ML20010H551
| ML20010H551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1981 |
| From: | Borgmann E CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 NUDOCS 8109250228 | |
| Download: ML20010H551 (73) | |
Text
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e THE CINCINNNI'I GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY CINCINN ATI. OHIO 45201 6
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SENtOR veCE PRESIDENT 1S87 % d Septen.ber 22, 1981 Docket No. 50-358
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Mr. Harold Denton, Director N
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two times the gate's weight. Attached is the M-17 drawing showing the heavy load movement paths. Each heavy load shall have specific movement path selected to minimize the consequences of a load drop. Any deviation to the specified movement path shall be approved by the maintenance engineer prier to lifting the load. Crane operators shall be instructed to minimize the lift of any loads to as low as practicable. Question 2.3.1 Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having significant design features to make the likelihood of a load orop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete. compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load handling-system (i.e., crane load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
Response
~2.3.1 The Reactor Building Bridge Crane is the only single i
failure proof crane at the plant site.
See Response 2.2.3.
Question 2.3.2 For cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single failure proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evalua-tion should be provided which includes the following l
information:
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v Question 2.3.2a.
The Presentation in a matrix fc..nat of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage may occur to safety related equipment.
Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross reference to information provided in 2.1-3c.
Impact areas should be identified by construction zone: and elevations by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings.
Response
2.3.2a Attached is a matrix for all cranes (lifting loads greater than 1 fuel assembly plus handling tool) listed in Table 1 submitted in the response to Section 2.1 of.
The matrix references M-19 series of drcwings which are the equipment removal drawings for the plant.
Those drawings are based on general arrange-ment drawings and show equipment access paths. These matrices are included as attachment 1 to this'. letter.
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Question 2.3.2b For each interaction identified, indicate which load and impact area combinations can be eliminated be-cause of separation and redundancy of safety related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical inter-locks, or other site specific considerations:
Response
2.3.2b The following equipment can be eliminated by one of the above reasons:
Item 101 Reactor Building Bridge Crane Main Hook (110T). The main hook has been addressed in Response 2.2.3.
The Auxiliary Hook (10T) shall be administrative 1y controlled to lifting item loads less than I fuel assembly (plus weight handling tool) over the spout fuel pool and to reach items on the west side of the
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reactor building and refueling finor where the main hook cannot reach.
These items shall be lifted and moved a minimum distance to allow the main hook to be used.
The auxiliary hook is also used, with the crane interlocks operable, to hoist new fuel shipping crates, fuel channel chippi.ig crates, replacement control rod blade shipping crates and incore detector shipping crates to and from the equipment access building and the plant refueling floor.
The auxiliary hook is utilized for movement of new fuel shipping crates during inspection of new fuel.
Item 107 RHR and RBCCW (IB) Heat Exchanger, Item 197, is a 20 l
ton monorail overhead hoist to be used for tube bundle removal and overhaul of the IB RRCCW Heat Exchanger I
and RHR Heat Exchanger 1A and 1B.
Sufficient separ-l ation exists insuring that inadvertant drop of any of the above components would not cause damcge to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The IB RBCCW Heat Exchanger is separated by 12 ft. from the north bank hydraulic control units and by two floors from the RHR Heat Exchankers.
The i
RHR Heat Exchangers are located in separate cubicles and are located 2 floors below the 1B RBCCN Heat Exchanger.
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Item 108 Main Steam Hatch Slabs and Isolation Valves Administrative controls shall be applied to assure that the main steam hatch slabs are not removel during plant operation.
Inadvertant dropping of the j
main steam hatch slabs after cold shutdown will not l
effect plant safety.
F1milarly, inadvertent dropping of any of the main stes, isolation valve components j
or feedwater val /e components, after they have been i
released for maintenance, will not have any effect on plant safety or decay heat removal.
Item 111 Hotch. Slabs and RCIC Liaintenance Panel H22-P022 contains one steam line flow switch for each main steam line and the recirculation loop flow transmitters feeding the B flow unit for APRM flow biased scrams.
Based upon single failure proof i
criteria employed in the design of these systems j
their failure can neither cause nor prevent the com-pletica of a safety function.
Item 112 RBCCW 18 Heat Exchanger 1A Item 11'2 is a 20 ton monorail overhead hoist to be used for tube bundle removal and overhaul of the 1A RBCCW Heat Exchanger.
Sufficient separation exists to ensure inadvertant drop of the heat exchanger would not cause damage to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat remo'ral.
Item 118 Low Pressure Core Spray The inadvertant drop of a low pressure core spray pump component, has a very small probability of damaging the RHRA pump as evidenced by equipment separation.
Even the assumed total loss of ECCS division I has no effect upon safe shutdown and decay heat removal since two redundant divisions of ECCS remain operable.
Item 119 RHR Pumps The inadvertant drop of any RHR pump component, has a very small probability of damaging the RHR pump or LPGS pump in it's room as evidenced by equipment physical separation.
Even the assumed total loss of
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