ML20133Q176
| ML20133Q176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1985 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133Q165 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-85-33, 50-325-85-33, NUDOCS 8511010415 | |
| Download: ML20133Q176 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1985033
Text
---
- - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - .
.
,-
p MI
UNITED STATES
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, '
REGION li
["
-
o
g
j
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
't
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323
%,...../
Report Nos. 50-325/85-33 and 50-324/85-33
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P_. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Dochet Nos. 50-325 and 50-324
License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62
I
Facility.Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
September 1 - 30, 1985
Inspectors: J
/d[l8 !I
forQ. H.-Ruland
Date Signed
-
NW
tohe Isf
9er
.
. Gar
Date Signed
i
Approvea By:
.-
/ /) /
/d'
P. E. FreYrickson, Section Chief
Date~Sitned
~
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine safety-inspection involved 126 inspector-hours on site in
the areas of
maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational
safety verification, onsite followup of events and main steam isolation valve
.
(MSIV) solenoid failures.
Results: One violation was identified:
Failure to maintain two valves in the
open position per Technical Specification required procedure OP-46; paragraph 7a.
One unresolved item was identified:
Main steam isolation valve solenoid
failures; paragraph 8.
8511010415 851021
ADOCK 05000324
G
--
.
..
.
- _ _______ ___ __-.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
~
4
.
..
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licen'see Employees
.P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
T. Wyllie, Manager
Engineering and Construction
.G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
L. Jones, Director - QA/QC
J. Moyer, Director - Training
M.! Jones, Acting Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
- G. Cheatham,- Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
'B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support
-L. Boyer, Director
Administrative Support
V. Wagoner, Director - IPBS/Long Range Planning
C. Blackmon, Superintendent - Operations
-J. Wilcox,' Principle Engineer - Operations
.
- W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor
W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor-
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor.
R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor-(Unit 2)
R. Warden,- I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
W. Dorman,' Supervisor - QA
W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
.
.
C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit.1)
R.' Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist
,
W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
.
engineers, technicians ~, operators, office personnel, and security force
members.
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
Thel inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 1,1985 with
.
the general 1 manager.
The licensee acknowledged the findings without
- exception.
The violation described in paragraph .7a was discussed in
. detail. .The licensee did -not identify as proprietary any of the materials
,
-provided to or reviewed by'the inspectors during the inspection.
.
E-' .
. .
.
.
.
.
'2
,
k
3.
Followup;on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
- 4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to
verify that~ work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, .
Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards.
The
inspectors also verified that:
redundant components were operable:
administrative controls were.followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel.were
qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological ^ controls were
proper; fire protection was adequate; QC hold points were adequate and
observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent
verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently
verified that_ selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests and authorizations (WR&A) were reviewed to ensure-
that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5.
_ Surveillance Observation (61726)
.The ' inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications.
Through . observation and record review, the inspectors-
verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;
administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instru-
mentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete.
The
inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to
service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
1 MST-RHR26R
RHR CS LO REACTOR PRESS PERMISSfVE INST CHAN CAL'
'2 MST-RHR22M
RHR-LPCI ADS CS LL3, HPCI RCIC LL2 DIV I TR UNIT CHAN
PT-1.1.12P
MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION CHANNEL ALIGNMENT AND
-FUNCTIONAL TEST
PT-4.1.6P-
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM AIR SAMPLING.
SYSTEM & WASTE GAS EFFLUENT MONITORS-
- No violations or deviations were identified.
E.
.
.
3
'
,,
.
'6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors' verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct
observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The-inspect' ors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR
'
~
50.54 ? and the Technical Specifications were met.
Control room, shift
supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain
information'concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to
ensure tha.t there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting
~ Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of . control
room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to
verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification
limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity
of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of
-
selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected ESF train was verified by insuring that: _each
accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power
supply . and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for
components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from
those'ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications,
was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper
lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which
might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional
requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
operable .by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve
lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that- the licensee's health physics policies / pro-
cedures were followed.
This included a review of area surveys, radiation
work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
~The inspectors verified.that: the security organization was properly manned
-
and that security personnel were capable of performing their assigned
functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the.
protected area (PA); vehicles were. properly authorized, searched and
escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification
badges; -personnel- in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory
measures were employed when. required; and security's response to threats or
alarms was adequate.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position
of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified
the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
No violations or deviations were identified.
-
.
.
.
4
~
.
7.
Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
a.
Reactor Scram
On September 4, 1985 at 4:26 a.m., Unit 2 was manually scrammmed from
100*l, power. The manual scram was initiated by the control operator
after he observed that: 1) the SCRAM PILOT AIR HEADER PRESSURE HI/ LOW
annunciator was lit; 2) multiple (>20) rod drift indications were lit;
and 3) two blue control
od scram lights on the full core display were
lit.
The manual scram required by the rod drift annunciator procedure
.was initiated within 6 seconds of the first rod drift alarm. The High
Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (RCIC) system auto started but did not inject.
Reactor feed
pump response to the water level shrink resulted in filling the vessel
to the turbine trip setpoints. Both'feedpump turbines and the HPCI and
RCIC turbines tripped on high level. Attempts to manually start RCIC
failed due to high exhaust pressure trip.
The HPCI system was
subsequently started to control vessel -level until the A reactor
feedpump was returned to service and normal shutdown was commenced.
Reactor pressure was controlled during the event by the turbine bypass
system.
Actions taken were in accordance with emergency procedure
E0P-01 (scrau recovery).
The low scram pilot valve air header pressure resulted from an
auxiliary operator (AO) inadvertently closing the air supply valves to
the header.
In preparation to perform maintenaace instruction MI
10-504B on check valve 2-SA-V53, the A0 was aligning valves in
accordance with clearance No. 2-1107. The clearance instructed him to
close valves 2-SA-V301 and V302 over motor control centar 2XM.
The
valves in this location were actually the header air supply valves,
RNA-V202 and V203, and were labeled as such.
The A0 dressed out,
climbed up to the area, incorrectly read the valve numbers and closed
the valves.
Air leaks in the header resulted in the low pressure
condition and subsequent. drifting in of control rods.
Operating procedure OP-46 requires the RNA-V202 and V203 valves to be
in the open position.
Equipment control procedures required by
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33
dated November 1972, as implemented by 0I-13, require all valves be
maintained in the position required by the OP valve lineup. Closure of
the valves was a failure to maintain the valves in their OP lineup.
This is-a violation (324/85-33-01).
During -review of safety system response to the event, the licensee
concluded that all ESF functions performed as designed. However,
certain items required review.
HPCI and RCIC turbines received a start signal but water level
recovered before the injection valves received all their open'
permissives.
The injection valve logics require the low water level
signal to be present at least until position switches sense that the
m
%
2.t
.;..
5
.
turbine steam admission valves have begun to open.
The computer
generated trip log confirms the low level two did occur for only a
relatively short time. Hence, these systems performed as designed.
.The subsequent failure of. RCIC was due to _ a malfunctioning pressure
switch. This.was repaired and the system returned to service prior to
restart. The. starting of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system with
no Group I isolation was investigated by the licensee. Low water level
is the most probable cause of the SBGT actuation. However, this same
-level . instrument'also supplies a trip signal to the Group I isolation
logic.
The licensee believes that the water level transient belov the
double low level.was so fast that the SBGT logic sealed-in hao +ime to
function but 'the seal-in of the Group I did not. Review of the logic
components indicate additional contacts and larger relay coils exist in
the Group I logic than in the SBGT logic. To verify correct operation
of components which would normally actuate on double low level but did
not, the licensee performed the functional surveillance tests on these
. systems.
.
Proper operation of the Group I function was verified by performance of
MST PCIS21M. - Proper operation of the ATWS (anticipated. transient
without scram) recirculation pump trip was verified by MST ATWS21M.
Unit 2. resuned power operation on September 5,1985. The licensee
plans to conduct additional testing on the SBGT and Group I isolation
logics.to acurately measure the time differenc between the logics.
b.
Hurricane Gloria
The center of Hurricane Gloria passed within 125 miles of the site.
The hurricane caused no damage to plant systems or structures. Highest
sustained winds for a 15 minute interval, 40.6 MPH at 300 feet and 21.2
MPH at 30 feet, occurred from 10 PM to 10:15 PM on September 26, 1985.
The licensee shutdown Unit 2 as a precautionary measure. Unit I was in
cold shutdown throughout the event.
An unusual Event (UE) was
declared. The. Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated even though
activation was.not required by the emergency plan.
The NRC activated the Incident Response Center (IRC) in Region II and
sent additiona'. personnel to the site.
Radio communications were
established between Brunswick and the IRC.
Six NRC personnel were
onsite during the hurricane.
Chronology
September 26,-1985
6:00 AM
National Weather Service (NWS) issues hurricane
warning for area
6:32 AM
UE declared
8:16 AM
. Commenced Unit 2 Reactor shutdown
_
_
n. .
.
.
,
'
6
.
12:02 PM-
Unit 2 generator off-line
4:32 PM
TSC activated
5:59 PM
All rods in, Unit 2 in hot shutdown
10:15 PM
Maximum winds on-site
September 27, 1985
1:07 AM
Deactivated TSC
6:00 AM
NWS lifts hurricane warning for area
6:15 AM
UE terminated
c.
Shedding of Two Loads on 4160 V Emergency Bus E-2.
On September 4, 1985 at 4:49 p.m.,
the 2D residual heat removal pump
and the motor driven fire pump tripped while running. Some other loads
which were running did not trip.
Control Room personnel observed a
momentary flash of the bus undervoltage annunciator. Investigation by
the licensee indicates that the probable cause of .the event was a
momentary drop out of a relay in the bus load shedding circuit.
Apparently the mechanical latching mechanism had been only marginally
engaged, and some vibration allowed it to open before it reclosed
again. Inspection of other similar relays revealed the same condition
existed on some of these. The licensee is currently reviewing whether
or not this might be a misapplication of the relay, GE 12HFA54E187H.
8.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Solenoid Failures
Three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) failed to close during required
cold shutdown in-service testing (PT-25.1). Both valves in
"C" loop (F022C
and F028C) and the outboard valve in "A" loop (F028A) failed to close. The
failure occurred at 11 PM on September 27,.1985.
Preliminary evaluation
points to a ~ problem with the ASCO solenoid-operated air pilot valves Model
No. NP8323A36E. The licensee has pulled all three solenoid valves from the.
MSIV's that failed to close plus the solenoid valve for a MSIV (F022A) which
closed ratisfactorily during testing.
Degradation of the ethylene propylene seats and 0-rings was discovered upon
valve disassembly.
The F028C solenoid valve has been sent to ASCO for
analysis.
The remaining Unit 2 valves along with the apparent foreign
matter discovered in the valves, and Unit 1 valves installed in 1983 and
removed in 1984, have been sent to the Harris energy center for analysis.
This item will remain Unresolved pending problem resolution and further NRC
follow-up: MSIV Solenoid Valve Failures (324/85-33-02).