ML20133Q176

Insp Repts 50-324/85-33 & 50-325/85-33 on 850901-30. Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Two Valves in Open Position Per Tech Spec-required Procedure OP-46.Unresolved Item Re MSIV Solenoid Failures Identified

ML20133Q176
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	10/18/1985
From:	Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133Q165	List: ML20133Q162 ML20133Q171 ML20133Q176
References
50-324-85-33, 50-325-85-33, NUDOCS 8511010415
Download: ML20133Q176 (7)

See also: IR 05000324/1985033

Text

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p MI UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION li

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g j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• 't ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323

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Report Nos. 50-325/85-33 and 50-324/85-33

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P_. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Dochet Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62

I Facility.Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: September 1 - 30, 1985

Inspectors: J /d[l8 !I

Date Signed

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forQ. H.-Ruland

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NW

. . Gar i

tohe Isf

Date Signed

Approvea By: .- / /) / /d'

P. E. FreYrickson, Section Chief

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Date~Sitned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine safety-inspection involved 126 inspector-hours on site in

the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational

safety verification, onsite followup of events and main steam isolation valve

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(MSIV) solenoid failures.

Results: One violation was identified: Failure to maintain two valves in the

open position per Technical Specification required procedure OP-46; paragraph 7a.

One unresolved item was identified: Main steam isolation valve solenoid

failures; paragraph 8.

8511010415 851021

PDR ADOCK 05000324

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licen'see Employees

.P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project

C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

T. Wyllie, Manager Engineering and Construction

.G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control

J. Holder, Manager - Outages

E. Bishop, Manager - Operations

L. Jones, Director - QA/QC

J. Moyer, Director - Training

M.! Jones, Acting Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP

J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager

J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance

- G. Cheatham,- Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control

K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance

'B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support

-L. Boyer, Director Administrative Support

V. Wagoner, Director - IPBS/Long Range Planning

C. Blackmon, Superintendent - Operations

-J. Wilcox,' Principle Engineer - Operations

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W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor

W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor-

B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor.

R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor-(Unit 2)

R. Warden,- I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

W. Dorman,' Supervisor - QA

W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security

R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

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C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit.1)

R.' Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist

D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist

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W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

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engineers, technicians ~, operators, office personnel, and security force

members.

2. Exit Interview (30703)

Thel inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 1,1985 with

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the general 1 manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings without

exception. The violation described in paragraph .7a was discussed in

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. detail. .The licensee did -not identify as proprietary any of the materials

-provided to or reviewed by'the inspectors during the inspection.

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3. Followup;on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

- 4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to

verify that~ work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, .

Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The

inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable:

administrative controls were.followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel.were

qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological ^ controls were

proper; fire protection was adequate; QC hold points were adequate and

observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent

verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently

verified that_ selected equipment was properly returned to service.

Outstanding work requests and authorizations (WR&A) were reviewed to ensure-

that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- 5. _ Surveillance Observation (61726)

.The ' inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical

Specifications. Through . observation and record review, the inspectors-

verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;

administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instru-

mentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The

inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to

service of equipment.

The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

1 MST-RHR26R RHR CS LO REACTOR PRESS PERMISSfVE INST CHAN CAL'

'2 MST-RHR22M RHR-LPCI ADS CS LL3, HPCI RCIC LL2 DIV I TR UNIT CHAN

CAL

PT-1.1.12P MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION CHANNEL ALIGNMENT AND

-FUNCTIONAL TEST

PT-4.1.6P- PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM AIR SAMPLING.

SYSTEM & WASTE GAS EFFLUENT MONITORS-

No violations or deviations were identified.

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'6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors' verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct

observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,

reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.

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The-inspect' ors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR

50.54 ? and the Technical Specifications were met. Control room, shift

supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain

information'concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to

ensure tha.t there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting

~ Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of . control

room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to

verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification

limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity

of system status was maintained.

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The inspectors verified the status of

selected control room annunciators.

Operability of a selected ESF train was verified by insuring that: _each

accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power

supply . and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for

components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from

those'ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications,

was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper

lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which

might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.

Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified

operable .by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve

lineup, if accessible.

The inspectors verified that- the licensee's health physics policies / pro-

cedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation

work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.

~The inspectors verified.that: the security organization was properly manned

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and that security personnel were capable of performing their assigned

functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the.

protected area (PA); vehicles were. properly authorized, searched and

escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification

badges; -personnel- in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory

measures were employed when. required; and security's response to threats or

alarms was adequate.

The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position

of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified

the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)

a. Reactor Scram

On September 4, 1985 at 4:26 a.m., Unit 2 was manually scrammmed from

100*l, power. The manual scram was initiated by the control operator

after he observed that: 1) the SCRAM PILOT AIR HEADER PRESSURE HI/ LOW

annunciator was lit; 2) multiple (>20) rod drift indications were lit;

and 3) two blue control od scram lights on the full core display were

lit. The manual scram required by the rod drift annunciator procedure

.was initiated within 6 seconds of the first rod drift alarm. The High

Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation

Cooling (RCIC) system auto started but did not inject. Reactor feed

pump response to the water level shrink resulted in filling the vessel

to the turbine trip setpoints. Both'feedpump turbines and the HPCI and

RCIC turbines tripped on high level. Attempts to manually start RCIC

failed due to high exhaust pressure trip. The HPCI system was

subsequently started to control vessel -level until the A reactor

feedpump was returned to service and normal shutdown was commenced.

Reactor pressure was controlled during the event by the turbine bypass

system. Actions taken were in accordance with emergency procedure

E0P-01 (scrau recovery).

The low scram pilot valve air header pressure resulted from an

auxiliary operator (AO) inadvertently closing the air supply valves to

the header. In preparation to perform maintenaace instruction MI

10-504B on check valve 2-SA-V53, the A0 was aligning valves in

accordance with clearance No. 2-1107. The clearance instructed him to

close valves 2-SA-V301 and V302 over motor control centar 2XM. The

valves in this location were actually the header air supply valves,

RNA-V202 and V203, and were labeled as such. The A0 dressed out,

climbed up to the area, incorrectly read the valve numbers and closed

the valves. Air leaks in the header resulted in the low pressure

condition and subsequent. drifting in of control rods.

Operating procedure OP-46 requires the RNA-V202 and V203 valves to be

in the open position. Equipment control procedures required by

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33

dated November 1972, as implemented by 0I-13, require all valves be

maintained in the position required by the OP valve lineup. Closure of

the valves was a failure to maintain the valves in their OP lineup.

This is-a violation (324/85-33-01).

During -review of safety system response to the event, the licensee

concluded that all ESF functions performed as designed. However,

certain items required review.

HPCI and RCIC turbines received a start signal but water level

recovered before the injection valves received all their open'

permissives. The injection valve logics require the low water level

signal to be present at least until position switches sense that the

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turbine steam admission valves have begun to open. The computer

generated trip log confirms the low level two did occur for only a

relatively short time. Hence, these systems performed as designed.

.The subsequent failure of. RCIC was due to _ a malfunctioning pressure

switch. This.was repaired and the system returned to service prior to

restart. The. starting of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system with

no Group I isolation was investigated by the licensee. Low water level

is the most probable cause of the SBGT actuation. However, this same

-level . instrument'also supplies a trip signal to the Group I isolation

logic. The licensee believes that the water level transient belov the

double low level.was so fast that the SBGT logic sealed-in hao +ime to

function but 'the seal-in of the Group I did not. Review of the logic

components indicate additional contacts and larger relay coils exist in

the Group I logic than in the SBGT logic. To verify correct operation

of components which would normally actuate on double low level but did

not, the licensee performed the functional surveillance tests on these

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. systems.

Proper operation of the Group I function was verified by performance of

MST PCIS21M. - Proper operation of the ATWS (anticipated. transient

without scram) recirculation pump trip was verified by MST ATWS21M.

Unit 2. resuned power operation on September 5,1985. The licensee

plans to conduct additional testing on the SBGT and Group I isolation

logics.to acurately measure the time differenc between the logics.

b. Hurricane Gloria

The center of Hurricane Gloria passed within 125 miles of the site.

The hurricane caused no damage to plant systems or structures. Highest

sustained winds for a 15 minute interval, 40.6 MPH at 300 feet and 21.2

MPH at 30 feet, occurred from 10 PM to 10:15 PM on September 26, 1985.

The licensee shutdown Unit 2 as a precautionary measure. Unit I was in

cold shutdown throughout the event. An unusual Event (UE) was

declared. The. Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated even though

activation was.not required by the emergency plan.

The NRC activated the Incident Response Center (IRC) in Region II and

sent additiona'. personnel to the site. Radio communications were

established between Brunswick and the IRC. Six NRC personnel were

onsite during the hurricane.

Chronology

September 26,-1985

6:00 AM National Weather Service (NWS) issues hurricane

warning for area

6:32 AM UE declared

8:16 AM . Commenced Unit 2 Reactor shutdown

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12:02 PM- Unit 2 generator off-line

4:32 PM TSC activated

5:59 PM All rods in, Unit 2 in hot shutdown

10:15 PM Maximum winds on-site

September 27, 1985

1:07 AM Deactivated TSC

6:00 AM NWS lifts hurricane warning for area

6:15 AM UE terminated

c. Shedding of Two Loads on 4160 V Emergency Bus E-2.

On September 4, 1985 at 4:49 p.m., the 2D residual heat removal pump

and the motor driven fire pump tripped while running. Some other loads

which were running did not trip. Control Room personnel observed a

momentary flash of the bus undervoltage annunciator. Investigation by

the licensee indicates that the probable cause of .the event was a

momentary drop out of a relay in the bus load shedding circuit.

Apparently the mechanical latching mechanism had been only marginally

engaged, and some vibration allowed it to open before it reclosed

again. Inspection of other similar relays revealed the same condition

existed on some of these. The licensee is currently reviewing whether

or not this might be a misapplication of the relay, GE 12HFA54E187H.

8. Main Steam Isolation Valve Solenoid Failures

Three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) failed to close during required

cold shutdown in-service testing (PT-25.1). Both valves in "C" loop (F022C

and F028C) and the outboard valve in "A" loop (F028A) failed to close. The

failure occurred at 11 PM on September 27,.1985. Preliminary evaluation

points to a ~ problem with the ASCO solenoid-operated air pilot valves Model

No. NP8323A36E. The licensee has pulled all three solenoid valves from the.

MSIV's that failed to close plus the solenoid valve for a MSIV (F022A) which

closed ratisfactorily during testing.

Degradation of the ethylene propylene seats and 0-rings was discovered upon

valve disassembly. The F028C solenoid valve has been sent to ASCO for

analysis. The remaining Unit 2 valves along with the apparent foreign

matter discovered in the valves, and Unit 1 valves installed in 1983 and

removed in 1984, have been sent to the Harris energy center for analysis.

This item will remain Unresolved pending problem resolution and further NRC

follow-up: MSIV Solenoid Valve Failures (324/85-33-02).