ML20132E225
| ML20132E225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1985 |
| From: | Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132E194 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-85-20, NUDOCS 8508010743 | |
| Download: ML20132E225 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1985020
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-416/85-20
Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.: 50-416
License No.:
Facility Name: Grand Gulf
Inspection Cond c 4 May 18 - June 15, 1985
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Inspectors:
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R. C.
'er, Senior Residtint Inspector
Date Signed
, LeLAJ~
'ha Isr
J.L.Calfell
Resident I#spector
Date Signed
Approved by:
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y [,./f [
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V'. V:' Tantfeia', Sectron Chief
D/tF61'gned
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection entailed 150 resident inspector-hours at the site
in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation,
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Surveillance Observation, ESF System Walkdown, Reportable Occurrences, Operating
Reactor Events, Design, Design Changes and Modifications, Startup Testing, and
Independent Inspection.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were
identified in six areas; two apparent violations were found in two areas.
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8500010743 850711
ADOCK 05000416
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- J. E. Cross, General Manager
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- C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance
- R. F. Rogers, Technical Assistant
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- J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
D. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
R. H. McAnulty, Electrical Superintendent
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R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent
- B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
- W. Russell, Assistant, Operations Superintendent
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- L. G. Temple, Assistant, I&C Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security
force members, and office personnel.
NRC Inspector
- W. K. Poertner
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 14, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify
as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
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inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee had no comment on the
following inspection findings:
a.
Violation (50-416/85-20-01), two examples (1) inadequate procedure
resulting in a reactor scram; (2) inadequate procedure resulting in
failure to perform a safety evaluation
paragraph 10.
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b.
Violation (50-416/85-20-02), failure to follow procedures for valve
lineups
paragraph 11.
c.
Inspector Followup Item (50-416/85-20-03), revise startup procedure to
reflect Technical Specification limits
paragraph 12.
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3.
Licensee Action un Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Operational Safety-Verification (71707)
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The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
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visited at least daily.when an inspector was on site. Observation included
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems;
tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;
adherence to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in
effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and
access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
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Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable.
The
confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path
alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,
lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation.
General plant tours were ccqducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
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of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside
areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-
tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant
conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress;
radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification
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systems; and containment isolation.
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In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
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During the report period, the inspector observed selected maintenance
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
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adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical
Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and
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adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
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In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Surveillance Testing Observation (61726)
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The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances.
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observation included a
3 view of the procedure for technical adequacy,
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conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument-
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calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal
from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and
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review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
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In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the Standby
Service Water system in the basin and standby diesel generator areas. The
walkdown consisted of an inspection and verification, where possible, of the
required system valve alignment, including valve power available and valve
locking, where required; instrumentation valved in and functioning;
electrical and instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials,
jumpers and evidence of rodents; and system free from other degrading
conditions.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reportable Occurrence (90712 and 92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with
plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by
an asterisk.
The LERs were reviewed using the guidance of the general
policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions. The following LERs are
closed.
LER No.
Report Date
Event
83-80
10-11-83
Problems with Control Room
HVAC Systems
83-82
08-01-83
Valid Failure of Division I
Standby Diesel Generator
83-103
08-23-83
Shutdown Cooling Isolation
Due to Spurious Isolation Trip
83-156
11-02-83
Capscrew Securing Division I
Diesel Generator Starting Air
Manifold to is Support Plate
Found Broken
- 83-179
12-06-83
Division II Diesel Generator
Shutdown Due to Fuel Line Leak
- 83-191
01-11-84
Standby Fresh Air Unit A
Inadvertently Secured When Being
Used To Meet Action Statement of
- 83-192
01-23-84
Failure To Adequately Perform a
12 Hour Channel Check
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- 83-53
03-10-83
Electrical Penetrations Opened
For Planned Maintenance
Activity
- 83-162
11-14-83
Drywell Pressure Instrumentation
Readings Exceed Allowable Values
of Technical Specifications
LER 83-179 is associated with violation 83-56-02 which was reviewed and
closed in Inspection Report 84-16.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
10. Operating Reactor Events (93702)
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor
scrams. The review included determination of cause, safety significance,
performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors
examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal
entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations maintenance and
engineering support personnel as appropriate.
Scram No. 23 occurred on April 14, 1985, with the reactor operating at 73%
of rated core thermal power. At the time of the scram, Instrumentation and
Control (I&C) Technicians were attempting to calibrate main steam line flow
instruments per Maintenance Procedure (MP) 07-S-53-C34-4 as a prerequisite
to Startup Test Procedure SU-25-3.
The MP had been recently changed to
require the reactor feed pump control to be placed in manual and the lifting
of an input lead from the steam flow instrumentation to the vessel level
instrumentation to prevent level changes during the calibration.
The
lifting of this input lead resulted in a large drop in sensed vessel level
at the recirculation pump controls causing the recirculation pumps to
transfer back to the Low Frequency Motor Generator (LFMG) Set.
The
resulting reduction in recirculation flow, power level and steam flow
combined with the feed pump controls in manual caused vessel level to
increase above the high level scram setpoint, automatically scramming the
reactor. The engineering review of the procedure change noted above was
inadequate in that it failed to realize the magnitude of the sensed level
change to the recirculation pump controls.
This review resulted in the
performance of an inadequate procedure which caused a reactor scram.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V states that activities affecting quality.
shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a
type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance
with these instructions, procedures or drawings.
Failure to provide an adequate
procedure will be identified as violation (50-416/85-20-01).
Also during the review of the procedure change the inspector discovered that
the safety evaluation applicability screening required by Plant Administrative
Procedure 01-S-06-24 was incorrectly performed.' This screening is performed
to determine if a safety evaluation is required. The screening procedure
asks four questions and, if any of the four questions-are answered yes, then
a safety evaluation form (Attachment I of Procedure 01-S-06-24) would be
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required to be filled out. The first question, " changes to the facility as
described in the FSAR", was incorrectly answered.
Discussions with the
personnel involved indicated that per their interpretation, procedure
01-S-06-24 did not require a safety evaluation for the lifting of the steam
flow input to the reactor vessel water level controller since it was being
lifted for calibration purposes only.
The failure to perform a safety
evaluation was due to an inadequate procedure and will be identified as the
second example of violation (50-416/85-20-01).
11.
Independent Inspection (92706)
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On June 6,1985, while performing a routine startup, operators noticed an
increasing temperature in the steam tunnel followed by an alarm indicating
the steam tunnel blow out panels had opened. An investigation revealed the
blow out panels to be closed but there appeared to be a steam leak in the
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tunnel.
The subsequent shutting of valve ES1-F063, the RCIC/RHR Steam
Supply inboard isolation valve isolated the leak.
The licensee discovered
two 3/4" test connection isolation valves Q1E51F207 and Q1E51F208 open. An
investigation by the licensee disclosed that these valves had been last
-operated in support of a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) 06-ME-1M61-V-0001 on
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valve Q1E51F076. The LLRT Valve Lineup Procedure 09-S-08-2 Attachment XIV
had been completed subsequent to the LLRT indicating that these valves had
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been independently verified in the closed position prior to the reactor
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startup. In interviews conducted by the licensee the operators responsible
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for closing .these valves stated that they attempted to close these valves
but found the valves already in the closed position. The licensee suggests
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that these valves were backseated open while they were still hot and had
cooled off causing them to stick on their backseat when the attempt to close
them was made. The licensee is looking into procedures for ensuring that
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valves are verified in their required positions. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures shall be established, implemented and
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maintained. The failure of the licensee to ensure valve lineup procedure
09-S-08-2 Attachment XIV was correctly completed will be identified as a
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violation of T.S.6.8.1 (50-416/85-20-02).
12.
Startup Testing (72530C and 72528C)
The inspector observed all or part of the conduct, or preparation for
conduct, of the below listed startup procedures and operations.
The
observation included ' a review of the procedure for meeting all test
prerequisites, initial conditions, test equipment and calibration require-
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ments. The overall crew performance was observed to ensure that minimum
crew requirements were being met,' that appropriate revised procedures were
in use, that crew actions appeared to be correct and timely, that all data
was collected by the proper personnel for final analysis, and that quick
summary analysis showed proper plant response to the test.
Where test
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results were available, in preliminary or final form, they were verified to
be consistent with observations or that overall test acceptance criteria had
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been met.
1-000-SU-27-6-
GENERATOR LOAD REJECTION
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1-821-SU-25-6
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The inspector reviewed the Reactor Startup of June 6,1985. The licensee
pulled critical while RHR Loop A was in the shutdown cooling mode of
operation. Grand Gulf Technical Specifications allows one loop of RHR to be
aligned for shutdown cooling for training startups provided the reactor
vessel is not pressurized, thermal power is less than or equal to 1% of
rated thermal power and reactor coolant temperature is less than 200 F.
The licensee placed RHR Loop A in shutdown cooling after placing the mode
switch in startup to reduce coolant temperature so that the Rod Criticality
data could be obtained at a coolant temperature of less than 150 F in order
to determine core thermal margins as requested by General Electric.
The inspector reviewed Integrated Operating Instruction (101) 03-1-01-1,
Cold Shutdown to Generator Carrying Minimum Load, interviewed management and
operations personnel and reviewed applicable logs and chart recorders to
determine if the licensee had violated Technical Specifications or applic-
able plant procedures.
The inspector determined that 10I-03-1-01-1 addresses a startup with
shutdown cooling in operation, however the procedure does not address the
action statement of Technical Specification 3.10.5 which requires that the
mode switch be placed in the shutdown position if the reactor vessel is
pressurized, thermal power exceeds 1% or coolant temperature exceeds 200 F.
Interviews with operations personnel determined they were aware of the
Technical Specification requirements and the action required if any of the
above parameters were exceeded. The licensee committed to referencing the
requirements of Technical Specification 3.10.5 in their procedure to ensure
the operators are aware of the requirements. Until incorporated this will
be identified as an Inspector Followup Item (85-20-03).
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
13. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)
During Startup Test 1-000-SU31-2, Loss of T-G and Offsite Power, a
deficiency was noted in that manual valve P41-F175A was closed by an
operator when offsite power was lost, a post test review revealed that
previous experience had shown that whenever Plant Service Water (PSW) was
shut down, the Standby Service Water (SSW) basin experienced a loss of
80 gpm due to siphoning of water back through the PSW supply header. The
licensee incorporated administrative controls to keep valve P41-175A closed,
except when filling the SSW basin, as an interim fix. The licensee has now
incorporated a Design Change Package (83/0316, Revision 0) which provides an
open vent path to ensure a vacuum breaker exists. The inspectors reviewed
the installation of DCP 83/0316 and verified, where possible the installa-
tion was complete, the proper procedural controls were followed, and the
change was appropriately reviewed and approved.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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