ML20125B225

Requests Hearing on Behalf of Sassafras Audubon Society of Lawrence,Green,Monroe,Brown,Morgan & Owen Counties,In,Re 790815 Order Confirming Suspension of Const

ML20125B225
Person / Time
Site:	Marble Hill
Issue date:	09/01/1979
From:	Eyed J SASSAFRAS AUDUBON SOCIETY
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML19261F168	List: ML20125B217 ML20125B220 ML20125B225 ML20125B228 ML20125B233
References
NUDOCS 7910250462
Download: ML20125B225 (16)

Text

. ATTACHMENT 3 3' /[ ,

The SASSAFRAS AUDUBON SOCIETY i h~, of LAWRENCE - GREENE SIONROE - BROWN -

h SIORGAN & OWEN COUNTIES g INDIANA September 1, 1979

,! TO: Victor Stello, Jr., Director i.( Office of Inspection and Enforcement

- , United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission RE: Public Service Indiana, Inc. Docket Nos.

(Marble Hill Nuclear Generating STN 50-546 Station, Units 1 & 2) ,

STN 50-547 A REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON. ORDER CONFIR'41NG SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION I

The CRDER CONFIPJ4ING SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION at Marble Hill, issued August 15, 1979, by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, states (page 7) that any person whose interests may be af-facted by this order may request a hearing within 20 days of the date of the order, and that the issues to be considered at such a hearing shall be: (1)

Whether the facts set forth in Parts II and III of the Order are true; and (2)  !

Whether the Order should'be sustained. I l

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II The Order 1) Confirms the stop work order on all safety-related construction issued August 7, 1979, by the licensee (Public Service Indiana) and cites in Sections II, III, and Appendix A, numerous instances of the licensee's noncompliance with Criteria of Appendix B 10 CFR Part 50 of the Commission's regulations; refers to the in-spection of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel ,

Inspectors, June 12-14, 1979, at the Marble Hill site which re- l sulted in the Board's recommendation that the licensee's ASME l Certificate of Authorization should be withdrawn and that the i licensee should cease acting as a supplier of ASME Code materi-al to its subcontractors without ASME authorization; and notes the failure of the licensee to institute a quality assurance program for the construction of Marble Hill;

2) Requires that the licensee submit in writing under oath to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement a description of its re-vised quality assurance program and the steps taken to assure that safety-related construction will be conducted in accordance with Appendix 8 of 10 CFR Part 50 of the Cer;nission's regula-tions; PDM gg .

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3) Orders that safety-related construction shall not resume in whole or in part until~ the Director of Inspection and Enforce- 1 ment has confirmed in ~ writing that reasonable assurance exists i that such construction activities will be conducted in accord- l ance with construction codes for nuclear plants, and lists 9

' items which the licensee must address in evaluating its past l quality assurance program and revising and developing a new 1 quality-assurance program, and which the Director will consider in reaching his determination (v;hether and extent to which the licensee has adequately addressed the 9 items); 1

4) Notes that the filing of a request for a hearing need not stay resumption of all or part of construction if authorized by the Director in accordance with the order, nor need that the Order l be stayed by-the pendency of any proceeding on the order.

III As previously mentioned, the Order 1) lists and describes violations and non- ,

compliances of Public Service Indiana (PSI) with provisions of their Construc-documents PSI's failure to institute a quality assurance tion Permit, program, the and basis2)for suspension of safety-related construction.

The main thrust of the Order, however, is toward "getting the show on the road" ,

again at Marble Hill. To do this, PSI must " reasonably assure" the NRC that '

safety-related construction will be according to accepted construction codes ]

and a quality-assured program. (under oath). j The final thrdst of the order emphasizes the priority the

NRC places on resumption of construction. Neither a re- i quest for a hearing, nor the pendency of any proceeding, need stay resumption of all or part of construction activ- 1 ities.

THE PRIORITIES OF THE NRC ARE MISPLACED. The Order characterizes the problems at Marofe Hill as " serious" out only in the context.of inadequacies in the  !

quality assurance program. How serious are the constructional deficiencies at Marble Hill in tenns of the public health and safety? The public is concerned as to the adequacy of the NRC-PSI investigation and should be informed of its extent. If it has not been sufficient, there should be a full-scale study.

The question of whether PSI's construction license should be revoked should be part of a thorough assessment of. the situation and take precedence over other considerations.

Several independent investigations of Marble Hill's problems are under way:

Senator Birch Bayh requested in July that the Senate Cem-mittee on Environment and Public Works conduct a full and ccmplete investigatio'n into numerous violations concerned I with improper pouring of concrete in safety areas of Marble L

Hill.

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) will 90019255

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conduct their own investigation in September based on the report of. the' National Board of Boiler 'and Pressure Vessel- '

Inspectors investigation of June 12-14, 1979.

The Indianapolis office of the FBI is investigating con-struction practices at Marble Hill' as an outgrowth of the

'NRC's-investigation of worker allegations of " cover ups"-

' of . faulty concrete.

It would.be arrogantly presumptuous to even consider resumption of safety-re-lated construction at Marble Hill before the results of all of the investiga-tions are in, a definite analysis is made of the quality of the structural concrete, and the seriousness of the violations and charges have been assess-ed. PSI did not delegate responsibility to its contractors but exercised full responsibility and control over all aspects of the Marble. Hill. Project. As the responsible party, it must wait for the results of the investigations.  ;

With these considerations ~in mind:

THE SASSAFRAS AUDUBON SOCIETY REQUESTS A HEARING ON THE ORDER FOR SUSPENSION BECAUSE OF OBJECTIONS TO AND @fGTINsdI ON THE ORDER, A5 WELL AS THE FIRM BELIEF THAT OUR INTEREST WOULD BE AFFECTED WERE CERTAIN PARTS OF THE ORDER TO BE SUSTAINED.

Whether the facts set forth in Parts. II and III of the Order are true is not as pertinent nor as important as whether they'give a fair and accurate account of the situation as it developed. By themselves , they are remarkably incom-plete (another valid reason for a hearing: to present other facts and other

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. viewpoints).

WE FURTHER REQUEST THAT THE SUSPENSION OF CON-STRUCTION BE SUSTAINED BY THE NRC UNTIL INVESTI-GATIONS IN PROGRESS ARE COMPLETED, AS WELL AS l ANY WHICH MIGHT BE DEEMED NECESSARY AS A CONSE- -l l

QUENCE, AND THE SERIOUSNESS 0.F THE SITUATION IS '

PROPERLY ASSESSED.

IV ,

l The following discussion of many points concerning 1) construction, 2) inspec-tion of construction, and 3) other regulatory aspects preceding plant opera- i tion relative to Marble Hill and other nuclear plants, is designed to further l establish our right to a Hearing under the Order of Suspension.  !

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V i H0w important is " meticulous engineering, construction, and quality assurance" in the construction of a nuclear plant to the safe cperation of that plant?

l The Risk Assessment Review Group on Reactor Safety asserted in their Report l -(NUREG/CR-0400 September 1978) that " safety with respect to normal accident ineering, i sequences would lie in redundancy, defense-in-depth, and meti

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construction, and quality assurance." 10 CFR Part 50.3 and Appendix B of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Code and the ASME !?uclear .' ode were adopted to insure, as far as they could, "c.eticulous engineering, ccnstruction, and qual-ity assurance" of nuclear generating stations. The of t-used term, " safety-re-lated", implies that there should be strict and conscientious adherence to the codes to assure the public's health and safety.

Appendix A of the Order of Suspension is an impressive account of noncompliance of PSI. personnel and personnel under contract with FSI with 10 CFR Part 50 Ap-pendix'B:

. . . . . personnel assigned to quality assurance respens ibilities did not have appropriate experience in placement of concrete for nuclear reactors and did not follow acceptable standards and procedures in the placement of concrete at Marble Hill, e.g. in specific instances, preplacement inspection did not identify improper horizont vertical preparation of construction joints, inadequate cle,al and anliness of reinforcement steel, and inadequate clearance of reinforcement steel; placement inspection did not identify improper use of con-crete vibrators, improper concrete lif t thickness, and excessive lateral movement of concrete using vibrators.

. . . . .even given recognition of improper placemenc of concrete', PSI in-spection personnel had insufficient authority to immediately stop or prevent nonconfornTing in-process work and there was no detailed procedure for evaluating repetitive nonconform nces.

. . . . . in the matter of repair of defective cencrete, 5I 1) did not assure that the accepted procedure for identification nd tagging of defec-tive concrete was followed; 2) did not assure - 3;uate training of 4 craft personnel in repairing defective concrett . as instanced by im-proper materials used in repairs, improper ste. _;e of cement used for dry-pack materials, and lack of a proced_re for repair of defec-tive concrete using dry-pack materials, and did not identify or take corrective action with respect to approximately 170 unacceptable concrete patches.

The Order of Suspension mentions that the first Notice of Violation with re-gard to poor control of the quality of concrete plac': cent was issued to PSI on May 4,1979, with a second Notice of Violation on May 29, 1979 (which included a citation on impreper curing of concrete in the contciement wall). The Order does not mention, hcwever, that NRC inspectors met with 5'te staff representa-tives at the conclusion of the Acril 3-6, 1979 inspectica and summarized the scope and findings which included noniciipliances in concrete work. Region III personnel also met with PSI Management on May 15, 1979, :o request that PSI evaluate in-place Auxiliary Building concrete liiid ciscmed the need of quali-ty control inspection of concrete activities. Nevertt eless, despite these early notifications and discussions with PSI, the man. nonc:mpliances listed in Appendix A (and repeated above) were identified in NRC investigations cov-ering the period from June 21-July 27, 1979, i

l VI l

l The public first learned of the faulty concrete construc-ion at Marble Hill 90019257

f as well as the faulty repair of that concrete) on June 12, 1979, through al-legations contained in an affidavit of Mr. Charles Cutshall who had worked as a concrete finisher's helper at Marble Hill. Mr. Cutshall is referred to in the Order as "a former construction worker at the Marble Hill site who alleged that several honeycombed areas in the concrete had been improperly repaired."

Both the' NRC and PSI identified honeycombed areas that had been defectively repaired subsequent to Mr. Cutshall's allegations, but no mention is made in the Order of his references to the directions of supervisor personnel "to fill ,

in cer'tain holes or honeycomb in the side of a wall before the inspector can see it." As Mr. Cutshall describes it:

.....the defective repairs made at the supervisor's direction consisted of slapping a patch on the honeycomb of an inch or so, just to make it look good from the outside.

No mention is made in the Order of Mr. Jewel Rogers, Mr. Stanley Mortenson, and Mr. Michael Walston, also concrete workers at Marble Hill, who signed af-fidavits, July 10, 1979, charging serious flaws in the concrete work at Marble Hill, including " heavy faults" in the base of the reactor containment building.

The affidavits cont'ain the names of personnel who allegedly ordered cover-ups of concrete flaws.

A fomer cement inspector at Marble Hill, an employee of U.S. Testing (who has remained unidentified by the press) has stated in a sworn transcript that one of his inspection reports was falsified. He alleges that his initial report indicated a failure of the cement batch, but was changed to show that it had passed. He came across the falsified report while going through the files on the site. ,

d The same cement inspector alleges that cement was poured in driving rains, ,

curing temperatures for concrete were recorded on days when no one was present, I and that he was instructed by U.S. Testing to wait for a " good batch" of ce-  !

ment before sampling it. He further alleges that PSI'was informed of many of t

the construction problems as early as August 1978 but took only minimum cor-rective measures, and did not tear out the work in the core contairment build-ing where specifications were not met.

PSI has also delayed reporting as well as failed to report structur-al damage at Marble Hill, although NRC Regulations require reports within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a "significant deficiency". I 1

On February 13, 1979, concrete was poured at a rate 3X faster than recommended in the NRC Regulatory Guide, rupturing a form and de-forming the steel liner. The construction company reported the "in-cident" immediately to PSI but it was felt that it was not serious enough to be reported to the NRC. NRC inspectors learned of the damage on their own on April 30, 1979, and received no formal noti- i fication until June 1,1979.  ;

1 A May 9,1979 Report from PSI to the NRC (found in the Marble Hill l l

File aI the Madison-Jefferson County Library) was concerned with an l i Acril 9,1979 accident in which two construction cranes collided, witn tee 4100 crane falling and striking the containment liner with j l

considerable damage to stiffeners and reinforcing bars. A complete l l

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report of the significance of. the damage was promised by' PSI when evaluation was. complete,-_ but there was no follow-up Report in the l

file in mid-June, '1979.

VII The Order notes in Appendix A (5)'that contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action), PSI did not take action to resolve noncom- ,

plianc'e with ASME requirements related to their activities as a supplier of materials to its site contractors, even though these noncomoliances were iden-tified aporoximately two years ago. (emphasis added)

The failure'of PSI to comply with the ASME Code within a " reasonable period of i time" prompted an investigation of the Marble Hill Project by the National

. Board of. Boiler and Pressure Yessel Inspectors, June 12-14, 1979, resulting in the citing of PSI for numerous violations of the ASME Code (1.7 of the Nation- ,

al Board Report, July 10,1979) and recommending that the owner's ASME Certi-ficate of Authorization should be withdrawn until such time as PSI has obtain-ed a valid Certificate of Authorization to use the ASME "N" symbol and has corrected the apparent Code violations. >

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) plan to conduct their own investigation in September on,the findin'gs of the National Board of Inspectors.

In the meantime, we seek answers to a number of obvious questions raised by the National Board Report:

.....Since PSI advised the National Board team that they, as owner, had overall responsibility for the design and construction of the Marble i Hill Nuclear G'enerating Plant, and did not propose to delegate that

" responsibility to others, why had they not applied "in good time" to l ASME~ for a Certificate of Authorization to use the "N" symbol as re-quired by NCA-3510?

.....Why didn't PSI and its contractors have the most recent Code edi- -

tigns and addendas for infomation concerning purchase of materials  :

and for design specifications?

.....Why was the only authorized Hartford Nuclear Inspector at the Marble Hill site (Cherne Contracting Corporation) instructed not to provide )

inspection and auditing services to PSI? l

....1.3.1 of the National Board Report says that "The Concrete portion l of the containment (and other concrete work) preceded the mandatory date of Section III, Division 2, and therefore was not designed to ASME Code Requirements." In what respects do the present ASME Code '

Requirements for containment construction differ from those fol' lowed by PSI for Marble Hill? s

.....Why did PSI not provide purchase orders and information on desig-nated impact testing per NCA-3252 as requested by the National Board?

.....Why did PSI not provide material ' documentation such as Certified Test Reports to their. subcontractors _ as requested?

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7 VIII The fiRC inspection of Marble Hill, April 3-6, 1979, found that the require-ments for welded joints as stated in the specifications for Examination of Welded Joints (Sargent and Lundy Specification fiO. Y-2725) were relaxed from a minimum density for single viewing of 1.5 to a 1.3 minimum density. A Notice of Violation was filed with PSI on May 3,1979.

At the same time, a "otice of Deviation was filed with PSI for failuro to ccm- .

ply wi'th Appendix X to Section III and Section V of the ASME B & PV Code in radiographic examination of primary containment liner welds and for noncompli-ance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III.

In the Order, the flRC cited PSI for noncompliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-dix B, Criterion IX in that the licensee's procedures for welding only pro-vided for performance of vertical and overhead welding techniques.

. IX How has PSI responded to the public being informed of PSI's problems? PSI har run twc rull-page advertisements about Marble Hill's construction in the m;s-papers in PSI's service area addressing many of the concerns but ex.hibiting a basic unwillingness to admit that SAFETY-----THE PUBLIC SAFETY-----is what the

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notices of violations are basically about.

In the Friday, July 20, 1979 advertisement STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT MARBLE HILL, under the first caption "how serious IS the problem at Marble Hill", PSI notes:

"In today's climate, any flaw in construction or inspection proced-  ;

' ures at a nuclear power plant is serious because of its effect on  ;

public confidence. Thus, in this context, are our Marble Hill pro-blems serious. Yet none o_f, f the concrete honeycombing--even if un- l recatred--ooses any serious concern to the safe operation of the l clant. Many of the 550 or so noneycEbs or voids icentifiR by the l

i Company to date are small--less than a foot in diameter--and are mere blemishes on the surface of a three . foot-thick concrete strud-ture. fione of the voids creates a serious weakness or increases the possioilTty of raciation leakage or structural fHlure. (uncer- l lining usec to dEignate cold-f acea tyjie in tne aavertisement) j In the Wednesday, August 8,1979 advertisement, PSI President Hugh A. Barker i pledged "we will not be satisfied with less than 100". compliance with all per-  !

formance standards in every phase of the project--construction, inspection, ,

cuality assurance and quality control" which sounds good in itself. l Actually, the second advertisement was a public confession of the depth and scope of PSI's mismanagement as revealed in the depth and scope of the evalua- l tion of total project management and organizational changes taking place to

" assure the public that all safety and work standards will be met."

At the same time, PSI continued to cast' doubt on the seriousness of the pro-  ;

blems that forced suspension of safety-related work by stating in their adver- 1 tisement: l l

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"The problems were real but.they did not affect the safety of the project.

and used the age-old scapegoat technique of blaming the nuclear critics, the media, and editorial cartoonists for. some of their problems by blowing them "far out of any reasonable' proportion." -

Should we let PSI's public pronouncement that none of the honeycombing, even if unrepaired, poses any serious concern to the safe operation of the plant go .

unchallenged?

In the NRC Inspectors Report on the April 3-6, 1979 inspection of Marble Hill, reference is made to numerous areas of defective concrete (i.e. honeycomb) in the Auxiliary Building, and to at least three honeycomb areas in both the Aux-iliary Building and the Reactor Building Unit I which were not properly tagged for status and repair, and. two repaired areas which were not being cured pro-perly. ,

On May 15, 1979, the licensee.was requested to evaluate selected areas of in-place Auxiliary Building concrete, to provide confidence that no internal voids or honeycomb were present in tIie completed structure. The request was based on the fact that PSI was experiencing a higher than normal frequency and severity of honeycomb occurrence in the Auxiliary Building. On the basis of  :

these results PSI was to determine whether further investigation of honey-combing in other buildings was warranted.  ;

Did PSI make an evaluation of internal voids of the Auxiliary Build-ing as requested by the NRC? If so, did they find further investi-gation warranted in other buildings? Was their study done before  :

Mr. Cutshall's' allegations?

How complete was the testing program of the NRC-PSI for honeycomb-ing, etc.-Are areas? (prompted by Mr.

the results Cutshall's of the testing allegations) program avai lable? .We arein safety-related assuming that internal voids were part of the investigation. l PSI speaks of many of the voids as small, mere blemishes on the sur-face. One void has been reported 20' x 8' x nearly 3', while Mr.

Cutshall mentions having seen honeycombs four to five feet square.

How big were some of the internal voids?

Mr. Cutshall reported in his affidavit of having had a conversation with an NRC inspector on honeycomb,ing:

"The information I have is through an NRC inspector, where he was telling me that radiation will leak through seams and honeycomb patches at a lot larger rate than if it was solid concrete and done i right." ( ,

Region III is reported to have told the press that if air bubbles are large (and undetected). they will affect the structural stability of the plant, and the censequence of not properly repairing surficial honeycombs will be diffi-culties in cleaning up after radioactive spills, leakages, etc. Would neutron c:vement, and therefore uptake by materials in the structural concrete con-tainment wall, be accelerated by honeycombing?

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The question is: How thorough has been the identification of honeycombing in the safety-related structural concrete, external and intern- ,

al? How thorough will be the repairs? )1 PSI, in' the first. advertisement, called the extensive repairs they would be J doing " admittedly overkill". '

X r.

The Nuclear Regulatory Cor: mission has asked the U.S. Justice Department to look into possible criminal violations which have occurred in the construction of the Marble Hill plant; The request is an outgrowth of the NRC's investiga-tion of charges by workers of deliberate cover-up of faulty concrete by impro- )

per repair methods.

Mr. Joel Deckard, Congressman from the 8th District, Indiana, who has been in- ,

dependently investigating worker allegations, has turned his materials and in- l formation over to the Justice. Department. 1 l

Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, after asking the Senate Environment and Public {

Works Committee to undertake a full-scale congressional investigation of con- i struction practices at Marble Hill, inserted a lengthy statement: NUCLEAR l 1

SAFETY: A MUST, in the Congressional Record of the Senate, July 31, 1979.

1 He mentions in that statement that, thinking long and hard about the question j of nuclear safety, it seemed to him "that the one thing which might do more to l assure strict compliance with safety standards than any other option was the extension of personal li. ability to those who knowingly and willfully violate '

safety standards."

v When 5.562 was on the Senate floor, Senator Bayh offered an amendment, which was passed, which extends criminal penalties of up to $25,000/ day, and up to 2 years in jail, to anyone who knowingly violates Federal safety standards for -

nuclear plants. His rationale for the amendment:

l "When somebody intentionally sets out to do bodily harm to another person, our system of justice holds that individual responsible by setting strict criminal penalties for such behaviour. The Congress has adopted this principal in a number of safety statutes currently on the books--such as those dealing with toxic substances, or drugs, or air and water quality--by insisting on criminal penalties for  ;

those who knowingly violate public health and safety standards de- i signed to prevent the poisoning of our industrial society. Given ]

these precedents, in statutes which deal with less dangerous risks than those intrinsic to nuclear pcwer, I felt it made good common-sense to extend similar penalties to those who kncwingly violate safety standards established to protect the public from risks asso-ciated with nuclear power." (emphasis added) 5.562 would. increase civil cenalties for violations of safety standards from 55,000 to $100,000 per violation and removes the ceiling on penalties for vio-lations ' repeated over time.

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XI The quality of the construction itself, as well as the quality of the materi-als used to construct a nuclear plant, enter into the " risk" which the public is asked to accept when they live near a nuclear plant (50 mile radius or so).

The public has the right to expect construction in compliance with the highest standards, and with the NRC, the regulatory agency, assuring quality construc-tion in the interest of the public health and safety. The public also has the right to knew when serious constructional deficiencies occur, such as h:;pened '

at liarble Hill, and when questions are raised as to whether and to what extent .

the deficiencies can be repaired.

Why did it take worker affidavits on faulty concreta construction and repair, and release of findings of an investigative report of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors fortui-tously via the news media for the public to learn that PSI had never really instituted a quality assurance / quality control program?

The fact that the NRC knew of. PSI's failure to develop a Quality Assurance Program, knew of constructional deficiencies (although not in depth), yet seemed to be unable to get PSI to conform to provisions in their construction pemit, standards and codes of construction, to respond to violations, etc.,

demonstrates basic deficiencies in the regulatory process.

" Friendly persuasion" did not work with PSI in the month of May,1979, for even as the NRC was meeting with PSI Management on such timely topics as a)

CC Insoection of_ Concrete Work Activities, b) Need for Promot and Adecuate Errective Action, c) Construction Oericiency Reporting Recuirements, c) Com-cunications Between NRC and PSI (on tne need for openness and cancor between tne licensee anc tneTC), eT7ousekeeping, and f) Document Control, PSI's c priorities were elsewhere, witn preparations for submission of tneir Final Safety Analysis Recort (FSAR) and Acolication for an Ooerator's License for Marole M111, so tnat tneir CONSTRUCliuN MILtdiuHtS EChcDUL woulo ce met.

The submission of the FSAR for Marble Hill on June 1,1979, to the NRC is in-dicative of the general. recalcitrance of PSI toward NRC regulatory authority.

The NRC Caseload Forecast Panel, after their February 27-28 site visit to "arble Hill, had " advised the applicant not to submit the Final Safety Analy-sis Report until after they set the reactor pressure vessel in place." (em-phasis added) Dr. James Couglilin, Vice-President, Nuclear, EI, instead wrote a letter to Mr. Boyd (May 4,1979), NRC, disputing the Caseload Fcrecast Pan-d 's esUmated date of July,1983, for fuel load, and submitted the FSAR on ~~

schedulk (PSI's) to the NRC. ,

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l XII l

The failure of the regulatory process to assure " quality-assured" construction of Marble Hill raised the question of HOW C0F"40N WAS THIS FAILURE in the con-struction of nuclear plants? ,

l WE FOUND IT VERY COMMON, 50 MUCH SO THAT THE FEDEPAL NUCLEAR POWER l PLANT INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DEEP CONCERN AND TRiiENSE ikyt5iiGATION BY THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ,

UNITED STATES (GAO), THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, AND OTHER l P00R ORGINAL 9ooi9263

CITIZEN GROUPS, LONG BEFORE THREE MILE ISLAND.

The " adequacy" of concrete placement, characterized by extensive _ honeycombs and voids, a " serious" problem at Marble Hill, has been indicative of a basic cuality assurance. problem at many other plants as well. The following resume is not exhaustive but illustrates the point:

MIDLAND, MICHIGAN NRC in'spectors identified serious deficiencies with concrete pouring, welding of reinforcement bars, and overall quality control at Midland nuclear plant in 1973. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board lambasted the utility for a " pattern of repeated, flagrant and significant quality assurance violations of a non-routine character, coupled with an unredeemed promise of reformation."

A public hearing was held, and the utility revacped its quality assurance pro-

- gram, and construction resumed after a six-week shutdown.

TURKEY POINT, FLORIDA Honeycombing was found in the" reactor building near the end of construction. )

It took the utility about nine months to make tne repairs in the early 1970's. I CRYSTAL RIVER, FLORIDA Honeycombing was discovered in the reactor building when construction was nearly finished in 1974. It took the utility about four montns to cnip out j tne defective concrete and patch it up. j I

PERRY, OHIO ,

NRC inspectors found that concrete wasn't meeting stress requirements and shut J j down concrete construction in safety-related areas for about three months in ,

1 early 1978. Cleveland Electric hired a new executive to oversee construction and work was allowed to resume. l NOLF CREEK, XANSAS The Base Mat Concrete in the Reactor Containment Suilding showed evidence of i weakening rather than hardening with age. Approximately 57% of the 132 cylin- l ders of the 90-day break test failed to reach 5000 psi. Builders, owners, and  :

Federal regulators of Wolf Creek learned of the concrete problems in the base l mat between March 13-15, 1978, the public on December 13, 1978, when an inter- l nal NRC memo was " leaked" to the Kansas City Star. j Work continued on the reactor containment structure which sits atop the base mat until December 18, 1978, five days after the public was informed of the concrete problems, s

In addition to the base mat problem, a large void was discovered in the reac-ter containment wall under the equipment hatch, and reported to Region IV NRC, December 14, 1978. The void was reported to reach through the wall and ex-tended several feet on each side of the hatch. The void disclosure prompted ,

additional inspection of concrete construction. As a result, a Notice of Vic-lation was issued to Kansas Gas & Electric (KG&E) for 6 instances of failure to comply with conditions of their construction permit regarding concrete

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construction and 14 additional items were listed as requiring further investi- l gation.

KG&E have been repeatedly cited for noncompliance with standards and for the general failure of their quality assurance program. The NRP instructed KG&E to fill in the voids, revamp-its quality assurance program, and alleved con-struction to proceed as of July,1979. Was the base mat strengthened, or cri-teria lowered?

SOUTH TEXAS, TEXAS Honeycombing in the reactor containment building of the South Texas Nuclear - l Plant near Bay City, Texas, was found to be sufficiently severe to cause the NRC to halt concrete work in safety-related areas in June,1979.

XIII  ;

1 The GAO (General Accounting Office) was drawn into the matter of nuclear power i plant construction and inspection as the result of worker allegations of poor l construction practices on the North Anna Nuclear Power Plants in northeastern Virginia,.about 40 miles north of Richmond. Mr. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, requested on August 25, 1976, that GA0 re-  !

view the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation of the workers' allega- "

l tions. GA0 published their Report: ALLEGATIONS OF POOR CONSTRUCTION PRAC-TICES ON THE NORTH ANNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS co June 2,1977. l The NRC investigation found 32 instances in which Virginia Electric Power Com-pany (VEPCO) and its contractors failed to meet acceptable construction cri-teria or specifications. Ma'ny of the allegations referred to piping systems and one serious problem centered around the quality c' the welds of a major 6pipesupplier.

The NRC concluded that the items investigated had no direct safety signifi-cance but, collectively, were indicative o_f_ poor clUiagement control over the -

. The NRC fined the utility construction and cuality

$31,000, required assurance corrective orogram_s_

action on the items of .pcor construction, and re-quired the utility to strengthen its management and quality assurance efforts to preclude further. deficiencies.

GAO found that the NRC investigators assigned to North Anna were thorough and aggressive in their work but disagreed with the NRC Headquarters decision that there was no' direct safety significance involved. .

GAO discussed the investigation Report with NRC investigators with several of them not knowing the technical basis for NRC Headquarters conclusion that the investigation had no direct safety significance. Two of them disagreed with the conclusion, and several were surprised that a more harsh enforcement ac-tion wasn't taken in view of the number and types of noncompliances found at North Anna.

NRC's basis for concluding that there was no direct safety significance asso-ciated with the items of noncompliance is based upon the premise that, if the defects had .gone undetected and led to equipment failures, independent back-up equipment or systems would protect against a nuclear accident (redundancy and 90019265

defense-in-depthphilosophy).

GA0' believes that the public should have b' een informed that if some of the items had not been found and corrected, there could hWe been

{ decrease in, reliability in, certain secondary, oack-ug, or supoort-Ing components or, systems.

GAO noted in its Report'that achievement of an " effective" redundan-

, cy is also deoendent on a high level of oualTty construction and. a ,

nighty motivated work 7oice. It reouTres tnat the criteria or stan-i dards establisned g the NRC aiicI nuclear industry be closely adhered

_to during the plant s, construction.

The NRC concluded from an internal analysis of the deficiencies at North Anna that, if some of the. items had not been found and corrected, there could have been a decrease in reliability in certain secondary, back-up, or supporting components or systems. This could have prevented these systems from respond-ing as. anticipated in certain emergency situations and might have removed one i layer of safety that is designed into a ccamercial nuclear power plant. This l information, however, was not oresented in the NRC investication report or its

~

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l attacnments. l l

At the time of the North Anna investigation, Unit 1 of North Anna was 94% com- l plete (and Unit 2 about 75% complete, although Unit 2 was not part of the in-vestigation!). GAO emphasized in their Report that, since Unit 1 was nearly complete, and the quality assurance management weak (NRC inspectors found that the deficiencies at North Anna placed it at the lower end of the spectrum with regard to quality of construction work), the situation offered very little as-surance that other problems--possibly more serious than those uncovered--diii-not exist a- I.ortn Anna.

b XIV GA0 continued to study and evaluate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's pro-gram for inspecting the construction of nuclear plants.and inspecting firms 1 that supply safety-related components for nuclear plants. The GAO study Re- l port. l'iE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NEEDS TO AGGRESSIVELY MONITOR AND IN-  ;

DEPENENTLY EVALUATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION (September 7,1978) has as its pincipal conclusion (page ii):

THE COM'4ISSION SHOULD IMPROVE ITS BASIS FOR JUDGING THE QUALITY OF

'GUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION Commission inspectors should know about the day-to-day activities at a construction site and determine for themselves the quality of construction work, but GA0's review revealed that the Commission inspectors C

...do little independent testing of construction work, and rely heavily upon the utility company self-evaluation;

... spend little time ' observing ongoing construction work; and j

...do not communicate routinely with people who do the actual 90019266

construction work.

GA0 pointed out that the Commission does not have the equipment necessary to perform most. types of testing and that much of the inspector's time is spent reviewing the mass of documentation maintained at a construction site as a ba-sis for judging the adequacy of the utility's programs for insuring quality construction.

GAO found that Coraission inspectors are not required to maintain any type of  ;

documehtation or support for their inspection reports, which means that the Commission has little evidence to support the extent and quality of the in-spection effort.

GA0 criticized the Commission for not developing a regulation to protect con-struction workers from reprisals when workers bring construction probles to the attention of the Commission.

~ GA0 also noted that THE COMMISSION'S VENDOR INSPECTION PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED-  ;

1 The Commission began a vendor inspection program in 1974 when it re- l alized that about 63% of all nuclear pcwer plant construction and operation problems were traceable to vendor errors, and that utility 3 companies were not properly inspecting vendors to make sure that they were producing quality components.

GA0 found that NRC vending inspector reporting practices needed im- I provement with more attention to details and documentation of in- i spection work,, and investigations. In addition, the Commission was  :

largely neglecting manufacturers of electrical ccmponents and other instruments that control critical operations of safety systems, and

.; had insufficient personnel in terms of the number of firms involved. ]

XV Item (9), page 6, of the ORDER OF INSPECTION asks the licensee to describe their system (for the NEW ORDER) "to train all levels of construction person- l nel in the need and importance of satisfying quality requirements and to en- I courage all personnel.to communicate, without recrimination on the part of the licensee or its contractors, their concerns or knowledge of improper construc-tion practices to proper levels of management for evaluation and resolution."

We look with complete scepticism on " encouragement" of personnel to communicate knowledge of improper construction practices to proper levels of management (without recrimination) as an effective way of improving the quality of construction! Pernaps, if an NRC inspector were present at the moment of worker communication of such to manage-ment, its potential might increase, but to what extent is also ques-tionable.

At Marble Hill, former worker affidavits was the only way to go to make known improper construction practices and deficiencies since PSI repeatedly refused I to act on NRC requests to monitor themselves, and evaluate various aspects (honeycombing, for example) of the construction.

90019267

XVI

.The CALLOWAY SAGA (as unfolding near Fulton, Missouri), in the telling of Mrs.

Leo A. Drey of University City, Missouri, in letters to: the Senators from Missouri, Eagleton and Danforth, December 6,1977; Mr. James G. Keppler, Di-rector, Region III NRC; Glen Ellyn, Illinois, January 12, 1978 and July 17, 1978; Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Washington, D.C. , April 20, 1978; and Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director, Office  ;

of Inspection and Enforcement, liRC, Washington, D.C. , June 28, 1978; etc., H will b'e a momentous chapter in the history of Inspection (and Enforcement) of

" Quality-Assured" Construction of Nuclear Power Plants, filled as it is with wholesale violations of criteria, standards, and construction codes, even in its early history, and containing an account of the failure of the NRC, to pro-tect a worker who did first recort his concerns and knowledge of improper con-struction practices to proper levels of management (to no avaiT7 prior to telling and snowing TMC inspectors.

As with many other nuclear plants, Calloway had concrete void problems (in-dicative of basic quality assurance problem). Mrs. Drey notified Region III by phone on June 17, 1977, of concrete voids in the reactor building base mat, a significant deficiency in construction which could, were it to remain uncor-rected, adversely affect the safe operation of the plant (10 CFR 50.55(e)),

In the letter to Senators Eagleton and Danforth, Mrs. Drey noted that only about 5". of the undersurface of the concrete mat was accessible for viewing.

Union Electric informed the NRC in a letter dated July 15, 1979: "In order to assess the significance of this condition, we have chipped away the areas con-taining voids and have found that the honeycombing extended into the lower layers of the reinforcing steel matrix ... . If the defects in the concrete are limited to those which can be visually observed at this time (emphasis added), we believe that tne structural integrity of tne case mat is not im-

\; paired and that repairs can be made so that tendons may be properly installed."

Mrs. Drey observed: "If reports of inadequate vibrating (to distri-bute and settle the concrete) during the pour are accurate, it would -

seem highly probable that voids in the concrete exist not only in the ceiling of the tendon gallery, but throughout the rest of the base mat, as well." .

The extent of the voids in the base mat and the matter of the faulty embeds remain unresolved at Calloway.

XVII The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) has closely monitored government regu-lation of the U.S. Ccamercial Nuclear Power Program in the past few years, and the publication LOOKING BUT NOT SEEING by Lawrence S. Tye, December,1978, is an outgrowth of their concern.

UCS believes that the task of monitoring construction of a nuclear plant is made extremely difficult by:

1) the lack of detail in design information in construction permit 90019268

applications even for vital safety systems;

2) standards which are supposed to govern construction are themselves vague;

3) utilities' commitment to adhere to the standards is "cquivocal";

4) utilities have been ' typically permitted to change plant design "in the field" and as they go along without notice to the NRC; e

5) even when NRC inspectors try to prove significant licensee non-conforinance, enforcement is difficult, because many regulatory

. criteria are voluntary and thus unenforceable.

The UCS charges that NRC Headquarters Personnel typically understate the safe-ty significance of inspection findings, opting for mild enforcement sanctions.

They assert that many of the widespread and frequent safety problems of the nuclear industry would not have occurred if adequate regulatory measures had been imposed on the nuclear industry.

How has the NRC responded to criticism concerning the failure of the NRC regu-latory process to assure quality' construction of nuclear plants? According to the.UCS, by, suggesting that the licensees police their own activities more_ ,

vigorously, even tnough tne utilities' recoro cemonstrates tneir inao1Tity o_r_

unwillingness to do so!

XVIII The Office of Inspection and Enforcement of the fiuclear Regulatory Commission, in its ORDER OF SUSPENSION, is following an historic pattern with Public Ser-ivice Indiana, offering them the opportunity "to police themselves more vigor-cusly" (to a " fail-safe" quality assured program under oath), even though the utility's record demonstrates their inability and even unwillingness, under strong pressure, to do so. '

'n'ill the public, in turn, be expected by the NRC to accept that "A LEOPARD CAN CHANGE HIS SPOTS" (UNDER OATH), and, perhaps, an on-site NRC inspector can perform miracles?

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ff J n A. Eyed, President l Sassafras Audubon Society TO O' Clock Ridge Road 5 Nashville, Indiana 47448 90019269