ML20126L861
| ML20126L861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1985 |
| From: | Brownlee V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8506200160 | |
| Download: ML20126L861 (2) | |
Text
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M MAY 2 81985 Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. L. Stewart, Vice President Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT - NORTH ANNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF NOVEMBER 15, 1984 Enclosed is a copy of correspondence received from FEMA forwarding their evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness for the North Anna exercise which was conducted on November 15, 1984. As described in the enclosure, FEMA has identified an apparent offsite deficiency that needs to be resolved.
We understand that the identified item may have already been resolved or is in the process of being resolved. We encourage your continued assistance to the Commonwealth of Virginia and Louisa County to correct the deficiency noted by FEMA before the next full scale exercise. At that time, all pertinent areas will be re-evaluated, and the results used by the NRC in any decisions per-taining to the adequacy of the state of emergency preparedness at the North Anna site.
We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will test as many of the areas as practical in which the previously identified deficiencies were found.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely, i
Viril L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Memorandum from R. W. Krimm to E. L. Jordan, dated May 1,1985, with attachment 3
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J. I. Oatts, Chief Operating Officer W. S. Mistr, Manager. Security E. H. Harrell, Station Manager 8506200160 850528 ADOCK 0 % 338 PDR
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bec: NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk Comonwealth of Virginia l
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.v-MAY l MEMORANDUM FOR:
Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM:
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Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Exercise Evaluation Report on the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise at the North Anna Power Station Attached are two copies of the Exercise Evaluation Report for the November 15,.
1984, exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the North Anna Power Station.
The exercise report dated January 18, 1985, was prepared by the Region III staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Also attached is a copy of the corrective action schedule submitted by the Commonwealth of Virginia.
The exercise report cites a Category A deficiency for Louisa County which resulted from the failure of the Louisa County Acting Coordinator of Emergency Services to cont.act the State Emergency Operations Center (E0C) for clarification of the Governor's evacuation order, thus, resulting in a 35-minute delay in implementing the protective action.
The confusion resulted from differences in the onsite and offsite scenarios during the General Emergency phase of the exercise, which caused I.ouisa County Officials to reach an inappropriate decision on implementing the protective action.
Exercise participants had agreed during exercise design to run a separate onsite and offsite scenario during part of the exercise in order to generate evacuation actions in all jurisdictions.
However, for a period of time Louisa County continued to play on the basis of the onsite scenario. Thus, the noted Category A deficiency'was artificially created by the scenarios and exercise control failures.
A remedial exercise will not be required for the Category A deficiency since the Commonwealth of Virginia and Louisa County have committed to proper coordination in the future which should alleviate confusion in implementing protective action recommendations.
In light of the schedule of corrective actions submitted for the Category A and B deficiencies, there is reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be implemented by offsite authorities in the event of an accident at the North Anna Power Station.
Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted by FEMA on February 23, 1983, will remain in effect.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachment As Stated w M M 'YL m
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Region III 105 South 7th Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 February 11, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief Technological Hazards Division ATTENTION:
Gloria Joyner n
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FROM:
James R. Asher, Chairman Regional Assistance Co::ni ee
SUBJECT:
North Anna Exercise Corrective Actions Enclosed for your information is a copy of the follow-up response, as pro-vided by the Comonwealth of Virginia, in clarifying proposed and completed corrective actions for deficiencies [recomendations identified during the North Anna Power Station REP Exercise conducted on November 15, 1984.
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COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA Department ofEmergency Services mm aswron.n February 4, 1985 YM Mr. James R. Asher Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III Sixth and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Dear Mr. Asher:
This is.in reply to your letter dated January 21 concerning our comments on the North Anna Power Station Exercise Report.
We provide the following statements to clarify our previous response.
Item 12 V
On January 3, 1985, the State Department of Emergency services initiated a telephone conversation with the Caroline County coordinator of Emergency' Services concerning exercise deficiencies and proposed corrective actions.
The Coordinator agreed, on this date, to seek information from the State EOC on ingestion pathway protective actions in the absence of information being made available from the State.
As regards this item, the State Deputy Director of Operations in the State EOC has agreed to cause on-going status reports of emergency / exercise activities to be provided to local governments in the plume and ingestion exposure pathways.
This corrective action has already been taken.
Date:
January 3, 1985.
Item 2ft Spotsylvania County has agreed to clearly demonstrate route alerting and route alerting procedures during future exercises and to assure that the assigned federal representative observes this action.
This corrective action was discussed and agreed to'on
' January 2, 1985.
. Mr.' James R. Asher Page Two
-February 4,1985 The following is the revised projected dates for completion of the noted corrective actions:
1 Category & -
Item 1
- December 1984 - January 1985 category 3 Item 1 - January 1985.
Item 2 - In process.
Item 3 - Under discussion; October 1985.
' Item 4 - On-going training being provided.
i Item 5 - On-going training being provided.
. Item 6 - On-going training being provided.
Item 7 - Under discussion; meeting held January 1985.
Item 8 - In process; October 1985.
Item 9 - On-going. training being provided; recordkeeping cards / sheets emphasized.
Item 10 - Under discussion; meeting held December 1984.
It.em 11 - Discussed and agreed.
January 8,1985.
Item 12 - See statement above.
Item 13 - Action taken; January 1985.
Item 14 - Discussed; January 1985.
Item 15 - Discussed; January 1985.
y Item 16 - Discussed; January 1985; plans being developed.
Item 17 - Discussed; January 1985; prescribed message format being developed.
Item 18 - On-going training being provided; January 1985.
Item 19 - On-going training being provided; January 1985.
Item 20 - On-going training being provided; January 1985.
Item 21 - In process; prescribed message format being developed.,
Item 22 - Discussed and agreed; December 1984.
Item 23 - Under discussion; installation scheduled for June 1985.
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Item 24 - Discussed; January 1985.
Item 25 - On-going training.being provided.
Item 26 - See statement above.
Item 27 - Discussed; December 1984; revised plans being developed.
Item 28 - Discussed; December 1984; plans in place.
Item 29 - Training in progress; January 1985.
Item 30 - Discussed; January 1985; staff currently reviewing procedures.
Item 31 - Refresher training provided December 1984; monthly tests of the computer network to include hardcopy. transmission of information
.is being scheduled with local governments.
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Mr..Jcmas R. Asher Page Three February 4,1985 Item 32 - Discussed at a January 1985 training session; on-going training for field deployment' is being provided.
Item 33 - Discussed; January 1985.
Item 34 - Discussed; December 1984; new location under study.
Itep 35 - Discussed; January 1985; Coordinator has made provision to effectively employ status board in exercises and/or emergencies.
Item 36 - Antennae cable work has been scheduled; January 1985.
Item 37 - Discussed; January 1985; plans underway to accommodate press representatives in Hanover media briefing room.
Item 3 8 - Corrective action will be discussed with local government officials and other principal parties at a meeting scheduled for February 1985.
Item 39 - The North Anna Computer Network, as of January 1985, is in place, operational, and has been tested; will be used to provide the exchange of hardcopy news releases.
Item 40 - Discussed; December 1984.. County currently y
making provision to utilize a status board in the EOC.
Item 41 - Orange County has requisitioned appropriate communications links to be installed between the two facilities; January 1985.
Item 42 - This item was discussed at a December 1984 meeting; arrangements.have been made to relocate message center.
Item 43 - Discussed at the December 1984 meeting; message logs were reviewed for deletion of non-essential information; new procedures being discussed with message journal clerks.
Item 44 - On-going training will be provided to all EOC and EAC personnel; discussed and scheduled at the December 1984 meeting.
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l Should you have any questions concerning this subject or any of the above information, please feel free to call me.
Sincerely, p)
W at j
rge O'N. Urq nr ief, Radiolog ca Planning Branch GOl'/na s t
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REGION III January 21, 1985-Mr. George Urquhart Department of Emergency Services 310 Turner Road
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Dear Mr. Urquhart:
This is to formally acknowledge receipt of your written response to the North Anna Power Station Exercise Evaluation Report for the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on November 15, 1984.
The proposed corrective actions and projected completion dates for each of the listed deficiencies and reco==endations have been reviewed and, in general, ap' ear to satisfactorily resolve the identified concerns.
p In addition, due to the nature of,the Category A deficiency identified in Louisa County, and with the understanding that subsequent contact with Louisa County officials has indicated that in the future the County will respond to protective action directions received from the State in a ticely canner, it has been determined that a re=edial exercise or drill will not be necessary in order to correct this deficiency.
However, your assistance in clarifying the following concerns is requested.
1.
The proposed corrective action for the Category B deficiency numbered 12 does not indicate definitive actions to be taken to avoid the recurrence of this deficiency in future exercises.
2.
Although it is reported under Corrective Action numbered 26 that route alerting procedures were demonstrated by Spotsylvania County, the federal observer's report of activities and exercise logs and message forcs do not indicate the dispatch of, contact with, or completion of route alerting activities.
It is reco== ended that the next full-scale exercise scenario for jurisdictions surrounding the North Anna Power Station ensures the completion of route alerting procedures in Spotsylvania County to permit the focused federal observation of the activation.
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In genefal,'the projected dates for all of the corrective actions should be reviewed so as to indicate the date of projected completion of each activity, and revised as necessary.
Your contin' ed assistance and cooperation in resolving the recommendations u
and deficiencies raised during this exercise are appreciated.
Please provide your response to the above listed items to my attention at your earliest convenience, but not later than February 15,1985.
Sincerely, C' 1 m)LCD '
LL t.k James R. Asher
,,/ Chairman Regional Assistance Committee h
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l COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA A. E. SLAYToN, JR.
OrparlmcMl0/ Emergency Services 3io r,n., Road Acting State Coordinator Richmond, Virginia 232254491 January 7,1985 Mr. James R. Asher Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III Sixth and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Dear Jim:
This is in reply to your letter dated December 18, 1984, which' transmitted the Exercise Evaluation Report (draft) for the' North Anna Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on November 15, 1984.
We have reviewed the interim report and, with few exceptions, accept its recommendations.
Copies of the report were distributed to major exercise participants who were invited to comment on their respective elements.
A consolidated response of comments and a schedule of corrective actions to identified deficiencies / recommendations is attached.
Should you have any questions on this submittal, please contact George Urquhart (804-323-2846).
Sincerely',
A. E. Sla r.
AESjr/GOU/nas Attachment cc:
NAPS Area Local Governments M. M. Cline C. C. Sawtelle, Jr.
J. L. Tribble O
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a, Attachment The following sheets list the numbered deficiencies /recomendations contained in Pages 47-61 of the NAPS draft Exercise Evaluation Report and State corrective comments and projected date of response.
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SUP9tARY OF CATEGORY "A" DEF.ICIENCY Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correct 1'on Date i
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Louisa County i
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After receiving the Governor's J.9 1.
The tousu county acting coordinator or E.ersency services and his Mhy '868 evacuation directive which EOC staff s
Deputy, upon receiving the Covernor's evacuation directive.
pertelved to be inappropriate County proceeded to discuss this proclamation with oembers of the I
s off1Clals failed to Contact the State personnel. "This directive was also disc sesed with the I***
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EOC for clarification resulting in a state's Acting negionai Coordinator. The point of
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s thirty-fIVe RInute delay in implement {ng diu mim: Now m it pmible fu um in Loulu 3
the protective action.
In order to County to be affected by the radiological incident at the assure a coordinated response thus MAPS when, up to the time of the order, reports from the po er statsoa consistatly showed wind and plume pathway s
minimizing public confusion County
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- s offlCIals should Contact the State E0C in adjacent jurisdistions were also called to discuss this
.atter.
It was.oon discovered by toutsa that all other promptly regarding questions on directions julsdictions within the ten-elle EPZ were directing or instructions and protective actions p ecun ion in a cordance with the directive from the State e
E0C. As soon as these reports were received. Louisa should be Completed on a timely basis.
county officials tunediately ordered evacuation for the "affected" portions of the County.
The major cause of the delay in implementing the directive l
was that the 18ApS technical scenario and the scenario for off-site authorities, which called for evacuation out to ten miles in all directions differed during the General Emergency Phase. The dual scenario was required to cause sufficient plan implementation and maximum participation in all jurisdictions, regardless of wind direction and other plant-generated data.
i la the tuturg jurisdictions will toplement protective
. actions based on the exercise scenario. State directives or best available information. Also, every effort will be made to ensure that any confusion caused by dual scenarios will be minimized.
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- Scheduled date for the next joint full; scale,
exercise of NAPS.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Commonwealth of Virginia 1.
The State Operations Officer should E.5
- 1. Every effort will be made to ensure that May '86 ensure that all documents concerning the Governor's Proclamation of Emergency protective actions, to include the conforms with current protective action Governor's Proclamation of Onergency, conform with current protective action ~
recommendations / decisions.
recommende.. lons/ decisions.*-
2.
The need for heightened coordination E.5
- 2. An abbreviated radiological status condi-May '85 cnd sharing of information received by J.9 tions form is being developed for use with the BRH at the State EOC should be the North Anna Computer Network system.
emphasized with BRH staff. Updates to This will facilitate the transmission of rcdlological/ meteorological conditions more frequent and timely information to should be immediately forwarded to the appropriate agencies and organizations.
cppropriate individuals / organization.
3.
Consunication to the Counties regarding E.5
- 3. We agree that future exercises should May '86 the timing of the simulated EBS and stren F.1.b.
include an actual demonstration of the activation was belated, and no advance activation of the siren and EBS systems.
coordination with the primary siren activation point was demonstrated.
Future cxercises should actually demonstrate cctivation of the stren and EBS systems.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date 4
The Department'of State Police K.3.a.
- 4. This observation resulted from an isolated May '85 should ensure that all police department K.3.b.
incident. The Department of State Police emergency workers are issued TLDs and has issued TLDs and record keeping cards to instructed to maintain record keeping all emergency workers. Also, all State ca rds.
(See Louisa Coun.ty report.)
Police emergency workers have received instructions on the use of instruments ar.d Stnte/ Local Radiological Monitoring Teams record keeping.
1
'5 Field teams should be briefed with regard J.9
- 5. In the future, we will ensure that the May '86 to meteorological conditions by the EOF EOF will include meteorological conditions
~ prior to their deployment to the field.
in field team briefings prior to their deployment into the field.
6.
Additional training should be provided K.3.a.
to team members with regard to decon-0.4.c.
- 6. On-going training will be continued with May '86 tamination procedures, maximum dose regard to decontamination procedures, allowed without authorization, and maximum dose allowed without authorization, instructions regarding procedures to be and instructions regarding procedures to fbilowed if dose limits are exceeded.
be fo11 cued if dose limits are exceeded.
7.
Communications should be maintained F.1. d.
- 7. We will ensure that radio contact is May '85 between the field teams and the EOF maintained to improve communications throughout the course of the exercise between field teams and the EOF. Also, 7
as to team locations, plant conditions, we will increase our frequency of contact etc.
with field teams and the EOF.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Agricultural Sampling Team 8.
Field sampling teams should be providsd F.1.d.
- 8. Two-way radios for field sampling teams May '86 with two-way radios in their vehicles is currently being scheduled for installation to permit the timely exchange of in order to permit the timely exchange of in formation.
information.
9.
Recording keeping cards should be K.3.a.
- 9. Record keeping cards will be issued to May '86 issued to sampling teams members along K.3.b.
sampling team members as recommended.
with other dosimetry equipment.
News Media Center 10.
The Department of Emergency Services E.5
- 10. The Department of Emergency Services May '86 and Public Information staff should re-G.4.b.
lP anning, operations, and public informa-View information flow processes to the News tion staff and the licenseg have met and Media Center to ensure the timely trans-reviewed information flow processes to mission of information regarding plant the News Media Center to ensure the timely
- status, transmission of information regarding plant status.
Caroline County 11.
One access point to the EOC designed for J.10.J.
- 11. Security to all EOC access points will be
.May '86 cse by the media was laft unmonitored for Pro,vided by local government.
an extended length of time. Arrangements should be made to prevent this in future cxercises.
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Proj'd Defic f ency/RecanseendatIon Part !I
-Correc tion Date
- 12. The State E0C did not initiate any J.9
- 12. In the event the state Roc does not May '86 discussion with the County regarding J.11 initiate transmittal of information ingestion pathway protection actions.
regarding the ingestion pathway protec-In the absence of such State initiative, tion actions, local government should the County should have squght Informatfon neck out information.
l concerning the Ingestion pathwy.
13.
Protective clothing was not available to K.3.a.
- 13. named on the excetne, the county han May '86 County emergency. workers in the ffeld.
'retodated i.ome p.catective clothina to some of this type equipment, which is the I.adynetth Rescue squad nutiding l
cvallable at the County EOC, should be which in located to mile from the power Prepositioned at a more convenfent station in Caroline Cototy--just outside location.
the plume EPZ.
Hanover County
- gl4 Security should be more fully J.10.J.
- 14. Adequate necurity was demonstrated at May '86 demonstrated during future esercles.
the EoC with a person positioned adjacent to the "stan-in" sheet at the Eoc 15.
Elected officials should take a more A.2.a.
entrance. Other acccan doors were locl+t active role in future exercises.
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- 15. Elected County officialm will be urged to
,May '86 16.,
If the County continues to use the r.l.d.
he present at future exercimen.
cperations room used in this and past N.5 caertIses, a drop off for the Instaphone
- 16. Hanover County plans to construct a May '86 cad additional telephone Ifnes should be ruhtte Factttty nutIdinn in FYn7 which Installed at the E0C.
It fs noted that this will include a communicatione center.
was an Identifled deficiency In the denlaned to effectively addreas the O.
- previous enercise.
concerna for adequate telephone lines '
and inntaphone.
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v SUf9WUtY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference
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NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction I
Date
- 17. The E0C staff need'to better develop E.5
- 17. For future exercises, a prepared May '86 their plans for route alerting. The E.6 prescribed statement will be developed EMC is unaware of how many vehicles J.10.c.
to be broadcast by teams involved in would be needed or the path that they route alerting. Such messagee will alert would take Also, a general, prescripted residents to tune into their EBS station.
message saould be developed that these '
Also plans for route alerting will be these teams will broadcast. -It is further refined as r.eeded, reconnended that they alert residents to tune to their EBS station.
- 18. The RADEF Officer should refamiliarize 0.1 sharpen County workers familiarity with J.9
- 18. on-going training will continue to May '86 himself with the procedures established for emergency worker radiological established procedures for emergency exposure control.
worker radiological exposure control.
19.
E ;. vency workers should be fully briefed J.9
- 19. Emergency workers will continue to be May '86 en the maximun dose allowable without K.4 breifed on the maximum dose allowable authorization.
O.4.g.
without authorization through an on-going training program.
Lexisa County
- 20. Some emergency workers observed in the J.9 20.'There will be an increased emphasis May '86 field were unfaelliar with the radiation K.4 placed on training of emergency cuposure limit..Faergency workers should 0.4.g.
w rkers including training in radiation be fully briefed on the maximum dose exposure limits and maximum dose allowable without authorization.
allowable procedures.
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StNetARY OF CATEGORY "B^* DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Deficiency / Recommendation Proj'd Part II Correction Date
- 21. Route alerting teams simulated broad-
.E.5
- 21. The County will develop a prescribed May.'86 ccsting a message which, according to E.6 message instructing residents to tune County officials, would have advised to their EBS station for further residents to evacuate.
In the interest instructions.
of time and clarity, a general, pre-i scripted message 1s recommended.
1::structing residents to tune to their E85 station.
Spotsylvanta County
- 22. The Superintendent of Schools act as A.1.2.
- 22. In the' absence of superintendent of May '86 '
11c1 son between the EOC and EAC at the schools, an alternate representative County..After reporting to the EOC.
such as the assistant supetintendent will however, he left because of other be assigned his duties.
In this particu-commitments. This is a very important lar exercise, the EOC was adequately position tt:at should be manned to co.
staffed and the EOC coordinator made a crdinate response activities between the decision to let the superintendent leave EOC and EAC, thereby re11eving key for other duties. The EOC coordinatx decision-anakers of this additional accepted full responsibility for this f;nction.
action.
23.
It is recommended that a drop off of F.1.d.
- 23. This is presently under study, and if a June '85 the Instaphone be located in the EOC Q P off line is needed to improve Operations area which would permit
- """"I"**I "' It "III D* 'dd*d-direct connunications between the EMC and the decision-makers at the State EOC. EOF and other risk counties.
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SUNIARY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES s
~
Reference MUREG-0654 Proj'd Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date 24.
County operations staff are not aware J.10.e.
- 24. For' future exercises, the State Depart-May '86 of any protective action procedures for J.11 ment of Agriculture will continue to fcruers in the area who may request to K.4 coordinate its procedures with local reenter the EPI in order to feed and 0.1 government to ensure the protection of cllk their ifvestock. The County farmers in the area. The State Depart-Extension Agent should work with the ment of Agriculture has procedures for State Department of Agriculture to clarify contacting dairy farmers directly in cstablished procedures to protect these case of emergency.
Individuals.
- 25. Briefings to field workers should J.9
- 25. A continuing on-going training program May '86.
include procedures in the use of KI J.10.e.
by the co mty and State addresses the use cnd maximum doses allowable without K.4 of KI in times of emergencies. Procedures c,thorization.
0.4.g.
for its use and guidelines for its distribution will be refined.
- 26. The County did not demonstrate route E.5
- 26. According to County officials, routing N/A cierting procedures.
It is noted that N.5 procedures were demonstrated.
this was an identified deficiency in the previous exercise and should have been demonstrated during this exercise.
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SUf9WUtY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Deficfency/ Recommendation Proj'd Part II Correction Date
- 27. The physical layout at the entrance to K.S.b
- 27. This was the first time Spotsylvania May '8@
the EAC should be revised in order to County used Battlefield Intermediate eliminate the possibility of contaminating school as the EAC, and upon advice from
" clean
- evacuees and emergency workers.
State Radiological Health representatives, The following areas should be considered:
developed a physical layout and procedures
-contaminated evacuee area and the registra-for handling evacuees. Further refinements tion area should be set further apart; to these procedures will be forthcoming
-contaminated individuals should be based on the results of this exercise.
registered after decontamination;
-following decontamination, women should not have to pass through a contaminated area to enter the EAC.
280 At one point in the exercise, individuals J.10.J.
- 28. spotsylvania county agrees to provide were observed entering the EAC through the K.5.b.
better access control at the EAC for May '86 kitchen area. This could pose a potential exercises / emergencies.
problem during an emergency, should these individhals be contaminated. Actions should be taken to provide better access control to the EAC.
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SUfWIARY OF CATEGORY "B" REC 0f9fENDATIONS Reference
- NUREG-0654 Proj'd Deffcfency/ Recommendation Part II Correction Date Commonwealth of Virginia
- 29. Additional training should be provided 0.1
- 29. Additional training will be provided May '86 to back-up support staff responsible to back-up personnel responsible for for message handling and status board message handlina and status board updates.
updates.
30.
BRN fnfonsation handling p'rocedures
- 30. Information processing procedures will May '86 should be reviewed for possible improve-be reviewed to include the need for ment, to include the need for clarification of messages received.
clarf fication of messages received if not completely clear.
- 31. The E0C PIO should utilf re available hard G.4.b.
- 31. The EOC PIO will utilize the computer May '86 copy transmission devices (telefax, VCIN (primary means) or other available means cr the new computer network) to provide to provide the County with timely the Counties with timely Ir. formation updates.
Information updates for future exercises.
St :te/ Local Radfological Monitoring Teams 32.
It is recommended that the joint teams I.8
- 32. The joint teams will continue their May '86 capeditiously prepare for field de.
training activities to ensure rapid ployment at the staging area to allow deP oyment upon direction by the EOF l
for immediate deployment upon direction during exercises / emergencies.
from the EOF.
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,5tlHMAlly ()l' CAllr.0fty *tt* liffielHlfDAy0NS lloforenen Ntiltl.G 06S4 De fic iency/Recomendation Proj'd Part !!
Correction Udt" i
33 Consfilcration shoIsid lin maito for more 2
I.fi U countdonation will lie utvon for more Hay 'n6 esttensive use of the field teams' catenatvo uno of the flalit team'a capahlittles, f.e., the monttoring of capabtttt(ca.
aifdltional locations and a greater variety of samples, including water, soll and/or vegstation.
News Medl.a Center, 34 It is recomended that a working area
- 34. A woiking anoa will bo not antito for Plo Hay 'Mi be set aside for PID staff use, atatt uno, t o lio acpai n t eit ti om t he meit t a secluded from the media briefing area.
briettnn acca.
Carollnn County 3b All slunificant incoming and outgoing M. A atatua bonid will lie uttilseit to scroid Hay 't16 IOC messages should be logge.l.
Stunift-alnnttirant toromtna and outuotun t0C (ant on anil of f= site events, includitig mo n a nna st.
rmorgency classification levels, should be posted and updated in order to enable newly arrived staf f to spilckly orient themselves as to the status of the emergency response.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS
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Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Recommendation Part II Correction Date Hanover County 36.
The antennae cable for the RACES F.1
- 36. The antennae cable will be repaired.
May '86 equipment had been severed, requiring the RACES staff to operate from their vehicle cutside of the building, some-.
what delaying the receip,t of messages.
The antennae cable should be repaired.
37.
A larger room providing seating for J.10
- 37. Additional maps and a larger room for May '86 anticipated press representatives would media functions will be considered better accommodate media functions.
within present building constraints.
Additional maps, such as the EPZ and Note #16.
Evacuation Route maps, would be extremely helpful in accomplishing more effective briefings.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RFC(N9fENDATI0ltS i
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd
)
Deficiency /ltecomumendation Part II Correction Date 4
Louisa County 38.
County officials strongly favor using E.5
- 38. Options for sounding the sirens and EBS May '86 the stren system and EBS to provide are being considered at present with early warning to the public, preferably appropriate parties.
ct the Site Area Boergency phase. This -
does not conform to the State's policy i
of using the strens and EBS to alert cad notify the public at the time protective actions are announced.
It is recommended that County and State officials resolve this issue by developing
]
o coordinated approach towards the use of l
the stren and E85 public notification I
systems.
- 1. The capability for the exchange of hard G.4.b.
- 39. The North Anna Network system will be May '86, copy ne'ws releases among the County EOC, utilized for this function.
State EOC and the Joint Media Center was l
not available at the County.
In order to permit effective coordination of news re-j leases between the County and State PIDs.
i some means for transmitting and receiving 1
.hard copy news releases should be established
)
and used at the County EOC.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" REC (NetENDATIONS Recommendation NUREG-0654 Deficiency / Recommendation Proj'd Part II Correction Date 40.
It is recommended that a large.
clearly visible status board be utilized
- 40. Louisa County will utilize,a large, May '86 ct the County EOC.
clearly visible status board at the County EOC.
. Or^nge County 41.
It is recommended that a dedicated F.1.d.
Ifne or other direct consunication link
- 41. This recommendation for a line linking June '85 the dispatcher's office with the EOC between the Dispatcher's Office and.the vill be accomplished.
EOC be established.
, Spotsylvania County i
- 42. The EOC operations room is a somewhat
- 42. This recommendation is presently being May '86 congested area when all staff are present.
considered by County officials.
l It is reconsended that the message center be relocated to the room immediately adjacent to the operations room to alleviate some of this congestion.
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' swowir_or cAirr.ony s an.anntmentions Reference MUREG 0654 Proj'd beficiency/Recommiendation Part !!
Correction 1
lDate
- 43. ftessage center personnel maintain an
- 43. Henaane.loga will ha reviewed to.. If Hay.'86 officist copy of all messages and are they can ha atreamlined to contain responsible for maintaining the status ennential information only.
Naturally, boards and official message logs.
To the County mont decide what in eenential i,
j relleve some of the demands placed on and what tan't.
message center personnel, message logs l
should contain only essentia1 information.
l not the entire tent of the, message.
- 44. Although the staff in the [AC knew their O.4.
44' U"-aning trainina will I.a forthcoming to May '86 Individwal assignments, the inC llenager 8* Prove overall performance or y.Ac did not provide suf ficient supervis;on and P"taannel.
Note #27 renponne.
coordination to combine these Individual functions into a smoothly run l
Cperation.
The staf f were l
Infonned of the status of activities dering the esercise.
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4 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION III EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FACILITY: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION Town of Mineral, Louisa County, Virginia REPORT DATE: January 18, 1985 EXERCISE DATE: November 15, 1984 PARTICIPATING i
JURISDICTIONS: Ommnonwealth of Virginia Risk Counties of Caroline, Hanover, Louisa,
)
Drange Spotsylvania NON-PARTICIPATING j
JURISDICTIONS: None
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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s)
EXERCISE SUMMARIES.,................................................i-111 B AC K G R O U N D.......................................................... i v PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS /0RGANIZATIONS...........................V OBSERVER ASSIGNMENTS................................................vi EVALUATION CRITERIA USED............................................vii EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.................................................viii-ix SCENARIO............................................................x DEMONSTRATION OF RESOURC ES.......................................... xi PREVIOUS DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS...........................xii-xiv EXERCISE OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED................xv EXERCISE REPORTS.,................................................ 1-45 S ta t e Ac t i v i t i e s............................................ 1 - 14 Ca rol i ne Co unty Ac ti v i ti es.................................. 14-20 Ha nov e r Co unty Ac ti v i ti e s................................... 20-2 6 Lo u i s a Co u n ty Ac t i v i t i e s.................................... 2 6 - 3 2 Ora n g e Co u n ty Ac t i v i t i e s.................................... 3 3 - 3 6 Spotsylvania County Activities.............................. 36-44
SUMMARY
LIST OF DEFICIENCIES.......................................
45-60
EXERCISE St#mARIES Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
In general, activities at the State E0C were well organized and representatives from all of the organizations present demonstrated skill and knowledge in the performance of their responsibilities.
The communications capability at the State is excellent.
Increased emphasis is needed with regard to the timely transmission of radiological / meteorological information from BRR at' the E0C, to other response organizations.
Demonstrated 1
activation of the siren system and EBS is recommended in future exercises.
Emergency Operations Facility The Bureau of Radiological Health representatives at the EOF displayed I
adequate training and knowledge to carry out their assigned responsibilities. Calculations were promptly made as received from the radiological monitoring teams. All functions were performed in a prompt and professional manner and any identified problems were quickly corrected.
State / Local Radiological Monitoring Teams Four joint State and Local Radiological Monitoring Teams were deployed during this exercise.
The teams were, in general, well outfitted with required monitoring equipment and team members displayed adequate knowledge with regard to the use of the monitoring equipment available.
Instruction with regard to meteorological conditions should have been provided to the teams prior to deployment, and communication with the E0F throughout the exercise was limited. Local team members should be better instructed as to their roles on the team, especially with regard to the predesignated location of monitoring points. More effective use of the teams should be considered in future exercises, i.e., deployment to additional locations and greater variety of samples (water, soil, vegetation).
Agricultural Sampling Teams Milk and vegetation sampling teams adequately demonstrated sampling techniques, collecting both samples by 1745 and transporting the samples to the laboratory by 1900.
Team members were knowledgeable regarding the I
proper use of dosimetry equipment and KI. However, record-keeping cards should be issued to the team members along with the dosimetry equipment and two-way radios should be made availa' ale to the teams to permit timely exchange of information.
Red Cross District Office (Fredericksburg)
F The Red Cross District Office demonstrated adequate resources to support emergency response operations.
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News' Media Center
'The Public Information Officer and staff were well-trained individuals who demonstrated adequate knowledge and procedures for staffing and operation of the News Media Center.
Information regarding escalation to General Emergency was received at 1755, nearly thirty minutes after its occurrence.
The organization.of the media center facility could be improved by providing a working ~ area for PIO staff secluded from an area set aside for media representatives.
Caroline' County EOC' Caroline County, in general, demonstrated a capability to implement its plan to cope with an emergency ~at NAPS. Personnel and resources are more than adequate.for the small number of households and land area within the ten mile emergency planning zone falling within the County.
Hanover Ccunty EOC s
The staff of the Hanover County E0C responded to the simulated acciden't at the North Anna Power Station in a most professional manner. Staffing occurred in a prompt manner and the facilities at the County are adequate to support emergency operations in general. The communications area could use some improvement in terms of a link off the.Instaphone, additional telephones in the E0C and better arrangements for RACES. Adequate procedures were displayed for traffic control and dealing with the mobility 4
impaired.
Knowledge concerning radiological exposure control should be 1
updated. The field activities (evacuation assembly center, decontamination, traffic control) were demonstrated in an adequate manner.
s Louisa County EOC Activation of the E0C and mobilization of the staff occurred efficiently and in accordance with the plan. The E0C was fully staffed and the staff generally displayed adequate training and knowledge.
E County oificials took appropriate action in directing the County's emergency i
response during the early phases of the exercise.
However, after receiving the Governor's evacuation directive, which they perceived as being inappropriate, County officials failed to contact the State EOC for clarification. This resulted in a thirty-five min'ute delay in implementing the evacuation.
The exercise revealed a disagreement over the use of the primary alert and -
notification system. County officials want to use the sirens and EBS to provide early warning for the public, preferrably at the Site Area Emergency 8
phase. The State's policy is to use the system as a means of announcing protective actions.
It is recommended that the State and County coordinate a resolution to this issue.
The E0C facility was adequate and the County's communication capability was very good, with one exception..The County did not have the capability to
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transmit and receive hard copy news releases with the State EOC and the Joint Media Center, thus precluding effective coordination of news items
- between the County and the State PI0s.
The County demonstrated good capability to contribute to the dose assessment 3
' effort by deploying five radiological field mor.itoring teams. The teams' activities were ably directed by the Radiological Officer at the County E0C, and the teams demonstrated good capability in the field.
Orange County EOC Overall radiological emergency response activitiet demonstrated during this exercise were well-coordinated.
Emergency response staff demonstrated adequate knowledge and training with regard to their assigned responsibilities. The establishment of a direct communications link between the Dispatcher's office and the E0C is recommended.
Spotsylvania County EOC The overall response demonstrated by Spotsylvania County was well coordinated and in accordance with the County Radiological Bnergency Response Plan.
The Superintendent of Schools did not remain in the EOC to perform his function as liaison between the County and the Evacuation Assembly Area.
This position is important to insure a free ficw of information between the EOC and the EAC.
The County Extension Agent was aware of six dairy farms in the area.
However, he was not aware of procedures for farmers to reenter the EPZ in order to feed and milk their cattle.
The State Department of Agriculture should work with the County Agent to clarify established procedures which would protect these individuals.
The Instaphone is presently located in the Sheriff Department's Central Dispatch Office.
In order to facilitate direct communications between the EMC, State decision-makers, EOF and other risk counties, a drop off to the Instaphone should be located in the EOC operations area.
For the most part, the Evacuation Assembly Center staff demonstrated the capability to adequately operate during an emergency situation. The lay-out of the EAC should be reviewed and more comprehensive security provided to the center.
It should be noted that in Spotsylvania County over 100 people were involved
'I as players in the exercise, most of whom were volunteers. They should be commended for their enthusiasm and dedication.
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4 BACKGROUND Federal requirements dictate that periodic Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness exercises be conducted in support of nuclear power plants to
' evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities.
The exercises test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. The exercises simulate a coordinated response by State and local authorities, along with the utility, to include mobilization of personnel and resources adequate' to verify the capability to deal with an accident scenario requiring responses up to, and including, evacuation.
This was the fourth full-participation exercise for the North Anna Power Station and the various off-site organizations.
The Commonwealth of Virginia's State and local plans and preparedness for the North Anna Power Station were approved on February 23, 1983, as providir.g reasonable assurance that appropriate off-site protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and are capable of being implemented. This approval was conditioned with the successful demonstration of adequacy of the public alerting and notification system in accordance with the standards set forth in Appendix 3 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission / FEMA Criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the subsequently published standards in FEMA-43.
The purpose of this report is to record the capabilities of State and local governments to respond to an accident at the North Anna Power Station based upon.the actual demonstration or simulation of their abilities during the November 15, 1984 joint, full-participation exercise.
Deficiencies will be identified from this exercise and corrective actions will be recommended which would help to improve preparedness and response capabilities.
This exercise was observed by a team made up of individuals from FEMA Region III, with support from FEMA Region II, the Aqerican Red Cross and Argonne National Laboratory, along with members of the Regional Assistance Committee.
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PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS /0RGANIZATIONS State Agencies Agriculture and Consumer Services Department of Air Pollution Control Board, State Conservation and Economic Development, Department of (Division of Parks and Recreation)
Corrections, Department of Emergency Services, Department of Game and Inland Fisher,ies, Commission of General Services, Department of (Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services)
Health, Department of (Bureau of Radiological Health and Division of Emergency Medical Services)
Highways and Transportation, Department of Information Technology, Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Department of Military Affairs, Department of Social Services, Department of State Police, Department of Water Control Board, State Local Governments Caroline County Hanover County Louisa County Orange County Spotsylvania County Private Organizations Civil Air Patrol (CAP), Virginia Wing Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
American National Red Cross Salvation Army Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) 1.
Corporate Headquarters 2.
North Anna Power Station (NAPS) v 5
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LIST OF OBSERVER ASSIGIMENTS RAC Chairman James R. Asher (FEMA)
Regional Director Paul Giordano (FEMA)
Virginia State EOC Karen Larson (FEMA) Project Leader Penny Wallingford ( ANL)
EOF Bob Trojanowski (NRC)
E0F/BRH Jerry Combs (DOE)
State / Local Radiological Don Newsome _( ANL) Team Leader Monitoring Teams Caroline Herzenberg ( ANL)
Field Sampling Teams Bob Conley (USDA)
Anna Hill (USDA)
Communications Fred Donnelly (FEMA)
Media Center Hugh Laine (FEMA)
Louisa County EOC Steve Hopkins (FEMA) Team Leader John Tatar ( ANL)
Spotsylvania County E0C,
Walt Adams (DOT)
Jan Lamb (FEMA) Team Leader Gary Seidenfeld (FEMA Region II)
Hanover County EOC Rick Kinard (FEMA) Team Leader Dennis Figg (FEMA)
Paul Farber ( ANL)
Caroline County E0C Joe Gavin (FEMA) Team Leader John Wells (HHS)
Orange County E0C Dale Petranech ( ARC) Team Leader Tom Majusiak (FEMA) vi i
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EVALUATION CRITERIA USED The Commonwealth of Virginia and local governments' response during this exercise was evaluated in relationship to the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Plan, Annex I-V to Volume II, Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated June 1983, and the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Caroline, Hanover, Louisa, Orange and Spotsylvania Counties, dated April 1981.
These plans were prepared under the authority of the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 1973 (Code of Virginia, Chapter 3.2 Title 44), as amended, and were developed in accordance 'with NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", November 1980.
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EXERCISE OBJECTIVES l'.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and State and local E0Cs in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communication systems among and within emergency response organizations and between all designated facilities and field activities.
3.
Demanstrate the, public information aspects and abilities of each to coordinate, communicate, and cooperate.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the public warning system (notification of general public and messages to be disseminated).
(Simulated) 5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of accident assessment abilities of the licensee and State Bureau of Radiological Health.
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process at State / local government to see if they conform with the recommendation for protective action / measures and the ability to implement protective measures.
7.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the reentry / recovery decision process.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to provide the advance coordination of information released.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
10.
Demonstrate an ability to effectively respond to both in-person and telephone news media inquiries in a timely manner.
11.
Demonstrate an ability to establish and operate a joint information center.
12.
Demonstrate that internal message and information flow (collection, consolidation, and dissemination) in the E0Cs ensures coordination with all affected agency representatives.
13.
Demonstrate the ability of the E0C to direct field teams to perform plume, ingestion, and reentry monitoring and/or sampling.
14.
Demonstrate the ability of the field teams to take environmental samples and transport the samples to collection points.
15.
Demonstrate that response organizations can alert, notify, and mobilize emergency response personnel in a timely fashion.
16.
Demonstrate that E0Cs can be staffed in a timely fashion.
viii e.,-._
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Demonstrate that response organizations can dispatch personnel to all appropriate locations to effect/ implement protective response measures, i.e., evacuation, monitoring, assessment, assistance centers, in a timely fashion.
1B.
Demonstrate that the State / local government can carry out free play in the decision-making process with regard to protective measures for the plume emergency planning zone.
19.
Demonstrate the abilities of local governments to provide control of acce,ss to restricted areas and effectively per'orm a coordinated evacuation.
20.
Demonstrate support from elected or appointed public officials regarding the operations process and decision-making.
21.
Demonstrate the capabilities of all jurisdictions to execute emergency response plans to protect the public's health and safety.
22.
Demonstrate the existence and adaquacy of emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.
23.
Demonstrate the abilities of the response organization to effectively utilize / support agencies and authorities where/when local capabilities are exceeded, ix
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SCENARIO The on-site scenario called for Units 1 and 2 to be operating at full power equilibrium.
The Unit 2 reactor core was at midlife and fission product coolant inventory was considered to be normal.
Failure of a pump motor '
caused an electrical fire in the motor control center, which spread to involve stored contaminated waste oil.
The fire was considered to be out of control in ten minutes and an " Unusual Event" was declared.
Off-site fire assistance was requested and the fire extinguished.
Two employees received injuries, were contaminated, and transported to a support hospital. An
" Alert" was declared ghen letdown coolant activity exceeded 1.0 x 10" cpm for greater than fifteen minutes, indicative of severe clad damage.
Fuel failure due to loose parts and a known leak of containment resulted in the declaration of " Site Area Emergency". " General Emergency" was declared following the loss of two out of three fission product barriers, with the potential loss of the third.
Radioactive effluent escaped through faulted containment ventilation piping resulting in an unplanned / uncontrolled release across the Site Boundary.
In order to demonstrate protective action measures in all five counties located within the plume EPZ, the technical scenario and recommendations for protective actions by the Bureau of Radiological Health were administratively expanded by the Director of Operations in the State E0C to cause evacuation protective measures to be implemented 360 degrees out to ten miles.
The evacuation involved all participating State, County and private organizations in the area.
i SCENARIO CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS Projected Actual 1200-1345 Notification of Unusual Event 1318 1345-1415 Alert 1348 1600-1630 Site Area Dnergency 1637 1700-1715 Evacuation of NAPS Non-Essential Personnel 1701 1715-1730 General Emergency 1726 2000 Recovery Phase (on-site only) 2020 2100 Exercise Terminates (on-site only) 2030 2130 Recovery Phase (off-site) 2115 2300 Exercise Terminates (off-site) 2208 x
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i DEMONSTRATION OF RESOURCES
- State and County E0Cs.
Communications systems and equipment.
Staffing of facilities.
Simulation of notification system (siren system and EBS).
Route ale'rting.
State and County Media Centers, including rumor control.
Field sampling teams (food, milk) and equipment.
Evacuation Assembly Centers.
Designated access control and traffic control points.
Combined State / local and local field radiological monitoring teams.
Bus evacuation routes.
Sel f-reading dosimeters, dose records, TLDs and simulated KI for emergency workers.
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PREVIOUS DEFICIEplCIES AII0 RECWWIElIDATI0Its Recommendation Status Virginia State EOC 1.
Consider placing staff positions 1.
Adequately addressed.
~
on shift schedule roster so that both names and duties are indicated.
CarolIne County '
2.
The elected officials should be 2.
Adequately addressed.
present and actively involved in decision-making in future exercises.
3.
Periodic briefings to update EOC 3.
Adequately addressed.
staff on the situation should be held in future exercises.
4.
Future scenarios should provide 4
Adequately addressed.
enough activity to allow meaningful participation by and adequately test the capabilities of the EOC staff.
Ranover County 5.
To improve Hanover County's 5.
Not demonstrated.
Tht 5 i
consunication capability, a drop-off action has not been line to the Instaphone into the EOC accomplished at the Cou ity should be installed.
This will in-EOC, and remains a sure that nothing is lost in the deficiency with County EOC relay of traffic between the EOF and o perations, communications / dispatcher office.
In addition, it will free the concercial lines for other traffic.
Louisa County 6.
Louisa County should consider using 6.
Adequately addressed.
either the CAP or RACES as a means although RACES was of communications between the minimally used by the radiological teams and the E0C's.
County EOC.
Alternate each exercise using one for backup of other communications.
This will ensure them a means of checking out their equipment and proredures.
7.
There are currently no permanent 7
Adequately addressed.
record dosimeters available for County energency workers.
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or TLD's, in the necessary numbers, should be obtained as soon as possible, in order to assure a history of exposure (or lack of it) for workers involved in responding to any incidents at the North Anna facility.
8.
Refresher training should be given 8.
Radiation monitors to all radiation monitors to assure demonstrated adequate they will continue to remain totally capability to perform their familiar with all the various aspects assigned function, of this critical ' function, 9.
The County should continue to update 9.
Adequately addressed.
their monitoring teams and any individuals operating in the field to reassure them that they are not in, or heading towards, a hazardous area.
Orange County
- 10. Orange County E0C should expedite 10.
Adequately addressed.
notifying key personnel at the Alert stage, and assume taking responsibility for Instaphone messages.
Spotsylvania County
- 11. The capability for a shift change 11.
Adequately addressed, should be demonstrated in future exercises; the coordinator should maintain a two-shift roster for all responding agencies.
12.
Elected officials should participate
- 12. Adequately addressed, in future exercises.
- 13. The County officials should rec-13.
Adequately addressed.
ognize the State's accident assessment capability and implement the protective actions promptly and without "second guessing", in order to establish a uniform and effective response.
- 14. As there is no capability to quickly 14 Not demonstrated.
This
)
and accurately identify siren activity remains as a failures, route alerting should be deficiency with performed as a matter of course, to Spotsylvania County provide a secondary means of notifying Operations.
the public. As specified in the plan, xiii
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e Sheriff's deputies should be used to perform this duty, leaving other emergency workers free to complete their assignments without interruption.
- 15. The County should consider placing 15.
Adequately addressed.
rumor control within the PIO operation to provide the opportunity i
to share'the PI0's access to informa-tion.
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EXERCISE DBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED i
4.
No advance coordination with the primary siren activation point and no EBS message construction were demonstrated at the State E0C; notification to the Counties regarding siren activation was belated.
6.
Louisa County officials delayed the implementation of evacuation protective actions for an extended period of time following notification from the State EOC.
- 12. Heightened coordination and dissemination of information obtained by BRH at the Stat'e EOC is recommended.
18.
Free-play in the decision-making process regarding protective measures for the plume EPZ at the State E0C was limited due to the administrative expansion of recommended actions to include evacuation j
for 360 degrees out to ten miles.
- 19. Access control was not comprehensively demonstrated at the Spotsylvania EAC and the Hanover and Caroline County E0Cs.
20 Hanover County did not demonstrate active involvement by elected public officials.
- 21. Specific information regarding route alerting procedures was not available at Hanover County; procedures for protective actions for farmers acting as emergency workers was not available in Spotsylvania County; Louisa County should consider establishing a standard message for route alerting teams; Spotsylvania County did not demonstrate i
route alerting procedures (an identified deficiency in the previous exercise).
Louisa County delayed implementation of evacuation l
procedures for thirty-five minutes following a directive from the State EOC.
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- 22. Agricultural Sampling Teams should be provided two-way communications capability; a drop off to the Instaphone and additional telephone lines should be installed at the Hanover County EOC; a drop off line 4
is also recommended at the Spotsylvania E0C Operations Room.
Protective clothing was not available to emergency workers in the field in Carolina County.
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EXERCISE REPORTS
' Commonwealth of Virginia EOC I.
Activation and Staffing Notification of an Alert at the North Anna Power Station was received at the Virginia State EOC at 1404 acting to initiate activation of the,E00.
The primary communications link with the utility is via a direct Instapho'ne line, making verification of calls unnecessary.
Mobilization of staff was accomplished via up-to-date name and telephone namber listiags.
Full staffing of the EOC was complete at 1734, and included Dep3rtment of Emergency Services staff, Department of Health, Emergency Medical Services, Department of Agriculture, National Guard. State Police, Department of Information Technology, and RACES. Other participating organizations activated representatives at their respective offices due to limited office space at the EOC.
Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing and by presentation of a roster.
An actual shift change was demonstrated for the DES Operations Officer position at 1608.
The second shift staff person was briefed and provided copies of all t
messages transmitted up until that point in the exercise. All designated positions demonstrated adequate training and knowledge.
A rotational duty system provides for EOC activation capability during non-working hours.
II.
Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations at the State E0C were effectively overseen by the Director of Operations and coordinated by the Operations Officer.
Periodic briefings were held to update the desk officers on exercise activities. Message handling and updating of the status board was initially somewhat disorganized until this support position was filled by the regularly assigned individual.
Additional training 1
with regard to efficient message handling is recommended for this back-up individual.
Access to the EOC was controlled via sign-in/out sheets and the issuance of identificaticn badges.
Notification of Alert was received at the EOC at 1404, of Site Area Emergency at 1644, and of General Emergency at 1730.
Protective action recommendations were received on several occasions from the EOF, the first of which was received at 1735, which advised sheltering for 360 degrees out to two miles, and out to five miles for P, Q R.
A Governor's proclamation of a State of Emergency was simulated at 1740; however, revision to the pre-written proclamation should have been made as protective action recommendations (evacuation for a two mile radius and up to five miles downwind) did not correspond with those of the EOF nor with the expanded actions of 1
the State E0C.
In accordance with the exercise scenario, an adminstrative expansion to the recommended protective actions was made at the State E0C, to include evacuation for 360 degrees out to ten miles, in order to demonstrate protective actions at all five plume counties.
Federal assistance was not requested, although timely notification to the FEMA Regional Office was completed for each change in plant status classification.
The Commonwealth's Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety was in attendance during the exercise, althdugh not involved in decision-making.
III.
Facilities The State E0C facility is well-equipped with ample furniture, space, lighting and telephones to support emergency operations. A status board was clearly visible and was kept up-to-date on significant activities during the majority of the exercise. Maps were posted which indicated the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, traffic control and access control points, radiological monitoring points and population by evacuation area.
IV. Communications Communications facilities at the Virginia State E0C were excellent.
Voice communications between the State E0C, the licensee, the E0F and to the County EOC's utilized the instaphone system and the Ringsoown system, both dedicated land lines. Two hard copy systems also connected the State EOC with the EOF, the licensee and the County E0C's. The Virginia Criminal Information Network (VCIN) was a teletype system used regularly and effectively to relay hard copy messages to numerous points and provided the State E0C with an automatic " log"'of all communications sent on the system.
According to the Communications Officer, the National Warning System (NAWAS), a dedicated land line, provides a primary communication link to contiguous states through a national teletype system. Commercial telephone Ifnes are available for back-up communications. The same systems are available to connect the State E0C to FEMA, although commercial lines served as the primary resource during this exercise.
Commercial telephone equipment provided primary communications to the EBS stations.
Secondary facilities included a VHS remote programming unit.
Commercial telephone, direct radio (VHF and UHF), Red Cross mobile units and RACES systems are used to provide communications to I
local schools and support hospitals.
Communications with the radiological monitoring teams was conducted primarily through the EOF and County E0C's.
Communications to the media center were handled through the commercial telephone system; back-up would be available from the new computer network.
Some difficulties were experienced with the 2
/
4
computer network during the course of the exercise, but it eventually became operational near the end of the exercise.
This network, when installed and incorporated into standard operating procedures, should provide valuable assistance in the overall communications network.
However, in lieu of this computer system, facsimile equipment available between the EOC and the media center should be utilized for the transmission of hard copy information.
V.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action The' Bureau of Radiological Health at the State E0C does not have the operational lead for calculating projected doses or for recommending protective actions; by plan, these activities are undertaken at the EOF. A medical doctor from the State Health Department was a member of the EOC Radiological Health team and numerous references were available for use during the exercise.
Field readings were received from the EOF while in operation.
Readings were then received from the local monitoring teams via the Counties.
For the most part, these readings were timely.
- Readings, along with output from the Weather Bureau and NAPS TSC (regarding status of the plant), were carefully reviewed in anticipation of a potential radioactive release and the'need for protective action (s).
However, this data was not regularly communicated to other elements within the State E0C nor to the County EOC's.
Data on radiation levels in the area of the plume were initially posted on a map, however, no changes or additions to the map were made as additional data was received.
Based on a recommendation from the EOF at 1855, the representative from the Public Health Department at the State EOC gave the instruction to the Radiological Health Officers in Spotsylvania and Louisa County EOC's to administer KI to emergency workers in Sectors Q and R.
This recommendation immediately followed an announcement from the EOF as to high radiation readings and presence of radioiodine in Sectors Q and R.
Approximately 20 minutes later the EOF called to inform the Radiological Health Officer at the Sta.a EOC that there had been a laboratory error.
No iodine was present and the plume did not touch the ground due to a meteorological inversion.
However, the counties were not recontacted in order to forward this information error.
Communications and information handling by the Bureau of Radiological Health at the State EOC should be reviewed for possible improvement.
Many of the messages (both incoming and outgoing) were not logged, tracking and posting of radiological monitoring data was inconsistent, and periodic summaries or briefings by the Radiological Health Officer were not provided.
Also, communication between the Radiological Health Representatives and other response organizations was limited.
For example, the Bureau of Radiological Health requested milk sampling in response to an inserted canned message by the State Controller at 1810.
Sample results were received at 3
approximately 2025 indicating high radiatior, levels, but were not promptly conveyed to the Department of Agriculture.
The physician stated that these results were probably in e~or, but made no effort to verify the information.
Twenty minutes la ter a phone call from the E0F conveyed that the results were incorrect and that there was no contamination.
On two occasions messages were received via RACES which were unclear as to the location of sampling points (a double letter system was being transmitted by the County versus a single letter locating point system used at'the State). A message at 1915 was also confusing with respect to monitoring results.
Efforts were made to decipher this quandary with the RACES operator, however, this message was never properly resolved.
It is noted, however, that the subject sampling was from an area outside the anticipated plume pathway.
VI.
Public Alerting and Instruction A call via the Instaphone from the EOF at 1735 recommended protective actions which were administratively expanded at the State E0C to include evacuation for 360 degrees out to ten miles at 1740.
Activation of the sirens and EBS were simulated to have occurred l
simultaneously at 1759.
However, the support staff was not briefed and directed to notify the County EOC's until 1803.
No advance coordination for siren activation was demonstrated with the primary action office at the Louisa County E0C. Advance notification to the County E0C's of siren and EBS activation is recommended in order to 1
ensure a well-coordinated emergency response operation.
Activation of the EBS was simulated, and although the development of emergency public instructions was not demonstrated, this activity was I
successfully demonstrated in previous exercises. A 1753 Vopex message to local Emergency Services Coordinators instructed those people in Louisa, Spotsylvania, Hanover, Orange and Caroline Counties, in all evacuation zones, to evacuate in an orderly manner to their designated Evacuation Assembly Centers.
Due to the timing of the exercise, no considerations were demonstrated regarding the evacuation of school children.
VII.
Protective Action A.
Evacuation and Access Control i
Activation of traffic control points was announced over the VCIN I
immediately following the Governor's proclamation of a State of Emergency and the ensuing recommendation for a ten mile, 360 degree j
evacuation. Air traffic was instructed to be rerouted following an indication of a radioactive release from the power station.
Actions to initiate the rerouting of water and rail traffic were not observed.
County EOC's were directed to activate designated Evacuation Assembly Centers (EACs) at 1747; follow-up inquiries with regard to the status of EAC activities were demonstrated.
4 4
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B.
Special Evacuation Problems Not applicable at the State level.
C.
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions Information regarding the location of food processing plants was available with the Department of Agriculture representative at the State EOC. According to the Radiological Health and Agriculture Officers, dairy farm locations are available through the main office of the Department of Argiculture; water supply intake points are available through the State Water Control Board and soil maps are in l
Agriculture field offices.
The Department of Agriculture, State Water Control Board and Fire Services would reportedly be available to assist with the implementation of prote:tive actions undertaken by farmers, foodworkers and water utilities.
l During the North Anna exercise, requests to sample soils, allk, water I
and fish were made by the State EOC, in general, in response to canned messages inserted to exercise play by the State EOC Controll er.
Reports of initial milk sample analysis indicated high levels of radiation, however, approximately twenty minutes later the initial report of contamination was rescinded as being incorrect.
A message was received from the Hanover EOC at 2046 recuesting a i
response to eight local evacuees who had requested to reenter the evacuated area in order to feed and water their livestock. This request was responded to by BRH based on infor=ation received from the EOF at 2050 which indicated that no ground contamination had occurred as the pluse had dispersed in the upper atmosphere.
However, a canned message regarding contaminated milk products at 2105 was responded to by the Department of Agriculture. The Dairy Inspector was advised to take specific protective actions and to check with the Health Department "to see if it is safe to enter the l
area".
Increased information coordination would assist the EOC to comprehensively respond to ingestion pathway considerations.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control According to the Radiological Health Officer, low and high-range j
dosimeters, chargers for dosimeters, record keeping cards and TLD's l
are available at the State EOC, altho lh this equipment was not observed.
The EOC is located outside the ten mile EPZ and no emergency workers are issued from the EOC.
The BRH and Emergency Medical Staff were well versed on the procedures for radiological exposure control should such expertise be needed in the E0C or requested by response organizations. Adequate supplies of dosimetry are reported to have been predistributed to the counties.
Potassium iodide in the amount of 500 doses is reported available for emergency workers' use under the coordination and direction of the Regional Pkdical Directors.
l l
5 l
i l.
j i
II. Media Eelaticas
. ha provisi:ns for triefings to ne sedia mere safe at the State ECC.
I
~
as by plan this is a furction of the Joint Media Center, kes j
l releases, as received frca the Jaint Metta Center and cleared by EDO l
operati:ns, were f:rwarded to the counties vertally via teleme; althcagh a telecopier was available, it was not used to transatt this
.[
infersation. Cece c;eratienal, the Er:5 Ar.na cos;cter netacek should provide the capahtlity fer transmittf ag hard ccpy releases.
In lieu of this r.etacrk, the telecopier srcsic te used fcr this i
purpose to prev'ide *he timely transatssica of infersatten. A rzer i
control.naber uns established and sanned, but no calls were received cver the line.
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I.
Recovery aM bentry
.j Re:crery aM reentry activities were limited ad sosedat smrganized at the State EOC. At 2050 the Massver C:anty EOC was advised by 513 that farmers could return to the era: sated areas as the plume had dispersed into tee u;per atscs; tere aM that there was no gressf.
ccatanir.ation. Mcuever, it was rot until 2155 that the !?M afvised the Director of Coeratiens that *radica:tivity levels had dr:; ped f
bel:w energency classificatien - reconned reentry into evacsated i
areas". Timely communicati:n aM cc:rdination tetween the Igreau of
{
- adiological Health representatives ad the Dire:ter of Ccerati:Ss i
regarting radt: activity /seteorolcgical conditices should be stresse in future exercises, r
II. Scer.aris The scenario f:r this exercise mas-devised to inc1=te an assinirtrative expansics of EOF reconsented trote:tive atti:ss to in:1ude the evacuati:n of the entire plze EF2. This a:ted to in:rease exercise play aM allcw the descastratics of ;r0*.e:tive action activities in all fIve affected c anties. >ceevee. BRM representatives assigned to the ECC denenstrated some cesfusi:n with regard to their roles in :he esercise wwn State and 1: cal F
jarlsdicti:rs' a:tivities did not c:rres;ced with incosing field readings and EOF protective actica reconneetati:ns. ror eith the inserted canned sessages. C nfusion also arose at one of the i
counties resulting in a delayed response to the crfee to era:aate the t
entire E7Z. Message traffic from the EOF had to be reorganized la order to limit the transfer of pctentially coeflicting radiological inf:rsatica to the counties. is avoid pcssible confssion is fature esercises la uAich pectettive action reconnesdations are akinistratively espanded, it is recommended that these a:tions be awanced to all organizaticas as a precauticaary sessare undertales ty the $ tate within the scope cf the esp:1sg 5:ecario. Also, canned i
messa3e5 should te prepared aM introddef Ss as to tetter confers i
with ad su;9ert exertise play.
i t
i i
Commonwealth of Virginia E0C Deficiencies / Recommendations
, 1.
Additional training should be provided to back-up support staff responsibile for messaga handling and status board updates.
2.
The State Operations -Officer should ensure that all documents concerning protective actions, to include the Governor's Proclamation of Emergency, conform with current protective action recommendations and/or decisions.
~
l 3.
The need for he,ightened coordination and sharing of information received by the BRH at the State EOC should be emphasized with BRH staff. Updates to radiological / meterological conditions should be j
immediately forwarded.to the appropriate individuals / organizations.
4 BRH information handling procedures should be reviewed for possible improvement, to include the need for clarification of messages received if not completely clear.
I 5,
Communication to the counties with regard to the timing of simulated EBS and siren activation was belated; in some instances occurring after the simulated activation time.
Also, no advance coordination with the primary contact point (Louisa County) for siren activation was demonstrated.
In order that this activity, and all associated l
activities, may be fully and adequately exercised and demonstrated.
it is recommended that future exercises actually demonstrate activation of the siren system and EBS network.
l j
6.
The EOC PIO should utilize available hard copy transmission devices (telefax, VCIN or the new computer network) to provide the counties with timely information updates released to the public at the State level and to provide a responsive receiving system for county-I developed releases.
l 7.
The Department of State Police should ensure that all police I
emergency workers are issued TLD's and instructed to maintain their record keeping cards.
(See Louisa County report.)
Emergency Operations Facility l
The EOF was located in the VEPC0 training facility of the North Anna Power Station.
Participating personnel from the Virginia Bureau of l
Radiological Health included the Director, an Administrative Aide, a Dose Assessment Officer and a radio operator.
Representatives from the Department of Emergency Services included an Emergency Management l
Director and an assistant, who were briefed concerning plant status I
upon arrival and established communication with the State EOC in an effective and timely fashion. All individuals were in-place when the EOF was activated at 1540. The Bureau personnel can be assembled through a rotating Duty Officer system, using office phones, home phones and pagers, any hour of any day. The Bureau staff displayed 1
7 l
l I
adequate training and knowledge to carry out their responsibilities.
Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated via an extensive roster for changing shifts.
A 12' x 12' room next to the Training Reactor Control Room was assigned to the Bureau staff. The room was adjacent to the VEPC0 Dose Assessment Staff and near the NRC Assessment Staff. The assigned area was adequate in terms of size, space and equipment.
Primary communication lines from the Bureau to the State and local EOCs include Ring-Down phone and Instaphone; both are dedicated land i
l line' systems. The secondary line to the State was via radio.
l SeconJary lines to local EOCs or the Media Center would be through the State EOC (not observed).
The Bureau was not directly involved with media or risnor control functions.
Dose projections were derived from data provided by VEPC0 regarding the plant radiological release and from data provided by Bureau field team readings. These data, plus other parameters, were entered into the Bureau computer to calculate projected doses.
Problems were encountered with the Epson printer and with the phone from about 1700 to 1730, but functioned well after required corrections. The Bureau I
staff were capable of hand calculations, but it was not necessary to demonstrate that capability due to the use of the computer.
Calculations were made promptly as data was received from the Bureau teams. The Bureau checked their calculations against those derived by the VEPC0 Dose Assessment Group. Monitoring data was not plotted on the Bureau map. The Bureau Director directed the four teams promptly to define the plume. The plume was defined correctly.
Readings from the field teams were radioed to the Bureau base station promptly. There was no need to estimate total population evposure because of the evacuation order.
Protective action decisions were applied to both plume and ingestion pathway hazards. These decisions were based on Bureau (Virginia) exposure guidelines that are within the EPA guides.
Factors considered in the guidelines were plant status, weather, etc. Activities or discussions involving KI were not observed.
Protective action recommendations were reviewed and updated promptly as conditions changed, discussed and jointly agreed to by the Commonwealth and VEPC0 representatives, and forwarded to the State EOC in a timely fashion.
l The Bureau performed its functions in a prompt and professional l
manner.
State / Local Radiological Monitoring Teams l
l I.
Field Tena Mobilization l
l Mobilization of the four joint field teams was only partially l
demonstrated during this exercise.
State and local personnel were I
given advance instructions to report to the Mineral Fire House I
8 1
a L
staging area at specified times.
Deployment of the teams from the Fire House was directed from the EOF.
Team equipment was packed in the vehicles in such a manner that rapid deployment should have been po ssibl e.
However, despite having over an hour between the State personnels' arrival at Mineral (1530) and the first order to deploy (1640), the first two teams took ten to twenty ninutes after the deployment order before they were ready to depart.
This time was occupied in sorting out dosimetry, record keeping forms and repacking equipment, activities that could have been completed earlier to enable departure immediately upon direction.
Bef6re deploying, the teams were briefed on plant conditions, exposure control procedures, equipment checking procedures and division of responsibilities among members.
However, there was no briefing on current meteorological conditions.
Also, the local members of the joint teams had apparently not received detailed instructions prior to the exercise about their responsibilities.
Consequently, they were not well prepared to follow the available local maps. Most of the teams were able to find their assigned field locations within fifteen to twenty minutes, but one team had great difficulty, spending approximately one hour to locate their designated position.
During this interim, communication was lacking between the field team and EOF as to the actual location of the team.
II.
Field Team Equipment Field team vehicles were large enough for team members and their equipment and suitable for most expected weather and terrain conditions at preselected monitoring points.
The vehicles used were automobiles rather than 4-wheel drive vehicles, which might have encountered difficulty in extreme weather conditions.
The copy of the State plan referred to did not appear to contain a list of equipment for the monitoring teams; instead the teams referred to documents from the Bureau of Radiological Health, State Department of Health.
Checklists of required equipment were available to team members and were in reasonable accord with the equipment on hand.
The available radiation monitoring instruments included GM Survey Instruments and Ionization Chamber Ratemeters.
No alpha detectors or end window GM counters were observed.
Each of the four combined State / local field teams had air sampling equipment.
Two teams had air pumps which operated off of vehicle battery power, while the other two teams had air pumps which operated off of self-contained batteries with presettable timers.
The air sampling pumps checked had decals indicating calibration in 1980, but personnel indicated they had been calibrated within the last few months. Both charcoal cartridges and silver Zeolite cartridges for iodine sampling were in use as well as particulate filters. One team also had equipment for on-location radioiodine measurement.
The teams had equipment for soil and vegetation sampling, including scoops, plastic collection bags, plastic containers,' writing materials and identification labels.
For water sampling, plastic collection jugs 9
4 and a bucket and rope were available.
Considerable additional equipment was available, including further radiation monitoring equipment (a Ladlum GM counter supplied by the State and an OCD CDV-700 survey meter brought by a local team member), orange reflective vests for personnel safety during roadside monitoring, anticontamination suits, boots, gloves, respirators, etc.
The principal radiation monitoring equipment in use (Eberline Model E-520 geiger counter) was marked as calibrated on November 9,1984.
III.
Field Team Technical Operations The field monit'oring equipment had already been set up and checked in advance of its arrival at Mineral.
Hence, setup procedures were not observed. However, it is evident from the operation of the equipment that it had been set up properly.
During the exercise, the teams were called on to take only air samples and gamma readings at just a few locations.
Proper techniques were shown for both of these activities. At no time were j
the teams directed to measure radioiodine levels in the air, or to collect soil, vegetation or water samples.
Inclusion of these activities and deployment to a greater number of monitoring locations would have made more effective use of the field teams.
The air samples collected by three teams at different points and times were collected by one roving team to transport to the Mobile Lab at Mineral. While this procedure did serve to keep all but one team available in the field, it also induced delays of up to forty to i
fifty minutes after samples were taken before they arrived at the lab.
IV.
Field Team Communications Radio contact was established between the field teams, the Mobile Lab, and the Field Team Controller at the EOF.
Radio contact was maintained throughout the exercise.
However, there were long periods (twenty minutes or more) during which no communication to the field teams from the EOF Controller was forthcoming.
These periods left the teams idle and without current knowledge of on-site and off-site activities.
l Some backup radio systems were present, though not uniformly in all vehicles, and they were not operated for two-way communications in this exercise.
V.
Field Team Exposure Control The State / local radiation monitoring teams were provided with protective equipment, including anticontamination suits, boots, gloves, tongs and respirators. The teams were provided with supplies of potassium iodide. As regards to the use of KI, the field team members indicated that the administration of KI would be by directive 10
/ a
via radio from the Emergency Operations Facility. The teams were provided with both low-range (0-200 mR) and high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters, as well as a dosimeter charger and record keeping cards.
However, some of the dosimeters is use exhibited erratic and spurious readings.
Field team members also had permanent record dosimeters (TLDs and, in some cases, film badges).
The team members were knowledgeable as to how often to read and record their dosimeters.
The maximum dose allowed without authorization reported by one team was very conservative low value (10 mR), a value far lower than the dose limit in the State plan. Team members indicated they would call in on the radio for instructions if they received an excess dose.
As rega'rds procedures for decontamination, team members also responded that a radio call would be made for instructions.
IV. Scenario The radiological scenario was apparently sufficient to have driven effective exercise play by the field teams. However, the field team controller at the EOF did not exercise the teams as fully as could have been justifled by the scenario (e.g., by monitoring a larger number of points, taking radioiodine measurements, taking water, soil or vegetation samples).
Also, the graphs provided to the teams from which to read off-site releases were awkward to use, and added unnecessary confusion. A graph or table of readings directly in mR/hr would have been pre fera ble.
State / local Radiological Monitoring Teams Deficiencies / Recommendations 1.
Field teams should be briefed with regard to meteorological conditions by the EOF prior to their deployment to the field; local team members should be briefed concerning their responsibilities.
2.
Communication should be maintained between the field teams and the EOF throughout the course of the exercise as to team locations, plant conditions, etc.
3.
It is recommended that the joint teams expeditiously prepare for field deployment upon arrival at the staging area to allow for immediate deployment upon direction from the EOF.
4.
Additional training should be provided to team members with regard to decontamination procedures, maximum dose allowed without authorization, and instructions regarding procedures to be followed if dose limits are exceeded.
5.
Consideration should be made for more extensive use of the field teams' capabilities, i.e., the monitoring of additional locations and a greater variety of samples, including water, soil and/or vegetation.
l 11
Agricultural Sampling Teams.
The field sampling 'eams were mobilized in an adequate manner.
For the purpose of this exercise the food and milk sampling teams were deployed from different locations and a meeting place was pre-determined at the Louisa Safeway Store to meet with the Federal Evaluators.
The time of departure from the Safeway Store was 1633. Arrival time dt the E. A. Terrel Dairy Farm, Louisa County, was 1650.
The milk sample collection process was completed at 1718.
The food sampling teani was met at' the Safeway Store Louisa, at 1730.
The food sample was taken at the store at 1745. The food sampling team received the milk sample from the milk sampling team at the Louisa store and transported both samples to the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services in Richmond, Virginia, arriving at 1900.
Field team representatives were familiar with the local area.
Food and milk sampling teams were briefed on exposure control and equipment check procedures. Both teams were well aware of their.
responsibilities and successfully carried them out. A complete and current call-up list was observed; field team mobilization was accomplished in a professional and timely manner.
4 The milk sampling team used a large mouth plastic container to catch j
milk and then poured it into a plastic container with a screw-on lid.
This container was labeled with the day's date, the name of the dairy farm and the type of sample.
l The food sampling team placed five pounds of kale in an elongated j
plastic bag and tied it at the top to seal the opening.
Labels were placed around the tie and these labels indicated the day's date, name j
of store and type of sample. The food sampling team also completed the COV Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' " Sample and Collection Report".
The equipment used by the field sampling teams to collect various samples was adequate and in accordance with the written departmental SOPS.
Each of the sampling teams has written copies of the SOPS in their vehicles.
There was no radio communication established with the field sampling teams during the sample collection process.
Field sampling team vehicles were not equipped with two-way radios.
On discussing communication procedures with field sampling representatives, it was learned that they would maintain communications with Richmond through a periodic telephone call-in process.
Field sampling teams should be provided with two-way radios in their vehicles to keep team members updated and informed of significant activities while working in the field.
The fleid sampling team members had the following equipment:
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7
Protective Clothing Desicetry EcuiDrent Rubber boots Eadiological Desiretry Cnarger-Rubter gloves CC7 753 Coverall boots CD7135-Ferscnal Dosineters (high)
Cloth coveralls CDY 7:2-Personal Desi=eters (Ice)
Tape TLCs Written procedures Extra battery The equipcent did not include radiological record keeping cards.
Thes.e cards should be issued to the tean re:ters in ceder to allcw proper protecti\\e action procedures.
The sampling teams were aware of dosinetry reading and j
decontamination procedures and knew the locations of decontaninaticn centers.
KI was not included in the field sanpling team equipnent package, althcugh tea = = enters were amare of proper KI use.
Agricultural Sanolin; Teau Deficiencies /Fecon=endations l
1.
Field sampling teans should be provided with two-way radios in tneir vehicles to pernit tirely exchange of infernaticn.
2.
Record keeping cards should te issued 'to saepling teas nerbers along I
with other d0sinetry equipnent.
Red Cross District Office - Fredericksbur; l
The Fed Cross District Office participated fully in the exercise and l
der:nstrated their ability to provide support for food, bedding, conf 0rt and cedical supplies. The ARC Chapter Director was fully aware of the details I
of the exercise and indicated the local availability of resources to su; pert l
any actual energency.
Prinary ccreunicaticns at the district office are by l
co :ercial land line; a back-up systen is in place with volunteer radio o peratcrs.
News Media Center The Media Center at Mineral, Virginia was adequately staffed by the State Department of Energency Services (CES).
It was the pef =ary center for coordination and release of infornation by the State.
The State CES had liaison persons at the Utility Corporate Feadquarters Media Center and at I
the State ECC in Rich Ond.
The Public Inforsation Officer (710) and staff are well-trained and capable individuals. Mobill:ation is by call-up list and has been adeqJately dee:nstrated cany times.
Fcr this exercise, a shif t change was not actually deecastrated. Twenty-four hour staffing capability i
was deeenstrated via presentation of a roster.
Facilities at the Media Center shcwed inprovesent over the last exercise in that rew and better furniture was provided and c:re phones were avallable.
There were adequate displays available for the redia. FO ever, tne organization of the facility could be in; roved by providing a segregated 13 L
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- f it f71dt6DT Ytist *t f ty esuIltiLt C f Jht: sutn Clissiff;utf DT s.
2.
It iis re::numentet itti z atrt!:tg t et le set asi!:e #::* T*O staf f 111 sechbet frvt ite setit teit!!TG L*tt.
Cn : Tite Cvut:y I*C I.
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- sese calls ae-e re:tf act et tne *.rsu2rteme, wtftt is ent ft:ususty notit:eet it ite Cruttf c:numutititiets r: cur. Ites.e alls atee a e"ifiet et tte stateeitt tonunutfutiots attrace1. T*3.
Suff
?t O
a 8
- mobilization proc'edures were demonstrated during the Alert phase.
Written call lists were used with all E0C staff contacted promptly.
Organizations alerted and reporting to the E0C included the following :
Public Information Officer, Traffic Control (State Highway representative), Red Cross, County Health Department, School Board, Social Services, Fire and Rescue, and State Police. The Sheriff's Office, which provided E0C security, supplied deputies in
' ~
addition to the officers directing the E0C communications center.
The E0C was staffed by approximately 1520.
The system for notification and activation of E0C staff is well established and'can be implemented at any time.
The participating staff displayed adequate training and knowledge.
Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by a combination of double staffing, shift change and presentation of a roster.
Incoming staff were briefed appropriately.
II.
Emergency Operations Management The County Emergency Services Coordinator, as designated in the Caroline County REP Plan and SOPS, was effectively in charge.
The County Supervisor who serves as the County Director of Emergency Services was present and actively involved in decision-making as appropriate, e.g., at declaration of local state of emergency.
Periodic briefings, mainly after upgrades of emergency classification levels, were held to update staff on the situation.
There appeared to be, however, a paucity of information available to the County concerning plant status, off-site radiation releases, etc.
EOC staff members had SOPS and checklists available and actively consulted them throughout the exercise. Message logs were kept and messages reproduced and distributed where appropriate. Some incoming and outgoing phone messages, for instance the Coordinator's relay of the evacuation order to the County EAC and route alerting personnel, were not logged. There were, however, no problems observed resulting from messages not being logged.
Access to the EOC was controlled. However, an alternate entrance designated for use by the public or media seeking information was left unmonitored for periods of time because of the absence of actual public or media inquiries.
The EOC was notified of Alert status at NAPS at 1400, of Site Area Emergency at 1644 and of General Emergency at 1732.
The evacuation order was received and immediately relayed to the route alerting team and other County field organizations at 1806.
Radiological monitoring teams, the evacuation assembly area, the route alerting team and the school bus driver (s) were activated at appropriate times.
4 15
III. Facilities The E0C is a quite adequate facility for response to an emergency at NAPS.
It is equipped and used for response to a variety of emergencies of short and long duratien.
Emergency classification levels were posted.
However, no status board was used. Maps of the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access centrol points, radiological monitoring grids and population (no more than 100 in the plume EPZ) were all posted.
IV. Comgunications Communication facilities in this County were good.
The County made very good ;se of RACES by having them serve as the primary net for the EAC.
The RACES operators were also used to establish a high frequency relay net between Fredericksburg and Richmond.
This was necessary due to Fredericksburg being unable to contact Richmond directly.
l The County Fire and Rescue nets, State Police radio, teletype nets, l
and RACES were all used to provide back-up communications support for I
the Instaphone.
The Virginia Criminal Information Network (VCIN) was used to provide transmission and receipt of teletype hard page copy l
between the E0C and surrounding EOCs.
I All traffic between the power station and the E0C was recorded on proper message forms.
The traffic was logged in and out through a message control station within the EOC, which keeps a log on all i
I message traffic.
I V.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations l
Local radiological monitoring teams were mobilized and dispatched at l
about 1800 at the direction of the County EOC.
The team assembled, checked its equipment and was apprised of the situation at the North Anna Power Station.
The rescue squad depends on the County dispatch system for a communications base; members have portable radios on which they can be contacted.
A Health Physicist from Virginia Commonwealth University Medical College was contacted by the State to assist Caroline County. He reviewed the equipment and personnel at the rescue squad headquarters i
and did an operational check of the equipment. The 50P is well-developed and there are adequate copies available.
The primary assignment of the County monitoring teams is to monitor background i
and surface radiation; air, soil and milk sampling is the responsibility of State teams.
The teams did not detect or simulate detection of more than background radiation.
All dose assessment and protective action recommendations came from the State.
The use of KI was not recommended by the State nor did the County teams encounter any situation that could call for such use.
16
/
VI.
Public Alerting and Instruction The E0C directed the Ladysmith Fire and Rescue Company to conduct route alerting upon activation (simulated) of the NAPS siren system.
^
This directive was precipitated by a call from the State E0C at 1806. The alerting team began its route immediately.
During the route alerting procedure, a rescue squad ambulance went in the front of the evacuation school bus. The vehicle's PA system was used to announce the status of the situation as an exercise and that the bus
~
was for the purpose of evacuating the people in the event of a real 1
emergency. The bus went by every house in the EPZ in fifty minutes.
Prescripted eme'rgency public instructions are prepared in this EOC for both exercises and for actual emergencies.
For this exercise the message used advised residents that an exercise was actually taking place. The area covered by route alerting in Caroline County contains only about twenty-five households, all of which have been provided with extensive information and directions regarding what to do and where to go in the event of an emergency at NAPS.
VII.
Protective Action A.
Evacuation and Access Control Activation of traffic control points was promptly ordered. One of the two access control points listed in the County 50P was manned.
l Barricade materials were delivered to pre-designated sites (Routes j
738 and 671, 738 and 669). Because of the limited extent of the County's portion of the EPZ and the small number of roads leading into it, there is no question of the County's capability to control access to contaminated areas.
I The Evacuation Assembly Center was activated at the appropriate time and was prepared to accept evacuees. There are currently no mobility impaired individuals in the area. Again, because of the small size of the area and the close-knit nature of the community, there is little likelihood of anyone having a transportation problem being overlooked.
B.
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions There were no discussions of ingestion pathway protective actions at the County EOC and no communication from the State E0C observed.
VIII.
Radiological Exposure Control Radiological exposure control was conducted from the Ladysmith j
i Volunteer Fire Department station in Ladysmith.
Emergency workers had adequate personal detection equipment.
The 50P is well organized. The worker exposure sheet is well-developed and keys into the 50P. However, adequate protective clothing for team members was not available. This equipment is stored at the E0C in Bowling Green and would presumably be distributed in the event of a real emergency.
17 J
II. Media F.elati:ns Fr:visi:ns.ere ante at the ECC f:r press t-tefin;s.
S:.eier, n:
- ress 10
- i afrantage of *bese ;rctist:ns and ro triefin;s mare actually reld. A rus:r c:str:1 pt:ne ran:er was estatiistet.
I.
Fecovery and ?stntry The eva:aated area of the C0;nty was se:urts by neans Of ac:ess
~
c:ntr:1 imseflately up n era:aati:n.
Citer than a.niting dire:ti:n from the State EOC t: ternina*e the exercise, no rec:ve*y a*d reestry activities were observed at the Cour.ty EOC.
II.
5:erario The 5:er.ario was adequate t: test essential elener.ts :f the C;.nty's raf t:1 ;fcal energere:y resp rse plan.
Carolice Ccuety ECC Ce ficie6:les/;e :mmendations l
l 1.
Cee 4::ess p; int t: the E:0 dest;.sted for use by the netia ens lef t l
u c: nit: red f:r an extended les;;h Of tine.
arran g ene".ts s h:ul d t e cafe t: ;revent this in fature exercises and energee tes.
2.
The State ECC did n:t initiate any dis:sssi n with the C:unty regardin; ingesti:r. patt.af ;r:te: fre atti:is.
In ite abs-en:e of sa:n a State initiative, tee C unty st:ald tave 50.;tt inf:rnati:t c:n:ernin; re:ommer.ded in;esti:n ;r tective a:ti: s.
3.
All significant ie:cnin; and Out;:in; EOC nessa;es st:uld te 1:;;e:.
Signif t: art en-site and off-site e ents, in:1uding ener;ency classif t:stien levels, st:uld te ;csted and updated in Order to enable newly arrived staff : calc 11y crient taenselves as : the st.atus of the energen:y resp:nse.
2 Frcie:ttie :10 thin; was e.:t availatie to C unty ener;en:y = criers in ite field.
Sone of this ty;e of e:aiseent. =tich is availatte at the C:unty EOC, s':uld te pre;csiticce at a ecre cenrenten 10:sti:n.
Caroline C unty Evatuatice Assently Center I.
A:tivati:n and Staffin; The Caroline C:unty Eva:uati:n Assently Ce-ter is 10:sted in t*e Ladyssith Elenentary Sch:cl. The Direct:r of t e Center is the
- rtecipal une has atninistrattie c
- ntr:1 c er the fa:llity unter nornal and energes:y c:n iti:ns.
IS
.A J
The center was staffed by the following organizations with these respective nurnbers:
ARC (4)
RACES (2)
Social Services (3)
Rescue Squad (5)
State Police (1)
County Sheriff (1)
Director (1)
Custodian (1)
The' staff membirs reported to the EAC as they were called by their counterpa rts.
The staffing is adequate for the twenty-five families designated for this shelter (approximately 100 people). Most could be processed in two to three hours. Twenty-four hour staffing would be reduced to accommodate feeding, caring for informational needs, and other social services.
Second shift staffing is available, including the position of the Director.
The activation went smoothly as the Director assigned and reviewed responsibilities for each staff member as he or she reported to the EAC. About one-half of the rescue squad personnel have had training in radiological emergency response.
The State Trooper is an instructor in such emergency response and he carries a monitoring device and protective clothing routinely.
Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees Only three or four persons were processed during the exercise. Most staff knew their responsibilities and those who were new to EAC operations were briefed by those who had staffed the center previously.
The registration forms are stored at the school and were available for the volunteers. The design of the form appears to be efficient.
A monitoring exercise was demonstrated on the four volunteers. The staff followed a written SOP. A team from the rescue squad, trained in radiological monitoring, performed the actual monitoring; they have adequate equipment.
If a person is found to be contaminated, he or she can be decontaminated at the school and provided a clean change of clothing. The school has a showering facility, storage rooms and adequate space to define clean or contaminated spaces without compromising the ability to shelter the 100 people.
III. Congregate Care of Evacuees The center is more than five miles from the EPZ border.
It can handle the 100 persons provided for.in the plan.
There are two other schools which lie farther out of the EPZ which could bc used for 19
h l
L overflow.
The County EOC would be notified if these facilities were l
needed.
The ARC volunteers appeared capable of providing feeding for I
the evacuees and support staff on a twenty-four hour basis.
The school has sufficient kitchens, bathrooms and other facilities for sustained holding.
Communications, which included telephones, RACES, as well as rescue squad portable and vehicle radios, all were _
operating properly.
Decontamination Activities _
The Ladysmith School is the only decontamination point for emergency workers and evacuees from the EPZ of Caroline County.
The volunteer staff demonstrated the ability to monitor for contamination and procedures for decontamination of persons. They operated a separate entrance to locate potentially contaminated vehicles. The school grounds are adequate for this activity; inside this area is controlled. Anyone contaminated can be sent to the showers and receive clean clothing before entering the clean area.
Any contaminated clothing is stored in drums which can be isolated from the building. The EOC would arrange for disposal.
The shower area would be continuously flushed until it was contamination free.
Hanover County E0C I.
Activation and Staffing The Hanover County EOC is tied in tc the Utility via the Instaphone system, an extension which is located in the County Central Dispatching Point. A call was received by the County from the North Anna Power Station at 1644 (Site Emergency), initiating activation at the EOC. Mobilization procedures were demonstrated through the use of a written call-down list. Most staff members reported to the EOC within one-half hour; staffing was completed in less than one hour.
The EOC was fully staffed by the Coordinator of Energency Services and his deputy, and representatives of RACES, the Red Cross, schools.
State Police. Sheriff, Fire Department, RADEF Officer, Social Services. Health Department and State Highway Department. The staff was highly professional in all aspects of the emergency response, displaying excellent knowledge of emergency response procedures in l
general and radiological emergency response procedures in particular.
Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated through the presentation of i
a roster and, in several cases, double staffing.
These individuals maintained the high quality of the County's emergency response demonstrated by the primary individuals.
q II.
Emergency Operations Management The Coordinator of Emergency Services was effectively in charge of emergency operations, as called for in the plan.
He was replaced during the exercise as part of a shift change by his designated al ternate.
Periodic briefings were conducted to update the staff on 20 i
(
m
i j.
i l
the current situation. As different problems arose concerning particular areas of expertise..the appropriate staff members were consulted prior to decision-making.
Copies of the Hanover County Radiological Emergency Response Plans I
were available which included written procedures and checklists for the various response areas.
Messages were recorded and delivered to the Coordinator who f
officially logged them and, if action was required, read them aloud and then posted the message.
l Socirity was not strictly enforced, although every access point to the EOC was locked except the main entrance, where a sign-in sheet was posted. A Sheriff's deputy, by plan, would normally be stationed at the E0C entrance.
The Alert message was received by the County at 1400 (declared 1340),
Site Emergency message at 1644 (declared 1637) and General Emergency message at 1732 (declared 1726). At 1759 the County was informed that the Governor had declared a state of emergency and that an evacuation of the ten mile EPZ should commence.
The Evacuation Assembly Center was activated at Site Emergency, while the County's radiological monitoring team was activated at General Emergency.
Elected officials were not present or involved in decision-making i
during the exercise.
III.
Facilities The Emergency Operations Center for Hanover County provided sufficient space and furnishings for efficient and effective operations. The operations room was large and adequately appointed with tables and chairs. Separate adjoining rooms were provided for the computer, the RACES operator, the reception area and two separate work areas.
The Media Relations Area was down the hall in a small room about fifteen meters away.
The status board was clearly visible and kept up-to-date on major events by the EMC.
The plume EPZ and evacuation route maps were both posted as well. An access control points map w4s available, but not posted, as was a map displaying radiological soittoring points.
IV. Communications L
Dverall communications capabilities in this County are sufficient, 4
but they should be put to better use.
During the last exercise it i
was recommended by FEMA that a drop off the Instaphone, used for primary message traffic, be put in the E0C to relieve confusion.
This installation still has not been completed.
Until this is done the possibility still exists that messages from the E0F or State E0C will not reach the E0C in the exact format in which they were transmitted.
21 IL-..__.,....__..
. _ _,..,, _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _._, _ _ _ _ ~- _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
l s
9 The County had a room set aside for use by RACES operators within the E0C. but they were unable to use it due to equipment limitations.
Prior to the County moving into the E0C. a room was available across t
the street for RACES operations. The antenna and coax cable are l
still mounted at the old location.
The County should either extend the cable into the new operations area or move the antenna to the l
roof of the new EOC and run the cable into the EOC.
l The room being used as the operations room had no telephones. There l
were three phones available in offices located throughout the EOC, l
but should something happen during normal duty hours these phones will be used for normal County operations. Across the street in the dispatch office was a room that is normally used as the E0C.
In this room there were four telephones, put there to handle EOC traffic.
If the County is going to continue to use the room they used for this exercise, consideration should be given to having the four telephones appear in both locations. The current situation is for incoming calls to go to the phone numbers in the new E0C area, which has no back-up power.
Should the commercial power fail, everyone would have to move over to the old EOC in the dispatcher's building, which does have back-up power. When this occurs, the County is using four different phone numbers. Unless the County calls everyone to give them the new numbers, no one will know where to call. With the four phones in both locations, it would not matter from which building they operate.
The County did have sufficient back-up communications and made good use of message forms.
V.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Dose assessment activities not observed at this EOC.
VI.
Public Alerting and Instruction l
According to the plan, the EOC will alert the public only in the event that the sirens fall.
However, plans for completing route alerting should be reviewed, as the EMC was unaware of how many vehicles would be needed, the pith that would be followed; a prescripted message should also be drawn-up for route alerting teams.
The staging area team was placed in standby status at 1732 when the Site Emergency was declared.
The State simulated the activation of the sirens and E85 at 1759.
The staging area team was contacted by the EMC to stay on standby for other duties.
As indicated above the staging area team would conduct route alerting only if the strens failed.
The teams would use fire and police emergency vehicles equipped with PA systems to warn the people.
22
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i The RADEF Officer is aware of the maximum dose allowed without authorization and of decontamination procedures, both of which are contained in the County plans.
'lX.
Media Relations i
A small room down the hall from the EOC was designated for media relations activities.
No briefings were actually given during this exercise, though during an actual emergency, press from two local newspapers, several area television and radio stations and other l
concerned parties could be expected.
The County Public Information l
Officer would present statements prepared by the Emergency Management Coordinator, adgmenting the briefings with the posted maps.
X.
Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry was not demonstrated.
XI. Scenario The scenario provided Hanover County with a sufficient test to display their capability to respond to a radiological accident at the North Anna Power Station. The messages inserted by the Office of Emergency Services gave the County additional opportunity to deal with other situations that could arise during an emergency.
The field activity scenario provided all personnel with sufficient activity in the areas of traffic access and radiological exposure control.
Traffic access control was so realistic that many motorists stopped to ask if the roads were actually closed.
Hanover County EOC Deficiencies / Recommendations 1.
Security should be more fully demonstrated during future exercises.
2.
Elected officials should take a more active role in future exercises.
l 3.
The antenna cable for the RACES equipment had been severed, requiring the RACES staff to operate from their vehicle outside of the building, somewhat delaying the receipt of messages.
l 4.
If the County continues to use the operations room used in this and past exercises, a drop off for the Instaphone and additional telephone lines should be installed at the EOC.
I 5.
The EOC staff needs to better develop their plans for route l
alerting.
The EMC is unaware of how many vehicles would be needed or i
the path that they would take.
Also, a prescripted message needs to be developed that these teams will broadcast.
It is recommended that they alert the residents to tune to their EBS station for any and all instructions.
l 24
/:
\\
i
i 6.
The RADEF officer should refamiliarize himself with the procedures established for emergency worker radiological exposure control.
L 7.
Emergency workers should be fully briefed on the maximum dose I
allowable without authorization 8.
A larger room providing seating for anticipated pr2ss representatives l
would better accommodate media functions. Additional maps, such as the EPZ and Evacuation Route maps would be extremely helpful in accomplishing more effective briefings.
Hanover County Evacuation Assembly Center I.
Activation and Staffing The Evacuation Assembly Center (EAC), located at the Patrick Henry High Schcol in Ashland, Virginia, is the designated EAC for both Hanover and Louisa Counties.
Activation of the EAC was essentially complete by 1800, with additional personnel arriving untti 1900.
Suf ficient staff, with i
varying responsibilities (Red Cross, Fire Department, etc.), were in attendance to take care of most conceivable situations.
If necessary, twenty-four hour staffing would have been accomplished by two 12. hour shifts which would be activated and arranged by the Director of the EAC.
Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees Registration and monitoring of evacuees was handled in a professional manner.
The entry to the EAC was cordoned into two pathways; one for male evacuees and one for female.
This permitted separate monitoring and, through the use of the boys' and girls' locker rooms at the EAC, decontamination through stripping and showering of both sexes. After monitoring and decontamination, evacuees were then registered into the EAC. Monitoring was accomplished by four teams of two people each. Two teams were stationed at the entry way to the EAC and two teams at the showers for post-decontamination check.
!!!. Congregate Care of Evacuees Congregate enre at the EAC was explained but not actually demonstrated vis.a vis assembling of ccts, blankets, etc.
Facilities seemed adequate to handle several hundred evacuees, with an i
additional school located approximately 300 yards away as a back up i
location for overflow. Although no nursing station was formally established, a nurse's facility exists at the EAC, and both Red Cross and Hanover fire personnel were versed in first aid.
For serious medical cases, a
- crash" truck was located adjacent to the EAC during the exercise and could aid and transport any seriously injuried people.
25
IV.
Scenario The scenario was adequate, providing enough activities for all participants.
Decontamination A:tivities On the whole, decontamination procedures were carried out in an orderly and professional manner.
Two decontemination stations were observed; (1) field monitoring personnel station at the Beaverdam Quik-Stop, and (2) an evacuee station at the Patrick Henry High School.
Beaverdam Fire Department personnel properly established an isolation zone and used CDV-700 monitors to check personnel, equipment and vehicles. After checking, personnel were carefully allowed to leave the isolation area.
At the EAC, the same monitors were used to check incoming evacuees.
Evacuees were not allowed off of a paper pathway taped onto the floor until they had been checked and decontaminated, if necessary.
It should be pointed out that no actual decontamination of people / vehicles were observed since actual readings indicated no contamination.
Teams at the EAC were sufficient to process the expected numbers of evacuees.
Louisa County EOC 1.
Activation and Staffing Activation of the EOC and mobilation of the staff occurred efficently and in accordance with the plan.
The Alert notification call, which initiated activation, was received from the North Anna Power Station (NAPS) at 1402 via the Irstaphone.
Verification was not required.
Dispatchers in the County's Dnergency Communications Center used a call list to notify the appropriate County emergency officials.
Staffing was completed at about 1500, and at 1505 the Coordinator announced that the E0C was activated.
The EOC was fully staffed as specified in the plan.
The County Office of Emer gency Services (OET) was represented by the Coordinator Assistant Coordinatoi. Radiological Officer, and Public Information Officer.
Other organizations represented included the Sheriff's Department, Health Department, Superintendent of Schools, Public Welfare Department, State Police. Highway and Transportation Department. Information Technology Department, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board of Supervisors.
The staff generally displayed adequate training and knowledge.
A shift change, for the most part, was simulated, but capability for round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.
II.
Emergency Operations Management The OES Coordinator was in charge of operations at the County E0C.
The OES Director, who is also the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, was also present throughout the exercise.
- ~
26 e
s I
e
Periodic briefings were held to keep the staff updated on the developing situation.
Copies of the plan and written SOPS were available and referenced. Message logs were kept, but message forms were not used for message distribution.
E0C security, enforced by Sheriff's Deputies, was very tight.
The EOC received notification of events as follows:
Plant at Alert Status 1402 Plant at Site Area Emergency 1644 Plant at General Emergency 1732 Governor's Emergency Declaration and Evac'uation Directive 1750 In the early stages of the exercise, appropriate actions were taken to coordinate emergency activities. Being the " parent" county, Louisa responded promptly to the Utility's requests for fire and rescue units. Calls were placed to neighboring risk counties to check communications and establish initial coordination.
County officials wisely deployed the radiological monitoring teams at the Alert stage, which is earlier than specified in the plans. This was in response to a NAPS report that a release was in progress, and that Utility monitoring teams had been dispatched off-site.
After receiving the Governor's evacuation directive County officials delayed implementing the action for about thirty-five minutes.
This was apparently due to the fact that the State's decision to evacuate the entire ten mile EPZ was not based upon or supported by the simulated scenario conditions, but was an administrative maneuver designed to demonstrate capability in all five risk counties. When they received the evacuation directive t.t 1750 County officials recognized that the wind direction and speed, which had remained constant, resulted in the release affecting only a small portion of the County.
They were reluctant to implement a total EPZ evacuation, eventually consulted with Hanover and Spotsylvania Counties, and finally commenced the evacuation at 1825.
While it is understandable that the County officials questioned the appropriateness of a full evacuation under these circumstances, their failure to promptly contact the State EOC for clarification resulted in a thirty-five minute delay in implementing the evacuation.
County officials must recognize that when the Governor's protective action directive has been announced publicly, the public will respond.
In order to minimize public confusion, the County must implement appropriate response actions promptly and in coordination with the other affected jurisdictions.
The exercise revealed another issue which, although it did not result in a deficiency, should be resolved in order to assure coordinated response in the future.
County officials were virtually unanimous and definitely adament in their belief that the siren system and EBS should be used to provide early warning to the public, preferably at Site Area Emergency.
They appeared to come close to carrying through 27
with a stlisteral de:tsics t a:tivate !*e sire *$ at t*4t itse.
F rts ately, t*ey re:.este* a.tS:et:sti:e f r:n t*e State !!C. att e
etted.: f:11:wir; t*e :T a? ;*:<t: sees a*4 State 1*ste :ti:*s.et:*
s sil11:e the Sires systen as a net s Of alertte; t?t pat 11: at : e tire Of a :a:te:ttee a:tf:S at:ist:*.
It is Pt:0mne**e: !*-at 5 tate ar4 C:. sty ef ff:tals a*:ress t*ts iss.e :: efft:t a res:Istt:.
Fa:llities i*e [C; ;r:vitet afeceate 5:4:e. f.ent sSte;s.11;*!! ; at4 tele:A:tes t: sa:p:et t*e asst; et staff. WW:s de:t:tte; a::r :*1ste inf:rtatt:S wert ett*tr p;stti ** a satla*le. A stat 4s L:3 72. ~4 " s e.
.as 6 t use!. Classif t:sti 4 leetls 494 tSt* si tt f f aMt eettts i
etre >*ste! CS a states 10; ::tsistle; Of a : tete :f tatlet Pa:4*.
iti s c o al
- ec t te re a s f ron ne ee
- .a s se s tes t f ee 4 47, a*4 :*:sfie" city t*e west tast: l e f: en a ti:n.
F:' t*.e te efit :f t*e sta f f, it is rt::.me ett et tta t a 14 *;e. Cl e s l y e t s i bl e s ta t.1 b: a *4 t e sai t ta l t e
- witi 20re con:lete inf;rnati:S.
!Y.
[?mm.tt ati:*s Comn.st:att:es capatt11ttes at L:s sa C:wrty are it y 7:43.
!* e testa:t:9e is use" as t*4 ;* teary neses of c:en.st:atte; etts t*e Statt I C as* tat EOT.
- a:a.w; comm.et:sti:s ts :e:,1*e: tf EL:ti, j
tele:34*e a?! t*_e vir;tata Cetattal I*f:rnatt:t %etw:ra (1: 51.
i*,e
- inary its: 1: t*e ra*t:1:;i:a1 n: it:rt ; teans.as tf t*e C:.*ts fire ra*1: ettw:ra, af t e r the l a s t a s e
- t s e i t en s r e: me t* :t* tta t t*t C:.* t y n a a t
- etter sse f t*e 8.A*[5 *et.
The trafft: ttat 2t*[5 tae:ied f.ett; ttts eier:fse was a:e. ate to test t'ete et.t: meet a+* :-::e:.*es.
altt:w;t it.as ret sted eate* steely f:r I C t'af f t:.
- 4 C:.mtf
- grat:rs
'if :4ss stee al ra*t:1:;t: 1 rea*ta;s t: t*e EL:[5
- 4 rat:r at tte State I C. 4*f estatlis*ef t.c relaf tts - :+e at C? art:tteseille ae4 t*e :t*er at artist:re. t: relaf trafft: *:e et*er tL*!5 c:e at:rs.
!*ef also establistes a ta:n-w; sin:les ra*1:
et ilmate; t?e L:sita C:.t f IDO.its t*e IOF a*4 State IOC. te case t*4 ;*tnary liek tet tes
- e IOF at: 5:ste I:~ fattet.
T'e C:.*ty tas 4 :*tnary tele:S:ee its t: t*e "e*1a Certer. 26: *af
- tica<.;.
Tre fa:statte na:St*e at t*t !:C.a s m:t c:g ratt:* al.
l I* e C.? tf FIO did rat a*ce =*y it was *: ttf e; ste" m:e.as *e f antitar witt its c:gratt:n.
Ca:4tt11tf f:e t*e es:*4*;e f *aed
- f of reos releases s*4ul! 2+ estatits'+2. 4 ! sont
- *e trai*e! le t*e sse of t*e e74 tant 91 sh:ald t4 settlatte at all stnes, a sessneet 4%f Frett:ttee A:tt:9 fet:enet*att:*s j
Y.
Dese s
c L alsa C:.*ty fen 0* strate! stry ;;4' CA:att11tf t: ::* trit.te 10 t*e d:se assessweet eff:rt ty te:1ef e; a t:tal cf five Fait:10;t:a1 f
fleid natit: ele; teens.
Fe of t*t teens was latte assf at* ate
- t*t:
4 j:ltt State /10:41 teen.
I'e ni: e em e* ts O f t*=e f:.7 10:41 teans ware a4,s a
b directed by the Radiological Officer (RO) from the County EOC. All fleid readings obtained at the pre-designated monitoring points were recorded, plotted on a map and reported to the State EOC by the R0.
The five teams were dispatched from the Louisa. Mineral, Bumpass.
Hollygrove and Blue Ridge Shores Fire Companies.
The teams were dispatched during the Alert by the Louisa County Radiological Officer. Before departure the teams were read their equigrient check procedures, told of the current plant conditions and told to follow exposure control procedures. All of the local monitoring team members were at their respective fire companies when the activatfor call was received. The County's fire tone alert system is utilized as the means of notifying team members to mobilize.
The local 50P lists the equigreent available for the monitoring teams. Of the two monitoring teams observed, both had all the equipment listed.
The function of the local teams is limited to taking gelger counter readings at specific check points.
No air sampling, ground or water sampling is required of the team. However, during this exercise, on special request by the State, the taking of a water sample from Lade Louisa and delivering it to the State team at Mrth Anna was completed, but not observed.
The equipment available was appropriate and adequate for their roles.
The local teams made use of the local 50P's for their set-up and operation.
These SOPS were reinforced during activation when they were read to the teams from the Louisa EOC by the Radiological Officer. One team member was observed taking readings with the meter at waist height.
It is recommended that readings also be taken near ground level.
The monitoring teams were familiar with all of the monitoring locations, although they have been changed from the original plan.
Radio contact was maintained with the monitoring teaus throughout the exercise and no proble.as were observed with the equipment.
- However, the team members did not report their dosimeter readings on a regular basis.
It is recommended that the Radiological Officer obtain and record this inforwatton periodically to assure that team members are not inadvertently exposed.
VI.
Pubile Alerting and Instruction All aspects of activating the primary alert and nottfication system were simulated by offletals at the State EOC with no prior coordination with Louisa, the primary activation location.
The County received a message at about 1800 advising that the State E0C 0
had simulated activating the stren system and EBS at 1759.
Af ter deciding to implement the evacuation at 1825, the County officials initiated simulated route alerting throughout the EPZ portion of the County.
The simulated route alerting was performed by the Sheriff's Ocputies using PA equipped cars.
According to the
$hert(f. they would have broadcast a message advising people that an evacuation had been declared had this been an actual event.
29 o
v VII.
Evacuation and Access Control Sixteen Access Control Points ( ACPs). Suf ficient to block access to the entire Louisa County portion of the EPZ, were established at the ten-mile boundary.
Barricades and signs were delivered to each ACP during the Site Area Emergency phase by the Highway and Transportation Department. The Sheriff's Department and State Police made arrangements for the manning of four ACPs, corresponding to the evacuation time.
According to these representatives, they have ample personnel and resources to activate all necessary Access and Traffic Cor. trol Points, should it be necessary.
The four ACPs d'esignated for manning were observed, but one position, which was the responsibility of the Louisa County Sherif f's Department, was not manned at the time of the observer's visit.
The other three positions observed were manned by the State Police. All I
pesonnel were familiar with the evacuation routes and the location of the evacuation assemaly center.
Personnel had low and high range pocket dosimeters. TL0s and record keeping sheets, although in one case the sheet was completely blank and one trooper did not have a TLD.
Actions to activate the joint Louisa Hanover Evacuation Assembly Center (EAC), located in Hanover County, are coordinated at that location.
The EAC evaluation is included in the Hanover County section of this report.
l Evacuaticn of on site personnel was demonstrated during the Site Area Emergency phase.
At the Utility's request, the County Sheriff's Department established a Traffic Control Point at a key intersection.
The County demonstrated the capability for evacuating residents without their own means of transportation by running two of the ten pre-established bus evacuation routes.
The other eight routes were i
simulated.
The buses picked up volunteer " evacuees" and proceeded to I
the EAC.
j Evacuation of schools was not a consideration during this exercise I
for two reasonst the evacuation took place well after normal school I
hours, and the Superintendent of Schools simulated closing the I
schools at the Site Area Emergency phase.
There are no other special l
facilities located within the Louisa County portion of the EPZ.
l Lists of handicapped and others needing special assistance were not available at the EOC.
According to the Staff, the Welfare Department l
l maintains such lists and is responsible for arranging transportation.
1 V!!!.
Radiological Exposure Control l
All emergency workers observed (local monitoring teams and manned traffic and access control points) had low range and high-range l
pocket dostmeters.
All emergency workers, except for one State Trooper, had TL0s.
The monitoring teams appeared tn be making 30 D
l
regular checks of their dosimetry and recordings of readings on to a log sheet.
In one case, a State Trooper showed his log sheet with no readings marked on the sheet, nor any other information (e.g.,
initial readings when the dosimetry was signed out).
Because the exercise did not provide for the insertion of high readings on any of the emergency worker dosimetry, it is difficult to evaluate what actions would have been taken if an emergency worker approached or exceeded the exposure limits. Although the County Radiological Officer had firm criteria for removing workers from the field, the workers were generally aware of the fact that they should inform the County Radiological Officer of any unusual readings on their pocket do'simeters, but not of a specific maximum doso.
The l
State and/or County may consider in the construction of the scenario l
for the next exercise to incI; 10 play where an emergency worker is told that he has a high dosimetry.eading.
Provision of K! for emergency workers in the fleid was simulated.
County officials reportedly had an adequate supply (not observed) and that unly the Health Department can authorize the use of KI.
The use of K! was simulated during the exercise based on a recommendation by i
l the State and authorization by the County Health Department Director.
IX. Media Relations The PIO was located in a room adjacent to the County E0C.
Although the primary location for dissemination of information to the news media was the Joint Media Center, the P!O reported that this room could be used for press briefings, should it be necessary.
During this exercise, however, a lack of media interest precluded this.
t Information was disseminated by the P!0 to local radio stations via telep'ione, as appropriate, but this was largely simulated, and hard t
copy of such information was not prepared.
Good coordination and l
information sharing was demonstrated between the PIO and the Coordinator.
The PIO also demor.strated capability for rumor control.
Capability for the exchange of hard copy of news releases among the County, State and Joint Media Centers was not available at the County.
The new computer system could not provide this capability, and the previously available telecopter was not used during this l
exercise. Wit 1out this capability, coordination of news releases between the County and State P!O's, as called for in the plan, could not be accomplished effectively.
Some means for transmitting and receiving hard copy of news releases should be established and used at the County E0C.
X.
Recovery and Reentry In accordance with the exercise objectives, the County's radiological monitoring teams remained in the field, reporting readings, until the State EOC reported that radiation levels were low enough to allow 31
reentry.
This nott f tcation was received at the County EOC at 2159.
At 2203. the County was aJvised by the State that the esercise had been terstnated.
ho further recovery and reentry activities were demonstrated.
Louisa County ECC Def tetencies/Pecommendations 1.
After receiving the Governor's evacuation directive, which ECC staff perceived to be inappropriate. County officiais failed to contact the State EOC for clartffcation, resulting in a thirty-five minute delay in implementing the protective action.
In order to assure a coordinated response. thus sintaf:ing public confusion. County officialt should contact the State EOC promptly regarding questions on diretttons or instructions and protective actions should te completed on a timely basis.
l 2.
Ctunty officials strongly favor using the stren systes and (B5 to provide early warning to the public preferably at the Site Area Esergency phase.
This does not conform to the State's policy, which has been to use the strens and [BS to alert and notify the PJblic at the time protective actions are announced.
It is reccenended that County and State offletals resolve this tssue by developing a coordinated approach towards the use of the strens 4*.d (85 public l
nottftcation systens.
3.
The capability for the enchanga of hard copy news releases among the County E00, the State IOC and the Joint Media Center was not available at the County.
In order to permit ef fective coordination of nens releases between the County and State P!0s, sote means for transmitting and receiving hard copy news releases should be established and used at this County E00.
4.
Sose energency workers observed in the fleid were unfamiliar with the radf ation esposure limit.
Energency workers should be fully triefed on the manimum dose allowable without authorization 5.
A status log consisting of a sheet of tablet paper. was posted =tth only the most basic information, and was not readable from more than several feet away.
It is recommended that a large, clearly visible status board be utilized at the County (OC.
6.
Route alert teaus staulated broadcasting a message wntch, according to County offle.f alt, w)uld have advtsed residents to evacuate.
In the interest of time and clarity, it 15 reccenended that a general, all purpose nessage be used, rather than one specifically prepared for a given event.
Such a pessage would advise the public that a power plant emergency had occurred and instrutt then to tune to their (85 station (s).
32 8 &
/
Orange County EOC Activation and Staffing Upon receipt of notification of the Alert classification at 1402, the Emergency Services Coordinator activated the staffing of the EOC.
The EOC was operational by 1410 and staffed by County government representatives, the RADEF Officer and RACES.
The State Regional Coordinator arrived following notification of Site Area Emergency.
Twenty-four hour staffing capability was indicated by the round-the-clock manning of the Sheriff's switchboard and presentation of a call-up roster.
Emergency Operations Management The Emergency Services Coordinator, the person designated in the County plan, was effectively in charge of emergency response operations. He briefed the staff upon receipt of every message.
Because the EOC was engaged in non exercise related daily activities, access could not be secured until after regular working hours.
The EOC was notified of Alert at 1401, of Site Area Emergency at 1644, and of General Emergency at 1759.
Support units were notified by the EOC staf f in a prompt and ef ficient manner.
Elected officials were present and were consulted in decision making.
Facilitie s Because of Ilmited spice within the EOC. the Emergency Coordinator elected to have vew fe'4 people physically report to the EOC proper.
Exercise participants were, however, readily available at their normal day-to day offices.
Status boards and information were displayed indicating EPZ sectors, access control points, and radiological monitoring points.
fr. formation regarding the location of mass care facilities and population in the EPZ was available.
IV. Communications Orange County is well prepared for any emergency with regard to communications capability.
A11 communications personnel are well briefed and trained on their job responsibilities and equipment functions.
The primary link to the EOF EOC and surrounding County EOCs is via the Instaphone, with RACES and commerciel telephone lines as back up. The Virginia Criminal Informatloa Network (VCIN) was also available for hard copy toist)pe traffic at the Dispatcher's Of fice.
The County had telephone contact with the Media Center, but had no back up voice or teletype wl:h this center.
Communication I
between the EOC and the Otspatcher's Office was by commercial telephone.
All message traf fic was e scorded on the proper forms and posted for staff to review.
33
V.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations The local monitoring team was put on alert by the County EOC at approximately 1330; mobilization followed in a timely manner.
The team received the calls at their homes and proceeded to pick-up their monitoring equipment at the firehouse.
They reported arriving at the station at 1455.
The monitoring team leader briefed the staf f on all required procedures.
The team may be activated by phone and/or by a paging system.
An 50P was used by the team to set up their equipment; team members were well ver' sed in the use of all instrumentation.
The members were very familiar with the region, and a map indicating the location of the monitoring stations was available in the EOC.
The monitoring team had available a copy of the County plan.
including a itsting of equipment required.
The team was fully equipped to provide local radiation measurements.
Air, soil, vegetation sampling would be accomplished by State monitoring teams.
The monitoring team had a continual communication link with the County EOC.
According to the local plan, a telephone located across the steet from the monitoring point is the primary communication link with the County C0C.
However, for the purpose of this exercise, a radio was used as the primary communication Itak in order to test this capability. The team was fully equipped with protective clothing and equipment.
The team reported that K! would be available from the Health Department, if required.
The team was issued adequate dosimetry equipment, and was aware of the proper procedures for its use and the location of the decontamination factitty, if needed.
It is noted that the fleid monitoring site is technically located outside the ten mile EPZ.
The Health Otractor was aware of the appropriate procedures in the use of K! and reported that sufficient quantitles were available to meet the needs of the County.
VI. Pubtle Alerting and Instruction Upon being notified of the simulated activation of the sirens and EBS announcement, the E0C staff dispatched a but to run a pre-designated route.
The [0C had prewritten informational messages for local release had they been necessary.
Uecause of the small number of persons who reside within the EPZ the EOC maintains a list of all familles in the [PZ.
In an actual emergency. they would be telephoned and the Sheriff's Department would knock on every door to l
alert the people.
Vll.
Protective Action Traffic Control Points were ordered and activated in a prompt manner as were the (AC activities.
The [0C list indicated that there were no persocs with special transportation needs. Although the State is 34 o
Ul
primarily responsible for Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions, the EOC staff does maintain a close relationship with the County Farm Agent.
Vi!!.
Radiological Exoosure Control The dosimetry equipment available to emergency workers in Orange County included low and high-range dosimeters with chargers, record keeping cards and TLDs. Workers were adequately trained in the use of this equipment.
The County Medical Director was in charge of K!
and was familiar with the guidelines for use.
The RADEF Officer was familiar with r,adiological procedures, monitoring and decontamination procedures.
l IX. Media Relations There was no area set aside for press briefings at the County level.
i A member of the press was invited into the EOC to observe exercise activities.
The rumor control function is provided for by the Sheriff's switchboard staff.
1 I
X.
Recovery and Reentry When a message from the State indicated the area was safe for reentry, the E0C staff authorized return.
No other recovery and reentry activities were demonstrated, l
XI. Scenario In Orange County, the decision to fleid test the computer tended to interfore with E0C operations in that the computer operator was consistently using the limited telephone lines which were available at the E0C.
Orange County E0C Deficiencies / Recommendations 1.
It is recommended that a dedicated Ifne or other direct communication link between the Dispatcher's Office and the E0C be established.
Orange County Evacuation Assembly Center I.
Activation and Staf fing The activation and staffing was completed in a reasonable time.
The principal used a written call down Itst to contact all staff members.
The principal reported that actual activation was achieved in approximately twenty minutes. The number of staff was adequate to support required operations, and all staff members were well trained in their emergency functions.
Twenty four hour staffing was not demonstrated nor accounted for.
The principal reported that the staff present would have to provide round the clock staffing.
35
r Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees The evacuees were monitored for contamination at the doorway of the facility, located within the Orange High School, by rescue squad members who are trained in the proper procedures.
Upon determination of contamination or non-contamination of an individual, they would be led to appropriate points in the EAC.
The non-contaminated evacuees wou1J be taken to the registration desk, and the I
contaminated evacuees would be taken to a paper runner which led to the decontamination station.
The outer clothing is depositec in a covered container en route.
Upon arrival at the showers, thero is
- another covered container, which is well marked, for deposition of final clothing.
After showering, temporary clothing would be l
availab)e for the evacuees.
The decontaminated evacuees would thin bo taken to the registration desk.
111. Congregate Care of Evacuees l
l The EAC is located well outside of the ten mile EPZ.
There are only l
approximately 110 possible evacueos living within the ten mile EPZ and the center can readily accommodate this number of persons.
Adequate sleeping, toilet, drinking, storage and parking facilities are available.
The school catsteria had adequate supplies of emergency foodstuf fs.
There were no special considerations for the handicapped however, the emergency response fact 11ty is located on the first floor, with the exception of the cafeteria.
l IV.
Scenario l
The scenario was adequate to demonstrate EAC activities.
l Decntaminatinn Activities l
l The decontamination facility was also located at the Orange High Sc hool.
The fire Department had equipnent to decontaminate equipment l
and vehlCl9s. Upon arriving at the mass Care Center, all persons and vehicles would be monitored by a rescue squad for possible i
contamination.
Center staff were aware of proper decontamination l
procedures, however, actual demonstration of decantaination i
activities was not observed.
Spotsylvania Cnunty EOC l
Activation and Staf fing a
The Sheriff's Office received notification of an Unusual Event at the 4
North Anna Power Station at 1340 over the dedicated phone in its central dispatch office from the Utility. Using the Standard Operating Procedures and call down IIsts provided, the dispatcher notified the I;nergency Management Coordinator (CMO), who reported to the C0C.
Upon notification of the Alert status at 1348, the EHC began alerting the staff and Informed them of the status of the 36
/
o m
incident and placed them on telephone standby until further notice.
At 1645 the E0C received nottffcation from the Utility that the emergency was upgraded to a Site Area Emergency. At that time all staf f were contacted again and told to report to the EOC.
Sta f fing was completed at 1720. However, the Superintendent of Schools advised the EMC that he had other commitments and lef t the E0C.
His duties were turned over to the Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator who was otherwise occupied with the coordination of all response actions in the County EOC.
The Superintendent of Schools should remain in the E0C and coordinate response actions between the EOC and EAC Manager, thereby relieving key decision-makers of this additional func, tion.
The E0C was fully staffed with the following organizations:
Emergency Management Coordinator Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator l
Pubile Information Rumor Control Message Center Red Cross l
Social Services Superintendent of Schools Transportation l
Pubile Works Medical / Heal th RADEF Officer l
01saster Analysis Rescue Fire Department Sherif f Department State Police County Entension Agent RACES Various Volunteers Serving As Message Runners All staff members displayed adequate training and knowledge.
Twenty four hour staf fing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster and double staffing.
The response ef fort in Spotsylvania County (EOC staff and EAC staff) included support from well over 100 people, most of whom were volunteers.
They should be commended for their enthusiastic participation.
Emergency Operations Management The Emergency Management Coordinator, who is designated in the radiological emergency response plan, was effectively in charge of the emergency response operations.
Coples of the plan and vartous standard operating procedures were available and utilized throughout the exercise. Message logs were kept, nessages were reproduced and routed immediately to the appropriate action agency. Message handling was very efficient. Itowever. In order to relieve some of 37
the confusion and space problems in the operations area. the message center should be set up in the room immediately adjacent to the operations room.
It is also suggested that since the message center keeps a copy of all messages, that the log contain only essential information and not the entire message text. Access to the EOC area was controlled by the Sheriff's Department.
Badges were made up for all members of the response team and were worn throughout the l
exercise.
The EOC was nottfled of Alert status at 1348, Site Area Emergency at 1645, and General Emergency at 1732. All emergency response personnel were placed on standby at 1600 and activated af ter Site Area Emergency.
Elected offletals were present and actively involved in deqision making.
Ill.
Facilities The fac111ttes used for the EOC were adequate for an emergency i
response staf f.
There were sufficent furniture, lighting and telephones available.
Space in the operations room was somewhat Ilmited.
In order to partially alleviate this congestion several l
response functions have been moved to offices outside the operations room. Back up power is available and tested weekly.
Emergency classification levels were posted on the status board, which was clearly visible and kept continuously up to date.
All necessary maps were available and posted, j
IV. Communications l
The County has established an outstanding communications network, l
l both with primary and back up methods.
The Instaphone is used 45 the primary means of contact between State E0C, North Anna [Or, and i
I surrounding E0Cs.
This is backed up with RActs. VCIN, and commercial telephone.
The Instaphone is located in the Short f f's dispatch o f fice.
In order for the County [MC to be able to talk directly to i
the State [0C and (Or personnel, a drop off the Instaphone line should be located in the operations room.
The primary contact with the local [AC was provided by the Civil Air
)
Patrol (CAP), with emergency vehicles by the County radic not, and with the radfological monitoring teams by RACts.
All those radio I
nets were backed up by commercial telephone.
The RACES operators were also providing a transmission path for Red Cross traffic between the County and State EOC.
All message traffic was recorded on the proper forms and then passed through the message control point where it was logged and then distributed to the action individual.
1 j'
Overall, the communications and message traffic was handled very l
professionally.
l l
l 3a
[
i
l V.
Dese Assessment and Protettive A:tton Reconmendations Four local sonitoring teaus were n:blitted and dis:atc*ed fe:n the EOC at 1930. Three were assigned to field routes and t*e foweth sent to the EAC. All teaus were forsed from nerters of volunteer fire departsents, who are accessible through twenty-four hcur ;.4163 1
systess and RACES bact up. idhen the mesters arrived at t%e E00 shortly before 5tte Energency, they were betefed and updated on plant confittens. east;rient chect ;rocedures, esposure control and team responsiblittles, t.e., route assigments acnttoring and repertin; procedares. Each tess was supp1ted with anti contantnation clothing.
hig't and low ran;e pocket d:stretry. TLCs adewate dete: tion egat;ssent (1 700 and 2-115s) ans route naps.
(ach teas was assired a RACES volunteer to accespany then.
TPe l
RACES sester proviced a back up cetweanication Systta to tee energen:p l
veitcles' sobile FN systess.
Teams were instracted to call in readings uling both Systess.
i Oc.e a:nttoring teas was observed in the field.
The tean was fast 11ar with tMe area they were alstrt2 to a:ntter.
The test dt"*nstrated I
their ability to properly a:nttor their 455tred locattoe.1 and call in their readings.
Tean nesters wsre prop 4e dotteetry aed monitored l
and recorded their readings at appropetate intervals. Ce occasion
- dead spott' occurred along their route where the team wat unable to cceanicate *:nitored readingt. N=ever. einar moetsent of t*e vehicle reeltab11thed C0ertantcations.
E! wat r.st available to teas aesters eor were they aware of w".at it it or grocedwres for its wie.
Att%3s;i the pr1ctr ute of dattettry was dee:nstrated the l
senters were not aware of what nestaus dotes were allowed or w"at constituted dangerous levels.
TPey were aware of t%e location of the decontastnetton center, but Pad no idea of w*en they w wid reed to l
re;crt to the decontantnation center.
VI.
Pabite Alerting and Instrwetion T*e County received a nellage fres the $ tate [0C at 1802 t*st the stren tiltei and 185 had been activated at 1759.
There was no attempt by the State to coordtrate the activation of this systes with
$potsylvanta County.
The Cownty hat many actions to take in conjunction with the alert aed rettfication syntes activation and i
should be aware teforemand of esa: tty w*en the sittes is to be activated.
Route alerting was not disculled or de* castrated daring this esercise.
Although the $ tate was responttble for activation of the (B$ lyttes and preparation of aessaget to be alred cver the fl$ station.
Spotty 1vanta County did prepare and tend out, over regalar local radio stations. leforsational type rev$ releasel to the pabitc.
These news releasel were coordlested with the State P10.
Teep were clear and appropriate to the tituation.
i 39
VII. Protective Actions A.
Evacuation and Traffic Control A full demonstration of access control was conducted by the County Sheriff's Office and the State Police.
Three posts were manned by State and local police.
Each location was provided signs by the Virginia Department of Highways.
The police stopped all vehicles passing through the control points and informed the public that an exercise was in progress and an esercise brochure was given to each vehicle.
Those vehicles entering the EPZ were also told that in an actual emergency they would not be allowed to proceed.
All officers were fully aware of their responsibilities, how to control ingress and were familiar with the location of the mass care center.
The officers had also been trained in radiological monitoring and esposure control.
The police /public interchange was a very positive aspect of this demonstration.
The pubitc appeared to very favorably receive the information provided.
Activation of traffic and access control points and Evacuation Assembly Center were ordered promptly.
8.
Special Evacuation Problems The Transportation Officer in the IOC is responsible for the evacuation of mobility impatred individuals. There are two such people in Spotsylvanta County within the ten mile EPZ.
Actual communication with these individuals was not observed.
The equignent/ vehicles are reportedly available in the County to evacuate the mobility impaired individuals.
C.
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actfons The County Estension Agent informed the observer that there are $1s large dairy farms in the ten mile [PZ in Spotsylvania County.
These Csttle are always fed with stored feed and water.
However. County officf als are unaware of any esisting plans or procedures for farmers to reenter the evacuated area to feed and milk their livestock.
No ingestion pathway protective action recommendations were received from the State Department of Agriculture.
Local officials should be Instructed 45 to established procedures for reentry of farmers into the restricted area.
VI!!.
Radiological (sposure Control All field workers reported to the EOC af ter 5f te Ares [sergency.
They were issued high (0 200R) and low (0 200mR) range dostmeters and permanent record dosimeters (TL0s).
Appropetate instructions for charging and reading dostmeters and record keeping were given by the Radfological Of ficer at a briefing for all field workers.
Field workers knew where to report for decontamination, but were not aware of mastmum doses allowed without authorization, in some instances.
40
,/
r A rec:meagatt:n to assinister t! to teer;e*:f <:**ers in l
Sp:tsf esita is re:etet! fem t*e 5:ste ECC at a:;reateateifIC.
A:e;;ste sa::1tes of (!.eet seatla:1e; Pc.eee*, 5:me flet:.:eters e procesa es c:m:ernts; its use.
.ece c:t a.are c r
II. Nsta telatices A.i of fice was dest;*atet f:r ;-ress telef te;s in t*e IOC. a*$
telefin;s.ece ;1.es coer t$e tete;* *e ty t*e P!O ts 1:<a1 :eess a*
ratto statt:9s. All inf:*esti:n 11se9 to t*e utsta as c::rit ste:
.t.t9 t** 5 tate P!0. i s:e c:etr:1.as esta:11s'e!. etti t*e 8!O tee;te; tMe rs:r c:ntrol staff carrent :s t*e ente;ea:p stat.s.
E.
CtcGetry art Fetntry i
l
%:t detestrate$ darln; t%ts esertis4 tef *3 c:sttR.t3 raitelt;ttal l
field rea$1n;s.
II. $0enart:
l l
i'4 s:eearto was af e;4 ate to test t*-e !;ctsple asta C.:. sty 8!s).
5;<ts eleseta Ce.etf (CC 04f tetex tes/8e:: mea. sttees 1.
tee 5.:ectete*:ent of 5:6:31s a:ts as 11sts:a tetweem t*e (0* act II; at t*e (casty. Af ter re:qrtle; to tte t00. *c tse*, *4 lef t te:aase o f :t'er entititits.
f*e Itals:a. tetwee9 t*t ("O 4*$ Is0 ts a se*f is:cettet ;1s11109. ttet st:ald 24 wat*ei to c::rita, ate t*e res;;*se a:ttettles 24tetes t*e (0; ar.: 150 t*ereof retteste; sey ee:tsten.
naters of tif s sisitf mal faxties.
j 2.
t*e IOC c;4raticas etes is a seme.*.at coegested area w",en all sta ff are ; resent.
It is re::mtaged t*at t*e Wests;e ce9 tee te ret?* ate!
1 t%e r::e i s titately afja:ent to t*e 0:4ratices c us 1: 411eetate sont o f t*,e cen;estion.
3.
Nsta;e center ;4rs
- eel estatsin 49 official c:pp of all sessages sat are res;4estele for saf etatate; t*e sistas t>:aets as! offittal
!/
sessage Ic;s.
To relieve sone of tr.e itnamit places ce nessage coeter pres;erel. wessage Ic;s s**c914 coatata celf esteettal 19f:ena ton, ret t*e entire test of tre sessa;e.
4 A 4 rop off t*e Insts;%ee s*.:vid te 1ccates in t*e (~4 c 4ratt:ms area *tc% w:vid ;4estt dire:t com.stcatteas t4 tete 9 t* e (** 4
- 2 t* e Ce-:tsten. asters at the $ tate (00, t*e (0F art ot*er ritt co.ettes.
Cowety 0:4rattoas staff are ect aware of any plans ce secteettee actics trcceferes f:e farmers in tPt area =*c nay re;aest to reteter the (PZ in orfer to feed ans allk t*etr livest ca.
It-e Ceaety tateetten A; eat should w:rk wit *t (Pe State 04;4rtweet of A;etcattare to Clartff estabitstti pr0ct$ ares to grotect 19ese tefteli.als.
41
6.
Briefings to field workers should include procedures in the use of KI and maximum doses allowable without authorization.
7.
The County did not demonstrate route alerting procedures.
It is noted that this was an identified deficiency in the previous exercise, and should have been demonstrated during this exercise.
Spotsylvania County Evacuation Assembly Center 1.
Activation and Staffing Staffing of the EAC occurred earlier than called for in the plan.
The.EAC Manager was called during the Alert phase and activation procedures (unobserved) were implemented at that time.
The EAC was almost fully staffed within fifteen minutes of the Site Area Emergency.
Since many of the staff (volunteers) were working in the school (the Battlefield Intermediate School), or the immediate vicinity, this early activation is justifiable.
Approximately fifty I
individuals were staffed within EAC:
(10) EAC Manager and immediate staff (food, maint., etc.)
(3) Sheriff's Office (security)
(1) State Department of Health (radiological)
(3) Local Department of Health (8) Social Services (registration, radiological I
monitoring, issuing clothing, etc.)
(5) Red Cross (included nurse)
(2) Volunteer ambulance corporation -
(4) Volunteer firemen (radiological monitoring in full gear)
(15) Volunteers - no predesignated assignment The staff size was sufficient, but additional representation from State Health and additional radiological monitors would abet operations.
l The staff appeared to be adequately trained for their assigned i
functions. Refresher training of radiological monitors by the State Health individual was provided as needed.
Call lists for the EAC second shift were available at both the E0C and EAC.
Simulated calling of the second shift was demonstrated.
Though the staff knew their individual assignments, the EAC Manager did not provide sufficient supervision and coordination to combine these individual activities into a smoothly run operation.. The staff was not informed of the status of activities during the exercise.
II.- Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees All evacuees were checked for contomination upon entrance to the EAC.
Upon completion of radiological monitoring activities, all individuals were processed (registered), with those identified as being contaminated being routed through the decontamination facilities at the EAC..
42
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j III. Congregate Care of Evacuees The EAC (Battlefield Intermediate School) is located approximately sixteen miles from the North Anna Power Station.
This center could
~
accommodate approximately 1,000 individuals with food and shelter, if necessary.
Should additional facilities be necessary for an overflow of evacuees, another school is located nearby which can be utilized.
The food supply at the EAC was sufficient for the staff and evacuees.
Communication between the local E0C and EAC was via commercial telephone.
Decontamination Activities The decontamination facility was located at the EAC.
Upon entering the EAC, all evacuees,went through two contamination checkpoints.
Volunteer firemen (monitors) checked evacuees outside the EAC with CDV-700 instruments, while radiological monitors (Social Services) monitored evacuees inside the building with Ludlum instruments.
Though this was redundant, it gave all monitors the opportunity to get additional training.
Protective clothing was available to volunteer firemen but not for the other radiological monitors. While procedures were demonstrated for determining the need to decontaminate people, equipment and vehicles, actual demonstration of decontamination of equipment or vehicles was not observed.
Upon completion of the contamination check, those evacuees who were determined to be contaminated were processed through the decontamination facilities.
Pathways were clearly identified to distinguish contaminated versus clean areas. However, additional supervision is necessary to monitor and limit access of contaminated individuals to specified areas. At the shower facilities, contaminated evacuees simulated disrobing and placing all contaminated clothing into metal bins.
They were issued towels and soap (other items from Red Cross) for showering.
After showering, they were immediately rechecked for contamination by radiological monitors.
If still contaminated, they would go through showering again.
If contamination was still present, the State representative from the Department of Health was present to determine a further course of action.
Clothing provided by Salvation Army was available for evacuees following the decontamination process.
The major deficiency in the decontamination process was logistical; EAC personnel should consider additional measures to restrict the contact of clean and contaminated persons in the Center.
For the most part, the EAC demonstrated the capability to adequately operate during an emergency situation.
Evacuation Assembly Center Deficiencies / Recommendations 1.
The physical layout at the entrance to the EAC should be revised in order to eliminate the possibility of contaminating " clean" evacuees and emergency workers. The following areas should be considered:
43 1
c s,
(a) contaminated evacuee area and the registration area should be set further apart and contaminated individuals should be. registered after
~
decontamination; (b) following decontamination, women should not have to pass through a contaminated area-to enter the EAC.
~
2.
At one point during the exercise, individuals were observed entering the EAC through the kitchen area.
This could pose a potential problem during an emergency, should these individuals be contaminated.
Actions should be taken to provide better access
. control to the EAC.
- 3.. Although the staff in the EAC knew their individual assignments, the EAC Manager was' lax in providing -sufficient supervision and coordination to combine these individual functions into a smoothly run operation..The staff was not informed of the status of activities during the ' exercise.
L I
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44
7 s
SUMMARY
LIST OF DEFICIERCIES/ RECOMMENDATIONS This report has referenced two types of deficiencies.
Category "A" and Category "B".
It is important to differentiate between the two.
A Category "A" deficiency is of the type that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the North Anna Power Station in thd event of a radiological emergency.
Category "B" deficiencies include those where demonstrated (and observed) performance during the exercise was considered faulty, corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of an actual radiological emergency, appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
Also included under Category "B" deficiencies are Category "B" recommendations.
Category "B" recommendations are those areas where performance was considered adequate, but where a correctable weakness was noted.
Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to perform their adequately demonstrated response capability.
45
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, Y
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCY Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Lcuisa County 1.
After receiving the Governor's J.9 evacuation directive, which EOC staff perceived to be inappropriate, County officials failed to contact the State E0C for clarification, resulting in a thirty-five minute delay in implementing the protective action.
In order to assure a coordinated response, thus minimizing public confusion, County officials should contact the State EOC promptly regarding questions on directions or instructions, and protective actions should be completed on a timely basis.
46
SUMMARY
OF CATIGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual-De ficiency/ Recommendation Part il Correc tion Da te Da te Commonwealth of Virginia 1.
The. State Operations Of ficer should E.5 ensure that all documents concerning protective actions, to include the Goverr.or's Proclamation of Emergency, conform with current protective action recommendations / decisions.
2.
The need for heightened coordination E.5 and sharing of Information received by J.9 the BRH at the State EOC should be emphasized with BRH staf f.
Updates to radiological / meteorological conditions
- should be immediately forwarded to the appropriate individuals / organization.
.3.
Communication to the Counties regarding L.5 the timing of the simulated Ens and stren F.1.b.
activation was belated, and no advance coordination with the primary stren ac tivation point.was demonstra ted.
future exercises should actually demonstrate activation of the stren and EHS systems.
47
g, N
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l l
SINGIARY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Ac tual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correc tion Date Date 4.
The Department of State Police K.3.a.
should ensure that all police department K.3.b.
emergency workers are issued TLDs and instructed to maintain record keeping cards.
(See Louisa County report.)
State / Local Radiological Monitoring Teams 5.
Field teams should be briefed with regard J.9 to meteorological conditions by the EOF prior to their deployment to the field; local team members should be instructed as to the'ir roles / responsibilities.
6.
Additional training should be provided
.K.3.a.
to team members with regard to decon-0.4.c.
tamination procedures, maximum dose allowed without authorization, and instructions regarding procedures to be followed if dose limits are exceeded.
7 Communications should be maintained F.1. d.
between the field teams and the EOF throughout the course of the exercise as to team locations, plant conditions, etc.
48
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Agricultural Sampling Team 8.
Field sampling teams should be provided F.1.d.
with two-way radios in their vehicles to permit the timely exchange of information.
- 9.. Recording keeping cards should be K.3.a.
issued to sampling teams members along K.3.b.
with other dosimetry equipment.
News Media Center
- 10. The Department of Emergency Services E.5 and Public Information staff should re-G.4.b.
view information flow processes to the News Media Center to ensure the timely trans-mission of information regarding plant status.
Caroline County
- 11. One access point to the E0C designed for J.In.j.
use by the media was left unmonitored for an extended length of time.
Arrangements should be made to prevent this in future exercises.
49
'N s
i SIMIARY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Da te Date
- 12. The State EOC did not initiate any J.9 discussion with the County regarding J.11 ingestion pathway protection actions.
In the absence of such State initiative, the County should have sought information concerning the ingestion pathway.
13.
Protective clothing was not available to K.3.a.
County emergency workers in the field.
Some of this type equipment, which is available at the County E0C, should be prepositioned at a more convenient location.
.1 Han:ver County
- 14. Security should be more fully J.10.J.
demonstrated during future exercies.
15.
Elected officials should take a more A.2.a.
active role in future exercises.
16.
If the County continues to use the F.1.d.
operations room used in this and past N.5 exercises, a drop off for the Instaphone and additional telephone lines should be installed at the EOC.
It is noted that this was an identified deficiency in the previous exercise.
50
St# WARY Of CAilGO_RY *R* DillCll_NCig Reference NilRE G-06S4 proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation part 11 Correction Da te Date 17.
The [0C staf f need to better develop E.5 their plans for route alerting.
The E.6 IMC 15 unaware of how many vehicles J.10.c.
would be needed or the path that they would take.
Also, a general, prescripted message should be developed that these
' these teams will broadcast.
It is recommended that they alert residents to tune to their Lil5 station.
18.
The RADEr Officer should refamilldelic J.9 himsel f with the procedures established 0.1 for emergency worker radiological exposure control.
19.
Imergency workers should be fully briefed J.9 on the maximimi dose allowable without K.4 authorliation.
0.4.g.
Laufsa County 20.
Some emeryoney workers observed in the J.9 field.were unfamiliar with the radiation K.4 exposure limit.
Imergency workers should-0.4.g.
he fully. hrlefed on the maximum dose allowable without authorfration.
61
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SUf9tARY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Da te
- 21.. Route alerting teams simulated broad-E.5 casting a message which, according to E.6 County officials, would have advised residents to evacuate.
In the interest of time and clarity, a general, pre-scripted message is recommended, instructing residents to tune to their EBS station.
Spotsylvania County 22.
The Superintendent of Schools acts as A.I.e.
liaison between the E0C and EAC at the County.
After reporting to the E0C, however, he left because of other commitments.. This is a very important position that should be manned to co-ordinate response activities between the E0C and EAC, thereby relieving key decision-makers of this additional function.
23.
It is recommended that a drop off of F.1.d.
the lastaphone be located in the E0C Operations area which would permit direct communications between the EMC and the decision-makers at the State E0C, E0F and other risk counties.
52
SUMMARY
OF CAT,EGORY "B" DEFICIENCI,ES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj 'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correc tion Date Date 24.-
County operations staff are not aware J 10.e.
of any protective action procedures for J.11 farmers in the area who may request to K.4 reenter the EPZ in order to feed and 0.1 milk their livestock.
The County Extension Agent should work with the State Department of Agriculture to clarify established procedures to protect these individuals.
- 25. Briefings to field workers should J.9 include procedures in the use of KI J.10.e.
and maximum doses allowable without K.4 authorization.
0.4.g.
26.
The County did not demonstrate route E.5 alerting ' procedures.
It is noted that N.5 this was an identified deficiency in the previous exercise and should have been
' demonstrated during this exercise.
53 l
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Suf01ARY OF CATEGORY "B" REColglE100AT10llS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correc tion Date Date Commonwealth of Virginia 29.
Additinnal training should be provided 0.1 to bac!.-up support staff responsible for m:ssage handling and status board updates.
- 30. BRH information handling procedures should be reviewed for possible improve-
. ment, to include the need for clarification of messages received if not completely clear.
31.
The E0C PIO should utilize available hard G 4.b.
copy transmission devices (telefax, VCIN or the new computer network) to provide the Counties with timely information updates.
State / Local Radiological Monitoring Teams
-32.
It is recommended that the joint teams I.8 expeditiously prepare for field de-ployment at the staging area to allow for.immediate deployment upon direction from the EOF.
55
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4,
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SINSUutY OF CATEGORY "B" RECWWIENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Da te Date
- 33. Consideration should be made for more I.8 extensive use of the field teams' capabilities, i.e., the monitoring of additional locations and a greater variety of samples, including water, soll and/or vegetation.
News Media Center 34.
It is recommended that a working area be set aside for PIO staff use.
secluded from the media briefing area.
. Caroline County
- 35. All significant incoming and outgoing E0C messages should be logged.
Signiff-cant on and off-site events, including emergency classification levels, should be posted and updated in order to enable newly arrived staff to quickly orient themselves as to the status of the emergency response.
56
.n.
SINSIARY OF CATEGORY "B" REC (NOIENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Hanover County 36.
The antennae cable for the RACES F.1 equipment had been severed, requiring the RACES staff to operate from their vehicle outside of the building, swe-what delaying the receipt of messages.
The antennae cable should be repaired.
- 37. A larger room providing seating for J.10 anticipated press representatives would better accommodate media functions.
Additional maps, such as the EPZ and Evacuation Route maps, would be extremely helpful in accomplishing more effective briefings.
57
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S_UDOIARY OF CATEGORY "B" REC (BetENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual De ficiency/ Recommendation Part II 2'rrection Date Date Leuisa County 38.
County officials strongly favor using E.5 the stren system and EBS to provide early warning to the public, preferably at the Site Area Emergency phase.
This does not conform to the State's policy of using the strens and EBS to alert and notify the public at the time protective actions are announced.
It is recommended that County and State officials resolve this issue by developing a coordinated approach towards the use of the stren and EBS public notification systems.
39.
The capability for the exchange of hard G.4.b.
copy news releases among the County E0C.
State EOC and the Joint Media Center was not available at the County.
In order to permit effective coordination of news re-leases between the County and State PIDs.
some means for transmitting and receiving hard copy news releases should be established and used at the County EOC.
58
SINWIARY OF CATEGORY "B" RECWWIENDATIONS Recommendation NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 40.
It is recommended that a large, clearly visible status board be utilized at the County E0C.
Orange County 41.
It is recommended that a dedicated F.1.d.
line or other direct communication link between the Dispatcher's Office and the l
EOC be established.
i Spotsylvania County 42.
The E0C operations room is a somewhat congested area when all staff are present.
It is recommended that the message center be relocated to the room immediately adjacent to the operations room to alleviate some of this congestion.
59 4
N, StBOIARY OF CATEGORY "B" RECOBOKIISATIONS Re ference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Da te
- 43. Message center personnel maintain an official copy of all messages and are responsible for maintaining the status boards and official message logs.
To relieve some of the demands placed on message center personnel, message logs should contain only essential information, not the entire text of the message.
44 Although the staff in the EAC knew their 0.4.
Individual assignments, the EAC Manager did not provide sufficient supervision and coordination to combine these individual functions into a smoothly run o pera tion.
The staff were informed of the -status of activities during the. exercise.
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