IR 05000443/1985008

Insp Rept 50-443/85-08 on 850402-05.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Area Inspected:Rcs Hydrostatic Test,Including Review of Test Procedure & Checkout of Test Preparations & Prerequisites

ML20129H003
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/22/1985
From:	Bettenhausen L, Kamal Manoly, Van Kessel H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129G985	List: IR 05000443/1985008 ML20129G979
References
50-443-85-08, 50-443-85-8, NUDOCS 8506070438
Download: ML20129H003 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-08 Docket N License No. CPPR-135 Priority --

Category B Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire P.O. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: April 2-5, 1985

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Inspectors: ' b k l . C' l-D -

H. F. Van Kessel, Reactor Engineer date t

[M Mf K. M yr Lea Reactor Engineer 5/1/JE date i

Approved by: . .d k/ MA L. H.lettenhausen',' Chief I dgte

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Operations Branch, DRS /

Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 2 - 5, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-443/85-08 Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test, including review of the test procedure, checkout of test pre-parations and test prerequisites, test witnessing, participation of contrac-tor's and licensee's QA/QC organizations in the test, observation of the pre-cautions, as listed in the test procedure, by test personnel, and observation of general performance of test personnel during the test. Independent test measurements were taken of metal surface temperatures during the test. In addition, the status of some previous findings of NRC inspectors were deter-mined and the progress made on these findings was determined and evaluate The inspection involved 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> on site by two NRC region based inspector Results: No items of noncompliance were identified during the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test. For the progress made on previous inspection findings see the attached details of the inspection repor [kN 3

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 New Hampshire Yankee (NHY)

1. Startup and Test Department (STD)

R. Anderson, Primary System Lead Engineer R. Doyal, Mechanical Startup Supervisor S. Dunphy, Technical Support Supervisor R. Gwinn, Startup Test Engineer

• G. A. Kann, Test Group Man.ger

• W.~ J. Mackensen, Preoperational Test Supervisor

• D. Mc Lain, Startup Manager D. Mueller, Plant Auxiliary Engineer

• K. W. Seitz, Special Projects

• J. G. Tefft, Project Engineer

• B. Temple, Quality Assurance Supervisor 1. Construction Quality Assurance

• D. L. Covill, Surveillance Manager 1. Nuclear Services Division R. Tucker, Mechanical Engineering Group 1.2 Pullman Higgins (P-H)

• D. H. Wright, Test Engineer 1.3 United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)

A. Dufault, Discipline Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

R. S. Barkley, Reactor Engineer A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector H. M. Wescott, Resident Inspector

• Denotes personnel at exit meeting

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, Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Violation (443/82-03-03) and Unresolved Item (443/81-09-03)

A review was performed of various documents pertaining to the above vio-lation and unresolved item. The two subject items are closely related and have been linked in many licensee responses and subsequent NRC actions and reports. Therefore, they will be addressed jointly in this section. The violation had identified deficiencies in the licensee's QA inspection pro-gram of installed class IE raceways on the basis of the FSAR endorsement of Regulatory Guide 1.30 and the requirement for compliance of safety related systems to IEEE-336, which includes raceways as part of class IE system The unresolved item and the subsequent followup in inspection report 50-443/82-03 had raised concerns relating to the adequacy of the test program for raceways. The concerns included test tray configurations, boundary conditions of test spans, and their effect on the calculated capacity from the biaxial loadin Other related documents reviewed included the following: PSNH response letter No. SBN-284 on June 23, 1982 to the Notice of Violatio . FSAR amendments 45 and 46 addressing the qualification of raceways and support . Memorandum from the Division of Projects in Region I to the Division of Licensing of NRR on August 16, 1983 regarding the transfer of lead technical responsibility for the Q-classification of raceways through a Task Interface Agreement (TIA). Response from the Division of Licensing of NRR to Region I on November 1,1983, providing NRR's evaluation and position to Action Plan items 1 and 2 of the TI . Independent Design Inspection (IDI) Report No. 99900510/83-02 of September 7, 198 . United Engineers and Constructors Letter No. SBU-89620 on July 26, 1984, and attached Report No. 9763-ESG-WP-1 on the engineering program for cable tray supports at Seabrook Station Unit 1 and 2.

! United Engineers and Constructors Report No. 9763-C-EE-IE-02F on

" Static Testing of Cable Trays with Simulated Defects", performed by

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Metal Products Corporation, to verify site receipt criteria.

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Discussions were held with cognizant licensee representatives following the review of some of the documents listed abov The testing report was not available prior to the discussions with the licensee; however, it was available for review in the NRC regional i'

office. In addition, the licensee indicated that other design related documents, which provide the detailed approach to the design i of raceway supports and bracing system, will be forwarded for NRC

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review. The following questions arose from the review of the above documents and during the discussion with licensee representatives on sit United Engineers report (Reference #6 above) provides a de-scription of the engiraeering effort on cable tray supports at Seabrook Station and outlines briefly the design philosophy for the seismic qualification of cable tray systems. Particular attention has been focused on the generic approach employed in addressing the bracing system of raceway supports, and on the interaction between the trays, supports and axial bracing . Are the connections (friction type) between the trays and the frames capable of transmitting the self weight excita-

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tion loads of the frames in the out-of plane direction to the trays? Has the slip capacity of these connections been tested for cyclic loading? Is the utilization of friction connections in providing an out-of plane brace to support frames documented in any acceptable design standard? Bolted and welded joints are typically used to connect bracing members to raceway support frame . Are the trays qualified to transmit axial compression loads between axial bracing systems (approximately 40 feet long)? If the trays are used in the design of the support frames, as a bracing system to reduce the unsupported member lengths, should they not be treated as safety related iteins? As such they will be subject to the same material requirements, QC inspections, and stress limits as those required for any Q-item .

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5 Are any of the raceway support frames braced out-of plane by means other than utilizing - the trays to provide the restraint? If such a condition exists, has the increased stiffness of- the frames in the out-of plane direction been considered in the re-distribution of axial loads between support frames and axial bracing systems? How is the interaction between axial braces and support frames addressed for sloped raceways when the analysis and design of each is performed independent of the other? What material properties are used for the trays in the analysis of raceway and support systems when they are supporting dead weight and safe shutdown earthquake loads to stresses -beyond the proportional limit of the tray material? What is the technical justification for considering the equivalent static load method in determining the fundamental frequency of the support system? In many complex configurations, this approach will yield higher mode frequencie . How does the equivalent static approach used by the licensee in determining the fundamental frequency and corresponding g-level from the amplified response spectra reconcile with the requirements in the standard review plan (SRP) section 3.7.2.II-b which recommends the use of a factor of 1.5 to the peak acceleration of the applicable floor response spectra?

II. United Engineering Static Testing Report (Reference #7) of cable trays specimens containing defects simulating actual '

installed configuration . The majority of tests were conducted on specimens whose ends were constrained from rotations (fixed-fixed). How

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could the load rating obtained from these specimens be an indication of the capacity of actual configurations which j are essentially continuous beams? How does the limit load (ultimate capacity) for the tested .

specimens compare with that of actual configurations, and I also of simple beams with free unrestrained ends as required by NEMA-VE-1 standard?

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-9 6 The load limits for deadweight plus SSE combination is not explicitly defined since it is . described in Appendix B of reference 6 to be equal to the proportional limit plus one third of the load difference between the proportional limit and the applied maximum loadin The applied maximum loading varied throughout the testin . What are the safety factors used in determining the allowable vertical and lateral loads for both deadweight plus OBE and dead weight + SSE loading combinations?

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The staff will review other relevant design documents relating to the qualification of raceways and support systems at Seabrook Station when they are provided by the licensee. Upon completion of this review, all remaining concerns will be addressed in a future meeting between the NRC staff and representatives from the licensee and United Engineers and Constructor .0 Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test (Cold Hydro)

3.1 Scope and Objectives The Reactor Coolant System (RCS), including the reactor coolant loop (RCL) piping, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) housings (4), the primary side of the steam generators (4), the pressurizer, and the welded parts of RCS instrumentation and associated tubing, are subjected to an integrity test at 3200 psig and a leak test at maximum operating pressur Some piping, interconnected with the RCS and designed for RCS pressure, is included within the hydrostatic test boundar The scope of this inspection was to witness the Cold Hydro and to verify that the licensee performed the test in accordance with their own approved procedure and the test requirements of ASME Code,Section III, Class .2 References (1) "RCS Hydro Boundary Graphic", by J. Woo (2) 1-PT(I)-35, Revision 1, " Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test", TPI-62-F02, Revision 2, approved by Joint Test Group on March 22, 198 (3) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 1977 Editio { {

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(4) Seabrook Station FSAR, Chapters 3.9, 5.2, and 14.2; and table

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14.2-3.

I (5) RC-IT-01, "RCS Integrity Test", Revision 0, Field Change 7, implemented April 3, 1985.

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3.3 Review of Test Procedure L

f References (2) and (5) were used for the performance of Cold Hydro, i

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Reference (2) contains the operational part of the test program. The execution of this procedure is under the responsibility of the Startup

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Test Department (STD). The execution of the Integrity Test and the Leak Test remains the responsibility of construction. Reference (5)

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is used by construction. The inspector reviewed the two test proce-dures, references (2) and (5), and verified that code requirements

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would be met, static heads were accounted for, pressure plateaus de-I fined, test pressure tolerances stated, test pressure hold time stated, leak test pressure hold time stated, nilductility temperatures for the l

RCS components at the test pressure identified, RCS pressure tempera-ture relations to be adhered to during the test clearly identified, I heat up and cooldown rates of RCS defined, pressurization and depres-j surization rates stated, and data recording requirements give The inspector also verified that overpressure protection was included, valve alignment sign-offs were in place, test equipment specified, and step by step instructions for the test with sign off requirements were include The inspector noted that the test procedure accounted for the RPV design pressure at the top of the vessel and that the pressure at the "RPV Zero" location will be the design pressure plus the static head of water. It was also noted that the maximum hydrostatic test

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pressure includes the FSAR tolerance and gage error adjustmen .4 Test Organization A Test Director, assisted by two Shift Test Directors, led the (STD)

test organization as far es the test operations, and test coordina-tion with the contractors, is concerned. The operational portion of the test, as performed in accordance with procedure 1-PT(I)-35 (re ), was their responsibility. The actual performance of the RCS In-tegrity Test and the Leak Test, in accordance with RC-IT-01 (ref. 5),

remained the responsibility of the construction contractors involved i f.e. Pullman-Higgins (PH), United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C),

i and Westinghouse Electric Company (NSSS Supplier).

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- Each contractor had their inspection team (s) assigned to perform the inspection work within the available time of the test period. PH had-12 inspection teams. Each team had one ANI inspector, two PH QC in-spectors and one UE&C QA inspector. UE&C had 6 inspection teams (I&C). Each team had one ANI inspector, two UE&C QC inspectors and one UE&C QA inspecto One STD engineer was in charge of the Hydro Laser, another STD en-gineer was assigned to take equipment vibration measurements. STD, also, coordinated all of the inspection team efforts in close com-munication with the Test Director. This coordination took place in a staging area close to Containmen The Westinghouse team witnessed the test and performed the RCP in-spection during the extended test pressure holding period (after the initial 10 minutes for the Integrity Test).

Dry runs were organized and executed with the inspection teams to make the teams familiar with the inspection work assigned to each team and the sequence of events during the actual test .5 Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the establishment of the various pressure plateaus prior to reading test pressure and verified that the precautions, identified in the procedure (ref. 2), especially with regard to RCS pressure and temperature, were observed. Independent temperature measurements were taken by the inspector upon reaching and holding at approximately 2500 psig prior to the Integrity Test (for details See 3.6).

The Integrity Test was witnessed by the inspector in the . vicinity of the Test and Backup Gage on top of the RPV. Independent RCS pressure - time data were taken by the inspector for comparison with the official data after completion of the tes The inspector then witnessed the inspection of the RCPs by the Westinghouse Team in the holding (pressure) time period following the first 10 minutes of the Integrity Test (at 3200 psig).

Following the Integrity Test and the RCP inspection (at test pres-sure), the RCS pressure was brought down to the maximum operating pressure level and held there for the Leak Test. The inspector wit-nessed the Leak Test . (more than 10% of welds and joints).

Observations were recorded for future comparison with the test exceptions listed per Ref. (5).

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~ During the'~ pressurization and depressurization .of the RCS particular

- . attention was paid to actual' heat up and cool'down rates, pressuriza-tion and depressurization rates as . recorded in the control room. As part of the test records a graph was ' developed to record the RCS

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water temperature versus elapsed time. . Independent temperature read-

'i ngs ' byL the inspector were compared with the data of this grap The inspector' verified that the RCS metal te'mperatures prior to the

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test would permit the performance of the test, .(expected to last at least g hours) .without these temperatures falling below the minimum

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of 150 F-(as set by the.. steam generators and pressurizer) as- a re-sults of heat losses from uninsulated RCS metal surface .6 Independent Measurements

'RCS metal surface ~ temperature measurements were taken by the

. inspector at the maximum operating pressure plateau (approximately 2500 psig) prior to :the Integrity Test. These readings were taken at the: same or similar locations as those of the temporary TCs installed by the licensee to-measure RCS metal surfacef temperatures throughout the test. These locations were as follows:

-i- TC N Location in RCS 1 RPV head flange (top)

2 RPV head flange (bottom)

3 RPV Bottom 4 C - Steam Generator Channel flange (bottom)

5 D - Steam Generator Channel flange (bottom)

6 A - Steam Generator Channel flange (bottom)

7 8 - Steam Generator Channel flange (bottom)

8 Pressurizer Bottom 9 Pressurizer Top i The most critical = locations were the locations 4 to 7 of the steam generator channels. The TCs for these locations, initially, were at the top of. the bottom flange close to the shel Later, during the

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tom = of the steam generator flange. This was done with'the concur-ence of Westinghouse. The reason for this _ change was thy low tym-perature reading ' obtained in the top loc ton f.e. 152 to 155 These temperatures are too close to the 15 minimum to permit ade-quate time (5-10 hrs.) for the (eak Test. In the bottom location the temperature was found to be IUF higher. The inspector noted the decision by the Licensee to move the TCs for the steam generators

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to the bottom of the flange (near the channel).

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i The top location does not truly measure the metal temperature of the-channel because the T/C location is too close to the shell of the steam generator, which is cooled by containment air on both side The results of the independent temperature checks were compared with the strip chart readings from the temporary dedicated temperature recorder located in the Leak Test staging area. All of the readings indicated a - comfortable margin allowing ample time to perform the Leak Test (See Attachment A). The temperature readings were taken by the inspector with a hand held thermocouple thermometer, Omega 450 AET, type E, FLS 806, calibrated on March 19, 1985 (due for recalibration on September 19,1985).

Independent shaft vibration readings were taken on two operating RCPs by the inspector with a hand held vibrometer, IRD Mecha'n alysis, model 810, FLS 563, calibrated on January 18,1985 (due for recalibration" on July 18, 1985), serial number 118216154. The D pump showed 14 mils, the C pump 4 mills. Upon inquiry about the high reading for the D pump, the Westinghouse specialist informed the inspector that the initial reading for this pump had been much higher earlier (ap-prox. 28 mils) but that their installation of an extra coupling bolt had brought it down to the 14 mil leve Further balancing of the D .

Pump would be pursued by Westinghouse after the Cold Hydr During the- Integrity Test the inspector took independent pressure and time readings. These readings were compared favorably with the data from the test recor The independent data are shown in Attachment The inspector made independant observations during the Leak Tes These observations were checked against the test records (test exceptions). No deviations from the test records were observe The inspector witnessed the visual inspection of the four (4)

reactor coolant pumps as well as the subsequent ASME code stamping of the pumps by the Westinghouse representative and the designated ANI representativ As specified by procedure RC-IT-01, the minimum RCS hydro test pressure was maintained for 10 minutes before the inspection was begu The following components on the pump were inspected for

. . , leakage at the hydrostatic test pressure:

(1) RCP main flange gasket (2) Thermal Barrier inlet and outlet lines up to their field connections (3) #1 seal housing gasket (4) #1 seal injection line to field connection (5) #1 seal leakoff line to field connection

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No leakage on any of.the pumps was detecte The inspector observed the code stamping of the pump. He verified that the ASME National Board Number and NPSH requirements also

" stamped on the pump agreed with the QA documentation of the pum .The inspector reviewed the ANI inspector's qualification card and determined that his certification was valid and up-to-date. The NPV-1 Manufacturers' Data Reports for the RCP's were also - reviewed and found in orde .7 Licensee Identified Items All exceptions observed by the PH teams and the UE&C teams, as recorded in the test package of RCIT-01 (ref. 5), were accepted by the ANI people. The test, therefore, is considered valid by ANI and retesting of the RCS (and RPV) will not be required for any of the listed items. . A total of 17 exceptions were identified by P-H and 18 exceptions by the UE&C team .8 QA/QC Interface As stated in Paragraph 3.4, construction QC people were assigned to-each inspection team. QA maintained assigned personnel coverage and audited the entire test performanc Evidence of QA and QC coverage was apparent throughout this inspectio .9 Findings The inspector determined by direct observation, test witnessing, records review, and independent measurements that testing was effectively conducted and met acceptance criteria in accordance with approved procedures, code requirements, and FSAR commitment No items of noncompliance were identifie .0 Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with the licnesee representatives (denoted in l Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector sum-

! marized the scope of the inspection and the finding No written material related to the inspection findings was tramsitted to the i

license t

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Attachment A To Inspection Report 50-443/85-08 Independent Temperature Measurements (ITM) During RCS Hydro (Taken April 3,1985)

Readings from Temporary TR Stripchart -F ITM ITM TC No/ Lo a.m. 7:21 :20 a.m. 9:44 Time Bottom /(Top)

1. RV Head 16 .1 16 .4 8:25 .0 2. RV Flange 16 .1 16 .3 8:30 .3 3. RV Bottom 17 .2 17 .9 16 . SG "C" 15 .1 16 .3 9:24 .0 (155.3)

5. SG "0" 15 .9 15 .1 16 (153.8)

6. SG "A" 15 .0 15 .5 16 (152.3)

7. SG "B" 15 .3 15 .0 16 (153.6)

8. PR2R-Bottom 17 .3 17 .6 9:41 ,0 9. PR2R-Top 16 .7 16 .8 17 * Readings taken at curvature between flange and steam generator channel (bottom)

or shell (top)

Steam Generator TC readings still obtained with TCs in top location .__

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Attachment 8 To Inspection Report 443/85-08

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RCS Hydro Pressure Versus Time During Escalation to Test Pressure l (Data Date: April 3, 1985)

-RCS Pressure (PSIG) Time . Remarks 3000 2:24 :28 :29 :30 :32 :33 Start to hold 3200 2:34 Hold

'3210 2:35 Hold 3218 2:36 Hold I 3220 2:37 Hold :38 Hold l 3215 2:39 Hold I

3215 2:40 Hold 3210 2:41 Hold 3210 2:42 Hold

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3210 2:43 Hold 3205 2:45' Start hold extension perio for RC Pump Inspectio :53 :57 :58 RC Pump Inspection Complete i

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Attachment C To Inspection Report 443/85-08 RCS Hydro Boundary Leak Inspection (Data Date April 3, 1985) Sheet 1 of 2 Weld joints and components examined (No deviations found):

System Isometric Dwg Weld and Component Number Reactor Coolant 1-RC-146-1 F0101, F0102, F0103, F0104 (RC) RC-V-446 (valve)

RC+RV (hot leg) RC-10-01 FWO102 RC+RV (cold leg) RC-12-01 FW0102 RC RC-9-1 FWO101 CVCS CS-368-02 FWO202 CVCS CS-368-03 FWO201, FWO301, CS-V-177 (valve)

Safety Injection SI-273-1 FWO101, FW010? FWO103, (SI) FWO104, SI-273-03 (flange),

SI-V-147 (valve)

SI SI-275-02 FWO201, FWO202, FWO204, FWO206 SI SI-275-03 FWO301, FW322, FW326, FW327, FW321, FW313, FW314, FW315, FW325, FW328, FW318 SI- SI-256-05 SI-V-128 (Valve)

Residual Heat 1-RH-162 -01, 03, 04 FW0106, FW0103, FWO302, FWO308 Removal (RHR) FWO310, FWO312, FWO401, FWO402 RC 1-RC-1-01, 05 FWO101, FWO103, FW0104, FWO501 FWO502, FWO503, FWO504, FWO505 FWO506, FWO507, FWO508 SI 1-SI-261-02, 04 FWO204, FW0205, FWO402, FWO404 FWO406, FWO408

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Attachment C To Inspection Report 443/85-08 RCS Hydro Boundary Leak Inspection (Data Date April 3, 1985) Sheet 2 of 2 Flow Orifices (and checkvalve) found to be leaking at gasketed faces:

System Isometric Dwg Component / Joint Number SI- 1-SI-272-11 SI-FE-924; JTR 1101*

SI 1-SI-260-02 SI-FE980; JTR0201*

SI 1-SI-261-04 SI-FE986; Temporary Installation

- SI 1-SI-261-01 SI-261-V-87; JTR-0101*

• Test exception JTRs 1101 and 0201 were retorqued above design pressure (2485 psig) contrary to requirements of Pullman Higgins procedure IX-5, paragraph 6.2.4 (filed NCR 9851). Joints were reexamined below design pressure. JTR 1101 was OK but JTR 0201 had to be retorqued to stop the leakag JTR-0101 was retorqued and found acceptabl ,.

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