ML20012A186
| ML20012A186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1990 |
| From: | Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NYN-90051, NUDOCS 9003080462 | |
| Download: ML20012A186 (16) | |
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!N6w. Hompshire-Tod C. Feigenboom u- Senior Vice President and T Chief Operating Officer - ;
NYN-90051 March 1, 1990 +
United Sates Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Washington, DC 20555 ;
Attention: Document Control Desk References (a)- Facility Operating License NPF-67 Docket No. 50-443 (b) PSNH Letter (SBN-1211) dated October 9, 1986, "10CFR50.59 Evaluation', G. S. Thomas to V. S. Noonan
Subject:
'10CFR50.59 Quarterly ~ Report.
3L Enclosed please find the Quarterly Report of 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations for Seabrook' Station. This report covers the period of October 1, 1989, to December 31,'1989-, and is'being submitted pursuant to the reporting-requirements outlined in Reference (b).
Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R. Belanger at (603) 474-9521,- extension 4048.
Very tr61y yours, j A r?s i .i Ted C. Feigenbaum I' Enclosures i-cc: Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Region I ,
475 Allendale Road g King of Prussia, PA 19406 e;;
g Mr. Victor Nerses, Project Manager eg Project Directorate I-3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'J.b.** *f g Division of Reactor Projects bc eo Washington, DC 20555 jbC- Mr. Noel Dudley NRC Senior Resident Inspector
'ef l$4 P.O. Box 1149 j
- @ Seabrook, NH 03874 k 88- /
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New Hampshire Yonkee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshine P.O. Box 300
- Seabrook, NH 03874
- Telephone (603) 474 9521 (lj
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,-_ '_a New Hampshire Yankee March 1, 1990 ENCLOSURE 1 TO NYN-90051 Seabrook Station 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Quarterly Report October 1, 1989 - December 31, 1989
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. New Hrmpshiro Yanksa March 1, 1990 ENCLOSURE 1 TO NYN-90051
- 1. Desinn-Changes The below listed design changes were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Design-Coordination Report: Number 86-555
Title:
Fire Detection for Carbon Filtration Systems
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Description:
Design Coordination Report (DCR)86-555 was implemented to give an early warning of a fire in a charcoal filter bed.
This DCR included installation of a carbon monoxide (CO) monitoring. system with 20 solid state carbon monoxide ,
cetectors and alarms in the Main Control Room. The C0 t detection sensors were mounted on the charcoal filters. The detectors sense CO concentration in the ventilation system immediately upstream and downstream of the charcoal filter-unit and HEPA filters.
All sensors and control modules are seismically supported since they are located in Seismic Category I buildings, and the sensors are mounted on Seismic Category I components.
The sensors and associated equipment are not classified as
. Class 1E components. The cables used for this design are ,
qualified and routed in safety-related raceways. The breaker -i used for power supply to the C0 monitoring panel is also qualified.
This system does not substantially increase the fire loading and this additional fire loading does not impact safe shutdown
, procedures or equipment, train barriers, or electrical-separation.
The carbon monoxide system provided by this DCR would-not function per design. Extensive testing indicated that the e solid state C0 detectors of this DCR were not appropriate for the application. In the vendor's opinion, the detectors were so sensitive that any one of a broad spectrum of gases could be causing interference. This interference results in L unacceptable drift and false alarms.
L Nevertheless, all design and licensing documentation changes and the associated physical modifications provided by this DCR and twelve subsequent change authorizations remain valid. All changes are considered part of the plant design at the time of issue of this last change authorization. The carbon monoxide monitoring system provided by this DCR will be modified by DCR 80-074 to provide an electrochemical type system.
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March 1,.1990-DCR 89-074 essentially converts the solid state carbon t monoxide monitoring system provided by DCR 86-555 to a detection system based on electrochemical technology. To' ,
accomplish this conversion, allaC0 detectors and their associated electronics and controllers are being replaced.
The existing probe assemblies and control panel will be modified-to accommodate the new equipment and reused for this ;
design change.
.DCR 89-074 uses the same breaker and cables as those of DCR 86-555. Furthermore DCR 89-074~did not require a safety evaluation.
-Conclusion: A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change andtit was determined that'this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-594
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Title:
Calculation of Overload Relay Heater Size for MS-V-204, 205, 206, 207 Description Due to a gear ratio change in the actuators for MS-V-204, 205, >
206 and 207, and the resulting changes in valve cycle time and motor current, the values for the instantaneous trip coil setting and the overload relay heaters require recalculation.
, This Design Coordination Report (DCR) initiated calculations. l l
that indicated a change in dial setting for the existing ' AMP-CAP' breaker coils with no change in the coil itself.- The existing overload relay heaters have been replaced by new heaters which are two sizes larger for proper coordination with the new valve cycle times and motor currents. .
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment. '
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N:w E mpshiro Ycnkss March 1, 1990 Design Coordination Reports- Number 86-709
Title:
CBA Syster. Modifications
Description:
This Design Coordination. Report (DCR) was implemented to
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enhance the Control Room Ventilation (CBA) System to satisfy
. NUREG-08000, Standard Review Plan and 10CFR50 Appendix A.
- y General Design Criterion 19' requirements.
The Control Room Ventilation System is designed to provide filtered air for continuous occupancy of the Control Room j Complex by Station Operating and Technical Support personnel '
during postulated emergency conditions. Briefly, the j modifications _ included modifying the Control Room Normal l Makeup Air Subsystem to provide a bypass line around the normal makeup air fans, upgrading the Control Room Emergency i Makeup Air and Filtration Subsystem to include a new redundant filter unit, and upgrading the Control Room Exhaust and Static ,
Pressure Control Subsystem, to include a new redundant exhaust l isolation damper and modifications to the fan trip circuitry, i These upgrades and modificacions are designed to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room Complex, provide for adequate air. change out within the Control Room Complex <j filter all Centrol Room makeup air and a portion of 4 E recirculated air during emergency / radiological conditions I within the Control Room Complex, and to satisfy the post- j accident Control Room dose and habitability criteria.
All active components, as modified by DCR 86-709, in the l Normal Makeup Air, Emergency Makeup Air and Filtration, and Exhaust and Static Pressure Control Subsystems except exhaust l- fan CBA-FN-15 are ANS Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I.
K The exhaust fan is designed NNS. In addition, all safety-related components are powered by separate and independent
. trains of emergency power from the diesel generators. The l
motors for the normal ~and emergency makeup air fans are ,
designed Class IE. The filter electrical heaters are also t designed Class 1E.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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. . New Hampshire Yankee March 1, 1990 Design Coordination Report: Number 87-317
Title:
RDMS Communication Loop Isolators
Description:
The' communications loop for the Radiation Data Management System (RDMS) connects Class!1E and non-Class 1E RM80s (local microprocessor for Radiation Monitoring System) to the RDMS host computer. Previously, there was a fuoe-dependent isolator in the Class 1E RM80 that provided isolation between the Class IE RM80s and the communication loop. During the November 1985 licensing meeting with the Instrument and Control Branch of the NRC, we were informed that the fuse-dependent isolator is not acceptable for providing isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E and between Train A and B devices.
This Design Coordinator Report (DCR) has been implemented to install non-fuse-dependent isolators. These new Class 1E communication loop isolators provide electrical isolation between Train A and Train B RM80s and between non-Class 1E and Class 1E RM80s. The isolators are not required to operate in a harsh environment since the RM80s they are associated with are not required to operate in a harsh' environment. The-isolators are seismically qualified. The isolators associated with Class 1E RM80 are provided with safety-related power supplies. Isolators associated with non-Class 1E RM80s are powered from non-safety-related reliable power supplies. All wiring has ben designed to meet the separation criteria ,
deucribed in the FSAR. The additional electrical load of the isolator has been reviewed and found acceptable.- The cables and circuit protective devices have been qualified in-accordance with the commitments described in~FSAR Section 8.3.
In addition, one radiation monitor is being moved due to I- ground water leakage problems around the supports, and the
" Feeder Breaker Coordination During Submergence" calculation is being updated to include existing radiation monitor RM-RM- t 6535B, by this DCR.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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New Hampshire Yankee March 1, 1990 Design Coordination Report: 88-124
Title:
Corrections to Calculations for Non-1E Class Loads on IE Class Buses
Description:
This Design Coordination Report (DCR) implemented the necessary revisions to the " Failure of Non-Class it Loads on Class 1E Buses", calculation and provided hardware changes to support the calculation. These revisions were based on a review of this calculation which analyzes the simultaneous failure of all non-Class 1E loads on Class 1E buses, and demonstrates that this failure will not cause power to be removed from any Class 1E loads. The revisions. implemented-by this DCR were made to correct identified discrepancies and to ensure that all non-Class 1E loads connected to Class 1E buses are properly addressed in the calculation and in the Technical Requirements Manual.
The effects of this DCR on the seismic qualification of equipment, the effects with respect to Class 1E and non-Class 1E interfaces and physical separation, the load additions to the emergency diesel generator and UPS, circuit breaker and-trip setpoint changes, and the effects on the Appendix R Fire Protection were evaluated and found to be acceptable.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 2. Minor Modifications The below listed minor modifications were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Minor Modification: Number 89-551 Titles Delete Detection in Sample Hx Room
Description:
The Sample Heat Exchanger Room contained two high voltage ionization detectors, numbers 04-14 and 04-15 of zone no. 4.
This room is a high radiation room and the detectors were not easily accessible. For this reason, this Minor Modification (MOD) removed these detectors, and spliced cables so as to continue circuit integrity.
Appendix R,Section III. G.c requires fire detectors in an area containing cable, equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train. However, it has been
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determined that detection can be amitted from the Sample Hx 1 Room for several reasons. The redundant Train B cabling is enclosed in a fire barrier having 1-hour rating. The room contains no combustible loading, no cable trays are located in this room, and all cable that does exist is in conduit. The room also has seismically designed concrete walls, which is equivalent to a 3-hour fire rating, and door P416 to this room is a 5 1/2' shielding door which is not fire rated, but will provide fire resistance. In addition, area-wide detection is
, provided throughout the rest of the fire zone with the s exception of this room.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Minor Modification: Number 89-605
Title:
Replace Containment Lighting Panel XL4 Supply Breaker Dascription: This Minor Modification (MMOD) replaced the power supply breakers for containment lighting panel XL4. The breakers are two in series for containment penetration protection and were rated 50 amp trip. The replacements were taken from j installed spares in panels PP-1A, 111C, which was subsequently l broken, and 111D and are rated 40 amp trip which is suitable l'
for the connected load.
The breakor trip rating change from 50 amp to 40 amp causes no effective change to plant systems function, safety or reliability. The HHOD provides an engineering evaluation to show the new rating is appropriate for the installation.
The new breakers are the same design and provide the same protection as those replaced. These modifications do not impact the design intent or function of the electrical distribution and lighting systems and the requirements of FSAR Chapter 8.3.1.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.63 for containment electrical penetration continue to be satisfied.
Conclusion A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was pe,2ormed for thic design change and it was determined that this change will not create t
an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment. ;
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Minor Modification: Number 89-624 T!tle: Circuit Breaker Coordination Curves
Description:
Thie Minor Modification (MMOD) affects the Electrical Distribution System which includes both safety-related and non-safety-related equipment. It evaluates the effects of revised time-current characteristic (TCC) curves on design base calculations. As a result of this evaluation, thia MHOD j makes a change to the trip setpoints for two circuit breakers to address an electrical coordination concern. This trip setpoint change is consistent with the criteria in a design base calculation. As such, there 10 no change to the design or function of the electrical system.
This HHOD also makes changes to the test setpoints and verification response times for the electrical protective devices identified in FSAR and Nuclent Production Technical Requirements Manual (NPTR) Tables 16.3-8 and 16.3 10. These changes are cleo consistent with design bawls calculations, such that there is no change to the design or function of the electrical system. These test setpoints and verification response tines are utilised in the routine testing of electrical protective devices to ensure that the devices are operable.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design changa and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 3. Temporary Hodifica d2EE.
The below listed temporary madifications were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Temporary Modification: Number 89-TMOD-0031
Title:
Temporary Power for Bus E5 Fire Panels
Description:
This Temporary Modification (THOD) involves the use of temporary 100 VAC power for certain fire protection control panels during the period of time that emergency bus E5 is de-energiaed for preventive maintenance. The temporary power will be supplied by local vall receptacles fed from non-emergency 120 VAC power panels, with one exception which will be fed from receptacles powered bus E6. During the time this modification is installed full compliance will be maintained l
with fire protection program features involving disablement of fire protection systems. Based on the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery back-up
o New Hampshire Yankee March 1, 1990 and compensatory fire watch requirements set forth in the Station Fire Protection Program there would be a negligible increase in the probability that a failure in the non-emergency power feed would prevent a response to a fire.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation performed this temporary modification and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Temporary Modification: Number 89-TMOD-0039
Title:
PCCW 'B' Train Temporary Clean-up Filter /Demineraliser System
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to facilitate the clean-up of chlorides, iron and particulates in the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) System 'B' train. It consisted of a filter and demineraliser being placed in the non-safety section of a PCCW loop that serves the vaste process building and tank farm area. Since the loop is equipped with aa automatic isolation feature that isolates all the component in the waste process building or tank farm area from safety related loads in the case of a 'T' signal or low head tank level signal, a failure in the filter or demineraliser would have no effect on the safety related loads of the loop. This modification in no way compromised the ability of the 'B' train PCCW loop to provide adequate cooling to the safety related loads it serves.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 cafety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
- 4. Technical Reauirements Manual The below listed changes were made to the Technical Requirements Manual at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 88-01 Rev. 1
Title:
Technical Requirements Number 13. Table 16.3-8 and Number 15 Table 16.3-10
Description:
This change to the Technical Requirement Manual was a result I of Design Coordination Report (DCR)88-124. DCR 88-124 implemented the necessary changes to the ' Failure of Non-Class 1E loads on Class 1E Buses," and provided the hardware changes to support the calculation. These changes included notes regarding failed testing of protective devices and various additions, deletions, and changes to Tables 16.3-8 and 16.3-10 of the Technical Requirements Manual, to correct identified discrepancies and to ensure that all non-class 1E loads connected to Class 1E buses are properly addressed in the Technical Requirements Manual.
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Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Technical Requirement Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be ,
incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Technical Requirements Change Request Number 89-02
Title:
Technical Requirement Number 12
Description:
This change to the Technical Requirements Manual was a result of Minor Modification (MHOD)89-551. Thi-a MMOD removes two high voltage ionization detectors from the sample Hx Room.
.The detectors, numbers 04-14 and 04-15 of zone #4, were difficult to reach and in a high radiation area. It was determined the detectors could be removed due to the lack of combustibles in the room, fire rating of walls and door, and because fire detection is provided throughout the rest of the fire zone.
The only change to the Technical Requirement Manual is to Table 16.3-7, to show two fewer smoke detectors in zone #4. ,
Conclusion A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this
,, Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined ,
L that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 89-03 Title Technical Requirement Nnmber 13 l
Description:
This change to the Technical Requirements Manual was a result of Minor Modification (MHOD)89-605. This HMOD replaces the l
power supply breakers for containment lighting panel XL4. The l breakers are two in series for containment penetration protection, were rated 50 amp trip and located in ED-MM-167 Circuit 20. The replacements were taken from installed spares in panels PP-1A, 1110, which was subsequently broken, and lilD l- and are rated 40 amp trip which is suitable for the connected l
load. This change to the Technical Requirements Manual consists of changing Technical Requirement Number 13. Table 16.3-8 to reflect the breaker rating. The MMOD includee a revision to calculation SBC-136, " Test Setpoints for Containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protection *, to provide supporting data for this change.
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Conclusion:
A 10CPR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for thib Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety questien. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment, i Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 89-06
Title:
Technical Requirements Number 13. Table 16.3-8 and Number 15 Table 16.3-10
Description:
Based on Hinor Modification (MMOD)89-624, which revised calculations SBC-136 ' Test Setpoints for Containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protection' and SBC-186,
' Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources.' this request was to revise test setpoints and verification response times for molded case circuit breakers and overcurrent trip devices (IAC relays).
The IAC relay instantaneous trip test setpoint and verification response times are also being revised, because of difficulty and inconsistency associated with testing under the present test criteria.
In addition, a statement was added for consideration of the lockout relay response time associated with reactor charging pump penetration protection. Additional test criteria was also added to address testing of all functions of a 125 VDC circuit breaker trip device.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 5. Final Safety Analysis Report The below listed Final Safety Analysis Report change requests were issued and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request Number 88-029 l
Title:
Detector 72E 1987 Code l
Deecription: This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Request is to change the smoke detector inspection frequency to comply with NFPA 72E 1987 code. This code established uniform requirements of a visual inspection at least semi-annually, an annual alarm test, and a sensitivity test within one year of l installation and every alternate year thereafter.
L l New Hampshire Yankee March 1, 1990 This change in detector inspection frequency will not !
adversely effect the fire detecting capability of the fire j detection system and complies with the code requirements.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR
, change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendruent. 1 i
Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 88-080 I 1
Revision to Section 9.5.1.1 of PSAR Title i
n Description The Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) states that all equipment in the Fire Protection System, except those items contaissed on a particular listing, is UL/FM approved. ;
contrary to this requirement, two non-UL/FM approved valves were purchased and installed in the fire pump house. The only function of these valves is to isolate a fire protection water storage tank from the fire pump test / relief return when the tank is out of service. The nornal position of these valves is locked open. The consenuences of a malfunction or failure of '
these valves would not adversely affect the ability of the fire protection cystem to perform its design function. -
Therefore, it has been determined that the use of non-UL/FM approved valves is acceptable in this application. This FSAR change adds these two valves to this listing in Section 9.5.1.1 of the FSAR.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 89-067
Title:
Power Ascension Test Program FSAR Chapter 14 Revision
Description:
To allow the performance of power ascension testing as currently planned, certain changes to Chapter 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) were needed. The revisions include Startup Test (ST) 47 ' Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Test', not being performed. The objectives of this test are met in another test and type / qualification teste have previously been performed on valves similar to those at Seabrook.
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Alto the test, ' Ability of Neutron Flux Instrumentation to Detect Control Rod Misalignments' will not be performed. The Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System provides accurate and sensitive indication of control rod position, and .
the in core flux instrumentation may be used as an alternative {
means to detect control rod position. The capability and sensitivity of this irstrumentation has been demonstrated numerous times.
i ST-22, ' Natural Circulation Test', will be performed in MODE 3 utilizing decay heat to demonstrate natural circulation. The performanes of thic test using decay heat instead of heat generated by a critical reactor provides more stable plant conditions during testing. Additionally, thin test will not include primary system depressurizaiton rate measurements, ;
charging and steam flow variations to determine subcooling ;
effects or primary system pressure reductions to verify subcooling monitor performance. The above changes to ST-22 :
eliminated the potential for certain transients on the plant.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.30.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety ;
Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 6. Procedures The below listed procedures were approved and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 100FR50.59.
L Procedures Number $7-23
Title:
Dynamic Automatic Steam Dump Control Test
Description:
Startup Test (ST) 23 is an initial plant startup procedure developed to demonstrate the performance characteristics of the steam dump valves and steam dump control cystem. This procedure also involves a post modification dynamic retest for Design Coordination Report (DCR)89-055, which corrected excessive side loading forces noted during low power physics testing.
ST-23 will be performed mainly in MODE 2, although some of the procedure maybe performed in MODE 3, with the plant operating below 51 rated thermal power. The test will demonstrate that the condenser steam dump valves are capable of going from full closed to full open within three seconds, and full open to full closed within five seconds, both including valve solenoid actuating time. It will also demonstrate the steam header pressure controller msintains a stable pressure approximately at the no-load setpoint during steady state operations and the load rejection and plant trip controllers can return and maintain a' stable Tavg following a simulated actuation.
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While conducting ST-23, the consequences of a malfunction of !
equipment Laportant to safety will not be increased. The i steam dump system is non-safety-related and would not bypass or degrade any engineered safety function capabilities.
During ST-23, all atmospheric steam dump valves and steam generator code safety valves will be available. The steam generator code safety valves provide the relieving capability required to maintain the steam system within design limits.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this procedure and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Procedures Number ST-48.1
Title:
Turbine Generator Torsional Response Test *
Description:
The primary objective of Startup Test (ST) 48.1 is to determine whether any torsional natural frequencies exist at or near 120Hz (two times electrical frequency), and to determine the precise location of the turbine generator rotor system torsional resonant frequencies. This test is ,
recommended by General Electric to ensure adequate separation exists between possible resonant frequencies occurring near 120Hz and dynamic torques also occurring at 120Hz, to prevent excessive torsional response stress of the rotor system.
l The test will be performed while the reactor plant is in MODE 1 at approximately 102 power. Plant electrical loads will be supplied from two of the three incoming 345KV lines. The third line will be isolated at the air break.
The independence of the offsite power sources, and the temporary protective relaying changes implemented by this l procedure, will ensure that an electrical problem associated l with the main generator breaker, or with the isolated portion of the third 345KV line, will not affect the availability of the two 345KV lines in service. The use of the reserve auxiliary transformers (RATS) to supply the Station 13.8KV and -
the 4.16KV busses during periods of maintenance or testing is recognized in the FSAR as an acceptable alternative means of supplying offsite power to plant loads. .Awitching evolutions-that are necessary to conduct this test will be controlled per this or other approved procedures as appropriate.
The temporary changes installed to support this test do not -
involve the alteration of any safety-related equipment. Nor do they alter any of the design features associated with Class 1E equipment. No Class lE is component is directly involved with the performance of this test or with any of the temporary electrical changes made to support it.
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During this test, the turbine and reactor protection systems will be fully functional with none of the protection features disabled or bypassed. With the exception of changes affecting '
the turbine, this test simply integrates a series of plant operations that are considered routine during periods of startup or shutdown. The turbine response to the changes i described in this procedure will involve only small scale effects when compared to turbine operations at full power, and.
will be carefully monitored by the turbine nanufacturer's representatives and plant test personnel.
ST-48.1 will not violate any provision of the technical specifications. The operability of offsite and onsite AC power sources will be maintained to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) conditions of T.S. 3/4 8.1.1.
If any of the action statements for that specification are required to be entered, due to inoperable equipment, testing activities will be suspended until the affected equipment can be restored.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this procedure and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. ,
Procedures Number STP-122
Title:
Service Water System Flow Balancing
Description:
Special Tetr Procedure (STP) 122 is to perform Service Water (SW) System flow balancing, following the installation of new Secondary Component Cooling (SCC) heat exchangers per Design Coordination Report (DCR)88-149. The new heat exchangers (SCC-E-29A and 29B) upgrade the thermal capability of the SCC System. They are designed for large SW flow and the original flow balance for normal operating conditions and certain surveillance conditions will be affected. Following the completion of STP-122, any physical changes to the Service '
Water System, such as the possible removal of the SCC orifice plates, will be authorized by a separately approved change to DCR 88-149.
Special Test Procedure 122 was performed in MODE 5 with negligible decay heat in the core. This flow testing is considered a normal startup testing evolution and has been performed in a similar manner in the past. The orifice plates involved are those in the SCC heat exchanger portion of the Service Water System which is not nuclear safety-related This portion of the system can be isolated from that portion supplying safety loads.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR.50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this procedure and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.