B. O'Connor, Field Supervisor QC (UE&C)

• D. Perkins, QA Engineer (NHY)

'

• W. Sanchez, Engineer, Licensing (NHY)

• J. Singleton, Assistant QA Manager (NHY)

• D. Snyder, Startup QC Engineer (NHY)

• J. Tefft, Startup and Test Department Special Assistant (NHY)

• Temple, Startup and Test Department QA Supervisor (NHY)

M. Toole, Startup Test Engineer (Nuclear Instrumentation and Reactor Protection Systems)

A. Wade, I&C Supervisor, Startup and Test Department (NHY)

2.0 Followup of Previous Inspection Finding

--

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (443/85-12-02) Licensee to resolve scope of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) testing. The licensee's scope of EDG testing (discussed in Paragraph 6 of Inspection Report 50-443/85-12) did not contain a requirement to perform a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) in coincidence with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) loading sequence after the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> at 100 percent load followed by a 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 110 percent load) load test of the EDG as required by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 due to a FSAR amendment. This item was discussed with NRR and the licensee on several occasions. The licen-l see has agreed to perform a LOCA/ LOOP test some time subsequent to the full load test (1-PT-33.1) by duplicating stable EDG temperature conditions obtained during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> full load run and then perform the hot LOCA/ LOOP sequential load test. The inspector agreed that this method of testing would satisfy the intent of RG 1.108. This item remains open pending inspector review of 1-PT(I)-39, Loss of Offsite Power Test, which was has not yet been written and approve No unacceptable conditions were observe f i ,_.____ ___ _____ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __

.

.

3.0 Preoperational Test Witnessing During the entrance meeting on July 8, 1985 the licensee informed the inspector that two preoperational tests of safety related systems were scheduled to be conducted during the week. The scheduled tests were 1-PT-18, Nuclear Instrumentation System (due to be completed on July 9, 1985) and 1-PT-19-1, Reactor Protection System, scheduled to start upon completion of 1-PT-18. In preparation for test witnessing the inspector reviewed the latest revision of 1-PT-19.1, discussed in Paragraph 4. of this repor .1 Test Witnessing Scope Testing witnessed by the inspector included the following observations of overall crew performance:

--

Approved procedure with latest revision available and in use by test personnel;

--

A designated person in charge and conducting the test;

--

Minimum test personnel requirements met;

--

Qualified personnel performing the test;

--

Test precautions followed and prerequisites met;

--

QA/QC notification and witness requirements met (QA enginee present);

--

Proper plant supporting systems in service;

'

--

Special test and measuring equipment required by the test procedure, its calibration and use;

--

Procedure is technically adequate for the test;

--

Testing being performed as required by the test procedure;

--

Test personnel actions appeared to be correct and timely during performance of the test; and

--

Adequate communications established for test performanc .2 Findings 3. Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS), 1-PT-18 The inspector observed several portions of 1-PT-18 on July

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ -

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

8, 9, 1985 and through procedure completion on July 10, 198 The portions observed concerned system logic, annunciator and computer alarms and system response time testing. .The inspector verified that testing was being conducted in a controlled manner and met the inspector's criteria stated in Paragraph 3.1 above. The inspector also reviewed the previously completed portions of 1-PT-18 including field changes and test exception Several minor problems were experienced during the portions

.

of the test observed by the inspector.

l --

A computer alarm (D5042) would not clear. The system test engineer (STE) initiated a work request to trouble shoot and repair the circuit. The fault was determined to be an open circuit breaker that supplied power to an auxiliary relay. The breaker was subsequently

,

closed and several steps of the procedure were repeated l to retest the alarm circuit with satisfactory result The visicorder chart speed specified in the pro-cedure (125mm/sec) was not fast enough to allow accurate determination of system response tim The chart speed used for the remainder of system response time testing was 2000 mm/sec. The pre-operational test procedure was appropriately re-vised by a field change to indicate the new chart spee Due to the high chart speed (2000 mm/sec.) a voltage cycle could be observed on the visicorder trace when the 43 volt supply to the reactor trip breaker undervoltage coil was interrupted by the induced tri Instead of dropping to zero volts and remaining there the voltage would cycle be tween 43 and zero volts several (three to five)

times before staying at zero. The cycles were square wave in appearance and total time for all cycles before' staying at zero volts was three to six milliseconds. The inspector questioned the STE concerning this item. The STE stated that a copy of the visicorder trace would be given to the Westinghouse on site representative for eval-uation and resolution. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspectio ,

j

-

_ _______________ _ ___-____--_ _-___-_-__ __-_ O

______

.

.

No unacceptable conditions were noted during the above review and witnessing of test performanc . _ Reactor Protection. System (RPS), 1-PT-1 l The inspector reviewed the completed prerequisite steps and field changes (FC) of 1-PT-19.1 and observed initial

.

i scram breaker control check outs on July 12, 1985. The inspector noted that FC-5 modified the procedure to verify operation of the scram. breaker shunt trip coils by testing from the semi-automatic test panel and did not perform subsequent testing to verify actuation during RPS logic testing in a manner similar to scram breaker undervoltage (UV) coil testing. The STE informed the inspector that Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 03102707 had modified the RPS to incorporate a shunt trip actuation when automatic trips are received in a manner similar to the scram breaker UV trip.. The inspector reviewed the ECA, the attached schematic diagram, the method of post modification circuit testing and the Work Request (WR-CP001B) that implemented the ECA. The shunt trip slave relay is connected in parallel with the UV coil 43 VDC supply. When a trip (manual or auto) is received the slave relay is de-energized, along with the UV coil, and closes a contact in the shunt trip coil circuit. The shunt trip coil is energized by 125 VDC to trip the scram breaker as a backup to the UV coil trip. The inspector was satisfied that verification of UV coil voltage during logic testing would also verify shunt trip coil actuation. The results of both 1-PT-18 and 1-PT-19.1 will be reviewed during a future routine inspectio No unacceptable conditions were observe .0 Preoperation Test Procedure Review and Verification The following preoperational test procedures were reviewed in

. preparation for test witnessing, technical and administrative adequacy

, and verification that testing planned would adequately satisfy regulatory guidance and licensee commitment The procedures were. reviewed to verify proper licensee review and approval, correct format, test l objectives, prerequisites, initial conditions, test data recording i requirements, technical adequacy and system return to normal.

I f

--

1-PT-19.1, Reactor Protection System, Revision 0, Approved June 6, 1985, and

--

1-PT-19.2, Response Time Evaluation, Draft ..

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

4.1 Findings 4. PT-1 The inspector reviewed 1-PT-19.1 in detail and independently verified that all logic trains in all combinations were being checked in the procedure. In addition the procedure incorporated logic and response time testing of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS).

The RPS preoperational test is divided into'two procedures, 1-PT-19.1 and 1-PT-19.2. 1-PT-19.1 checks system logic and measures response time from the actuation of a simulated input to the RPS cabinet (simulates a field input) to the de-energization of the scram breaker UV coil (and actuation of a shunt trip). The procedure also measures response time from de-energization of the scram breaker UV coil to opening of the scram breake Several other General Test Instructions (GTI's) measure response time of various loop components such as sensor response time and sensing line response times. 1-PT-1 takes component response times from the various test pro-cedures and combines them to obtain an overall system response time to verify that RPS and ESFAS response times meet FSAR chapters 7.2 and 7.3 and Technical Specifications requirements listed in table 3.3.-2 and 3.3.- The inspector had several minor questions concerning some circuit identifications which were resolved through discussion with-the ST No acceptable conditions were observe . PT-1 The inspector reviewed a preliminary draft copy of the procedure and had several comments concerning what should be considered to ensure conservative results when indivi-dual component response times are added. In general the inspector noted that the procedure did not require instru-ments used to measure response time to have their accuracy factored into the individual component response time fig-ures and that several automatic RPS trips listed in the FSAR were not incorporated into the procedure. Comments were verbally provided to the Phase II through VI startup manager. This procedure will be closely scrutinized during a future routine inspection af ter it is approve No violations were identifie _ _ _

.

.

5.0 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation Review 5.1 Scope The completed test procedure li~sted below was reviewed during this inspection to verify that adequate testing had been conducted to sati.sfy regulatory guidance, licensee commitments and FSAR require-ments and to verify that uniform criteria are being applied for eval-uation of completed test results in order to assure technical and administrative adequac The inspector reviewed the test results and verified the licensee's evaluation of test results by review of test changes, test excep-tions, test deficiencies, "As-Run" copy of test procedure, acceptance criteria, performance verification, recording conduct of test, QC inspection records, restoration of system to normal after test, in-dependent verification of critical steps or parameters, identifica-tion of personnel conducting and evaluating test data, and verifi-cation that the test results have been approve PT-7, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 2, Results Approved June 26, 198 .2 Findings The inspector performed independent calculations of pump head and NPSH values to verify the licensee's calculation No discrepancies were identified. The inspector noted that the acceptance criterion for the RHR pumps was specified in the procedure as 2 375 feet dis-charge head at 2 3000 gallons per minute (GPM). Data taken at the 3000 GPM flow rate were between 2950 and 2960 GPM. With the excess head developed by the pumps it was evident that the vendor's pump curve could be satisfied; however, the inspector was concerned that no explanation was provided by the STE or during Joint Test C*oup (JTG) review. When questioned the licensee explained that this was discussed by the JTG and that data had been extrapolated to verify that the vendor pump curve had been satisfied. During further dis-cussion the licensee agreed to add an explanatory note into the test summary. Since the pumps satisfied the required flow and head values, no safety concern was identified in this instanc The inspector did discuss the importance of meeting the specified acceptance cri-

'teria or providing acceptable justification in writing as part of each preoperational test procedure performance record. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspectio No violations were identifie _

- . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _

.

.

6.0 QA/QC Interface with the Preoperational Test Program The inspector reviewed several recent Startup and Test Department (STD)

Quality Assurance Surveillance Repor.ts (QASR). Four of those reviewed specifically related to the preoperational test (1-PT-18) witnessed by the inspector. The following QASR's.were reviewed:

--

QASR Q2.6.21.8828, completed June 24, 1985,

--

QASR Q2.6.21.8919, completed July 08, 1985,

--

QASR Q2.6.21.8925, completed July 09, 1985, and

--

QASR Q2.6.21.8937, completed July 10, 198 The above QASR's dealt with QA inspector witnessing of 1-PT-18 and is in addition to the witness points specified in the procedure. The QA inspector observed that test instruments used were calibrated, that test personnel were qualified and that procedure adherence and field change issuance was in accordance with approved administrative procedures. No deficiencies were identified by the QA inspecto QASR Q2.6.37.8815, Surveillance of Leak Testing of the Fuel Storage Building (pressure decay method) conducted under IP-23, Revision 1 and TP-12, Revision 6, completed on June 20, 1985. Testing observed by the QA inspector was in conformance with the referenced procedures and all leakage met the specified acceptance criteri QASR Q2.6.21.8796, Surveillance of Safety Tagging to verify compliance with TPI-23, Revision 6, completed on June 18, 198 The QA inspector identified four deficiencies as follows:

1)' Tag No. 34 - No release signature or date; 2) Tag No. 37 - Not signed as "off" on tagging order No.83-524; 3) Tagging Order No. 83-1030 - no date with authorizing signatur ) Tagging Order No. 83-1235 - no " tags verified by" signature or dat These deficiencies were' brought to the attention of the Control Authority and immediately correcte QASR Q2.6.14.8887, Surveillance of Defect Removal and Repair by Welding, completed on June 29, 1985. The QA inspector identified three deficiencies during this surveillanc ) The fitter performed additional grinding after visual QC examination; 2) The QC inspector failed to. properly document the inspection results; and,

-..

.

3) A repair order was not issued by the NDE technician to notify the NDE supervisor or his designee of the initial unacceptable NDE.results. These findings were brought to the attention of the Pullman-Higgins QC department.and NCR #73/11046A and YAEC Deficiency Notice No.107 were issued to document and track the deficiencie No violations were observed during the above revie The inspector also reviewed STO QC Inspection Report No. 85IR 2833, completed on June 25, 1985. This inspection-verified proper installation and post installation testing of the auto shunt tr.ip circuit per ECA 03102707 discussed in Paragraph 3.2.2 of this report. No deficiencies were identifie .0 Independent Calculations / Verifications The inspector performed independent verification of RPS logic testing and independent calculations of RHR pump head and NPSH values as discussed in Paragraph 4.1.1 and 5.2, respectively, of this repor .0 Plant Tours The inspector made several tours of various' areas of the facility during normal and backshift hours to observe work in progress, housekeeping, cleanliness controls, status of construction and preoperational testing activitie No unacceptable conditions were note .0 . Exit Interview A management meeting was held at the conclusion of the inspection on July 12, 1985, to discuss the inspection scope, findir;gs and observations as detailed in this report (see Paragraph I for attendees). No written information was provided to the licensee at any time during this inspectio .