ML20059D697
| ML20059D697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1990 |
| From: | Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NYN-90162, NUDOCS 9009070147 | |
| Download: ML20059D697 (17) | |
Text
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.New Hampshire Ted C. Folgenboom Ya e Senior Vice Fresident and Chief Operating Officer NYN 90162 August 30, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 '
l Attention: Document Control Desk
References:
(a) Facility Operating License No NPF-86, Docket No. 50-443
{
(b) PSNH Letter (SBN 1211) dated October 9,1986, *10CFR50.59 Evaluation", O. S.
Thomas to V. S. Noonan
Subject:
10CFR50.59 Quarterly Report Gentlemen:
i Enclosed please find the Quarterly Report of 10CFR50.59 Safety Evah:'tions for Seabrook Station.
This report covers the period of April 1,1990, to June 30, 1990, and is being submitted pursuant to the reporting requirements outline in Reference (b). ;
i Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R.
Belanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.
1 Very truly yours, 1 M
Ted C. Feigenbaum Enclosures TCF:CLB/ssi cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin i
Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission f
Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Noel Dudley NRC Senior Resident inspector P.O. Box 1149 9009070147 900830 3 DR ADOCK 0500( g New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300
- Seabrook, NH 03874
- Telephone (603) 474-9521 k[.
New Hampshire Yankee
. August 30, 1990 l
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l ENCLOSURE 1 TO NYN 90162 l Scab ook Station 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Quarterly Report April 1,1990 - June 30,1990 1 1
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New Hampshire Yankee
, August 30, 1990 ENCLOSURE 1 TO NYN 90162
- 1. Desian Chanacs 4
The below listed design changes were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-354
Title:
SCCW System Corrosion Monitoring Sample Bomb
Description:
This Design Coordination Report (DCR) was initiated to make a Temporary Modification ;
(86-TMOD-035) a permanent installation. The Temporary Modification installed a corrosion monitoring coupon in the Turbine Building in the Secondary Component Cooling Water (SCCW) System. This DCR removes all existing fittings and tub'mg and reuses the same !
corrosion coupon with new pipe fittings and tubing.
The corrosion coupon is added to the system to monitor corrosion within SCCW and preclude premature damage to the system components. SCCW is non-safety related and this DCR will have no interface with safety related equipment.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and 'it was
, determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the
-4 Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by z. cans of a future amendment.
1 Design Coordination Report: Number 87 233
Title:
Fire Protection Hose Reels Security Building
Description:
This Design Coordination Report (DCR) was initiated to develop P & ids which show and number the fire protection hose reels and to add the pressure limiting devices required by NFPA 14 on hose reels that have an outlet pressure greater than 100 psi. The pressure limiting device addition will be a::complished by replacing the four non-pressure reducing fire protection hose reel angle valves with the same valves only pressure reducing.
Although these specific hose reels are not discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the code requirements are discussed. This DCR will effect FSAR Figure 9.51.
This DCR effects only non-safety equipment that is not controlled by a Technical Requirement. This DCR will not effect safe shutdown of the plant or the margin of safety.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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i Niw Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 l
1 Design Coordination Report: Number 89-035
Title:
Backup Meteorological Mopb*ing Sptem
Description:
This Design Coordinha Report (DCR) was initiated to install an on-site, independent, backup meteorological monitoring system (Backup MET System). This will provide information to support the Radiological- Emergency Plan / Emergency Response Program Manual if the Primary MET System is lost. Consequently the probability of having to declare an Unusual Event due to loss of the on-site meteorological data will also be minimized.
The Backup MET System will provide information on average wind speed, average wind direction, and wind direction standard deviation at Elev 53' (approximate height of the lower wind sensor on the Primary MET Tower). The Backup MET System will be sufficiently independent of.the- Primary MET System so that no credible failure of one component will result in the loss of the information set required to calculate the off site dose projections.
The new Backup MET Tower and the fiberglass enclosure are designed as non-nuclear, non safety-related (NNS) Both structures are designed to withstand extreme environmental loads (wind and ice). The new conduit installed in the main control board is designed as non nuclear, non-safety-related, but seismically supported (NNS-1). Cable for this DCR shall be UL rated as sunlight resistant and acceptable for outdoor use. This cable does not interface with any plant cable systems therefore it does not require FSAR controlled qualifications.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed : for this design change' and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 89-078
Title:
Security 50 Yard Line
Description:
This Design Coordination Report (DCR) was initiated to make changes to the fence that separates Unit 1 from Unit 2 (the 50 yard line) security systems and establish a permanent Unit 1 - Unit 2 separation barrier consistent with other protected area boundaries.
This DCR is safeguards information, therefore the details are not included in this submittal.
Details may be obtained upon request.
This DCR included: fence and detection equipment (cameras, E-field, microwave) relocation, grading and paving, fire protection equipment relocation, and various electrical work. This DCR also resolved a parts replacement problem associated with potectai area gate balanced magnetic switches.
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N;w Hampshire Yankee 1'
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t A 10CFR50.54 report of this DCR was submitted to the commission.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change wdl not create an unreviewed safety question.
- 2. Minor Modifications The below listed minor modifications were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Minor Modification: Number 89-625
Title:
Provide Turbine Trip for Manual Generator Breaker Trip
Description:
This Minor Modification (MMOD) was initiated to interlock the main generator breaker trip with a turbine trip such that a manual control switch trip of the breaker causes an immediate, direr trip of the turbine. The previous design provided a corresponding turbine trip for every mau generator breaker trip except for the manual control switch breaker trip from the main control board (MCB), While it would not be a normal operation to manually trip the generator breaker with the plant at load, the capability to do so exists.
Such an event would cause a turbine overspeed trip.
This MMOD provides a direct trip to the turbine Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) system by wiring in a TRIP contact from the MCB breaker control switch.
Accident analysis of a turbine trip is evaluated in FSAR Chapter 15.23. The analysis concludes that a turbine trip presents no hazard to the Nuclear Steam Supply System. The addition of the breaker control switch trip is similar in design and operation to the existing generator breaker trip interlocks to turbine trip. Furthermore, based on normal operating procedures, a generator breaker manual trip with the plant at load is an unlikely event and would not add to the probability of a turbine trip event. The conclusion of Chapter 15.23 will not be impacted by the modifications of this MMOD.
This modification is consistent with the design and operation of other turbine trips and meets all design criteria for the affected systems and equipment. The affected components are not relied upon as part of any safety systems. There is no increase in the probability of a turbine trip event.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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l NLw Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 s
Minor Modification: Number 90-566 Tule: ISO Phase Bus Duct Flowswitch 1 ED-FSL 92 Replacement Descripdon: The ISO Phase bus duct fans cach supply a separate supply duct which run vertically, and-parallel to each other, to supply forced cooling air to the ISO Phase bus ducts. The air returning to the bus cooling unit is fed to the suction of both fans via a common duct in the center cubicle of the bus cooling unit. Each fan draws a suction on the center cubicle, drawing air through a cooling coil, through the fan and back up the ducts on
- either side, depending on which fan is in operation. A Dow switch,1 ED FSI-92, common l
to both fans, is located on the center cubicle. The low pressure side of the . switch is ,
connected to center cubicle enclosure, to verify that flow exists through either one of the two fans on either side. Upon loss of cooling flow, the suction on the switch is lost, and an input is provided to the cooling unit control panel to start the " preferred' fan and provide and alarm to plant computer. During normal operation, the maximum suction drawn on the center cubicle from either supply fan is 0.14 inches. This is based on actual manometer readings taken during operation.
The existing switch is a Dwyer model 1823-1' with a range of 0.3 to 1.0 inches water column (WC) differential, which is outside the normal operating range. This Minor Modification (MMOD) removes the existing 1 ED-FSL-92 and replaces it with a Dwyer model 1638-0, which has an operating range of 0.05 to 0.25 inches WC, well within the normal range for either fan. The switch shall be set at 0.08 inches WC decreasing.
The ISO Phase bus duct cooling system is non-safety related, non-seismic. Cooling to the bus ducts is supply by two redundant cooling fans each capable of 16,000 SCFM.
The bus duct sections will carry their rated current with forced cooling from either 1 ED-FN-140A or 1 ED FN-140B. The tubing is designed and installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1. The physical wiring to the switch remains unchanged. The only electrical revision is to change the legend shown on the schematic to indicate the installation of the model 1638-0.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and -it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporc* i by means of a future amendment.
- 3. Temporary Modifications The below listed temporary modifications were made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
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. Augus, 30,1990 l Temporary Modification: Number 87 TMOD-011 l
Title:
Ilydrogen Tube Truck Temporary Modification
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) installs temporary hydrown gas piping and modifies l an existing hydrogen tube trailer discharge stanchion HG-SKD 29B. This modification l facilitates the hookup of an existing hydrogen supply truck to the hydrogen fill connection.
The tube trailer is required to provide a sufficient volume of hydrogen to support the direct hydrogenation of the volume control tank during 5% testing and power operation, for makeup to the Reactor CMnt System (RCS).
The new piping connections are all welded with the exception of the tie-in points, connections to the isolation valves and the piping on HG-SKD-29B. Guard pipes and guard blocks are provided to preclude inadvertent puncturing of the piping or collision with the tube trailer. Leakage which could result in a combustible mixture is precluded due to atmospheric dilution and the outside location. A failure which results in the rupture of the supply piping to the fill connection would cause the rapid depressurization of the supply line which would activate a pressure signal, which weuld generate an alarm on the VAS, which would allow for rapid isolation of the le:Jk via operator response. Missile generatian from the trailer and of the trailer itself was evaluated and determined not to
[ create the possibility of accidents of a different type than previously evaluated.
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Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this temporary modification and it was determined that this change will not create and unreviewed safety question.
Temporary Modification: Number 88-TMOD 037
Title:
Mobile Demineralization Trailer Connection
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to remove a 90 degree elbow downstream of a resin trap in the Water Treatment (%T) system and replace it with a l 'T' and a valve. This TMOD provides temporary connections in the Demineralized Water (DM) and Water Treatment systems which will provide the necessary hookups to make use .
of n:obile water treatment units. This will provide greater system flexibility during brief periods of large water usage such as during startup periods. Mobile water treatment units that can be brought in on a temporary basis to supplement the permanent water treatment facilities.
The DM and WT systems have no emergency function and are not required for safe shutdown. The DM system interfaces with safety related sptems at several points and certain DM components, such as the system's containment isolation valves, are classified as safety related. However, none of these components are affectcd or involved in any way with this. The temporary connections are located very remote from any safety related equipment.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was perfcrmed for this Tennorary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unrewewed safety question.
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Temporary Modification: Number 89-TMOD-009 l l
Title:
Cross Connection of DM and WT Systems
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to provide temporary connections in l the Demineralized Water (DM) and Water Treatment (WT) systems that will provide greater system flexibility during brief periods of large water use, such as during startup periods. The connections will provide the necessary hookups to make use of mobile water treatment units that can be brought in on a temporary basis to supplement the permanent water treatment facilities.
This TMOD consists of adding a flanged spool piece to the WT system to allow water from the Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) to be reprocessed through the WT demineralizers. This connection may also be used to process water from mobile water treatment or pure water trucks.
The DM and WT systems have no emergency function and are not required for safe shutdown. The DM system interfaces with safety related systems at several points and certain DM components, such as the system's containment isolation valves, are classified as safety related. However, none of these components are affected or involved in any way with this TMOD, The temporary connections are located very remote from any safety related equipment.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Temporary Modification: Number 89-TMOD-011
Title:
Nitrogen Inertion of RMWST (RMW TK-12) l
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to provide the temporary equipment and connections necessary to establish a nitrogen (N,) blanket on the Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) storage tank for the purpose of oxygen control. The N, gas is supplied to the RMW storage tank at low pressure by a temporary hose and valving from N, gas cylinders. When required, the N, is bled into the tank. Small water seal devices are added at the tank vent and overflow pipes. These seals prevent oxygen (0 2) ingress while at the same time do not interfere with the tank's ability to vent or overflow if necessary.
Also additional connections are provided to add water to the seals from the Demineralized Water (DM) system.
This blanket is passive and for chemistry control purposes only. It involves only a very slight gas overpressure above atmosphere pressme that will not affect the operating characteristics of the system. The Na purging is performed intermittently under administrative controls established by control room personnel. The nitrogeo blanket is not placed in service indefinitely and left unattended.
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1 New Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 The RMW system has no emergency function and is not required for safe shutdown. The RMW system 'aterfaces with safety related systems at several points and certain RMW components, such as the system's containment isolation valves, are classified as safety related.
However none of these components are affected or involved with this TMOD. The RMW storage tank is located in the Tank Farm between the Waste Processing Building and the Primary Auxiliary Building in a diked area that does not contain any safety related equipment. The temporary hoses, vahes, and gas cylinders are located in areas remote from safety related components.
If a DM water hose should fail it would not haw the ability to affect any safety'related
( component due to its remoteness as well as small size. If the nitrogen pressure were to l be increased beyond the desired control range the nitrogen would biecd out off the small water seals at the vent and overflow connections. Even in the unlikely event that the tank would in some way over pressurize and fail or that a slow leak were to develop at the connection to RMW V 87 while it was open during a gas purge, the tank's contents would be contained in the diked area and in any case would not affect any safety related component.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Temporary Modification: Number 90-TMOD 015
Title:
Hotwell Cleanup
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to increase the capabilities to process condensate during startup and power ascension. High concentrations of contaminants are expected during these times. These contaminants may result in secondary water standards not being met.
This TMOD providu for the installation of a condensate polishing trailer and a flow path ,
which supplies water to the trailer from the condensate cleaning subsystem and returns the water to condenser hotwell "A". Also provided on the portable demineralizers is an outlet resin trap to preclude carry over of resin beads or fines into the effluent flow stream.
This TMOD will not affect the ability of the Condensate (CO) system or any of its components to perform its safety related function, it merely provides greater operational flexibility during periods of poor water quality.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
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Nm Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 l
Temporary Modification: %TMOD 017
Title:
Delta P Cells For Suction Strainers for FW.P-32A and B
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to provide differential pressure (delta.P) instruments for each of the main feedwater pumps (MFP) suction strainers. These strainers were installed per 86-TMOD 059 for pump protection during initial plant startup.
The delta-P instruments allow personnel to monitor the condition of the strainers as condensate system (CO) cleanup progresses.
The MFPs and the condensate and feedwater (FW) system flow paths involved with this change have no emergency function and are not required for safe shutdown. The temporary instruments and connected tubing have been selected to meet or exceed the system design pressure and temperature of the CO system at the MFP suctions. The installation is located in the Turbine Building and is remote from safety-related equipment.
The instruments will improve the ability to monitor the suction conditions at the MFPs during the initial plant startup and therefore reduce rather than increase the risk of an inadvertent loss of feedwater.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
Temporary Modification: BTMOD-018
Title:
Remove Signal Memory Function To Main FW Pumps
Description:
This Temporary Modification (TMOD) was initiated to disable the Signal Memory Function (SMF) of the main feedwater pumps. The SMF feature is intended to lock-in the last l control signal prior to a complete loss of the control signal. The purpose of this feature is to have the pump continue to provide feedwater following a catastrophic failure of the I
auto control circuit. From this point manual control. could be initiated and operator I
control restored. However, the auto control circuit used at Seabrook Station is extremely reliable. It has back-up power supplies and auto transfer to manual due to controller failure. Additionally a failure of this control circuit will cause a decaying control signal as oN:esed to an instantaneous zero signal. The decaying signal would be input to the existing ~ SMF memory until absolute zero was reached and then the transfer to memory would be made. In this case, the control signal from memory would be a reduced value 1 from the steady state control value and would cause a reduction of feed flow. An i immediate loss of control signal is not possible and this feature would not function as l designed. Because of this and to climinate unwanted actuation of this feature caused by contial system noise, this TMOD disables the actuating relay.
l The removal of this feature will not reduce protection features but rather enhance the feed pump speed control circuit. When the SMF is disabled per this TMOD a loss of control signal will cause feedpump to run back to its low speed setting.
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l The main feedwater pumps and the control equipment affected by this TMOD are all non-safety related and have no impact on safety systems. The emergency feedwater system is designed for. safety related actuation involving mitigation of feedwater loss.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Temporary Modification change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question.
- 4. Technical Reauirements Manual The below listed changes were made to the Technical Requirements Manual at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 90-02
Title:
Technical Requirements Number 9, Fire Hose Stations
Description:
This change to Technical Requirement No. 9 makes the change discussed in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Request 90-015, also reported in this submittal. To Table 1630 5, Fire Hose Stations, the note " Containment Fire Hose Stations are not required to l be operable a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to establishing containment integrity. However, l the fire hose stations shat be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 5 from MODE l 4, and in MODE 6".
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Technical Requirement Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create and an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Technical Requirements Change: Number 90-03
Title:
Technical Requirement Number 6, Containment Isolation Valve Tabulation
Description:
This Technical Requirements Change was initiated to reconcile Technical Requirement No.
6 (FSAR Table 163-4) and the Containment Isolation System Design Information found in FSAR Table 6.2-83.
Technical Requirement No. 6 provides a listing of valves for which the Limiting conditions of Operation identified in Technical Specification 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, apply. The basis for this specification provides for operability of containment isolation valves to ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environraent in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. This is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. As such, ' all ,
containment isolation valves, for which GDC 54 through 57 compliance is credited, are subject to these conditions.
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New liampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 A review of Technical Requirements No. 6 and the Containment Isolation System Design Information shows some inconsistency exists in Containment Isolation' Valve (CIV) listings.
An PSAR Change (FCR 90-022) tnd Technical Requirement Change (No. 90-03) has been ,
issued to reconcile these documents. These changes do not deviate from the requirements of GDC 54 through $7, or the Containment Isolation System design basis as stated in FSAR Section 6.2.4.1, but rather updates the tabulation of valves which satisfy these bases.
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Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of ;
a future amendment.
Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 9004
Title:
Technical Requirement Number 5, Snubber Inspection Period !
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Description:
This change to Technical Requirement No. 5 modifies the time period for the first inservice 1 visual inspection of snubbers. Currently, this inspection is required to be performed after '
4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION. This change will modify this period to 'after 2 months but within 12 months of commencing POWER i OPERATION". This change is consistent with the ASME program for inservice periodic _ ,
examination of snubbers, OM Part 4, Examination and Performance Testing of Nuclear Po:'er Plant Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers).
This change does not change the function, operation or failure modes of any plant equipment. Revising the inspection period does not undermine the effectiveness of the visual inspection program. The snubbers at Seabrook Station have been inservice since 1985 and have been through at least four heatup and cooldown temperature cycles. Sufficient time has elapsed to perform inservice inspection of the snubbers. The extension of this time period is insignificant relative to the time the snubbers have been inservice.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation n.:; prrformed for this Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined that this change will. not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Technical Requirements Change Request: Number 90-05
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Title:
Technical Requirements Number 3, Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) 7
Description:
This Technical Requirements Change was initiated to revise Technical Requirement No. 3 to be consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1. The- Change is strictly an-administrative change relating to the reporting requirements for-system inoperability.
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New Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1900 The current requirements allow continued plant operations with an inoperable LPMS. The change applies on to the reporting requirements and makes no changes to the operability requirements. No change to any systems, components, or structures are involved.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this Technical Requirements Manual change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety l question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 5. Final Safety Analysis Reoort The below listed Final Safety Analysis Report change requests were issued and safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 90-015
Title:
Fire Protection 15AR Changes !
Description:
This F'mal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Request (FCR) was initiated to make three changes relating to fire protection.
First, this FCR deletes a reference to NFPA 802-1974 because in its 1979 revision all references to Nuclear Power Plants were eliminated. The section still references NFPA 803 1978 which replaced NFPA 802.
The action required by Technical Requirement No. 9, if a required hose station is out of service and is not the primary means of fire f.uppression is - within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> install a wyc on the nearest operable hose station and connect to the wyc and store at the operable hose station sufficient fire hose to provide coverage for the area left - ;
unprotected by the inoperabk, hose station. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires '
that containment integrity be established prior to entry into Mode 4. To establish containment integrity, "All penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation vahes and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves . secured in their positions..."
FSAR Table 6.2-83 indicates that the containment fire hose station supply piping enters the containment through penetration X-38/76A. This table also indicates that, for containment integrity, fire protection valve 1 FP V592 outside of containment be locked closed and the hose station piping in containment be dry. To satisfy the FSAR requirements for containment integrity, the containment fire hose stations must be isolated in Modes 14.
The Seabrook Station Evaluation and Comparison to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A indiates that the containment fire hose stations are not the primary means of fire suppression in the containment. Fire extinguishers are the primary means of fire suppression in the containment.
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7 New Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 In the event that the containment fire hose stations were required during Modes 1-4, when containment integrity is required, valve 1 PP-V592 could be manually opened to supply water to the hose stations. The action requirement of Technical-Requirement No. 9 is currently being met by storing the extra required hose and wyc at a operable hose station outside the containment personnel hatch, even though the ;
Fire Hose would not be run through the airlock to supply water to the Fire Hose Stations. This change to Technical Requirement No. 9, adds a clarifying note stating !
that ' Containment Fire Hose Stations are not required to be operable a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to establishing containment integrity. However, the fire hose stations ;
shall be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 5 from MODE 4, and in MODE l 6". This climinates the need to store hose and wyc outside the containment personnel hatch.
1 This change does not degrade containment fire suppression capabilities. The fire hose stations, by design must be taken out of service for containment integrity. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit for removing and returning the hose stations, based on containment integrity are within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> technical requirement for action when a hose station is removed from service.
I This change also recognizes that the preferred method of supplying wa:er to the containment hose stations is the installed piping system.
Thirdly, this FCR corrects Figure 6.2-94 sheet 2 to show that fire protection valve 1 FP-V592 outside of containment is locked closed. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires this valve to be-locked closed for containment integrity. This valve was inadvertently shown as open on this FSAR isolation valve diagram.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for - this FSAR change and it was I determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety yestion.' Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 90-016
Title:
Boron Dilution
Description:
This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Request - (FCR) was initiated to accomplish two thingr - First, Amendment 62 inadvertently replaced the latest correct versior of page 15.4-25a, the Amendment 62 version, with an earlier version from Amendment 56. This FCR restores this page to the concet version.
The FCR also increases the max!:num times from the initiation of a-boron dilution event to the actuation of a shutdown monitor alarm. Calculations show that times can be somewhat longer than currently shown in the FSAR. However, the revised alarm times still occur early enough to provide time for the operator to prevent a loss of all shutdown margin and the conclusions of the analyses remain unaffected.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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New Hampshire Yankee August 30,1990 17 mal Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 90-037
Title:
Valve Stem Packing Configurations
Description:
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) motor operated valves (MOVs) are described in FSAR Section 63.2.2f as having"... a minimum of a full set of packing below the lantern ring and a minimum of M of a set of packing above the lantern ring. A full set packing _
is defined as a depth of packing equal to 1H times the stem diameter". This packing depth guideline was once the generally accepted industry standard. As stated in EPRI Report NP-5697 (" Valve Stem Packing Improvements"), ".. We now realize that the axial stress applied to a packing set from the gland follower decays rapidly if deep stuff'mg boxes are used".
The packing materials and packing configurations, identified in NP 5697, have now been universally accepted for reduced valve stem leakage rates. These configurations may deviate from the packing depths, as stated in 6.3.2.2f, but accomplish the objective of minimizing leakage to the extent practicable by design.
This Final Safety Analysis Report Change request was initiated to remove the above stated requirement and replace it with the general commitment to minimize stem seal leakage to the full extent practicable by design.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
1 Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 90-027 l
Title:
FSAR Section 13.2, Training i
i
Description:
This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Request (FCR) was initiated to address
( the comments of NRC Staff personnel regarding their review' of Section 13.2 of FSAR l Amendment No. 62. Included are clarifications to the descriptions of qualification and I requalification programs for licensed operators as well as organizational and editorial changes. These changes have no affect on systems, components or structures and in no way reduce the effectiveness of the training program.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Fm' al Safety Analysis Report were incorporated in Amendment 63.
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i New Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990 Final Safety Analysis Report Change Request: Number 90-046
Title:
Appendix A Page F 51 Revision D';scription: This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Change Requrst (FCR) was initiated to revise page F.51 of the 'Scabrook Station Fire Protection Program Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.51 Appendix A'. The chuge is to clarify that materials tested to the requirements of the ASTM E-84 test, " Surface Characteristics of Building . Materials' (1978),
no longer neco to report the fuel contribution factor. Prior to 1978 the report of the test included an evaluation of .he fuel contribution as well as the flame spread and smoke developed. It is now recognized that the test does not provide a valid measure of fuel contribution and is no longer normally reported. This FCR ma'.. no changes to the facility that would adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. It does not add any new or additional equipment. This FCR only changes the reporting requirements for ASTM E 84,
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
- 6. Procedures The below listed safety evaluations were performed pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
Procedures: OX1436.02 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Monthly, Quarterly, and 18-Month Surveillance Test OX1436.03 Electric Drivt Emergency Feedwater Pump Monthly, Quarterly,30-Day Cold Shutdown and 18 Month Initiation OX1436.04 EFW 18-Month Surveillance Test i OX1436.13 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Fsp Post Cold Shutdown or Post Maintenance Surveillance OX1456.27 Train A ESFAS Slave Relay K615 Ouarterly Go Test OX1456.49 Train B ESFAS Slave Relay K615 Quarterly Go Test OX1456.60 Train B ESFAS Slave Relay K640 Quarterly Go Test l OX1456.61 Train A ESFAS Slave Relay K640 Quarterly Go Test j l
1 i
l 14 l l
l
- p. .
J New Hampshire Yankee August 30, 1990
Title:
EFW Pump and EFW Initiation Protective Relay Surveillances
Description:
The purpose of this evaluation was to perform a safety evaluation for a change to the nrveillance procedures for the motor driven and turbine driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps to allow a jumper to be installed around the limit switch for ulve MS V393 and MS-V394 or the motor driven EFW pump mechanically operated contacts to prevent closure of the steam generator blowdown isolation valves SB V9, SB V10, SB V11 and SB V12 during EFW pump surveillance testing and protective relay testing.
The jumpers will be installed at the appropriate terminal blocks at the main control board.
This will maintain steam generator blowdown (SGBD) capability and steam generator clean up capability during the surveillance test period and will prevent an unnecessary isolation and re-initiation of steam generator blowdown flow following the surveillance test. _The-jumpers will be added and removed in eccordance with the revised procedure. An independent verification will be performed to confirm the restoration of the system following the surveillance test. This practice meets the guidelines in NRC Information Notice 84- 3 37, "Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenance or Surveillance Testing". All wires utilized for the jumpers will meet the applicable qualification requirements to comply with regulatory guide 1.118, Revision 2, Paragraph 6a. ;
The technical specifications allow the EFW pumps to be inoperable for a specified time period to allow for periodic testing. All system restorations will be performed within the allowable out of service times specified in technical specification 3/4.7.1.2. During the time that one EFW pump is out of service, the opposite train pump will be capable of performing its safety function, including automatic isolation of SGBD In addition, if EFW is required during the test, instructions are provided in the test procedure for the operator to realign the EFW and SGBD systems. For the 18-Month Auto Actuation Test, where both the turbine driven EFW pump and the motor driven EFW pump are simultaneously out of service, only the SGBD isolatioa contacts associated with the turbine driven EFW pump will be jumpered. The SGBD isolation contacts associated with the motor driven EFW pump will not actuate sicce the control switch is in the Pull-to-lock position.
Operators are instructed in the procedure to realign EFW and SGBD in this case. This test is only performed in Mode 3. The out-of service times will be in accordance with the technical specification requirements.
Conclusion:
A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this FSAR change and it - was determined that this change will not create an unreviewed safety question. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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