ML20024E531

Forwards Revised Sections I-IV to 830707 Control Room Design Review,Per NUREG-0737 (Generic Ltr 82-33) & SER

ML20024E531
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/10/1983
From:	Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, SBN-544, NUDOCS 8308150257
Download: ML20024E531 (79)

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,' SEABROOK STATION 5," :" ,ONbm 1671 Worceser Rood Frondrighom. Mossochusetts 01701 (617) - 872- 8100 l Pubec !Wryk:e of bhtw Ekunpohke 1 August 10, 1983 SBN- 544 T.F. B7.1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing Re ferenc es: (a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter, dated July 7,1983, "Seabrook Station Control Room Design Review", J. DeVincentis to G. W. Knighton

Subject:

Seabrook Station Control Room Design Review Inprogress Audit

Dear Sir:

During our meeting on July 26-29, 1983, to review the Seabrook Station Control Room Design Review Program, the Staff reviewer asked that we submit supplemental inf ormation to further his review of the program. We committed to submit as much of that supplemental information as possible by August 15, 1983.

In fulfillment of that commitment, we have enclosed, as Attachment 1, revised Sections I through IV of our Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Report which was submitted in Reference (b).

The following information was requested by the Staf f:

1. Expand on the role of the Management Review Team, the qualifications of its members, and its use of the human factors consultant.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III. A.

2. Expand on the use of the two-man review teams.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III.D.

3. Expand on the design process followed during the original control board design, including a discussion of Yankee's role and experience, how design decisions on hardware were arrived at, and how the process continued through various system design evolutions.

8308150257 830810 1)

PDR ADOCK 05000443 '

4 E PDR iOCO Bm St., P.O. Box 330, Manchester, NH O3105 . Telephone (603) 669-4000 TWX 7102207595 / j\

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S United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 10, 1983 Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton Page 2 This information is included in the revised report, Appendix G.

4 Submit T. B. Sheridan's discussion on the task analysis method used in the review.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III.B.

5. Provide a list of questions asked and procedures followed during the '

tas'k analf sis portion of the review.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III.B.

i 6 Confirm that there is an inventory list and describe how it was used during the review. Include a description of what is included on the list.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III.D.

7 Expand the discussion of how the assessment was conducted and how design improvements were selected.

This information is included in the revised report, Sections III.B and III.E.

8 Submit T. B. Sheridan's discussion on the verification process used.

This information is included in the revised report,Section III.F.

1 9 Submit a discussion on the coordination of the Control Room Design Process, Regulatory Guide 1.97, and Emergency Operating Procedure development.

1 This information is included as Attachment 2 to this letter.

10. Explain the procedure for including human factors considerations in future design modifications.

This inf ormation is included in the revised report asSection III.G.

11. Explain the procedure for assuring that the use of abbreviations is consistent in procedures, on'the main control board, and on the CRT.

This list of approved abbreviations is under development. When the list is completed, those persons who write procedures, develop CRT 1 sof tware, and develop MCB hardware will be provided with copies for their use.

12 Expand on the process used to extract potential HEDs_from the checklists evaluated, - then included on or deleted from the HED ' list.

This inf ormation is included _ in the revised ~ report in.Section III.E.

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4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 10, 1983  !

Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton Page 3 l

13. Provide a schedule for completion of all items for which the review has not yet been completed. Identify those items which cannot be completed prior to commercial operation and provide a basis for that decision.

The following items will be reviewed and information on their disposition will be provided to the NRC four months prior to fuel load:

o Video Alarm System, SPDS, and associated computer aids to the operator o Hard-wired annunciators o Radiation Monitoring System o Lighting o Control Room access and architecture relative to supervision, storage of emergency equipment, escape, limiting access of unauthorized persons, rest rooms, and eating facilities o Storage of operating procedures and keys, tagging, shif t turnover, and other administrative procedures o Remote shutdown panel The following items will not be completely reviewed until af ter commercial operation:

o Auditory signals, communications within and outside the Control Room, acoustic noise; Some preliminary review of auditory signals inside the Control Room will be done prior to operation to insure there are no major problems with alarms, etc. However, to complete the review, we need to wait for the rugs to be installed on the floor, for all radks and relays to be energized, and- for the plant to be operating normally. -This information will be provided following the first refueling outage, o Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; Some preliminary review of this will be done prior to operation to insure these are no longer major problems. However, for the complete review to be done, we must go through one complete heating and cooling season. This information will be provided following the first refueling outage.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 10, 1983 Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton Page 4 14 Some of the HEDs discovered needed additional study before the preferred fix could be chosen. These are shown as Category "B" items on the HED list, i.e., IB, 28, or 3B. In most cases, the fix is known but the method of implementation needs study. As disposition of these Category "B" items is completed, the information will be provided to you for review via supplements to the CRDR Report.

15. The Staff asked that we undertake two further studies and submit the information to them. They were:

a. A tabulation of the colors being used in the Control Room, the meaning of the colors, and the context in which they are being used,

b. A tabulation of the various lights on the board to indicate the percent testable, percent not testable, the types that are or are not testable, the number of dual bulbs or dual filament bulbs, and the watch turnover procedure that describes what is done to search for and replace burned out lights.

These tabulations are presently being compiled and will be submitted to you in the near future.

We trust that the above information provides you with the information necessary to further your review of the Seabrook Station Control Room Design Review Report. If you require any additional information, please contact us.

Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMP John DeVincentis Project Manager ALL/pf Enclosure cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List

William S. Jorden, III, Esquiro Ms. Oliva L. Tash Harmon & Weiss Designated Representative of 1725 I Street, N.W. Suite 506 the Town of Brentwood Washington, DC 20006 R.F.D. 1, Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director Edward F. Meany U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Designated Representative of Washington, DC 20555 the Town of Rye 155 Washington Road Robert A. Backus, Esquire Rye, NH 03870 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Mancehster, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. John B. Tanzer Office of the Attorney General Designated Representative of 208 State House Annex the Town of Hampton Concord, NH 03842 5 Morningside Drive Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Roberta C. Pevear Town Hall Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03842 the Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road Patrick J. McKeon Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Rye, NH 03870 Designated Representative of the Town of Kensington David R. Lewis, Esquire RFD 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board East Kingston, NH 03827 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Environmental Protection Bureau Chairman of the Board of Selectmen Department of the Attorney General Town of Newbury One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Newbury, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 Maynard B. Pearson Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 40 Monroe Street U.S.-Senate Amesbury, MA 01913 Washington, DC 20510 (Attn: Tom Burack) Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Diana P. Randall Concord, NH 03301 70 Collins Street (Attn: Herb Boynton)

SEabrook, NH 03874 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Donald E. Chick City Hall Town Manager Newburyport, MA 01950 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 4 1

g SEABROOK STATION CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW i

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND....................................................... 2 III. DISCUSSION....................................................... 3 IV. OVE RALL B OARD AS SE S S ME NT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 V. GENERIC HEDS..................................................... 21 VI. SPECIFIC HEDS.................................................... 40 VII. APPENDICES....................................................... 79 i l

A. Survey Team Membership and Qualifications B. Survey Team Training C. Operator Interview Form and Summary l D. Control Room Survey Checklist E. List of Procedures F. Procedure Talk-Through Example G. Initial Design of Seabrook Station's Main Control Boards l l

SEABROOK CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW I. INTRODUCTION In response to the NRC task action requirements established in NUREG-0737 and its Supplement 1, Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) has conducted a Control Room human factors design review. This review has identified potential Human Engineering Discrepancies (REDS) in the design of the Seabrook Station Control Room. These potential HEDs which were identified have been reviewed to see if they affect the safe operation of the plant. Those that did were, in turn, evaluated to see if there was a need to make modifications in procedures, in training, or to the Control Soard.

NUREG-0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews, Draf t NUREG-0801, Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review, and the GE BWR Owners Group Criteria were used as a base for the development of our own criteria for the review. After our criteria were developed, they were used for the review process.

The review process was divided into several parts - operator interviews; a Control Room survey which include hardware, control boards and panels, and alarm system; and procedure walk-through and talk-through sessions.

The Control _ Room survey operator interview and the procedure talk-through and walk-through portions of the review have been completed. The potential human engineering discrepancies have been listed, and appropriate fixes developed for them where it has been judged necessary. Many of these changes are underway at this time because of schedule commitments.

Some items will not be evaluated at at this time. These are items which i . require the Control Room to be complete and the plant operational.

l Included are such items as noise studies, communications evaluation, l HVAC evaluation and Control Room operational procedures for shif t change. .These items will be reviewed during the plant's initici operating cycle, and any necessary changes will be implemented.

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II. BACKCROUND A. Industry Human Factors Activity Since TMI, increased emphasis has been placed on human factors engineering within the industry. New industry groups have been formed and workshops have been conducted. Many projects aimed at increasing the understanding of operator performance and decision making have been initiated by EPRI and by INPO. The Westinghouse Owners' Group has developed Task Analyses and Emergency Operating Procedures for their plants. The BWR Owners' Group has taken the initiative in performing Control Room design reviews on BWR plants. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) and PSNH have taken an active role in all of these activities - most notably the BWR Owners' Group Control Room design review, the INPO activities and the Westinghouse effort.

The reason for this increased emphasis is the perceived need to increase the effectiveness and performance of the operator. Some of the specific areas now being addressed include the layout of control panels and work stations, adequacy of the information presented, Control Room staffing, training of the operators, and emergency procedures used by the operators. The objective of this activity is to decrease the probability of operator error and to improve the detection and correction of operator errors.

B. Prior Control Room Design Review Activity The Main Control Board (MCB) for Seabrook has undergone extensive design reviews during the course of its development. The basic layout of the MCB was developed by YAEC and PSNH, assisted by United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C).

Two major reviews of the MCB for operability and maintainability were performed. The first major review was performed in the time period from June - August, 1975. A full size mockup of the MCB was reviewed by personnel from YAEC, Central Maine Power, PSNH and UE&C. These persons had extensive engineering and operating experience, much of it obtained in other operating nuclear plants.

This expertise ensured the performance of a thorough operational analysis and review. This review process resulted in significant changes and improvements to the MCB.

The second major review of the MCB was performed in October of 1980, and included changes recommended by the Seabrook Operations Department. These changes were developed as a result of the acceptance testing of the Seabrook Station Simulator.

Participating in this review were YAEC, PSNH and UE&C. Details of the results of these reviews are included as Appendix G to this report.

Although not formally called " Human Factors" reviews, these reviews did in fact address many human factors concerns. In addition, YAEC/PSNH involvement has been maintained throughout the development of Control Board philosophies.

III. DISCUSSION The present detailed Control Room design review for Seabrook Station has been accomplished in accordance with the guidelines provided in the referenced NRC documents. Specifically, the design review responds to the requirements contained in Section 5 of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, Generic Letter 82-33.

The objective of the Seabrook Station Control Room design review is to improve the ability of nuclear power plant Control Room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the information provided to them. This design review identifies any modifications *of Control Room configurations that the review team feels will contribute to a significant reduction of risk and enhancement in the safety of operation. Decisions to modify the Control Room have included and will continue to include consideration of long-term risk reduction and any potential temporary decline in safety after modifications resulting from the need to relearn maintenance and

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operating procedures. This will be carefully reviewed by persons competent in human factors engineering.

A Flow Diagram of the steps l'ading to the final report submittal is included here as Figure 1.

A. Review Teams Qualified multi-disciplinary review teams using a review program incorporating accepted human engineering principles have been established.

Mangement Review Team A management team composed of representatives from YAEC and PSNH was established to review the overall progress of_ Control Room review. The team was composed of the Plant Operations Manager, representing PSNH plant management; the Seabrook Simulator Manager, representing training; and a Project Coordinator, representing Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

This team met initially to discuss the overall program and how it would be run. After contracting with a human factors consultant, Thomas B. Sheridan Associates, a senior human factors person met with the management team periodically for consultation. Members of the team were briefed regularly on the progress of the_ review; and the team reviewed final drafts of all documents prepared _during the review.

The qualifications of this review team are found in Appendix A of this report.

Survey Team Composition The survey team for the Seabrook Station Control Room review consisted of a core group of persons experienced in program management, plant operations, instrument and controls engineering, i

and human factors engineering. This core group was aided as required by persons experienced in other diciplines.

4 - Chronological Steps Human Engineering Deficiency Development Devise plan Develop Pre-liminary Report if Control Room m_

Survey

\l Operator Interviews  %

Task Analysis !

Nf I I Procedure Selection l l

l h I

Procedure l m Debrief-l '

Talk-throughs ing I

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l 1 Dynamic m Debrief-Walk-throughs 1"8

_l I _ _ _ _ d if Core Group Assessment Sessions

• Review of Select final Assessments by -

HEDS Operators Decide rating q-

Select design change

\f Verification Process

\f Report submitted Figure 1 REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS j 5

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1 Tha qualifications of this team are found in Appendix 'A of this '

report.

The methods used during the survey itself are found in Section III.D, Survey of the Control Room Hardware, f

'B. Function and Task Analysis Function and task analysis has been done by the Westinghouse Owners' Group to be used both in the performance of a Control Room human factors review and in the development of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).

These were available to our human factors

' consultant for his use during the review of Seabrook Station. It was determined by our consultants that task analyses, procedure talk-throughs and follow up walk-throughs must be considered as a single inseparable effort.

They consider that a proper model of operator action can best be obtained by observations based on 4

actual talk-throughs and walk-throughs of procedures. The talk-throughs involved senior Seabrook operating personnel and the HFE consultants.

The purpose of the talk-throughs and subsequent walk-throughs was to:

(a) simulate actions by operators in operating, managing and maintaining safe operation of the plant; (b) identify errors stimulated by design inadequacies; (c) exercise most elements of the Main Control Boards that are frequently used ,

or for which human error probably is considered significant due to high usage or potential impact on plant operation.

4 Our task analysis method was: '

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Round table selection' of emergency and normal operating procedures to ensure that the most important evolutions and all systems on the Main Control Board were exercised (minor exceptions because of equipment not yet installed). At this time questions of task goals and functions for each procedure were discussed and clarified informally, drawing on the task-function. analyses already done by Westinghouse as necessary.

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2. Talk-throughs of these procedures in the simulator in which:

a. SRO read the " basis" of the procedure, followed by further questions about purpose and functions.

b. With SRO reading procedures, one or two R0s, as required, performed each step, stopping af ter each step to allow other team members (one to three HF consultants, one to three I&C engineers with HF training) to make observations or measurements, ask questions or comment, make notations regarding objectives, decision criteria, displays required /available, controls required /available, {

consequences of error, or other (see form in Appendix F). l

3. Dynamic, real-time walk-throughs (with the simulator " live"),

repeating all time-critical procedures to observe timing, interoperator coordination, and body movements. We were also 1

able to observe the use of Functional Recovery Guidelines and l critical safety function status trees, i 4 Follow-up analysis of particular recommended design changes and rearrangements using marked-up photo-composites of various board sections (mimics, rearrangements), sometimes overlaid and compared to existing beard.

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TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF SEABROOK DCRDR METHODS TO THOSE RECOMMENDED BY NUREG-0700 (1) (2) (3)

Operator Control Board Task Six 0700 Steps Survey Survey Analysis

1) review of operating written experience questionnaire, interview

2) analyze functions select cnd and tasks discuss procedures review " bases"

3) control room apply MCB inventory device list

4) survey components, multiple team environment use of check lists

5) verification of extensive task capability talk-throughs (is what's needed there?)

6) validation of function talk- and (can what's there walk-throughs be operated?)

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These task analyses were perform d over a numbar of sessions, each lasting two to five days, and often parts of procedures were repeated. Both Control Board and procedures were critiqued in the process.

Table 1 indicates how the six DCRDR steps recommended in KUREG-0700 were accomplished. Note that what we are calling " task analysis" combines 0700 steps (2), (5), and (6), as per our conviction that this integration is preferable to keeping these separate. We feel that the separation has pitfalls in implementation that can be avoided by predicating the task analysis on the available procedure statements, especially those E0Ps and associated task-function diagrams recently developed by the steam-supply vendors.

Justification for this viewpoint is discussed below.

The draf t Task Analysis Guidelines developed by the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) for Control Room Design Review also seems to agree with our viewpoint by arguing the superior advantages of doing the task analysis by talk-through, walk-through rather than pencil and paper diagramming or procedural step-by-step discussion around a table. The NUTAC Guidelines may be criticized, however, in treating these as alternative methods of task analysis, when, we believe, they are best combined and done together.

The purposes of task analysis are: (1) ab initio procedure preparation; (2) understanding given procedures when they are not otherwise clear as to goals, functions, and component tasks.

With regard to purpose (1) above, the DCRDR team is not writing procedures from scratch, and is not, even with the assistance of one or two I&C engineers and operators, qualified to do other than make specific criticisms of the presentation and clarity of these, which we have done. f 1

I With regard to purpose (2) above, it is our belief that the function-task breakdown could best be considered by us in situ.

There is something to be gained by the exercise of additional i

1 formal diagramming. However, we believe there is more to be gained for us by clarifying and commenting, as we go along in the Control Room using Seabrook EOPs (and already available task-function diagrams provided by Westinghouse), on objectives, decision criteria, displays required /available, controls required /available, and consequences of error. Since all the human factors consultants

had training either as mechanical or electrical engineers, they understand the basic operation of the plant.

The actual talk-through was an unconstrained step-by-step, very detailed reconstruction of anticipated operator actions in implementing each procedural step. Note taking of data was used to document this process.

Each of the non-operator review team members had a copy of each procedure with columns for " objective", " criterion", " displays

required and available", " controls required and available",

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" consequences of error", and "other" printed to the right of each step. Reviewers were instructed to consider various questions in association with each of the above categories (these were presented in the training session). This was to ascertain and make a note in the appropriate column on the form of anything troublesome about the control board or procedural statement in conjunction with each successive procedural step, whether or not the problem or specific HED justification was clear at the moment.

For example, under " objectives", reviewers were to consider what the purpose of that step was (in some cases there were multiple objectives), and if the purpose was not clear, it was to be noted.

This included both what was to be achieved and how, in general, the operator was to achieve it.

l Under " decision criteria", the reviewer was to consider how the operator got direct confirmation that he had accomplished the step (objectives) satisfactorily, i.e., what variable would he look at, I what fixed number or other variable would he compare it to, what is l

the criterion for " satisfactory", how sharp is the dividing line l

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between good and bad, anel would the criterion change as a function of operating mode or other variables.

Under " displays required /available", the reviewer was to assess what information was necessary to display to the operator, }

specifically what variable, whether it had to be quantitative or could be qualitative or even binary, whether position or rate information were required, what dynamic range and accuracy was required, what scale units were appropriate, and what direction of indication agreed with the stereotype. Then the reviewer had to ,

ask himself whether what was needed was there, or whether there I

were some discrepancies.  ;

Under " controls required /available", the reviewer did the same,  ;

namely, what variable was to be controlled to what accuracy, over  ;

what range, or was control in terms of one or more discrete settings, was it a matter of setting in a value, or adjusting a ,

display continuously, and what operating action (force and i direction and displacement) was required and consistent with the display? ,

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Under " consequences of error", the reviewer was to ask himself whether he understood what consequences could result from an operator error, and, if the operator did not perform this prceedural step correctly, would there be consequences that either would not be evident to the operator, or would be particularly 4

critical such that the control should be especially labeled or  !

guarded or otherwise marked.

Finally, under "other", the reviewer was to consider and note any troublesome aspect which did not fit within one of the other categories.

In order to cull out all concerns, reviewers were encouraged to use the data sheets for personal notetaking to jog their memories, such that in subsequent debriefing they would be in a position to identify all concerns they had and nominate all potential

l candidates for the HED listing. If objectives were clear, displays and controls required were available and consequences of error were more or less evident, no remarks were required. There was no effort made to constrain words used or tc enforce legibility, since the aim was to minimize impedance to thinking and ensure some note, however informal, of all concerns.

1 Limited use of the Video Alarm System (VAS) was integrated into the procedure walk-throughs. That is, as the operators would look to both the hard wired annunciators and the VAS for alarm information, the reviewers were concerned primarily with the placement and visibility of the video display screens and the effectiveness of their separate association with safety, primary, secondary and electrical functions. Detailed evaluation of message formats, colors, mode of silence, acknowledge, reset, etc., was not evaluated at this time.

Each reviewer then came to the debriefing meeting with his personal notes on the given procedure. As we again stepped through the procedure, with each reviewer reading his own notes, concerns were voiced and potential HEDs were listed by the HF consultant. These notes were collected by the HF consultant for further review and clarification as he added these HEDs to the master HED list.

Selected procedures were executed in real-timc walk-throughs at the culmination of the task analysis - talk-through phase. The main purpose was validation of observations made during the preceding phases and to bring out time critical effects that may not have been noticeable during the non-real-time analysis.

The real-time walk-through observations were non-intrusive (no operator commentary). Unusual effects noticed during the walk-throughs were analyzed during the " post-hoc" evaluation sessions. The HFE consultant and review team personnel participated in the " post-hoc" evaluation sessions to assure i completeness and objectivity of the evaluation.

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The above process served also to identify any missing displays and controls. Additionally, an inventory of the Control Room instrumentation was used extensively during this review. Copies of a sample procedure walk-through sheet are attached as Appendix E.

C. Operator Interviews Since Seabrook is not yet an operating plant, operator interviews were, of necessity, conducted differently than if it were operating. The Operation's staff does consist of many senio-people with operations experience on other plants and with limited experience on the simulator. To make use of this experience, some of these operators were interviewed during the review process.

These interviews were structured based on formats developed by various human factors groups, modified as needed to.take into account the fact that Seabrook is not an operating plant.

Questions on training and the use of the simulator were emphasized. The final format was developed jointly by the Control I

Room review team and the human factors consultant. A copy of this interview form is included as Appendix C to this report, along with a summary of the comments received.

The interviews were conducted by the human factors consultant to assure a reasonable level of independence. The results were used to discover potential HEDs and to assess those potential HEDs previously discovered.

D. Survey of the Control Room Hardware The survey of the Control Room hardware was conducted on the Seabrook simulator. This simulator is an exact duplicate of the Seabrook Unit.1 MCB and is used extensively in the training of the operators. The layout of the Simulator Room and the environmental aspects (lighting, sound, etc.) duplicate those of the Main Control Room as much as possible.

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The survey was performed by a team of engineers, operators, and human factors specialists. The team was trained in both the simulator and classroom in what to look for while examining the Board panel by panel. An agenda for the training session is included as Appendix B.

Team members were divided into pairs, an operator paired with an j engineer or human factors specialist; and different pairs were assigned to different panels. These pairs employed common checklist / rating forms developed by the human factors consultant and YAEC, and made notations of human engineering deficiencies on those forms.

The checklist / rating forms were divided into three sections: A, Physical Panel Layout and Design; B, Panel Instrumentation and Hardware; and C, Non-Computer Alarm and Status Lights. These sections were divided up among the two person review teams to insure that one team would not be the only team to review a front panel. In other words, if one team reviewed a front panel using an A section of the checklist, we ensured that another team would review that panel using the B or C section of the checklist.

In most cases, the rear panels were also reviewed by more than one team. Copies of the above-mentioned forms are attached as Appendix D.

The senior human factors consultant was not assigned to a team. He was available throughout the survey process to answer questions and aid in making judgements on potential Human Engineering Discrepancies.

During this process, and again during the Procedure Talk-Through portion of the review, extensive use was made of the Main Control Board device list, which served as a Control Room inventory. The device list has on it the information used to specify the device.

.This includes board locations, tag number, color, and drawing references. For switches, it includes operator type and color; escutcheon type, color, and engraving; and indicating light, arrangement, and color. For instrumentation it includes the range, units, multiplier, the type of scale or chart, and the input signal.

Photographs of each panel were taken for documentation purposes.

These were used to document what was reviewed and in the assessment process as required to assess potential human engineering discrepancies.

E. Assessment ,

The potential human engineering discrepancies have been assessed, and a determination made as to which are significant and should be corrected. The assessment process included an evaluation with respect to the importance of the HED in contributing to operator error; and with respect to the appropriate schedule for modifying the Control Room to rectify the HED.

1 The review team took the raw data from the Control Room Review and organized it in a logical manner. A thorough assessment was then carried out by the core group mentioned previously. The remainder of the team that participated in the actual review was available on an as-needed basis for assistance in assessing discrepancies in their areas of expertise.

1 The list of candidate Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) drew from a number of sources and went through many iterations prior to the formal report submission.

The principal sources of potential HEDs, in chronological order of their occurrence, were:

1. Operator interviews.

2. Control Loard survey.

3. Talk-throughs and walk-throughs.

In addition, there were several other (informal) sources, namely:

4 Concerns that became evident to the instructors during the simulator acceptance test.

5. Recommendations that filtered informally by word-of-mouth through the community of operators and instructors.

The HED list was first completed after the Control Board survey to reflect data from sources (1), (2), (4), and some of (5).

Following the talk-throughs and walk-throughs, it was revised to reflect (3) and more of (5). Following that, a number of " quality control" items (i.e., non-compliance with the engineering specifications) which had been put on the HED list " temporarily" were checked in both the Main Control Board and the simulator to make sure they had been fixed. Those that had been fixed were dropped from the HED list. Several additional items f rom source (5) were added.

For all discrepancies on the list, an assessment of the consequences of any change was made by the core group. This assessment took into account whether or not the potential operator error was detectable and/or correctable, the system consequences as a result of the error, and the potential for serious system consequences. This assessment was the first step in the classification of HEDs.

Based upon the assessment, a priority was assigned to each HED.

This priority is a rating of the importance of the potential HED in contributing to operator error and the appropriate schedule for implementing any necessary modification. The Importance and Schedule categories follow here:

Importance

1. Significant potential for uncorrected operator error and risk of serious consequences.

2. Some potential for uncorrected operator error and risk of moderate consequences. No risk of serious consequences.

3. Little or no potential for uncorrected operator error and risk of consequences. Rectification of HEDs should enhance operator training and satisfaction.

Schedule

1. Before startup, initiate as soon as possible.

2. Before startup, but some further study and engineering will be required.

3. First outage.

4 Indefinite at this time.

5. Will not be done.

The process of this review and assignment of priorities consisted j of a series of meetings during which the CRDR team leader, the HF consultant, the principal I&C team member, and the senior operator team member (backed up by-one or two additional operators and one or two additional I&C engineers) went item-by-item through the candidate HEDs, added a rating as to both importance and schedule, and agreed on a strategy for design change. Alternatives such as enhancement, design change, procedure change, or no change, were considered for each HED.

Af ter each meeting, a revised list of the ratings, HEDs and l l

alternative fixes were sent out for review and comment by additional operators. The comments were then evaluated at the next core group meeting, and necessary changes made.

This final report details all discrepancies, the disposition of 1

each discrepancy, and the logic for the disposition.

The cumulative impact of minor HEDs was assessed for each board 1

section by taking all the HEDs for that particular section and looking at their interaction with each other.

For ease in discussion of the potential Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs), they have been divided with two sections, Generic and Specific. In the Generic section, the problem is stated, then those examples that appeared on the board are listed.

In the Specific section we include those which are not related to any generic problem. A preferred resolution has been developed for each potential HED.

F. Verification Each selected improvement has been verified to insure that it will provide the necessary correction and can be introduced into the Control Room without creating an unacceptable human engineering discrepancy in itself. Such improvements have been coordinated with changes resulting from other programs.

For some design change recommendations we made physical measurements and calculated improved visual angles, etc. For some mimic and rearrangement recommendations, we drew our redesigns on

[ photo paste-ups and compared these to the existing panel with both experienced and novice operators providing their reactions as well

! as the human factors consultants. For many design change l recommendations, the best we cor d do was thoughtful discussion of I

. advantages and disadvantages of the new (or several alternative forms of the new) as compared to the old.

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I G. Inclusion of Human Factors Considerations in Future Design j

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Modifications This process will be divided into two parts prior to commercial operation, and subsequent to commercial operation.

Prior to commercial operation, copies of all revised Main Control Board drawings will be sent to appropriate members of the core team for their review. All changes will be reviewed from a human factors viewpoint before being made.

I Subsequent to commercial operation, all engineering design changes that affect safety-related systems will be reviewed by a person trained in human factors engineering. He will have available the i services of a human factors consultant to use as needed during his review.

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IV. OVERALL BOARD ASSESSMENT The results of the above efforts are included in Sections V and VI of this report. In it are included the potential HEDs discovered, the selected design improvement for correction if necessary, and a justification for those not corrected.

We found that the general layout and organization of the Seabrook Control Room is excellent; the front panels being benchboards with all displays and controls of engineered safeguard systems located to the far left, the reactor and primary system located to the left center, the turbine generator and secondary system located to the right center, and the electrical system located to the far right. Associated with each of the four main sections is a video alarm system display and contiguous keyboard, as well as some redundant hard-wired alarm and status lights.

In the center are four video displays that may be used for monitoring alarms, as well as for call up of other variables, plant diagrams, trend plots, logic trees, and the management of these. Two large video displays to the left and right may be used flexibly.

Back panels generally contain only those controls and displays not needed frequently or in a hurry in emergencies or used in conjunction with front panel displays and controls.

A novel color coding scheme for indicators uses a pink scale background for temperature, light blue for flow, light green for level, and light yellow for pressure. The red / white safety train color coding of components is effective, and is well presented.

We feel that the board will adapt well to generic labeling and demarcation. Considerable flexibility is anticipated with the use of the Video Alarm System. Altogether, we find that the board is well layed out and designed.

Several items have not been included in this document because they are not yet ready for review. They are:

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o Video alarm system, SPDS and associated computer aids to operator, o Hard-wired annunciators.

o Auditory signals, communications within and outside tha Control Room, acoustic noise, o Radiation Monitoring System.

o Lighting, except to a limited degree.

J-o Heating, ventilation and air conditioning.

4 o Control Room access and architecture relative to supervision, storage of emergency equipment, escape, limiting access of unauthorized persons, rest room and eating facilities.

o Storage of operating procedures and keys, tagging, shift turnover and other administrative procedures, o Remote shutdovn panel.

These will be reviewed and included in a later supplement to this report.

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APPENDIX A MANAGEMENT AND SURVEY TEAMS' MEMBERSHIP AND QUALIFICATIONS

Management Team Members Lawrence A. Walsh - Operatione Manager, Seabrook Station Philip J. Swanson - Training Center Manager, Public Service Company of New Hampshire Edward A. Sawyer - Yankee Atomic Electric Company Survey Team Members E. A. Sawyer - Team Leader Yankee Atomic Electric Company Provides Project Management experience W. G. Alcusky - I&C Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company Provides I&C and Human Factors experience A. Miller - I&C Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company Provides I&C and Human Factors experience J. L. Peterson - Shift Superintendent Seabrook Station Staff Provides Operations experience M. J. DeBay - Unit Shift Supervisor Seabrook Station Staff Provides Operations experience

M. R. Breault - Unit Shift Supervisor Seabrook Station Staff Provides Operations experience Neal A. Pond - Senior Control Room Operator Seabrook Station Staff Provides Operations experience Joseph M. Malone - Operations Administrative Supervisor Seabrook Station Staff Provides Operations experience S. F. Urbanowski - Electrical Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company Provides Electrical Engineering experience P. L. Anderson - Systems Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company Provides Systems Engineering experience T. B. Sheridan, SCD - Human Factors Consultant Thomas B. Sheridan Associates Provides Human Factors Engineering experience D. D. Lanning, PhD - Human Factors Consultant Thomas B. Sheridan Associates Provides Human Factors Engineering and Operations experience

M. M. Danchak, PhD - Human Factors Consultant i

Thomas B. Sheridan Associates Provides Human Factors Engineering and Computer Technology experience Notes:

1. Resumes for the above listed persons follow here.

2. Various other operators and engineers were available and were used during the review process.

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• SB 1 & 2 FSAR RESUME OF QUALIFICATIONS' LAURENCE A. WALSH [

Have worked in the nuclear field since early 1961. Previous job held covered the full range of operations. With two commercial and one Navy new construction plants behind me, Seabrook construction is no stranger. Will complete training necessary to hold any management position in a Nuclear Compl ex.

POSITION Operations Manager EDUCATION St. Thomas Grammar Graduated 1955 Sacred Heart High School Graduated 1959 Navy Schools:

Basic Electronics and Electricity School Intercommunication Technicians School Submarine School (

Nuclear Power Training School Oxygen Generator Operations & Maintenance H2 Analyzer Operations & Maintenance Vibration Analysis Motion Projection Operation & Maintenance Connecticut Yankee Startup Training Course Central Maine Vocational Institute Instructor Training Maine Yankee Startup Training Course Central Maine Vocational Institute Technical Writing American Management Association Communications Course Psychology 401 University of New Hampshire Four credit hours Mathematics 1211 Memphis State University Three credit hours Physics 2511 Memphis State University Four credit hours Physics 2512 Menphis State University Four credit hours Nuclear Physics Memphis State University Phys. 4110 Three credit hours Reactor Physics Memphis State University Phys. 4220 Three credit hours In s t rume nt at ion Memphis State University Tech. 2411 Three credit hours Chenistry Memphis State University Ch em. 1010 Three credit hours Radiation Protection Memphis State University Biol. 4080 Three credit hours Calculus I Memphis State University Math 1321 Four credit hours Calculus II Memphis State University Math 2321 Four credit hours Additionally, Memphis State University has been contracted for an addi-tional 51 credit hours nf Shift Technical Advisor courses. ( ,

Management training - PSNH 280 hours0.00324 days <br />0.0778 hours <br />4.62963e-4 weeks <br />1.0654e-4 months <br /> 13D-10

SB 1 6 2 FSAR

' L. A. WALSH - RESUME Page IVo EXPERIENCE 1956 to 1958 Worked in shipping, receiving, display and advertising for local department store. (Grive, Bisset & Holland, Waterburv, Connecticut) 1958 to 1959 Worked in an eyelet manufacturing shop as a machine operator and started an apprentice program for tool making. (Westbury Mfg. Co., Waterbury, Connecticut) 1959 to 1961 Af ter completion of service schools associated with ny rate, served aboard USS Sea Owl (SS408) for approximately nine months. Duties performed while aboard were operation and main-tenance of all communications systems, electronic compasses and ships batteries.

1961 to 1962 Af ter completing nuclear power training school, qualified as a reactor operator at the SIC training prototype at Windsor, Connecticut. (Conbustion Engineering PWR) 1962 to 1964 Served as a member of the nuclear engineering crew aboard the USS Laf ayette (SSBN616) through initial construction, sea

(- trials, commissioning and operations. Among other du ties, I was also a qualified reactor operator on the S5W plant and also filled the duties of the spare parts petty officer.

1964 to 1966 Cas employed by Connecticut Light and Power Company at their 600 MUe fossil fuel generating station in Devon, Connecticut.

While awaiting startup crew assignment at Connecticut Yankee Atomic, served as operating assistant.

1966 to 1970 Transferred to Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company and was a member of the staff during construction and startup of the station. Was elected business agent of the local union and received AEC reactor operating licenses OP-2438 and OP-2438-1.

1970 to 1978 Transferred to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company to assist with plant acceptance from the NSSS and AE. Assisted with instrue-tion of prospective licenses holders and formulated initial procedures for plant operations. Dromoted to Assistant Department Head for Plant Operations and also represented con-pany as Project Engineer for a backfitted systen to complement the cooling water outlet diffuser. thile at Maine Yankee, I held an NRC Senior Operating License d SOP 1603, SOP 1603-1 and

• SDP 1693-2, the latter being current until August 1978.

1978 Transferred to Public Service Conpany of New Hanpshire. Have to Present hired a staff for management of the Operations Department and Unit 1 licensed operators. Have staged the effort for proce-dure development and am nidwav through plant systens desien review.

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d TRAINING CENTER MANAGER 1-RESUME Philip J. Swanson

SUMMARY

0F QUALIFICATIONS Mr. Swanson has over 20 years of power industry or related technical experience, eighteen years of which has been I Prior to his present nuclear power related experience.

position _of Training Center Manager, Mr. Swanson held j_ positions as a Senior Operation's Engineer with Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Nuclear Services Division; Instrumentation and Control Supervisor, Technical Assistant to Instrument and Controls Supervisor, and Supervisory Control Room Operator with Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. Mr. Swanson held a senior operator's license for the Maine Yankee facility.

l EXPERIENCE l

1961 to Public Service Company of New Hampshire - Training Center P resent Manager (Joined PSNH in this capacity in June, 1978)

Areas of Responsibility Responsible for all training facility, operator license programs and simulator activities at the Seabrook Training Center.

Yankee Atomic Electric Company - Senior Operation's Engineer (Joined YAEC, Nuclear Services Division, Operations Department, in this position in November,-1974)

Areas of Responsibility Lead Follow Engineer for new projects - Provide operational input in the design review of four 1150 MWe PWR units. This design review encompasses the factoring-in of practical operational concerns and licensing. Provide Operation's input in the preparation of the facility's SARs. Development of Plant Staff Training Program.

.t Collateral Responsibilities Northeast Chairman, Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specification User's Group i

j Coordinating Committee Member, Yankee Information Management

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System (computer based, micro-media records system).

Coordinating Engineer for the development of a General Employee Indoctrination Training Program for all of the i . operating Yankee plants.

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Mr. Philip J. Swanson Page 2 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company - Instrumentation &

Controls Supervisor (Promoted to this position January, 1974)

Areas of Responsibility Department Head - Responsible for all aspects of Instrumentation and Control's activities at the Maine Yankee facility.

Member of the Plant Operation Review Committee.

Technical Assistant to the Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor (Promoted to this position November, 1971)

Areas of Responsibility Supervision of 5 Instrument Technicians, 3 Testors and temporary technicians totaling to 12 individuals for a period covering from initial plant construction phases, startup test program, through power operation.

Responsible for writing and subsequent administration of Instrumentation Surveillance Test Procedures falling under plant NRC licensing requirements.

Responsible for Quality Assurance Acceptance Auditing for Safety Classified Instrumentation Systems and spare parts.

Alternate member of the Plant Operation Review Committee.

Responsible for the origination and teaching of Instrumentation Training Program for Hot and Cold License Programs. Design and implementation of Plant Instrumentation Design Changes.

MYAPC - Supervisory Control Room Operator (Joined Maine Yankee staff in this position March, 1970)

Primary duties were preparation of Plant Operating Procedures; construction follow; and system preoperational testing. Temporarily assigned to Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company to render technical assistance during Connecticut Yankee's first refueling operation.

United States Navy - Electronics Technician 1st Class Engineering Officer of the Watch - SIC Prototype Facility.

Shift operational responsibility for all phases of Nuclear Propulsion Plant operation at this facility.

Supervision ranged to 10 operators, with collateral responsibility for evaluating performance in terms of qualification, training, etc.

Engineering Officer of the Watch Instructor - Responsible for

.the classroom phase of training of Watch-Supervisors at the SIC Facility.

4 Mr. Philip J. Swanson Page 3 Prior assignment at SIC Facility as a Leading Petty Officer -

Reactor Controls Division with complete shift responsibility for all phases of operation and maintenance of related instrumentation, supervision of 4 operator / technicians.

Commenced duty at SIC Facility as Reactor Operator / Instructor. Prior Nuclear Related Naval Assignments: Leading Petty Officer Reactor Controls Division SSBN 622; Reactor Operator SSBN 622; Reactor Operator S3G Nuclear Prototype Facility.

EDUCATION / Memphis State University; Bachelor of Professional Studies TRAINING Degree, Magnum Cum Laude.

Quinsigamond Community College; Business Administration - 21 credit hours.

Westinghouse, PWR Information Course Westinghouse, A100, Electro-Hydraulic Turbine Control System Maintenance Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company - Senior Operator Training

! Program Central Maine Vocational Technical Institute; Instructor course, technical writing course Servi:e Schools (Navy)

Electronic Technician Class "A" - Great Lakes, Illinois J

U.S. Naval Submarine School - New London, Connecticut Nuclear Power School - Bainbridge, Maryland Nuclear Power Prototype Training - S3G, West Milton, New York Engineering Officer of the Watch Training - SIC, Windsor, Connecticut Technical Seminar Series - SIC - 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> Spalding Institute - Peoria, Illinois (high school)

LICENSES /

QUALIFICATIONS Senior Operator, Maine Yankee, C.E. PWR, SOP-1698 Engineering Officer of the Watch, SIC, C.E. PWR Engineering Watch Supervisor, S1c Reactor Operator, SIC I

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' Mr. Philip J. Swanson Page 4 Engineering Watch Supervisor, S5W, Westinghouse PWR I

Reactor Operator S5W Maneuvering Room Shutdown Watch, S5W Reactor Operator, S3G, G.E. PWR Qualified Submariner, SSK 244; SSBN 622; BDW SSK 244 Professional Affiliation ANSI /ANS 3.5 Committee, American National Standard Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training.

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RESUME EDWARD A. SAWYER Fire Protection Coordinator Yankee Atomic Electric Company EDUCATION 1965 - Northeastern University - BS in Electrical Engineering.

MEMBERSHIP National Fire Protection Association

. EXPERIENCE Yankee Atomic Electric Company December 1981 Responsible for Control Room Design Reviews for Yankee Atomic to Electric Company. This includes responsibility for the Present reviews of Seabrook Station, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee Rowe, July 1976 Fire Protection Coordinator directly responsible for the to overall preparation and implementation of the fire prevention Present and protection programs for four nuclear power plants -

Yankee Rowe, Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook Station.

August 1974 Project Manager on the Central Maine Power Company Nuclear to Project directly responsible for coordinating the development July 1976 of project design and engineering schedules with the principal contractors, administration of the Project Engineers under my direction.

January 1972 Electrical Project Engineer on the Seabrook Nuclear Power to Station. Duties consisted of supervision of the Electrical August 1974 Engineering effort of the A/E and Yankee in PSAR submittal and in plant design, and responsibility to the Project Manager for licensing activities, engineering coordination, notification of any cost or scheduling problems, including dealing with NELPIA in areas of fire protection design.

Project Engineer on the engineering, construction and testing of an Advanced Off-Gas Control System for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Duties consisted of supervising the engineering, scheduling and cost control efforts of the A/E and Yankee personnel; and following of the construction effort and test effort for the system.

November 1971 Assistant to the Project Engineer for Vermont Yankee Nuclear to Power Plant. Duties consisted of aiding in plant licensing, January 1972 writing of plant Environmental Report.

September 1970 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant to November 1971 Technical Assistant to the Plant Maintenance Supervisor.

Duties consisted of aiding Maintenance Department personnel in preparing the plant for. commission.

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1 January 1968 Yankee Atomic Electric Company to September 1970 Engineer in the Project Group for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. The Project group coordinated the work done on the plant by the Architect Engineer, Nuclear Steam Supplier, and the various other vendors and suppliers.

April 1963 New England Electric System to June 1965 Brayton Point Generating Station, Somerset, Massachusetts.

1 Co-op employment as Assistant to the Electrical Department Foreman of a 500 Mw Thermal Generating Plant.

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SUMMARY

RESUME William G. Alcusky WORK EXPERIENCE Yankee Atomic Elcetric Co. - October, 1979 - Present Instrument and Control Engineer: Work included environcental qualification of instrumentation and electrical equipment, design of new instrumentation loops, and procurement of instrumentation. Performed studies of Control Room Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for adequacy. Purchased isolation system for prototype SPDS. Responsible for human factors reviews of on-going design changes and participated in Control Room Design Reviews for 2 BWRs and 1 PWR, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - June, 1971 - October, 1979 Work included layout and equipment selection for control and relay panels, and arrangement and procurement of plant annunciator systems.

Developed electrical control circuits for pumps, valves, etc. Worked at construction site supervising installation and checkout of electrical equipment and installation.

EDUCATION BSEE, 1971, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts Graduate Courses in Management Sciences, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts Course, " Human Factors in Process Control", University of Maine, Orono, Maine, May-June, 1982 Recent Training Courses and Seminars Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., " Fundamental Management Skills",

January-February, 1982 American Management Association, " Improving Managerial Skills for the New or Prospective Manager", October, 1981 EPRI Seminar, " Human Factors Enhancement Approaches for Nuclear Control Room", August, 1981 NUS Corp. Seminar, " Emergency Response Facilities", May 13, 1981 EPRI Seminar, " Computerized Operator Support Systems", December, 1980

" Nuclear Electronics' Technology Update", at General Atomic, January, 1980 Industry Committees Member IEEE SC7, " Human Factors and Control Facilities"

ALBERT MILLER ENGINEER INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL ENGINEERING GROUP _

Mr. Miller received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from George Washington University in 1949.

From 1949 to 1951, he was employed by the U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency. His duties generally encompassed the area of computer evaluation, circuitry design and anlysis.

In 1951, he worked for the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore, Maryland, as a circuit designer in the area of electro-mechanical switching, and in 1952, he joined the Laboratory for Electronics Company. The position held by Mr. Miller required technical and administrative skills as a specialist on systems relating to electro-mechanical and electronic switching circuits.

In 1,954, he became a Senior Design Engineer with Photon Incorporated in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and while in the employment of this company, he progressed to Assistant Operations Manager.

Mr. Miller joined the Foxboro Company in 1960 as Senior Project Engineer in the Systems Engineering Division. He served as the technical and administrative authority of the Eavironmental Resources Department and his responsibilities were related directly to municipal projects, contracts, and related functions.

Mr. Miller joined the Yankee Atomic Electric Company in 1968 as an His immediate responsi-Engineer in the Electrical and Control Design Section.

bilities were in the area of computer application, interfacing, instrumentation, and hardware and software determinations.

Since 1974, Mr. Miller's primary responsibilities have been the instrumentation and control systems of operating plants. This has included the engineering of operating plant modifications, as well as the review of plant designs to ensure conformance to the applicable industry standards and Nuclear Regulatory Commission guides and criteria.

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Resume: Jerry L. Peterson

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS,:

Sixteen years experience in the operation of a nuclear power plant, both commercial and military. Experience includes: procedure writing, initial startup, full power operations, refueling and minor maintenance and testing of various nuclear power plant systems.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

April 1982 to Present Shift Superintendent, Public Service Company of New Hampshire Functions as the on shift representative of plant management and supervises all station operations required for safe, efficient and dependable service.

July 1979 to April 1982 Unit Shift Supervisor, Public Service Company of New Hampshire Directly responsible for the overal'. safety and efficiency of the unit to which assigned and for directing the activities of personnel assigned to that unit.

January 1973 to July 1979 Consolidated Edison of New York, Incorporated New York, New York Indian Point Unit No. 3 - Reactor Operator Responsible for shift operations, and Supervisor of support groups, of a 1000 megawatt electric nuclear station. Also responsible for acceptance testing associated with nuclear equipment, instrumentation and systems. Obtained Unit No. 3 operators license January 1977, Docket No. 55-4974 Indian Point Unit No. 3 - Nuclear Plant Operator Responsible for the safe and competent operations of the nuclear and conventional systems for the Unit No. 3 facility. Was involved during the construction phase with flushes, hydrostatic tests, equipment and system operational tests, fuel assembly inspection and acceptance.

Indian Point Unit No. 2 - Reactor Operator Completed the formal reactor training program at the Con Edison Indian Point Facility. During this time became intimately familiar with all components of the primary and secondary systems, including: the design, purpose, limitations and normal / emergency procedures. Also had extensive training on the Indian Point Simulator including full power operations and emergency casualty training. Obtained Unit No. 2 license January 1975.

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I Jerry L. Peterson Page 2 I

WORK EXPERIENCE: (cont'd)

Indian Point Unit No 2. - Nuclear Plant Operator Responsible for the safe and competent operations of the nuclear and conventional systems of the Unit No. 2 startup program, up to and including the initial core loading.

United States Navy 1966 to 1972

. Assigned to the USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN 630) as an Electronic Technician.

Qualified as a Reactor Operator and as an Engineer Watch Supervisor. Was involved with a complete overhaul and refueling of the nuclear power plant on the Calhoun.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING:

July 1979 to Present STA Qualified MSU October 1982 Memphis State University l Currently enrolled in Nuclear Industrial Operations Degree Program.

1973 to 1977 Con Edison Training for Nuclear Plant Operator and Reactor Operator. l 1966 to 1968 Electronic Technician School U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School 1964 to 1966 Edinboro State College 1964 Graduate of Cambridge Springs Joint High School Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania

RESUME: Michael J. DeBay

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS: Twelve years experience in the operation of a nuclear power plant, both commercial and military. Experience includes: procedure writing, simulator operations, full power operations as an auxiliary operator, re-fueling and minor maintenance and test.a.ig of various nuclear power plant systems.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

January 1980 to Unit Shift Supervisor, Public Service Company of New present Hampshire

' Directly responsibic for the overall safety and efficiency of the unit to which assigned and for directing the activ-ities of personnel assigned to that unit.

April 1979 to Control Room Operator, Public Service Company of New January 1980 Hampshire Operated, under supervision of the unit shift supervisor, a nuclear power plant during assigned shif ts. Manipulated a1.1 controls during all phases of operation of the nuclear steam supply system, turbine generator and all associated supporting systems and components. During the contruction phase, responsible for procedure writing and systems start-up.

January 1978 to Nuclear Plant Operator, Indian Point #3 April 1979 j

Responsible for the safe and competent operations of the nuclear and conventional systems for the Unit 3 nuclear facility. Experience included commercial and refueling-operations.

1972 to 1979 Six years experience aboard a naval nuclear submarine as a member of the electrical division, responsible for supervision and maintenance of electrical and pro-pulsion systems. Experience standing watches on electrical generating equipment and as engineering watch supervisor.

Michael J. DeBay Page 2 Qualified auxiliary electrician aft, primary duties of monitoring and controlling the ship's AC and DC generating equipment. Secondary duties of on watch inspection of all running electrical equipment.

Qualified battery charging electrician, responsible for charging the ship's main storage battery.

Qualified as engineering watch supervisor and engin-eering duty petty officer. In this capacity, res-ponsible for supervising seven watch standers in the operation of a naval nuclear propulsion plant during all aspects of propulsion plant operation. While shut down, responsible for supervision of all engin-eering watch standers, including insuring shutdown reactor safety and coordination of shutdown maintenance.

Other Qualified Watch Stations:

Control Point: Controlling access of personnel and material to and from radiation area.

Propulsion Control Cubicle: Controlling ship's electric drive unit by varying voltage sources and motor fields.

Auxiliary Electrician Forward: Monitoring ship's atmos-phere with installed and portable equipment and monitoring major ship's auxiliary equipment.

Six years experience in preventive and corrective main-tenance of electrical generating equipment and the ship's DC propulsion systems.

Two years experience supervising a thirteen man division.

Responsibic for the scheduling and completion of all

electrical repairs and preventive maintenance, including documentation, quality assurance and coordination of outside repair activity assistance.

EDUCATION:

Bachelor of Science, University of the State of New York, February 1983.

Shift Technical Advisor qualified by Memphis State Univer-sity, October 1982.

Currently enrolled in Nuclear Industrial Operations degree. program by Memphis State University Graduated Plainville (CT) High School 1970.

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i Michael J. DeBay Page 3 Military Schools.

U.S. Navy Electrician's Mate Class 'A' School 1972 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School 1973 U.S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Prototype Operational 1973 Training U.S. Navy Noise Measurement and Reduction 1974 U.S. Navy Variable Speed Controllers 1975 1976 U.S. Navy Shipboard Instructor U.S. Navy Administration and Operation of Naval Maintenance Material Management 1976 1977 U.S. Navy Quality Assurance l

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1 RESUME: Micheal R. Breault

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS: Ten years experience in the nuclear field consisting of six years in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program and four years as a member of the operations depart-ment at Seabrook Station.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

May 1983 to Unit Shift Supervisor - Public Service Company of present New Hampshire Directly in charge of shif t operating personnel and responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the unit. During the construction phase, directs,.

shift personnel in the writing of station procedures and system testing.

October 1982 to Supetvisory Control Room Operator - Public Service May 1983 Company of New Hampshire Directed the activities of control room operator, alternate control room operator and auxiliary operator in the development of station operating procedures.

April 1979 to Control Room Operator - Public Service Company of October 1982 New Hampshire Responsible for writing station operating procedures for systems assigned to my shift and assisting in system testing.

November 1972 to Electroni: Technician - United States Navy November 1978 Qualified engineering officer of the watch (E00W).

Responsible for the supervision and safe operation of the nuclear reactor and all associated propulsion plant systems from the maneuvering room area. Res-ponsible for maintaining the chemical inventory of the primary and secondary systems within specifica-tions. Also responsible for all radiological con-trols imposed throughout the power plant.

Michael R. Breault Page 2 Qualified engineering watch supervisor (EWS) . Res-ponsible for the control of all watch stations in the nuclear propulsion plant located outside of the man-euvering room area.

Qualified nuclear reactor operator and nuclear reactor technician.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: Bachelor of Science, March 1983, University of _the State of New York.

Bachelor of Professional Studies, Nuclear Industrial Operations. August 1983, Memphis State University.

Completed Memphis State University Shift Technical Advisor Training Program in October 1982.

Graduated Plainfield (CT) High School - 1972.

Naval Schools:

Naval Instructor Training Naval Basic Computer Theory Naval Nuclear Training Facility Navel Nuclear Power School Naval Electronic Warfare Equipment Operations School Naval Advanced Electronic Technicians School

RESUME: Neal A. Pond

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS: Eight years' experience in the operation of a nuclear power plant, both commercial and military. Experience includes procedure writing, simulator operations and naval nuclear power plant operation and maintenance.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

October 1980 Senior Control Room Operator - Public Service Company to Present of New Hampshire Operates the controls and systems of Seabrook Station while directing the activities of the Control Room operators, alternate Control Room operators and auxiliary operators assigned to shift. Directly involved in procedure writing and scheduling during the construction phase and systems testing.

July 1973 to Served six years in the U.S. Navy. Spent the last three July 1979 years operating a naval nuclear propulsion plant on a submarine. Stood watch as engine room supervisor which involved the supervision of maintenance and operation of machinery of the reactor and propulsion plants. Also performed duties as an Engineering Laboratory Technician (ELT) and the last year as leading HPT. Responsible for initiating proper primary and secondary chemistry and radiological controls. Also prepared and gave lectures for training junior personnel and worked on a steam generator repair team providing radiological controls assistance.

EDUCATION: Bachelor of Science, March 1983, University of the State of New York Memphis State University Shift Technical Advisor Program, October 1982 Currently enrolled in Memphis State University Nuclear Industrial Operations Degree Program Graduated Winnacunnet High School, Hampton, New Hampshire, 1973 i

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Neal A. Pond Page 2 Military Training U.S. Navy Machinist's Mate 'A' School U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Plant Operator's School U.S. Navy Engineering Laboratory Technician's School U.S. Navy Diesel Engine Operation / Maintenance Course U.S. Navy R-114 Air Conditioning Operation / Maintenance Course U.S. Navy Lithium Bromide Air Conditioning Operation /

Maintenance Course U.S. Navy High Pressure Air Compressor Operation /

Maintenance Course U.S. Navy Quality Assurance School U.S. Navy Repair Parts Petty Officer Course 1

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RESUME: Joseph M. Malone

SUMMARY

OF ,

QU ALIFICATIONS: Over seventeen years experience in the nuclear field consisting of ten years in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program, three and one-half years as an instrumentation and control design engineer, and over four years as a member of the Operations Department at Seabrook Station.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

May 1983 to Operations Administrative Supervisor - Public Service Present Company of New Hampshire Functioning as the representative of plant management in all matters relating to administrative activities of the Operations Department for Seabrook St.ation Units 1 and 2.

January 1980 Unit Shift Supervisor - Public Service Company of New

to May 1983 Hampshire Responsible for the safe and efficient operation of one unit of the two unit Seabrook Station and directly in charge of shift operating personnel. During the construction effort, directed shift personnel in the writing of station procedures and system testing.

April 1979 to Control Room Operator - Public Service Company of New January 1980 Hampshire Responsible for writing operating procedures for the station and teviewing technical documentation.

December 1975 Design Engineer, Instrumentation and Control Engineering to April 1979 Department, Combustion Engineering, Incorporated Directly involved with the design of CE's Nuplex 80 Control Complex for the TVA Yellow Creek and GPU Forked River projects. Areas of responsibility:

Developed Control Room arrangement based on Human Factors design criteria and operator-oriented design objectives.

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Joseph M. Malone Page 2 July 1967 to Served Aboard the USS John Marshall (SSBN 611)

July 1972 This period included participation in a major shipyard refueling / overhaul and eight Polaris deterrent patrols.

Major responsibilities:

Supervised maintenance and repair of all ship's auxiliary power systems while serving as Auxiliary Power Petty Officer.

Actively participated in the administration of the ship's submarine qualification program and was also responsible for teaching and administering examinations on the ship's propulsion plant and electrical systems to new crew members.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING Bachelor of Science, University of the State of New York, September 1982 Completed Memphis State University, Shift Technical Advisor Training Program in October 1982 Presently enrolled in Nuclear Industrial Operations Degree Program, Memphis State University Presently enrolled in the MBA Program, New Hampshire College Graduated Coyne Electrical and Technical School, Boston, Massachusetts, 1965.

Graduated Central Catholic High School, Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1963.

Military Schools U.S. Navy Electrician's Mate 'A' School 10/65-02/66 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School 03/66-09/66 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit 10/66-04/67 U.S. Navy Submarine School 04/67-06/67 Engineering Officer of the Watch Training 03/74-08/74 Also attended various specialized schools dealing with the technical aspects of a nuclear propulsion plant.

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Joseph H. Malone Page 3 Established criteria and wrote procedure for the layout of Control Room indications and controls. This effort included research of operating procedures and philisophies and application of human engineering techniques.

Created alarm point selection criteria and designed a plant annunciator system which greatly reduced the number of annunciator windows in the Control Room.

Organized and supervised a Control Room operability analysis which involved the customer's engineers and operating representatives. This analysis utilized a full scale mock-up of the control center and consisted of walk-throughs of plant procedures and casualty operations to evaluate effectiveness of the control center design.

Coordinated the development of a cathode ray tube display information system to ensure consistency of the entire control center design.

July 1972 to Stationed at U.S. Nuclear Power Training Unit, Windsor, CT November 1975 Engineering Officer of the Watch - Served as E00W during refueling operations and post-refueling core physics acceptance testing and power range testing and directed the operation of the power plant for all prototype training evolutions.

Engineering Officer of the Watch Training Coordinator -

Scheduled, supervised and instructed eight to fourteen officer students in propulsion plant theory and operation and all aspects of the duties of a nuclear propulsion plant watch officer.

i Electrical Division Leading Petty Officer - Supervised and participated in the overhaul and modernization of electrical equipment associated with nuclear power propulsion plant during a major refueling / overhaul period.

Classroom Instructor and Phase Coordinator - Instructed thirty to forty students in propulsion plant theory and operation during classroom phase and supervised introduction to operational phase.

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August, 1983 STANLEY F. URBAN 0WSKI, JR.

SENIOR ELECTRICAL ENGINEER ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING GROUP Mr. Urbanowski received his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering (Power) from Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 1968.

From 1968 to 1970, he was employed by the Central Laboratory of the New England Power Service Company, Worcester, Massachusetts where he worked on various projects for the Brayton Point and Salem Harbor stations of New England Power Company. He also provided engineering assistance during construction of the Rhode Island, Eastern Massachusetts, and Vermont Energy Control (REHVEC) economic dispatch facility.

In 1970, Mr. Urbanowski transferred to the Substation Design Engineering Group of the New England Power Service Company in Westboro, Massachusetts where he worked as a project engineer with overall responsibility for the design of new or additions to, existing transmission and distribution substations.

In 1975, Mr. Urbanowski joined Yankee Atomic Electric Company as an Electrical Engineer. At Yankee Atomic he has been responsible for the preparation of engineering studies, design changes, and design reviews for the Yankee plant, Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook. These tasks have included installation of a major electrical backfit for the Vermont Yankee ECCS modification, installation of voltage regulators at the Yankee plant, preparation of voltage regulation studies, and supervision of the electrical design for an Alternate Safe Shutdown System to meet the NRC's fire protection requirements. He has participated in the Yankee plant Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), and he has been responsible for much of the work in the area of environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment. In September, 1978, Mr. Urbanowski was promoted to Senior Engineer in the Electrical Engineering Group with responsibility for providing expertise and services in all areas of electrical engineering.

Since June, 1981 Mr. Urbanowski has been a Senior Electrical Engineer with direct responsibility for the supervision of two engineers, including their training, work assignments, and completion of assigned tasks. He also has indirect responsibility for the activities of others in the Electrical Engineering Group, and for running the group in the absence of superiors.

Mr. Urbanowski is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Power Engineering Society of IEEE, and the Industrial Applications Society of IEEE. He was a member of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee from 1976 to 1982.

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SB 1 & 2 Amendment 45 FSAR June 1982

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PETER L. ANDERSON SEABROOK SYSTEMS ENGINEER Mr. Anderson graduated from the Cloucester High School, Gloucester Massachusetts in 1962.

He served eight years in the U.S. Navy in various engineering billets aboard a nuclear submarine and as an instructor at the SIC prototype located at Combustion Engineering in Windsor, Connecticut.

In 1970 he joined the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. During his 10 j

- plus years at Maine Yankee, he worked in the Chemistry / Health Physics De-partment, Operations Department and the Plant Management staff. He was a tember of the Startup Test Group responsible for procedure preparation, pre-operational and Hot Functional testing and the initial licensed operator training program. Following plant licensing, he obtained and held an SRO license for over seven years. As a plant Department Head, he was responsible for plant Security, Fire Protection, Administrative and'all licensed and non-licensed operator training. As the Assistant to the Plant Manager, he was responsible for all NRC required reports and correspondence. He served as a member and Secretary of the Plant Operations Review Committee for over six years.

In 1981 he transferred to the Yankee Atomic Electric Company as a Senior

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Titled Engineer for the Systems Engineering Group and was assigned as Lead Engineer for the Seabrook project.

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13C-50 1

February 1982 l

, Summerv Resums of Thomas B. Sharidan Thomas B. Sheridan was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, Dec. 23, 1929. He attended Durdue University (B.S.1951) and, af ter two years in military service (Aeromedical Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) attended the University of California, Los Angeles (M.S.1954) and M.I.T. (Sc.D. 1959). His program at M.I.T. was interdependental batween systems engineering and psychology, with one year spent in cross-registration at Harvard University, For most of his career, Dr. Sheridan has remained at M.I.T., where until recently he was Professor of Mechanical Engineering and is now Professor of Engineering and Applied Psychology. He heads the Man-Machine Systems Laboratory and teaches both graduate and undergraduate subjects in Man-Machine Systems. He is a Faculty Associate of the M.I.T. Science, Technology and Society Program. He helped develop a new inter-departmental graduate degree program in Technology and Policy, and has taught the core ceminars for that program. He has also taught control, design and other engineering subjects.

He has served as visiting faculty member at the University of California, Berkeley, Stanford University, and the Technical University of Delf t, Netherlands.

Dr. Sheridan's research has been on mathematical models of human operator and socio-economic syste=s, on man-computer interaction in piloting aircraf t and in super-vising undersea and industrial robotic systems, and on computer graphic technology for information searching and group decision-making. He is author, with W.'R. Ferrell, of Man-Machine Systems: Information, Control and Decision Models of Human Performance, M.I.T. Press, 1974, 1981 (published in Russian, 1930) ar.d co-editor of a 1976 Plenum Press book, Monitoring Behavior and Supervisory Control.

He has been active in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, was formerly editor of the IEEE Transactions on Man-Machine Systems, is past president cf the IEEE Systems Man and Cybernetics Society, served as Chairman of the IEEE Committee on Technology Forecasting and As'sessment and was chairman of the 1981 IEEE Workshop on Human Factors in Nuclear Safety. He is also a Fellow of the Human Factors Society, and in 1977 received their Paul M. Fitts Award for contributions to education. He is Associate Editor of Automatica and on the Editorial Advisory Board of Computer Aided Design.

Dr. Sheridan has served on the Accident Prevention and Injury Control Study See-tions of the National Institutes of Health, the NASA Life Sciences Advisory Committee, the NSF Automation Research Council, the NASA Study group on Robotics, the U.S. Con-gress OTA Task Force on Appropriate Technology, and the NSF Advisory Co==ittee on Applied Physical, Mathematical and Biological Sciences. He is a member of the Committee on Human Factors and the Ad Hoc Committee on Aircrew-Vehicle Interaction, both of the National Research Council.

His industrial consulting activities have included: The General Motors Corp.

(auto safety); General Electric Co. (t elemanipulators) : C.S. Draper Laboratory (de-sign of astronaut interface for Apollo guidance system, industrial robots); Biody-nimics, Inc. (biomedical and human factors): Public Broadcast Service (TV audience fesdback); National Bureau of Standards (industrial robots); Group Dialog Systems, Inc. (group meeting and decision technology); Northrop Aircraft (pilot workload);

Babcock and Wilcox Co. (industrial instrumentation); Lockheed, General Physics, American Electric Power, Consumer's Power, Gibbs and Hill, Virginia Electric Power, Gtneral Public Utilities, Stone and Webster, the BWR Owners' Group, Brookhaven National Laboratory and Electric Power Research Institute (man-machine aspects of nuclear plant safety).

Dr. Sheridan is married and has four children.

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Brief Resume 14 -

David D. Lanning (Ph.D.1963, M.I.T.) . ,

Professor Lann'ing's fields of interest are the areas of Applied Reactor Nuclear Engineering, Reactor Operation and Safety. He worked at the MIT Reactor in the areas of teaching, research, and reactor operation from 1957 to 1965, and returned ~

to MIT in 1969. At present, he is.the Graduate Admissions Offi-cer for the Nuclear. Engineering Department as well as continu-ing his teaching and research. He was in charge of the, now completed, core modificatipn design and installation for the  !

MIT Reactor. He also worked at the research laboratories in Richland,-Washington from 1951 to 1957 and from 1965 to 1969.

In the latter period, he worked for Battelle-Northwest as a manager of the Reactor Neutronics Section which included the utilization and operation of the High Temperature Lattice Testing Reactor (HTLTR) and the utilization of the Physical Constants Testing Reactor (PCTR) . He currently teaches a course in " Reactor Operations" and a course in " Nuclear Power' '

Reactors." His most recent sponsored research and consulting activities have been in the area of power reactor and research reactor core design, transient analysis, control system studies 1 l

and safety assessments.

Recent Specific Consulting

1. Member of the Safety Audit Committee for the Northern States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (BWR) .

2. Member of certain Design Review Boards for the Stone 6 Webster Engineering Corporation.

3. Consultant for Argonne National Laboratory working on utili-ation of low enriched uranium for research and test-reactor -

fuels. .

4. Review of Reactor Safety Related Information for the Boston Edison Company. -

5. Member of the General Public Utilities Ad Hoc Committee to review the Man-Machine Interface and Operator Training.

(TMI-2 Review)

~ 6. -Consultant to the BWR Owners Group for Generic Control Room -

Reviews. -

7. Coordinator of an independent consulting group to assist Boston Edison in Training for Core Damage Recognition and

. Mitigation.

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VITA UICHAEL M. DANCHAK Office Residence The Hartford Graduate Center 3 Stevens Place Computer and Information Science Rocky Hill, Connecticut 06067 275 Windsor Street (203)529-7769 Hartford, Connecticut 06120 (203)549-3600 EMPLOYMENT SYNOPSIS J

7/78 - Present DIRECTOR OF STUDIES Computer and Information Science The Hartford Graduate Center Hartford, Connecticut 7/74 - 7/78 SUPERVISOR - DISPLAY SYSTEMS Instrumentation and Control Engineering Nuclear Power System Combustion Engineering, Incorporated Windsor, Connecticut 9/69 - 7/74 GRADUATE STUDENT Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, New York 6/65 - 9/69 CC'IMISSIONED OFFICER United States Marine Corps EDUCATION 1974 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, Nuclear Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, New' York 1972 MASTER OF SCIENCE, Nuclear Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, New York l

i 1965. BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN ENGINEERING, Aerospace and Mechanical Sciences Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey

VITA of MICHAEL M. DANCHAK Page 2 PERSONAL DATA Date of Birth: March 28, 1944 Social Security: 200-34-8514 Place of Birth: Coaldale, Pennsylvania Marital Status: Married Professional Affiliations:

Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers The Human Factors Society Instrument Society of America Association for Computing Machinery Society for Information Display RECOGNITION Listed in Who's Who in the East Atomic Energy Commission Traineeship, 1972 - 1974 National Defense Education Act Traineeship, 1969 - 1972 Elected to Tau Beta Pi, 1970 Naval Reserve Officer Training Course Scholarship, 1961 - 1965 EMPLOYMENT HIGHLIGHTS

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1978 - Present The Hartford Graduate Center Involved with curriculum development and management as well as teaching courses on computer graphics, data structures,. man-computer interactions and related areas in the graduate program. Established a computer graphics laboratory that includes a color display system and use the laboratcry in ongoing education and research. Primary interests include color graphics and man-machine interactions.

7/74 - 7/78 Combustion Engineering, Incorporated Primary design responsibility for the computer generated color display cystem used in advanced power plant control rooms and the attendant human factors aspects. Performed extensive evaluations of available display and computing equipment, devised and tested new display techniques, established procedures for_ designing display pages and served as a resource for all human factors concerns.

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VITA of MICHAEL M. DANCHAK Page 3 1972 - 1974 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Designed and implemented an interactive computer graphics system for use in nuclear research as part of the doctoral dissertation requirements.

This included all hardware, interfacing, software and human factors considerations. Was also a teaching assistant in both undergraduate and graduate courses and a part-time programmer for the New York State Radiological Health Laboratory.

Thesis: The Assessment and Modificaiton of Neutron Cross Sections Via Interactive Graphics.

1969 - 1974 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Developed a mathematical model to predict the re-entrant hole effects in three-dimensional pulsed neutron assemblies, qualified for a Senior Operator License on the RPI Critical Facility (research reactor) and served as a teaching assistant in a special program for disadvantaged students.

Thesis: The Re-entrant Hole Effect in Pulsed Neutron Assemblies.

1965 - 1969 United States Marine Corps Was initially responsible for the day-to-day operation and training of the first tactical unit armed with the REDEYE Missile. Later assigned as Officer-in-Charge of the school which trained Marine Corps personnel in the use of the REDEYE.

RECENT PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Reviewer of human factors related papers for Nuclear Safetv 197S.

Invited participant, Man-Machine Interface Forum sponsored by Foxboro Corporation, June 10, 1978.

Member of the Implementation Subgroup, Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group for Graphics (SIGGRAPH) CORE System.

Consultant to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory on computer dis-play design for nuclear power plant control.

Rec eived a research contract from Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to study display of multivariate data on Cathode Ray Tubes-(1980).

Participated in a research contract to study the role of the operator in Nuclear Power Operations with RPI faculty,_ funded by_ Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1980).

Received a research contract from INEL to study the static and dynamic-design considerations of Process Control Alarm displays (1981).

VITA of MICHAEL M. DANCHAK Page 4 PUBLICATION AND PAPERS "The Rensselaer Interactive Graphics Analysis System," Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, June, 1974, 18, 159.

"A Simple Device Using Capacitance Switches for Data Entry in Man-Machine Systems," Nuclear Technology, September, 1974, 23, 337.

" Utilization of Interactive Graphics and Continuous Slowing Down Theory,"

Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, October, 1974, 19, 175.

" Effective CRT Display Creation for Power Plant Applications," Instrumen-tation in the Power Industry, 1976, 19, 87.

"CRT Displays for Power Plants," Instrumentation Technology, October,

.1976, 23, 29.

"The Man-Process Interface Using Computer Generated CRT Displays,"

Instrumentation in the power Industry, 1977, 20, 55.

" Alphanumeric Displays for the Man-Process Interface," Advances in Instru-mentation, 1977, 32, Part 1, 197.

"The Content of Process Control Alarm Displays," Advances in Instrumenta-tation, 1980, 35, 101. -

" Techniques for Displaying Multivariate Data on Cathode Ray Tubes with Applications to Nuclear Process Control," NUREG/CR-1994, April, 1981.

"The Human Factors of CRT Displays for Nuclear Power Plant Control," in Advances in Nuclear Science and Technology, (Lewis and Becker, ed.),

1981, (to be published).

APPENDIX C .

• OPERATOR INTERVIEW FORM 9

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SEABROOK STATION CONTROL ROOM REVIEW Operator Interviews Thirteen operators were interviewed during the period 4-12 August 1982.

They represented the more experienced operators, who intend either to operate the Seabrook station or to train others to do so. Our purpose in doing these interviews was to glean reactions to the control room as experienced primarily by the simulator, which all were familiar with to some extent, and secondarily in participation in operational planning for Unit 1. Obviously no plant operations experience was available at this time.

The combined experience of the operators was as follows:

1) Licenses held: 7 held SR0 licenses, about evenly split between PWR and BWR; 3 held R0 licenses; 3 had no commercial license at the time.

2) Operating experience: The average commercial operating experience was six and one half years, with the maximum beino 16. The three who had no commercial license had had significant " nuclear" navy operating experience.

3) Formal education: Four had Bachelor denrees; six had Associate degrees or significant numbers of college credit hours; the others had completed high school; three had completed STA courses.

4) Age: They ranged from 27 to 37, the average being 33.

5) Height: They ranged from 5'6" to 6'2", the average beinq 5'9".

6) Weight: They ranged from 150 to 200 lbs, the average being 171.

Composite answers (A) to questions (Q) posed initially on a written questionnaire, followed up by a 45 minute individual interview by the undersigned, were as follows :

QA. What do you consider will be the most difficult, confusing or unreliable system (or component) to operate and why?

AA. There was no one system which was criticized out of proportion to others. Three operators were anxious that the CIRC water system,

l. in particular the large (31/2 miles of 19 ft. diameter) tunnels to the sea might not operate "as advertised" under comand to j

reverse flow or backwash. One operator suqqested the need for ,

automatic control, the need for a more available temperature vs. time plot, and that there was no backwash on the condensers themselves.

Three operators were concerned that the feedwater system _would be difficult to operate on startup. Two commented that the combination of four steam generators, many controllers, and feedpump, bypass and other valves are not easily distinguishable on the panel.

. 2-Three operators expressed concern that the ECCS system is complex and hard to monitor, that the control layout is confusing and a potential source of error, that associated controls could be 5 ft. from each other, and that multiple set points "T", "P" add to the confusion.

One operator believed it important to mark indicators with various setpoints.

Two operators evidenced most concern about the video alarm system, though both admitted that they could change their minds with experience and stressed the need for careful testinq and training on the simulator. One operator suggested an additional display or a dedicated screen page of key status alarms - something comparable to an SPOS.

The other operator was concerned about alarm suppression during a transient, and that if programs are not written with sufficient prompts the VAS would not be palatable, or would be misused. He mentioned the incore analysis program as an example.

One operator chose the CVCS as his example with lots of functions to monitor and lots of controls, pressurized flow through seals and as many as 8 different prints, required to figure the system out.

Finally one operator used as his example the " administrative control system" FSAR's, technical specifications, etc. He felt that simulation training would be sufficiently good that hardware will be less of a problem.

QB. What do you consider will be the most difficult or most confusing procedure to perform and why?

AB. Six operators believed there was insufficient experience with procedures to answer this question. One commented on the need to coordinate major evolution procedures and the vendor reference procedures. One was concerned that the Westinghouse procedures may be giving too much credit to the operator and leaving out important detail.

Specific candidates suggested were main turbine section, in particdlar large load swings and potential trips during turbine valve testing, first-time and annual " heat treating" operations on the large tunnels, feedwater control during 5-15% power phase of start-up, heat-up, end-of-core-life cool down,and high pressure injection.

QC. What do you consider will be the most difficult or most confusing panel to operate and why?

AC. Five operators mentioned the engineered safeguards panel, two explicitly because of the partial mirror image (believing that a full mirror image would have been better), two explicitly suggesting that the mimic could have been more clear, one also mentioning a " plethora of ,

containment building caray suction piping", one saying the panel is too densely packed.

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Four operators mentioned the CVCS panel. One said it is complex by nature "nothing can be done about it". Another said trains A and B can get confused with loops 1 and 2. One said there are too many lights and switches in a row. One said a recent fix made the CVCS a lot better.

Four operators cited the feedwater control panel. One simply said it is normally the most difficult manual operation, another cited it but said it was now much better than it used to be.

Two operators specified the turbine supervisory panel, both citing the lack of indication available on the control panel (thermocouples and bearino readouts are on the back). One operator complained that you don't have direct control of the governors and have to calculate MW load.

One operator complained that the annunciators ' labeling is too small.

QD. Based on your operational experience, does the Seabrook control room lack any controls or displays needed for response to normal or emergency situations?

AD. Three operators simply said "no".

Three operators cited the need for hard-wired conventional alarm lights, calling attention to the importance of " pattern recognition" by the operator.

The other answers to this question varied. One operator mentioned the need for a centralized command position in the control room for the shift supervisor or STA.

One felt there should be more control of the electrical distribution system than is now available (substations are not now controllable relative to busses 1,2, E5 and E6; only status is available. You have to send an auxiliary operator. He feels that more back panel real estate is warranted to by-pass fire damaged load centers from the control room.

One operator complained that there is now no capability to track bearing vibration on a recorder.

One operator was worried about malfunctions associated with pump seals, delta P's etc. and believed there was room for more pump-related information.

One operator again mentioned the need for auto control of CIRC water

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during " heat treatment". .

One operator was anxious to get an x-y plotter and have horizontal trend indication (I presume this would be on the computer display).

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1 One operator expressed readiness for the SPDS DE. Are any important indicators out of visual accessability during normal or emergency operation?

AE. Three operators simply answered "no". Several operators said it would be helpful to move some displays to the front: turbine supervisory (vibration, eccentricity) were recommended by four operators. This could be done on the computer, several said.

One operator stated that start-up rate meters are too far to the right ,

relative to the reactivity section.

One operator complained that alarm panels and status liqhts are too high, have too much glare, are not well arouped, and not in sequence. A second operator said that all annunciators and status lamps are difficult to read even when one is close to them.

OF. Which controls are designed, positioned or labeled in a manner that increases the risk of inadvertent operation?

AF. Three operators had no response here. One operator simply commented in general that board layout is high priority but said company managenent is receptive to changes. One generally claimed many components are inconsistently labeled.

Several operators cited specifics about the emergency safeguards '_

panel which could lead to inadvertent operation. Two look-alike valves have the same numbers and first letters on their labels.

Mirror imaging and confusion among labels' "C", "B", "B and C" (?).

Two operators commented that the diesel voltage control raises to the left and lowers to the right. Some retote and trins werei claimed to be confusina. One operator _said he'd like trips to be buttons or other "special" controls. (The reactor scFedif s~ w itch ?

is pistol grip, so is main steam isolation).

One operator suaaested that " rod block" is BWR linqo" and "not accurate for a PWR", that it should be relabeled, another operator agreed and suqqested " rod stop" or " rod withdraval stop".

Six breakers on the 345 kV distribution on panel IF need more than just numbers , according to one . operator.

There are at least two different ranne indicators for stean generator and main steam header pressure and feedwater pressure. This makes it difficult to assess rapidly' the delta pressure around a. steam '

generator , claimed one cperator.

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All controls relating to the boron thennal regeneration system are located on rear panels and might better be moved to front panels.

One operator claimed the feedwater controllers aren't labeled (?)

One operater thought the four primary loops could be better separated on the panel.

QG. What displays do you feel are unnecessary, provide unimportant information or needlessly clutter the control panels?

AG. Eleven of the thirteen operators had no answer for this one.

One operator suggested that nuch of the electrical panel could be moved to back panels; he'd rather seee the turbine advisory on the front.

One operator said he would like to see more ammeters on the electrical pumps.

OH Which controls may be difficult to operate and why?

AH. Four operators had no answer.

Three operators mentioned the steam generator feedwater controls:

difficulty during manual phase of start-up, confusing grouping of controllers, and a feedwater pump control too close to the indicating lights.

Three operators spoke of the turbine generator breaker control switch (a " knuckle buster").

One operator stated that the PZR heaters have no manual "on" position and will not stay energized in the pressure band, which would be a problem if the spring valve were stuck. "One gallon-per-minute by ass is not sufficient to mix boron" was the conclusion.

One operator mentioned (again) "you have to operate many controls to keep steady flow on CVCS when the positive displacement pump is runnina".

One operator called the diesel generator switches " funny", mentioned that "isochronous" is a curious tenn.

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One operator complained that some switches on back panels are too hiqh.

QI. Which recorders or indicators may be difficult or confusino to read j and why? ,

AI. Three operators had no answer.

i Eight operators mentioned the difficulty of reading the trend recorders, primarily the Foxboro recorders where insufficient paper is exposed to see much of a trend. One operator complained also of glare on recorder faces. Another suqqested that a larger multi-channel recorder might be better. Another said you have to stand right in front of the recorders to read them. A different operator said the Foxboro

l recorders were ok, but the multi-point printing recorders are the ones most difficult to read.

One operator asserted that the TSI speed / valve position / eccentricity recorder is located on panel IR " knee high to a short person".

One operator felt that all vertical meters are more difficult to read than round types because of parallax.

One operator chose this category in which to mention that status lights tended to be unreliable (?)

QJ. Do you anticipate having any problems locating or using procedures or operational instructions and why?

AJ. There seemed to be no particular concern about hardcopy procedures, though these are just now being written. Most of the comment was on the (novel) VAS procedures.

Several operators liked the new VAS instruction-giving possibility, including the fault trees. Most of the operators were concerned about the ability to read procedures from the CRT. (Several for comparison said fault trees and setpoints were easier to read on the video .) The concern was mostly about crowdino too much information on the CRT or making the procedures here too abstract, that the CRT procedure was best for " mind jogging". One operator suggested that the operators should be trained to depend on hard copy procedures, not the VAS.

QK. What changes would you recomend (or not recommend) in:

OKl . planned shift coverage or turnover policies AKl One operator suggested shift change should be at 8 a.m., 4 p.m.,

12 p.m. with the oncoming shift arriving 1/2 hour earlier. Three '

operators commented that one Unit Shift Supervisor, one senior control room operator (SRO) and two R0's should be the shift complement, plus four A0's.

QK2. planned or ongoing tr.nni q AK2. Operators genera lv aw ed of the current plans: one week of J training (requireisimuiuwr training and lectures) every six weeks.

One operator urged that the Manager of Operations or his Assistant j

should give the operators plant update briefinq during every training cycle. -

QK3 color coding AK3 Ten of the operators comented that they genwally liked the color coding on the control boards; three had no comment on this. One commented that he particularly liked the color-coded vertical indicators.

Two were concerned about the inconsistencies in color codina as used on the VAS. One pointed out that in Sweden they consistently used white

- for steam, green for feedwater, purple for borated water, orange for nitrogen-blanked and brown for oil . One operator sugaested that the 1

1 brown mimic on the safeguards panels be changed to another color because of poor contrast with the background.

QK4. control room access AK4. Several of the operators, having experienced problems with too many people in the control room, urged that access be tightly restricted.

QK5. control panel layout or access AK5. One operator felt the control boards should have been made more compact. One operator suggested an opening in the front panel to enable better access to back panels. Three said the large panel was fine provided layout and demarcation are logical. One operator pointed out that the Unit Shift Supervisor had difficulty seeing the panels. Two operators explicitly criticized the layout of the

, status lich.t_ panels, especially for the SSPS (UL1 and UL6), as being too tightly " stuffed" and illogical. One suggested organization by channel and function.

OK6. coninunication systems AK6. Two operator believed the planned comunications system was excellent.

Two commented on the importance of having good communication with auxiliary operators. One operator believed that operators "close their ears to the paging system".

QK7. heating or ventilation AK7. As there was no experience and information available there was essentially no comment here. One operator commented on the importance of sufficient cooling that it not be necessary to remove cabinet covers.

t QK8. lighting AK8. Eight of the operators specifically expressed concern about the lighting problems, especially the clare_ experienced _in _ glass. lovers on meter and recorder covers. Inere were expiessions like " severe p7ablem" and 'il scelly tioIhers you". Several recomended flat glassormeters(madebySigma?). One thought that "parawedge" or similar light reflectors would help. Five operators did not comment. j OK9. special test equipment AK9. no comments, undefined as yet QK10. maintenance or surveillance testing plans AK10. One operator commented on the importance of doing all tests when a system was taken out for surveillance. One was concerned that test plans be clearly written so as to prevent inadvertent trips.

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QKil. data recording and log entry plans AKil . One operator stated that all CR0's should make hourly or half-hourly log entries to ensure that they "look at things periodically",

another mentioned the importance of CRO, SCR0 and USS log keeping.

A third noted that all recorders need to be erclosed to elirrinate the distractive noise. Extensive use of the computer was suggested for log-keeping.

QK12. information flow AK12 Only one operator chose to use this category to comment that night orders, plant updates and other internal information was mostly sufficient, but that " corporate information is always slow, I wish people would accept this".

furniture, equipment or workspace QK13.

AK13. Based on what they knew of plans, two operators simply said "ok".

One complained that the bathrooms and coffee were too far away.

There was one comment on the importance of sufficient storace space.

One comment said "we have the best of equipment - company attitude",

and a second echoed this feeling. One operator liked the chairs of the type used by "Capt. Kirk in Star Trek". He also stated that there should be a workstation for the SR0/USS in the control room.

QL With regard to the video ala m system:

QLl. Are CRT displays:

organized into a logical set that is meaningful to the operator designed with a format appropriate to their use updated at a rate suitable for the operator that use charts designed with the appropriate technique based on data and operator use All. All but one operator had something to say about the Video Alarm System.

None seemed opposed to it. Most were hopeful and expectant that i.t would prove itself out, but most also expressed some concern that there would be lots of careful work to "get the bugs out". Six explicitly worried about the loss of spatial " pattern recognition" (which presumably is one of the reasons the have insisted on up to 200 conventional hard wired annunciators .

One operator was concerned that 20 alarms on the first, usually present, !

l page was too few. Another suggested that in an accident alarms may back-up" if the operator gets busy. Another said the operator can't read the alarms fast enough as they come in. .

I Two operators proposed that alarm cuncression and logic by computer' should be considered to " restrict the flurry of alarms at the onset of a transient" and make the VAS a useful tool.

Two operators _ expressed dissatisfaction with the vertical time axis or trend display, two wanted general xy crossplot capability.

QL2. Does documentation exist for each display page?

AL2. Only one operator commented, namely that such documentation should exist. The others seemed not ready to answer.

QL3 Does the documentation specify:

the purpose of each page the content of each page the interrelationships between pages AL3 One operator said "yes". One said "it should". The others appeared reluctant comment at this time.

QM/N other?/ general comments AM/N Two operators emphasized the need for training in the VAS. One reemphasized the need to test out the VAS in various modes in the simulator. Two called for bigger lettering on the annunciators.

Two mentioned that management was very supportive in computer development and in other ways. One wrote a paraaraph on the importance of board layout to enhance scanning.

Interviewer's final comment: Operators were very cooperative, seemed interested in offering their comments without concern for anonymity (we chose to retain anonymity on general principle) , and were eager to see the control room be the best it could be.

Interviews and write-up by Thomas B. Sheridan September 10, 1982 ,

APPENDIX G INITIAL DESIGN OF SEABROOK STATION'S MAIN CONTROL BOARDS I

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Initial Design of Seabrook's Main Control Boards In early 1975 Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Nuclear Services Division (YAEC-NSD), acting in the capacity of principle technical support organization for the Seabrook Project, assumed responsibility for the layout design of the Seabrook Station Main Control Boards (MCB).

Under the direction of YAEC-NSD personnel, a working group commenced MCB design in September 1975. Members of this working group included the following:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company - NSD 1 Plant Systems Engineer 1 Senior Operations Engineer 1 Instrumentation and Controls Engineer 1 Senior Computer Engineer United Engineers & Constructor (A.E.)

2 Instrumentation and Controls Engineers Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1 Production Engineer 1 Instrumentation and Controls Engineer The instrumentation and controls selection analysis performed to specify the attendant indication and control devices needed to be provided to the Control Room Operator had, for the most part, already been completed before

! the layout design work began. The selection process used for identifying MCB devices can be broken down into three general categories: Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS) manufacturer recommendations, Architectural Engineer (A.E.) balance of plant design, and utility operating experience.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Seabrook's NSSS supplier, provided the AE and the utility with a Standard Information Package (SIP) detailing the general design criteria for all NSSS supplied systems. Included in this 1 information package was the recommended and minimum required MCB mounted instrumentation and controls for all the NSSS equipment. Westinghouse's recommendations were based upon safety analysis evaluation and years of industry experience.

United Engineers and Constructors performed detailed design analysis for all the Seabrook balance of plant supplied systems. As documented in the Seabrook Design Descriptions, each system was evaluated as to operation and required instrumentation and controls.

Yankee Atomic Electric - NSD performed detailed design reviews of all NSSS and balance of plant systems. With the construction, startup, and operation of the Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, and Maine Yankee plants, NSD represented approximately 29 years of pressurized water reactor operating experience. A great deal of human factors and man-machine interface criteria can be seen in the Control Room designs of each of these facilities. This extensive insight allowed design input based upon the understanding of the operators task in both normal and abnormal plant operations.

The initial design work was a table top approach and to scale cutouts assembled on corkboards. Basic design philosophy included a configuration which was plant operational mode compatible. Indication and controls were duplicated, if needed, to maintain operational state groupings.

I l As part of this effort, in 1976 and 1977 a full scale mock-up of the main control board was constructed at Public Service Company of New Hampshire's Manchester Steam Plant. The mock-up was completed right to final l

details, including mimicking. We utilized generic procedures to help in j layout of section by section, to insure compatibility with overall control, in moving from one operational mode to another. We brought in experienced PWR operators from other Yankee plants, these included Maine Yankee and Yankee Atomic Electric. Walk-throughs of procedures and emergency situations gave us confidence that the operators at Seabrook would have a main control board comfortable to operate and void of confusing and error prone configurations.

At the time at which the Three Mile Island accident occurred, Seabrook had already purchased the simulator and, in fact, it was in progress of being constructed and on the floor in the manufacturer's facility in March of 1979.

The pooling of resources and talent that followed the accident at Three Mile Island made available to ue extensive information of man-machine interface design which had been overlooked in our initial board design phase. In the summer of 1980, June / September time frame, we were in a unique position to be going through factory acceptance testing on the simulator at the manufacturer. During this process, the simulated Control Room is taken through all normal operations in a test procedure which is referred to as Mission Test. It is a startup from cold depressurized plant conditions to full power operations, operations at power, and plant shutdown back to cold depressurized state. Also, as part of that factory acceptance test, we performed over one hundred fif ty malfunction plant upset conditions on the simulator.

Armed with the added depth of understanding of human factor concerns, we had an exact replica of the plant fully dynamic and operational to walk through our various procedures - abnormal and normal - and further test the human element compatibility that would continue on in operational phase.

In this acceptance test program we utilized the resources of the Seabrook Training Center staff and senior experienced Operations personnel from the Seabrook Station Operator's crews. Throughout the acceptance test program we maintain logs and notes of recommendations and comments from the operators and training staff. Each of the suggested improvements were re-evaluated along with another level in-depth of review during site acceptance testing which occurred during the months of September / October of 1980. Seabrook's Unit 1 actual main control board was in the very early stages of manufacturing at that time. It afforded us the chance to include those changes that were defined with minimal impact on board cost and delivery. The primary, probably most significant, benefit of this particular phase of evolution was that they were performance tested in an actual Control Room environment using the actual plant-specific dynamics and centrol t

I configuration. In total, there was something like two hundred and thirty I

j discrete changes made in control board layout. Having factored the new design I into the actual plant Control Room, we took the simulator down in March 1982 and backfitted the changes into the simulator, providing us with simulator and l

a Unit I control board which are in agreement.

bbeLaL23 IMSCIO6.01.99 ATTACHMENT 2 PUBLIC SEAVICE M NiNews.m khir. INTRA COMPANY BUSINESS MEMO Subject Coordination of Control Room Design Review From L. A. Walsh District Date August 5, 1983 To E. Sawyer Reh3rence On February 22, 1983 a meeting was held in Washington, DC. The meeting was called by the NRC Region 1 office. Its purpose was to define to the utilities in its region what was expected from them in regards to Supplement One to NUREG 0737. From the pre-sentations given at this meeting, it was very cicar that the following topics needed a great deal of integration:

1) Safety Parameter Display System

2) Detailed Control Room Design Review

3) Regulatory Guide 1.97

4) Emergency Operating Procedures

5) Emergency Response Facilities It became evident that along with these topics, training and coordination of the interfaces was also a high priority.

Seabrook Station had already engaged itself in all the activi-ties of the above mentioned topics. It was established that the majority of items within these areas was directed towards operators. A control room design review was three-fourths of the way through its planning stage. Therefore, the most effi-cient method for Seabrook was to ensure coordination of these efforts was preserved rather than created.

As the operations manager, I was a member of the management review group for the control room design review. Additionally, I was the lead staff member for emergency procedure preparation, and also, the lead staff member in charge of SPDS. Yankee Atomic Electric Company had th' lead responsibility for the control room design review and Regulatory Guide 1.97. The responsibility for the last topic of the five, emergency response facilities is vested with the PSNH project group located in Manchester, NH.

Because of my membership on the Westinghouse Owner's Group pro-cedure subcommittee and my familiarity with the emergency pro-cedures, I suggested ihose emergency procedure and operating procedures to be used in the design review control board check-out. The philosophy in the selection was to ensure the board was checked against, at a minimum, a full spectrum of emer-gencies. This can be accomplished with four procedures; Less of

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nm: INTRA COMPANY BUSINESS MEMO p... 2 To E. Sawyer Dgne August 5, 1983 Coolant, Faulted Steam Line, Ruptured Steam Generator 'U' Tubes and Loss of AC Power. When using those proccdures, the full spectrum of possible accidents has been covered. All other emergency procedures are spin-of f s of the above men-tioned four procedures. The second area of full spectrum coverage would be from refueling, or cold conditions, all the way to 100% power while checking the board every step of the way by using the appropriate procedures. Finally, the remaining procedures were selected because of forecasts of frequent usage or to ensure all areas of the MCB were operated at least once. For the emergency procedures, we used the WOG basic set of guidelines. We realized these pro-cedures were being revised, but they had already been tested by a validation program at the Callaway Station. After the revisions have been completed, the WOG is running its vali-dation of the Revision I set at Seabrook Station. This should be our proof that they function properly here and it offers us traceability back to the basic set.

To cover the SPDS interface, we used the WOG critical safety functions. These critical safety functions cover the areas

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of subcriticality, core cooling, heat sink, RC system integ-rity, containment and RC system inventory. We have taken plant parameters and entered their values into our plant computer with the logic to interpret these parameters. When needed, this system will assist the operator in evaluating overall plant status. These critical safety functions were used'as part of the review process as were two of the pro-cedures that direct the operator in recovering fron loss of one of these functions.

As previously mentioned, Yankee engineering was mainly res-ponsible for compliance of instrumentation as defined by Regulatory Guide 1.97. This task was and still is being accomplished with close coordination between Yankee engin-eering and Seabrook operations. This effort is necessary to assure ourselves that an efficient overlap exists. This is an on-going process which will continue until initial criticality. All instruments being placed on the main control board are reviewed by the station's operations department.

The proposed instruments and location are sent to us prior to a board change request. Although there is no formal documentation, the process to date has worked very smoothly, d

i SSF11115 n"42 INTRA COMPANY BUSINESS MEMO p.,, 3 To E. Sawyer Dnee August 5, 1983

- This is a brief explanation as to why our working arrangement with Yankee has proven to be an effective method. Our present board layout can be viewed as proof of this working effectiveness.

dGh%4k L. A. Walsh Operations Manager LAW /dc 4

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