ML20062D772

Informs of Identification of Deficiencies Occurred During North Anna REP Exercise of 900808

ML20062D772
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/17/1990
From:	Mccarey J Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Slayton A VIRGINIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
Shared Package
ML20062D766	List: ML20062D763 ML20062D772
References
NUDOCS 9011160109
Download: ML20062D772 (5)

Text

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,  : i ,

. i a *k: I: Federal Emergency Management Agency l t

Region Ill  !

Liberty Square Buuding (Second Floor) g  :

lT 105 South Seventh Street Phundelphia, PA 19106

\

i AUS 171990 Addison-E. Slayton-

Coordinator Virginia Office of. Emergency Services 310 Turner Road Richmond, Virginia 23225 Tear Mr. Slayton:

Ii The purpose of ,his: letter is to officially inform you of the l.

i:lentification of .t w o Deficiencice which occurred during the  ;,

tior-h Anna REP Exercise which took place en August 7 and 8, 1990, l'

' The.firet _ problem involves the lack of coordination of siren and EBS: activations with-the fivetrisk county decision-makers and the

" information.which is contained in-the EBS messages. '-

The'= protective action decision was made by. the Governor's t desianee at 1307. At- 1309, all. risk. county dispatchers were advised .via insta-phone- of the. protective action. None were advised at thatitime that eirens would be activated. At that ,

point,- the siren activation. sequence was performed by the State I

' Communicator and- the Louisa County Dispatcher. Sirens-were

-activated at :1310 and confirmed by the risk county dispatchers at 1312.-:Three of the five risk county coordinators were not aware that eirens had been' activated. .

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Alliimportant emergency instructions should bel discussed between

'ithe' State . decision-makers and the-County . Coordinators, who :are - i responsible for implementation. It should be noted that neither l Caroline nor Hanover County are' equipped- with an insta-phone J extension. separate from.the County Dispatch Offices and that both

Louisa and Spotsylvania Counties.had equipment- problems with;the insta-phone extensions 'in the EOCs. The existing system (insta- ,

n phone) should be used as intended to provide a direct link 1 between the Commonwealth decision-makers and County' Coordinators 1 enlall emergency'information and instructions. Formal procedures 'I should be developed ~and included in the plans, and training'to the. Coordinators should be provided for activation of the' Alert' L

and-Notification System (Sirens, EBS).

9 The cecond part of this deficiency involves the EBS message ,

content. The EBS messages used during the exercise only ll identified the protective actions as they applied to evacuation 9011160109 901106 .

PDR ADOcy 05000339 1 F PNU l 4

zones (1, 2, 3, 4, etc..). Specific information should be included in the messages on the areas affected by the protective action to include -landmarks, geographical boundaries, the appropriate aspects of sheltering, ad hoc respiratory protection. This information is available and should be included in the EBS messages. It is recommended that prescripted messages be used to-cut down the preparation time for the EBS message and to insure that all required instructicas have been included. Al'1 pre-scripted messages should be inc3oded in the plan.

The second deficiency involves the entire accident assessment process from the initial protect'.ve action recommendation through the decision making process ant. on into the verification process through the use of field teame and laboratory analyses.

The Virginia Flan. Appendix 5, paragraph all), page 5-3.

describes the flow of radiological information. The Radiological Jfficer in the EOC has the responsibility to " advise the State EOC ctaff of the. radiological situation". This was not how the exercise was conducted.

The utility made an initial protective action recommendation at 1236, two minutes after declaration of General Emergency. This recommendation was made to both the OES and BRH personnel at the EOF. At 1240, thic recommendation was revised because the release was unmonitored. The protective action recommendation was faxed to the EOC (OES staff) by the OES liaison in the EOF at 1240.

' Contact between the'BRH staff at the EOF and the Radiological j Officer in the EOC did not occur until 1256. This left the  !

Radiological Officer with a' protective action recommendation  !

(provided to him by .the EOC OES staff) he could not explain for a ,

period of 16 munutes. 'During this critical time, he could not j perform his responsibility (as stated in the plan) to provide sound. technical advice to the OES staff in a timely manner.

On day 2 of the exercise- (evening of August 7, 1990) a meeting I was. held at the Emergency Operating Facility to develop a sampling plan to verify .the presence of radiation within the plume emergency- planning cone and the ingestion planning cone.

However, the campling plan which was developed was, except for

_two locations, restricted to the 10-mile- EPZ. Little or no l consideration was given to farms,- -dairies, etc., in the determination- of_ sampling points. The. philosophy demonstrated was geared to getting residents who had been evacuated and/or sheltered within the 10-mile EPZ back to normal living conditions in their homes. Little or no consideration was given to the campling requirements within the ingestion pathway. -

This was confirmed during day three of the exercise when field teams concentrated on the 0 to 10-mile EPZ and only took two 4

l samplee in' the 10 to 50 mile area (one at 11 miles and one at 12 miles). The sampling- plan failed to include indicator samples from the moet eeneitive ingestion pathway (pacture-cow-milk-consumer). This initial campling plan and misinterpretation of the DOE AMS flyover data initially led BRH to concluded-that there was no ingestion problems beyond the 10-mile EPZ. This conclusion was reevaluated based upon a controller message which injected additional data from dairy farms located at a distance of 26 miles. At that point the additional data was properly assessed and appropriate technical recommendations were made.

The overall concept for field monitoring and campling ehould be reviewed and plane and procedures developed and/or updated.

Three different organizations were performing field monitoring during the two day exercise (Commonwealth field teams, utility i field- teams and local field teame). However, none of these activitice were coordinated. In fact, at times the Commonwealth teams and the utility teams were monitoring and campling in the same locatione.which constituted a duplication of efforte and unneceecary exposure to radiation.

The procedures provided on day one of the exercise 1for taking samples and recording data- "ere not followed. However-, no controller data was provided the teams to record or forward to the LEOF, In addition many v. .. e procedures should be revised to reflect current guidance.

New team members have not been provided initial train'ing and existing _ team members were last trained five years ago.

Additional training (both initial and follow-on) is needed in the L areas of sample taking, monitoring procedures, reporting and <

recording requirements and radiological exposure control. t once team. members had taken each sample, they were instructed to take the sample to the mobile laboratory .for analysis. .This j resulted in a waste of time and could better be accomplished by a  :

runner, leaving the team avai'lable to take further samples, i The mission exposuree for the field teams were 1R/ hour and 500 l mR/ hour. If these conditions were encountered, the emergency L worker was to immediately leave the area. IR/ hour is not an' area >

in which an emergency worker should remain, but should only be entered after a conscious decision is made by an appropriate _

manager, that essential data is needed, or that a neccessary task  ;

must be accomplished. However, the 500 mR/ hour is less than the general population or non-escential personnel can receive. The i 500 mR/ hour is supposedly intended to be an administrative reporting level. County team members are only provide 0-200R eelf-reading dosimetere. County plans are vague as to what equipment should be available. One cannot measure accurately .5R g on a 0-200R dosimeter. Equipment provided must meet the lowest exposure limit for the mission.

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As you are aware FEMA is tasked with the responsibility to periodically review' the overall plane and procedures under the normal review procese. FEMA Region III will be initiating a updated review of the Virginia Radiological Emergency Planning Proceec. This review will include any changes in the plans due to ingestion pathway planning procece, changes in responsibilities, and changes in concepte of operation. In j..

addition, we will be revaluating the plane as they pertain to-  :-

planning problems that have been identified during exercices. . '

Some of these problems are as listed below:

Procedures that do not comply with current regulations and guidance.

Lack of procedurce.

Appropriate coordination between responsible agencies.

Appropriate. Letters of Agreement, j-

-Lack of. appropriate training to emergency responders Lack of proper equipment to perform assigned tasks On-going problems with the performance of equipment.-

We look forward to your cooperation in resolving these

-deficiencies. If' you have any questions, please contact RAC Chairman Joseph McCarey at-(215) 931-5520.

Sincerely, 6M Joseph M. McCarey, Chairman Regional Assistance Committee cc: Bobert Trojanoweki, NRC Dennie Kwiatkowski, FEMA National 4