IR 05000443/1985031
| ML20136F466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1985 |
| From: | Beall J, Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136F463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-85-31, IEB-79-08, IEB-79-8, IEB-80-03, IEB-80-3, IEB-81-03, IEB-81-3, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, IEC-78-13, IEC-78-16, IEC-79-12, IEC-79-13, IEC-79-22, IEC-80-11, IEC-81-02, IEC-81-13, IEC-81-2, NUDOCS 8601070391 | |
| Download: ML20136F466 (21) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.- . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' Region I Report No.
50-443/85-31 Docket No.
50-443 , License No. CPPR-135 Priority -- Category A/B Licensee: Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection conducted: October 21 - December 6, 1985 Inspectors: A. C. Cerne, Sr. Resident Inspector (SRI) D. G. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector R. S. Barkley, Resident Inspector G. A. Walton, SRI, Beaver Valley 2 J. M. Grant, Reactor Engineer T. J. Kim, Resident Inspector, Ginna R. J. Freundenberger, Reactor Engineer 12.fgop3-- Reviewed by: _7bt W u J. E. Bea'll, Project Engine'ei,TRP date signed ' Approved by: k / 2/Jol#f R. M. Gallo,~ Chief, Projects Section 2A date' signed Division of Reactor Projects, (DRP) Inspection Summary: Inspection on October 21 - December 6, 1985 (Report No. 50-443/85-31) Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by resident inspectors and region-based inspectors of work activities, procedures, records and the conduct of testing relative to the Preoperational Test Program, in general, and specifically hot functional tests. The inspectors also reviewed licensee action on previously identified items, including Bulletins, Circulars, and 10CFR50.55(e) reports.
Plant inspection-tours were conducted and certain construction program activities were reviewed.
The inspection involved 290 inspection-hours, approximately 25% of which involved the witness of back-shift testing activities.
Results: No violations were identified. Hot functional test exceptions requiring further NRC evaluation & follow-up are summarized in paragraph 13 and will be tracked as an unresolved item.
[[khK u
- -
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. DeVincentis, Project Engineering Manager (NHY) R. E. Guillette, Ass't Construction QA Manager (YAEC) G. A. Kann. Phase 2-6 Test Group Manager (NHY) D. C. Lambert, Field Superintendent of QA (UE&C) D. A. Maidrand, Assistant Project Manager (YAEC) G. F. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager (YAEC) D. G. McLain, Startup Test Group Manager (NHY) J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager (YAEC) R. J. Sherwin, Phase 1 Test Group Manager (NHY) L. A. Walsh, Operations Manager (NHY) Interviews and discussions with other members of the licensee and contractor management and staff were also conducted relative to the inspection items documented in this report.
2.
Plant Inspection-Tours The inspectors observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspections of the plant. The inspectors examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions.
' Particular note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as inspection rscords, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation.
The inspectors interviewed craft personnel, supervision, and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
Areas of site construction activities were inspected on a periodic basis to confirm compliance with design and applicable code requirements.
Specifically, HVAC, piping, instrumentation, and electrical supports were observed for weld quality, bolt tightness, clearances and general appearance.
The inspector examined structural steel member connections to assure proper installation of high-strength bolts, nuts and washers, and to verify tigntness of the connection and the correct use of plate washers in :, lotted hole connections.
The installation of spring nuts for eldr1 cal cable tray connections at support locations was witnessed by the inspector. He also inspected the cable tray supports for anchor bolt installation, bolt thread engagement, and proper identification.
, The inspector noted that several spare containment penetrations in the mechanical penetration area had not yet been capped. The inspector inquired into the status system which tracked completion and closure of all spare penetrations.
Evidence was provided to confirm the adequacy of penetration status by elevation and scope of work as part of the UE&C program for systems completion prior to building turnover.
._.
- - _ _ _. _, - - _ _ _. . _-- _ __
- - -. = - .-... - .. . .
The inspector also examined and questioned the design details and installation of specific pipe supports (eg: 4000-SV-20) and pipe whip restraints (PW-201-4) from the standpoint of corrosion and contamination controls and the supply of component standard parts. The design drawings or applicable design change documents (eg: Engineering Change ' Authorization - ECA 25/807093B) were reviewed to evaluate the acceptability of the noted support conditions.
, With respect to the general inspections of the plant and specific items examined, no violations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE) Bulletins & Circulars a.
(Closed) IE Circular (78-13): Inoperability of Service Water Pumps.
This event is not likely to occur at Seabrook because: 1) minimum seawater temperature at the circulating water intake location has been recorded since 1973 as never being less than 34 degrees F (freezing of seawater occurs at 28 degrees F) and therefore, no ice is expected to form; 2) the velocity cap on the intake structure, which serves as the horizontal intake on the vertical shaft to the tunnel, is ten feet above the ocean bottom.
Because of its height and the constant movement of the water, there is no chance of sand building up to the velocity cap and entering the shaft; 3) horizontal ficw into the velocity cap is sufficiently low that no drawup of sand from the bottom occurs; 4) water level above the velocity cap has been evaluated to never fall below 40-50 ft. above the cap, with the worst condition occurring during the probable maximum hurricane at low astronomical tide (the largest drawdown being ten feet); and 5) bypass lines around the < strainers exist to allow continued plant operation in the event the strainers must be isolated for maintenance and surveillance. The licensee also evaluated the effects that severe winter weather would have on the mechanical draft cooling towers and determined that icing could occur under certain conditions. To prevent freezing of the towers' basin water during severe winter weather, the licensee plans to either 1) circulate water through tower ' bypass lines and maintain the water temperature above freezing with pump heat or 2) circulate water through some normal service water system heat loads which are transferred to the tower.
Station Operating Procedure No. OS 1016.06, " Idle Cooling Tower De-Icing," has been drafted by the licensee, but will not be fully tested for severe winter conditions until the Winter of 1986.
The inspector had no further questions and concluded that the licensee had
sufficiently addressed the Circular's concerns. This item is considered closed.
b.
(Open) IE Circular (78-16): Limitorque Valve Actuators.
The problem discussed in this Circular was addressed to Seabrook in a letter from Limitorque Corp. to UE&C, dated August 31,1978. To .. ..... _- - -.. _ - _ - -- -. --- .- . .
. .
ensure electrical operability of an actuator that is manually operated periodically, Limitorque made three recommendations. Two of these recommendations (ie: that the declutch lever not be held in a depressed position while the motor is operating and that the valve be. stroked with the motor drive to ensure clutch engagement) have been incorporated by the licensee in Station Operating Procedure No. 1056.01, " Manual Operation of Remote Operated Valves." Houever, there is no evidence that the licensee has considered a third recommendation that the actuator not be used to manually seat a valve further than the electric motor had the capability of reating it initially.
The licensee has stated that.
this recommenda'. ion is being evaluated.
Pending the outcome of the licensee's evaluttion, this circular will remain open.
c.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (79-08): Events Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During TMI Incident. Seabrook is a pressurized water reactor; therefore, this Bulletin does not apply.
Similar TMI issues will be addressed for Seabrook through IE Bulletin 79-06.
d.
(Clased) IE Circular.(79-12): Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problems. The problem associated with the General Motors EMD diesel generators discussed in this Circular does not apply to Seabrook. The licensee has purchased and installed Colt-Pielstick diesel generators with Brown-Boveri turbochargers.
The turbochargers contain turbine-end bearings and compressor end bearings.
Each set of bearings has its own lubricating oil system-and supply, which is independent of any other lubricating system to the diesel generators. This ensures that an oil supply will always be available to the bearings. The inspector had no further questions.
This Circular.is considered closed.
e.
(Closed) IE Circular (79-13): Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Actuators. Seabrook has two Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc.
diesel fire pumps (Serial Nos. 10479429 and 10445556).
Cummins . notified the li_censee that the magnetic switch part No. 217588 was already provided on these engines.
The inspector reviewed Shop Order 42849, which is the as-built record for the engines. This shop order indicates that the correct magnetic switch was used in Seabrook's diesel fire pumps.
The Circular is considered closed.
f.
(Closed) IE Circular (79-22): Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). Seabrook PORVs are Garrett solenoid valve-control'ed, pressure-actuated relief valves, supplied by Crosby Valve ! Cage Company, with internal piston type stem assemblies. B?cause the stem assemblies of the Seabrook PORVs are different in dtsign configuration than those used at Robinson Unit 2
. .. . . . -. - -_ . .
(i.e., Copes-Vulcan PORVs), they are not susceptible to the same scoring problems. The licensee plans to conduct surveillance on the PORVs at least every 18 months (Technical Specification 3/4.4.4).
Surveillance will include channel calibration and stroking the valves through one complete cycle. The PORVs were initially stroked during Hot Functional Testing (HFT), and the worst-case stroke time were recorded as 0.225 seconds to-open and 2.94 seconds to close.
The Westinghouse design specifications require less than two seconds to travel full open or full closed.
Since both PORVs required more than two seconds to travel full closed, this test exception (No.11 to Preoperational Test, PT-40.1) was documented on a nonconformance report (NCR 82/964A) which was dispositioned to specify rework of the solenoid operators at the supplier's (Crosby) facility.
It was noted that both PORVs demonstrated successful stroking in the opening direction during HFT.
Since the opening direction was the fat'ure mode of the valves at Robinson, Unit 2 and since licensee evalcation of the difference between the Seabrook and Robinson PORVs indic6tes that scoring of the stems is not a potential problem,-the inspeccor concluded that the licensee's 18-month maximum time interval for surveillance of the PORVs is acceptable.
In the closing direction, where stroke time is less critical, the failure of the PORVs to meet the Westinghouse specifications has been adequately documented and will be tracked on the Startup Incomplete
Items List until modifications are completed and the valves are retested during precriticality hot functional testing.
Based upon the actions taken by the licensee and evaluation of the test results, in line with the intent of Circular 79-22, this ~ circular is considered closed.
Future planned NRC inspection effort-will review the adequacy of licensee evaluation'and corrective actions to address all HFT exceptions.
g.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (80-03): Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray Adsorber Cells. The subject adsorber cells are not used in safety-related applications at Seabrook.
The licensee has instead installed a bulk charcoal type for the safety-related Fuel Storage Building HVAC system. These units were supplied by CVI Corp. and were verified by a regional inspector to be all-welded, gasketless units with screens spot welded to the housing every two inches. The' inspector noted no evidence of damage or separation of the screen from the housing. The licensee stated that although no safety-related applications will use the tray adsorber cells, the cells will be used in nonsafety-related HVAC systems and ordered to specifications similar to the bulk charcoal type.
The Bulletin is considered closed.
- . - . . - _ _ _. _. _. - _ _ _ _ _.
. .
h.
(Closed) IE Circular (80-11): Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures. The problem identified in this Circular does not exist at Seabrook. The lube oil coolers to the Colt-Pielstick diesel generators have no solder joints between the tube and tube sheets.
Instead, the heat exchanger, manufactured by American Standard, is an expanded tube to tube sheet unit. Therefore, the potential for solder corrosion does not exist.
This Circular is considered closed.
i.
(Closed) IE Circular (81-02): Performance of NRC-Licensed Indivi-duals While on Duty. To emphasize the importance of maintaining a professional ata sphere in the Control Room and throughout the faci-lity, the licensee ims incorporated the recommendations of this Circular in the Operations Department Manual (except for drug and alcohol abuse, which are covered by the company policy delineated in the Administrative Program Manual and NHY Employee Handbook).
This Manual clearly delineates the responsibilities of the operators and supervisors and discusses acceptable Control Room conduct. The licensee has also included this Circular and a later Information-Notice (IN No. 85-53) on the same subject in the Operators Review Notebook, which contains required reading for the operators.
Based on the actions taken by the licensee, this Circular is considered closed.
J.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (81-03): Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Corbicula sp. (Asiatic Clam) and Mytilus sp. (Mussel). This Bulletin, as it pertains to Seabrook, was closed by IE in NUREG/CR-3054 based on acceptance of the licensee's program for detecting and preventing future flow blockage or degradation due to Mytilus sp. and for confirming adequate flow rates in safety-related systems. Based on IE's conclusion and further Region I review of the licensee's discharge permit and chlorination minimization usage plan, this Bulletin is considered closed.
k.
(Closed) Circular (81-13): Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors.
The licensee is in the process of verifying that valves required by design to have torque switch bypass circuits do indeed have the circuits installed (and not inadvertently removed). Verification is being conducted thru the testing requirements of General Test Procedure, GT-E-33, " Motor-Operated Valves," and GT-E-21, " Wiring Verification & Functional Checks." If testing and/or inspection reveals any discrepancies between the actual installation and the latest design drawings, action is taken under the licensee's Work Request program, TPI-11.
This Circular is considered closed as the licensee's actions encompass those recommended by this Circula.
1.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (84-02): Failure of GE Type HFA Relays in Use in Class IE Safety Systems. The Seabrook Station Procurement & -Materials Program controls the identification and requisition of spare. parts. Because the HFA relays identified in this Bulletin are to be used at a future date by the licensee in only nonsafety-related applications, the licensee has downgraded them to a non-nuclear safety (NNS) classification and initiated a " restrictive use" Spare Parts Data Form, whose data was verified by the inspector as having been entered into the Program's computer data base. This " restrictive use" causes the relays to be retagged in the warehouse as NNS and prevents them from being issued for a safety related application.
A resident inspector reviewed Work Request ED2E-0116, which directed the replacement of the five HFA 151 relays (Part No.12 HFA 151A 2H)' containing the long-life century series magnetic coil assemblies.
The inspector also reviewed the Certificate of Conformance, confirmed that the replacement relays were indeed GE Century Series HFA relays and verified that the relays in 480V unit substation buses E52, E53, E62 and E63 had been replaced per Work Request ED2E-0116. No unacceptable conditions were found.
This Bulletin is closed.
4.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items =a.
(Closed) Unresolved item (443/83-03-01): Cable raceway fill calculations.
Licensee action on this unresolved item was previously reviewed and documented in inspection reports 443/83-14 and 443/85-22.
The remaining issues involved review of the method of raceway cable fill calculations for exposed paths and verification of the computer cable routing program (CASP) for tray.
conditions which appeared to be overfilled.
During this inspection, UE&C Raceway Fill Procedure No.1, utilized only for raceways added for the protection of cables identified in the CASP as exposed paths, was reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel. The inspector also requested that a manual fill calculation be done for tray 86B1VA, which was noted to contain cables protruding above the tray side rails (reference: see paragraph 5).
This calculation was accomplished, as documented in response to YAEC Blue Sheet No.95, with a resultant 0.356 cable tray fill, confirming the accuracy of the CASP generated figure of 36%. Discussion with licensee representatives revealed their intent to retrain cables in trays where the mass of cables protrudes above the side rails or extend the tray siderails where retraining was not possible or sufficient.
In the case of the noted tray (86B1VA), the inspector reviewed an ECA (03/111417A) which provides details of a raised tray side rail and cover design to ha used at certain sealed electrical cable penetration. .
Based upon licensee actions to address cable routing in exposed paths, to confirm CASP calculated fill accuracy and to correct conditions where cables protrude above the tray side rails, this unresolved item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved item (443/84-20-02): Identification of Class IE equipment. The inspector reviewed UE&C Corrective Action Request (CAR) 147 and ECA 03/104622A, both prescribing the use of the Class IE Equipment List (M505300) and not the CASP Master Equipment List (L310982) for the identification of safety-related, Class IE electri-cal equipment and components.
Issuance of these documents in April 1985 provided a basis for verifying proper train designation / marking of electrical equipment in the field. The inspector noted that electrical QA/QC personnel were retrained per the CAR requirements.
Subsequently, ECA 03/1046228 was issued to reinstate use of the CASP Master Equipment List for certain safety-related node information, as specified by Specification 48-2, after a review had been accomplished to update and correct the list content (Reference: ECAs 03/107415A, B & C). The inspector discussed corrective actions and future controls for identifying and marking Class 1E equipment with licensee (A and engineering personnel.
The inspector had no further questions on the actions taken by the licensee to implement these controls.
This unresolved item is closed.
c.
(0 pen) Unresolved item (443/85-19-01): Preservice Inspection (PSI) program. This unresolved item is a ten part item dealing with the licensee's preservice inspection program.
Several concerns were raised by the inspector regarding the weld coverage, weld inspection technique, calibration standards, information recording and other pertinent concerns. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response on three of these items, as follows: Concern (b): Main reactor coolant cast elbow welds have not been -- ultrasonically examined and it is not clear as to what the licensee plans to do regarding these welds.
The licensee plans to use the ultrasonic method to inspect the cast stainless steel welds if an acceptable technique can be established. The licensee has purchased similar cast material and is in the process of fabricating a calibration standard from this material. The block will then be used to determine the possibilities of performing ultrasonic inspection of these welds.
The welds will be very difficult to examine due to high attenua-tion of the cast stainless material. After the test is attempted on the calibration standard, the licensee will make a determina-tion regarding use of ultrasonics or radiography, or request exemption from performing the test.
L
.
.
Concern (d): Site PSI ultrasonic data did not cross-reference -- previous ultrasonic examination of the same weld.
The licensee now has a copy of the PSI contractor (NES) data log which cross-references previous examinations.
, Concern (1): Preservice Inspection Document 80A8984, Page 12, -- Figure D-02, "RH System Line Nos.155 and 162 Weld and Hanger Map" had erroneous elevation data for Weld RH 155-5.
The inspector reviewed Site Control Drawing 9763-800155, Revision 18, and observed that this drawing contained the correct information.
The licensee's preservice inspection program is being updated to . reflect the correct elevations.
. ... Pending licensee actions to address all other PSI concerns raised by this unresolved item and implementation of any corrective measures, if required, this item remains unresolved.
d.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR 83-00-07): DS-416 Reactor Trip Switchgear. This CDR involved two distinct technical issues, both involving the undervoltage attachments on the Westinghouse 05-416 reactor trip breakers. The first issue involved deviations from breaker internal recommended clearances.
The second issue concerned a design discrepancy whereby the groove in a shaft receiving a retaining ring was not increased in width to be consistent with an earlier design change. Both problems were eliminated by replacement of the undervoltage trip assemblies in all reactor trip and bypass breakers which was accomplished on June 28,1985. The inspector reviewed the engineering change authorization (ECA 03/102582A), the work request (WR CP-0019), and the other associated quality assurance and procurement documentation associated with this replace-ment.
In addition, NRC inspection of the new assembly installation was performed in the field, as well as inspection of the tack welds which have been found to be defective on nther breakers at another power plant. No discrepant conditions were identified. The inspector concludes that the action taken is in confcrmance with the licensee's final report to the NRC, Region I, (SBN-866) dated September 4, 1985.
The CDR is considered to be closed.
Additionally, IE Bulletin 85-02, Undervoltage Trip Attachments on Westinghouse 08-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers (RTB), re-addresses concerns based on additional RTB industry failures and requires action be taken at those facilities which have not installed the shunt srip coil.
Since Seabrook has installed the shunt trip on its DS-416 RTB, this bulletin is not applicable and is closed.
e.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR 84-00-15): Velan Valve Corporation Stop Check Valves Fail to Open Fully. The licensee stated
- .
in their Final Report to the NRC, Region I (SBN-857, dated August 7, 1985) that the failure of the stop check valves piston discs to travel fully open was caused by a lack of equalizing holes in the side of the disc which allow the water trapped above the disc to escape.
The licensee disassembled the valves and returned the discs to the manu-facturer who drilled the required number of equalizing holes in them.
The discs were then returned and the valves reassembled per work requests FW-0330 & 0334 and the valve manual instructions (F.P.91957).
The inspector reviewed the work requests, the Velan Certificate of Compliances certifying that the holes were drilled in the discs, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Quality Control (QC) inspection report 84 IR 1582, and the disposition to Nonconformance Report (NCR) 74/2858 governing the deficiency. He discussed with a Startup Test Engineer the design of the check valve and the effect of the equali-zing holes in the disc. The inspector has no further questions on this issue.
This CDR is considered closed.
5.
Cable Tray Seals During routine inspection in the Main Steam and Feedwater East Chase, the inspector noted construction activities in progress in preparation for sealant injection into an electrical penetration through the concretc walls of two adjacent building structures.
Cable tray 86B1VA and six other trays pass through the noted penetration (No. EFP-4E). The inspector observed that cables were being separated to allow the sealant to penetrate to the full depth of the tray.
However, because of the filled condition of the tray, it appeared that full penetration of the sealant to the bottom of the tray might be impeded.
In addition, a water leak was observed at the Rodofoam joint between the concrete wells within the penetration. To pre-vent buildup of leakage water between the two sides of the seal, two small bore tubes had been installed so as to penetrate the seal on one side and act as a drain. Since this electrical penetration had been designed to serve as a fire barrier, the inspector questioned the effectiveness rf the fire barrier with open ended tubes through it and also noted a probability of tube blockag= within the life of the penetration.
The licensee conducted an engineering evaluation of the drainage design and determined that the drainage tubes would be subject to blockage. The design was subsequently changed to omit the far penetration seal, thereby eliminating the need for the drain as any leakage will flow naturally out the unsealed end of the penetration. The Rodofoam joint will now require its own fireproofing; and the entire caale tray system was removed to pro-vide access to the Rodofoam joint.
This work is being accomplished under Rework Form #8125 which was reviewed by the Mspector.
The inspector examined in process rework and checked temporary cable supports for ade-l quacy. No adverse impact on the cable was detected.
Based on the cor-rective action in progress, the inspector has no further questions at this time.
, L
__ _ . .
6.
BISCO Penetration Sealing Program 'The inspector observed the installation of BISCO fire barrier penetration sealant material into penetrations in the west main steam and feedwater chase and the RHR vault walls. He independently verified that the dimen-sions of of the seal in the RHR vault "A" wall met design dimensions.
The inspector also examined the dams built by BISCO to hold the fluid sealant until it cured. He questioned the BISCO technicians concerning how the material was applied and its curing properties.
Proper coverage by BISCO Quality Control (QC) personnel of the operation and sampling of the BISCO material to ensure it met density requirements was verified.
No violations were observed.
The inspector discussed with the responsible Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Quality Assurance (QA) engineer the implementation of the BISCO QC program. He reviewed the penetration seal design form for BISCO seal
- PB-(61)-RV104-1001 (an 8 inch penetration in the wall separating the two Emergency Core Cooling System vaults) to deterraine how the design specifi-cations for a seal are relayed. The inspector reviewed the internal work release and the. system verification log for the seal which document the results of the QC inspection of the seal material and installation. He also questioned whether the seal would withstand a hydrostatic head of water in the event of a flood in the vault. The inspector was referred to
~ Seabrook's Moderate Energy Line Break Study which indicated as design basis assumptions and conclusions that the vault would never flood up to the level of the seal.
No violation: were identified.
The inspector had no further questions.
7.
Construction Program Controls The inspector performed a review of the licensee's program for a.
installation of nonsafety-related components in seismic Category I buildings to determine compliance with Reg'ilatory Guide 1.29.
The review included discussions with engineering and quality assurance personnel and review of the following documents: Quality Assurance Procedure Number 9763-QAS-5, Revision 5.
-- This document establishes the minimum requirements for installation of nonsafety-related components and defines the pertinent requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and ANSI N 45.2.
The program establishes the minimum Quality Control inspection, requirements for each.nonsafety component.
UE&C Technical Procedure TP-4 identifies all nonsafety-related -- eq'lipment in safety-related buildings and establishes whether the equipment is seismically anchored or located such that it is isolated from safety-related equipment.
t . s I..
- . .
. FQCP-21, Revision 0.
This document is specific for inspection -- of nonseismic crane rails. As established in TP-4, numerous crane rails are non-isolatable and therefore, require implementation of the QAS-5 inspection program.
FSP-153, Revision 0, for structural steel erection, delineates -- the controls to be used when installing crane rails in seismic areas.
UE&C Quality Control Procedure QCP-10-8, Revision 2, contains -- the visual weld acceptance when inspecting structural welds established under the QAS-5 program.
- The inspector found all areas of review acceptable.
No violations were identified.
b.
The inspector discussed the licensee's third party review of nondes-tructive examinations for different fabricators onsite and also the licensee program for review of radiographic film for vendor supplied welds. The third party review involved a random selection of welds inspected by liquid penetrant, magnetic particle and radiography.
The licensee implemented this program until approximately April 1984, when it was discontinued because additional problems were not being found and very little activity requiring NDE remained to be completed.
The inspector also reviewed the results of the licensee's overview of radiographic film for vendor supplied welds.
To date, the licensee has performed an overview of virtually all vendor supplied radio-graphic film. Where problems were found, such as geometric unsharp-ness failing to meet the ASME Code, radiography was re performed on site and repairs were made, if necessary.
The inspector found all areas cf review acceptable. No violations were identified.
The inspector selected four radiographically examined welds and
reviewed the film for technique, film speed and quality, density, penetrameter selection and placement, weld coverage, and weld quality. The welds reviewed were: , -- Feedwater FW-4608-F0102 Field Weld -- Feedwater FW-4608-F0101 Field Weld -- Feedwater FW-4608-04-1506-16-5 Shop Weld -- Feedwater FW-4608-04-1506-16-5(C) Shop Weld The associated reader sheets for each listed weld were also reviewed to ascertain that relevant and/or nonrelevant acceptable indications were properly recorded.
. k
" . .
The inspector found all areas of review acceptable.
c.
The inspector performed a visual inspection of cable installation and cable support to ascertain compliance with installation practices.
During this inspection, the inspector noted that "Kellum Grips" are used to provide additional support for cable installed in extended vertical raceways. The grips, as noted by the inspector, did not appear to be installed such,that they would provide any support to the cable.
The grips were not pulled up tight around the cable sufficiently to grasp the cable and prevent the cable from sliding through the grip.
Subsequent inspection by the licensee of the observed conditior.s confirmed the concerns. A YAEC surveillance report was written to document not only the improperly installed "Kellum Grips", but also the fact that the grips were not installed in required areas.
Since QC inspection of these cable runs had not yet been completed, the licensee discussed with the NRC inspectors its efforts for assuring that final inspection of the cable tray and cables would identify any discrepant conditions regarding "Kellum Grips." Additional inspection criteria will be added to existing inspection checklists and inclusion of these criteria in the checklists for Building / Area Turnover, per Administrative Site Procedure (ASP) 5, is being considered.
An existing NRC open item (443/85-15-01) questions the way inspection criteria for the final area inspection process will be programmati-cally handled The insp'ector informed licensee QA personnel that the NRC question of the "Kellum Grips" status is one more issue that must be addressed in the closeout of, unresolved item 85-15-01.
8.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump B Seal Water Heat Exchanger Replacement The inspector observed the replacement of the RHR pump B seal water heat exchanger with the heat exchanger from the Unit 2 RHR pump B.
Specifically, the inspector observed retorquing of the pump casing bolts, which was done both manually and hydraulically by procedure. The inspector verified that the hydraulic ratchet torque indicator was within calibration and that the supervisor and QA inspector were knowledgeable about the conversion chart used to relate hydraulic unit pressure to ratchet head torque.
The inspector reviewed the UE&C retag request (#1817) governing the retagging of the heat exchanger.
He also reviewed Nonconformance Report (NCR) 82/895F which addressed the problem with the original seal cooler. The inspector questioned why the disposition of the NCR did not require the lines from the seal cooler to the pump and back to be hydrostatically tested again since they had to be cut and rewelded to the replacement cooler.
The inspector was informed that the line was exempted from hydrostatic test requirements because it was less than one
I - ..
(1) inch in diameter. This exemption is permitted by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, Section XI which governs the test requirements. The inspector had no further questions.
No violations were identified.
9.
Hot Functional Testing - Procedure Review & Test Witness From October 28, 1985, when reactor coolant system (RCS) heat-up commenced, through November 27, 1985, when the RCS was cooled down to Hot Shutdown conditions, the licensee conducted several preoperational tests under the general heading of Hot Functional Testing (HFT). The inspector reviewed the test procedures and witnessed portions of selected preoperational tests (PT) and acceptance tests (AT).
Procedures were reviewed for con-formance with FSAR Section 14 and applicable regulatory guidance.
The inspector evaluated each preoperational test conduct against the approved PT procedure by interviewing test engineers and licensed operators during the course of the test, reviewing documentation associated with the pre-requisites and test instructions, monitoring control room activities in support of the test, and confirming QA coverage to include the control and witnessing of designated mandatory STD QA witness points.
It was noted that during HFT, the operators used operating procedures and drawings, specifically modified for'the planned testing and controlled in a manner acceptable to support revisions in the course of test conduct.
So as not to interfere with HFT requirements, the operating staff also used and exercised several surveillance procedures in an attempt to identify any errors / discrepancies in the implementation of the surveillance activities per the utilized procedures.
The inspector periodically checked overall control of the individual tests thru governing integrated testing procedures -- 1-PT-41 for plant heatup, 1-PT-40 for HFT, and 1-PT-42 for cooldown. Test logs were examined, sequential' conduct of the individual tests spot-checked, and test procedure field changes and in process test exceptions reviewed to confirm the startup shift test director awareness and control of all integrated testing activities. The inspector also attended the daily HFT status meeting to remain cognizant of in progress and completed events and any identified problem areas.
The following list of pts represents those tests reviewed and witnessed by the inspectors with specific sections of the test or inspection points noted and discussed, as appropriate: a.
1-PT-4.2.
Balance of Plant Thermal Expansion: The inspector discus-sed with Westinghouse engineers the method by which final piping move-ment data would be collected. A computer printout of ambient caseline data, collected prior to the start of plant heatup, was reviewed.
The conduct of GT-M-08, " Pipe Support Spring Can Setting and Balancing," in relationship to PT-4.2 was discussed with Startup QA engineers.
YAEC Surveillance Report Y-186 was written to document a question on
c , .
final hot and cold load markings and was. resolved when Field Change No.2 to GT-M-08 was issued to track the affected spring cans for future load marker movement.
Surveillance Report (SR) Y-328 on the GT-M-07 testing of mechanical and hydraulic snubbers was also reviewed.
Separate from the SR, the inspector noted that as a result of HFT inspection, seventeen (17) of the twenty (20) steam generator upper lateral support snubbers, were identified to have reservoir fluid levels less than prescribed by the Westinghouse Snubber Manual (F.P. 55025).
NCR 82/IO06A was initiated to identify the apparent leaking condition of the subject snubbers.
NRC follow-up of this issue will be trackad under the unresolved item discussed in paragraph 13.
b.
1-PT-5.3.
Boric Acid: In closing a previously identified unresolved item (85-09-01) in the 443/85-20 inspection report, YAEC engineering had stated the excess letdown line flow would be limited to 25 gpm maximum by adjustment of drag valve CS-HCV-123 during HFT.
RFI 99/111337A was initiated to verify that flow did not exceed 25 gpm during the conduct of PT-5.3.
During the conduct of step 6.3.3 of PT-5.3, flow thru HCV-123 was calculated to be approximately 30 gpm at 60's valve position, equating to a maximum flow rate in excess of 53 gpm. A test exception-(No.1) to PT-5.3 was documented and subsequently closed upon issuance of RFI 99/111768A, which indicated that such a maximum flow rate thru the excess letdown line was acceptable.
Pending NRC review of the engineering justification for acceptance ' of the higher flow rate, relative to failure of nonsafety solenoid valves in the flow path, followup of the closure of test exception No.1 to PT-5.3 will be tracked under the unresolved item discussed in paragraph 13.
c.
1-PT-6.2.
CVCS-Boron Thermal Regeneration System: The inspector witnessed this test through step 6.1.6 and observed the pretest briefing. An as-built walkdown of the system was conducted in conjunction with the procedural review prior to and during the test.
d.
1-PT-9.
Emergency Core Cooling System: The inspector witnessed portions of sections 6.2, 6.5, and 6.6 to include ECCS primary and backup check valve leak checks and the accumulator flow verification test. Testing in the control room was observed, as_well as local test instrument monitoring in the mechanical penetration area and testing set-up activities inside containment. The startup test engineer was interviewed regarding activities to flush lines and retest check valves that had not attained acceptable initial test criteria. A test exception was written on the one safety injection (SI) check valve which didn't achieve an acceptable leak-tight performance at the conclusion of PT-9.
This exception is being tracked by Region I-based specialist inspectors in inspection report 443/85-30.
, s
. - . .
During SI pump runs with flow to loop 1 & 4 hot legs, accomplished in conjunction with PT-9 testing, startup engineering personnel noted vibration levels near a RHR suction valve off hot leg 1 (RC-V-22). A Request for Information (RFI) was initiated to UE&C engineering, and additional testing was accomplished to reestablish the vibration conditions, so they could be witnessed by engineering personnel. An NRC inspector witnessed control room operations / testing performed to reestablish the noted vibrations.
Subsequent NRC inquiry revealed that eng'ineering analysis had determined the observed vibrations to be within acceptable steady-state limits. Pending further NRC review of the quantitative evaluation and bases for this determination of vibration acceptability, this item will be tracked under the unre-solved item discussed in paragraph 13.
e.
1-AT-12.2.
Instrument Air and Service Air-Containment Building and 1-AT-12.3.
Instrument Air System-Air Quality Verification. These procedures were reviewed following an instrument air line rupture in containment prior to the HFT heatup.
This failrue occurred when a fitting broke loose on an instrument air line supplying an instrument rack near the Pressurizer Relief Tank (1-MM-IR-3).
Significant air line moisture was noted by the inspector immediately following the break. The test procedures were reviewed to ensure that the air quality will be adequately verified later in the test program.
It is suspected that the source of moisture was the temporary air compressor which was tied into the system during construction and which will be disconnected prior to system testing.
'1-AT-12.2 verifies containment air compressor and air dryer perfor-mance as well as containment instrument air branch line cleanliness and moisture content. Since this problem can reasonably be expected to be corrected by planned testing, the inspector has no further concerns pending satisfactory completion of 1-AT-12.2 and 1-AT-12.3.
During the failure, control room operators took timely and prudent action to prevent plant pressure control problems as a result of several air operated valves going closed. As a result of this inci-dent, operators are now aware of the location of the specific drawings that identify which instruments are located in each rack.
f.
1-PT-14.2.
Emergency Feedwater System (HFT): The inspector observed pre-test vibration runs on the turbine driven pump emergency feedwater (EFW) pump.
These were the first coupled runs with the pump on recirculation flow and were initially accomplished by bypassing the. steam supply valve.
Later runs were accomplished , with the supply valve open.
Subsequently, the thrust bearing s overheated and was replaced.
Portions of the bearing replacement were observed.
Following completion of the bearing work, the inspector witnessed the first cold start attempts in accordance with section 6.7 of PT-14.2.
These starts were unsuccessful due to improper governor
.
- '
.
operation which caused repeated overspeed trips. These tests and adjustments were performed under the supervision of the vendor representative.
The inspector reviewed Section 6.6 of the test and questioned the Startup Test Engineer (STE) regarding the pump thrust bearing temperature readings due to previous problems with high temperature on the turbine driven Emergency Feedwater pump outboard thrust bearing.
Test exceptions a,d problems with the cold starts for the EFW turbine-driven pui..p are being tracked by Region I-based specialists in inspection report 443/85-30.
g.
1-AT-19.1.
Steam Generator Blowdown System Flash Tank and 1-AT-19.2.
Steam Generator Blowdown System (HFT): AT-19.1 was fully reviewed while AT-19.2 was reviewed through step 6.1.
In association with these reviews, the blowdown system was traced out for as-built condition in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) and the steam generator blowdown room.
Several P&ID changes were noted during the trace-out and were checked against the HFT approved prints in the control room.
In addition, modification to the: startup feed and pressurizing drawings were also checked against HFT approved drawings. All drawings were found to be current and in accordance with design details for actual system configuration.
h.
1-PT-40.1.
Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control: The inspector witnessed Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) testing and solid plant control-demonstrations in the control room and examined the pressure transmitters (PT-403 & 405) in the field supplying primary RCS interlocks and pressure readings to the operators during this phase of operation.
Section 6.2.7 and 6.2.9 were witnessed, as was adjustment of the pressurizer spray bypass valves. A minor error in the data collection for RC-V-137 & 139 adjustment was noted, documented on YAEC surveillance report Y-166 and promptly corrected.
The inspector also witnessed the hydrostatic test of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV), RC-PCV-456 A & B, checking conduct of the hydrostatic against the criteria delineated in ECA 08/109569.
i.
1-PT-40.2.
Reactor Coolant Leak Detection and 1-PT-40.3.
Steam Generator Water Level: The inspector reviewed PT-40.3 and witnessed testing of the steam generator "C" high level deviation alarm and the high-high level turbine trip. He questioned the Unit Shift Supervisor regarding the setpoint level of the alarm and interviewed .the STEs concerning RCS conditions during the conduct of the both tests.
.-..
- =.
.
j.
1-PT-40.4.
Instrumentation.
The inspector reviewed PT-40.4 and discussed the need for recalibration of instruments after the completion of HFT with a startup test group manager. The decision was made to recalibrate all instruments for redundant indications which exhibit a deviation outside the 2% range which is considered i acceptable. The inspector had no further questions on PT-40.4.
k.
1-PT-40.5.
Remote Shutdown.
The inspector witnessed the RCS cooldown in conjunction with PT-42, from the Train "A" & "B" remote safe shutdown panels. He observed main control board (MCB) and both remote panel (CP-108 A & B) operations, verifying operational control per operations procedure, OS 1200.02.
Lock out of control from the areas from which operations had been transferred ( i.e, main control board and remote shutdown panel) was confirmed for each component.
The inspector questioned why the Primary Component Cooling Water Loop "A" Supply Header Temperature Valve was not being controlled locally during the cooldown.
He was informed that the valve was not modulating as designed so it was being controlled from the Main Control Board (MCB). The inspector, guided by the station shift supervisor, reviewed the status of the MCB indicating lights for the equipment under local control.
No-unacceptable conditions were observed.
1.
1-PT-40.6.
Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoint Verification: The inspector _ witnessed air set operations on the safety valves to confirm proper setpoint while attempting to reseat two of three leaking valves. Actual setpoint verification will be accomplished at a test laboratory on different valves than were installed during HFT.
Setpoint verification will be reconfirmed during later testing.
This issue is being tracked by Region I-based specialists in inspection report 443/85-30.
m.
1-PT-40.8.
Steam Generator Atmospheric Steam Relief Valves: The portion of this test which modulates the valves at no load conditions (steps 6.4.1.-6.4.12) was observed. Section 6.1 of 1-PT-3.3 (Power Conversion and ECCS System Dynamic Test) was performed concurrently with PT-40.8 to measure vibration and temperature response during valve operation. Valve cycling was observed from the main control room, turbine building and the yard outside the chase, n.
1-AT-63.
Initial Turbine Roll. The inspector witnessed the syn-chronization of the generator onto the electric grid. During the ~ test, he paid particular attention to the thermal transient induced on the RCS and ensured that the safety limits imposed on the RCS by the procedure were adhered to.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
-
h _ l*; 4.
, -
The inspector reviewed the design requirements of the reactor vessel relative to the' number of times a turbine roll test is permitted due to the thermal transient induced. An addendum to the original reactor vessel specification (Equipment Specification 676413), dated March . 10,1977 indicated that the vessel was designed to withstand twenty I (20) turbine roll tests.
Since the licensee performed the test fewer than ten (10) times, the inspector had no further concerns.
10.
Service Water Cooling Tower Thermal Performance Test (PT-15.3) , Two regional inspectors reviewed and witnessed the Performance Test (PT-15.3) on the service water cooling tower which is Seabrook's safty-related ultimate heat sink.
The test was performed to verify the design heat removal capability of the cooling tower.
Specifically the inspectors reviewed the test procedure for technical accuracy and witnessed the test from the control room and the cooling tower test station.
The inspectors verified proper compliance with the procedure, making the following observations: - latest revision of the-procedure was in use - the responsible Startup Test Engineer (STE) was directing the test prerequisites for the test were completed prior to the start of the test - test precautions were followed - Startup QA witnessed all portions of the test required by the procedure - adequate communication existed between all individuals involved post-test calibration of all vital test equipment was conducted i The inspectors noted that cooling tower spray header bypass, valve 2-SW-140 failed to open on demand. The inspectors verified that tne valve was not required to operate during this test and that the valve had not yet com-pleted Phase 1 startup testing.
The inspectors noted that the engineering department was notified of the failure.
The inspectors questioned the effect on the cooling tower's thermal per-formance when salt water is induced into the cooling tower basin.
Since the cooling tower basin contains only eno;gh water for seven (7) days of operation after an accident versus the thirty (30) day water supply man-dated by Regulatory Guide 1.27, water will have to be made up to the tower under accident conditions. Since the licensee states in the FSAR that they will make-up to.the tower basin with water from either the service water pump bay or the nearby Browns River (both sources being saline, ie: PSNH Operations Chemistry sample of Brown's River water dated Novemoer 13,1985, showing salinity at 31,130 part per million), the inspectors . - . , . .- . . - - - -,
- _
' .
questioned whether the cooling tower would perform adequately under con-ditions of high basin salinity.
Pending a response from the licensee, this issue remains unresolved and is addressed in paragraph 13 of this report for follow-up.
In regard to the performance testing observed, no violations were identified.
il Primary Plant Temperature Instrumentation.
With the plant at normal operating temperature during HFT, a regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature indicator (1-CS-TI-126) on the main con-trol board (MCB) was noted to be reading the same as primary temperature (560 degrees F).
Normally the differential temperature between charging and letdown flow is approximately 30 degrees F depending on actual flow of inspector inquiry revealed that two instrument cable connections at the electrical penetration were loose. When properly tightened, the instrument reading returned to normal.
Subsequent inspection indicated that rework had been conducted on this cable (H44-TF9) under work request (W1) CS-0411 in accordance with engineering change authorization (ECA) 03/1017298.
The instrument channel was later calibrated in accordance with general test procedure GT-I-07 (Inriicating/ Control Loops) under WR CS-1359 in preparation for test procedure AT-29 (Plant Instrumentation for HFT). GT-I-07 requires performance of GT-I-45 (Instrumentation Wiring Continuity Checks) for electronic loops.
It is not known whether GT-I-45 was performed during GT-I-07 or whether if performed, loose leads would have been detected. Pending additional review by the licensee and inspector, this item remains open and will be tracked as an unresolved item, as discussed in paragraph 13.
It was noted that the procedures existing at that time for identifying system deficiencies after turnover to the Startup Test Department (STD) did not appear to address any operator-identified control board anomalies.
On November 19,1985 Startup Administrative Instruction Twenty One SAI-21 entitled " Operational Problem Reports," was issued.
This document estab-lished a new system which provides direct deficiency reporting between the identifying party (subject to Unit Shift Supervisor / Shift Superintenc'ent verification) and the system test engineer (STE).
Since this instruction was recently implemented, it is too early to characterize the program's impact; however, it appears to address the generic problem identified during follow-up of the above temperature indication anomaly.
12.
Emergency Feedwater Steam Supply Drains Following the water hammer experienced by the En.ergency Feedwater (EFW) steam supply line during testing of the Terry turbine, an inspector walked down the steam supply drain on each of the two supply lines. He questioned the set point of the relief valves on the drain lines (MS-V-127 & 131).
The inspector also inquired about the process by which the relief valves were recertified to a higher set pressure than they were originally hydro-statically tested for.
He learned that the valves had not been properly
l recertified and that this problem was identified through the UE&C ASME N-5 l _ -- _
m _ '
Records Compilation Procedure (QCP-17-3, Revision 2). The results of that review are documented on NCR 74/3375A, the disposition of which will deter-mine whether all code data is accura'tely reflected in the records. The inspector also reviewed the UE&C retag request for the relief valves from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool cooling system (SF-V-45 & 74) to their present installation. The retagging appeared to be adequately controlled. With respect to the above activities, no violations were identified.
The inspector discovered and pointed out to the licensee an error in the piping and instrument drawing (P&IO) for the above drain line (Print No.202074). While the P&ID was wrong, the isometric drawing which governed the installation of the system was correct and the drain line were installed properly.
13. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item is opened in this paragraph to track the five follow-up items resulting from NRC witnessing of HFT activities, as follows: (1) Snubber Leakage (paragraph 9a.)
(2) Maximum Excess Letdown Flow (paragraph 9b.)
(3) RCS Vibration with SI Hot Leg Flow (paragraph 9d.)
(4) Effect of High Basin Salinity on Cooling Tower Performance (paragraph 10) (5) Erroneous Temperature Element Reading (paragraph 11).
These items remain unresolved HFT issues pending NRC review and follow-up of.the acceptability of the identified conditions and licensee corrective action, if required (443/85-31-01).
14. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were-held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection. An exit meeting was conductec; on December 3,1985 to ' discuss the inspection findings during the period.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors received no comments from the licensee that any of their inspection items or issues contained proprietary information.
No written
material was provided to the licensee during this inspection. }}