ML20141N277
| ML20141N277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Nine Mile Point, Fermi, Oyster Creek, Hope Creek, Cooper, Pilgrim, Brunswick, Vermont Yankee, Duane Arnold, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Morrow D FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141N278 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-782 NUDOCS 8603060039 | |
| Download: ML20141N277 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES h
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l Ms. Daurice C. Morrow Fried Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 1000 IN RESPONSE REFER I
Washington, DC 20037 TO F01A-85-/82
Dear Ms. Morrow:
This is in partial response to your letter dated November 25, 1985, in which you requested, seven categories of documents.
The documents listed on the enclosed Appendix A are responsive to categories one and three of your request. These documents are being placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC. You may obtain access by presenting a copy of this letter or by requesting POR folder F0!A-85-782 in your name.
The documents listed on the enclosed Appendix B are already available in the POR.
The documents listed on the enclosed Appendix C are outside the scope of your request based on your telephone conversation with Carol Ann Reed on January 14,198/g The search for and review of additional documents subject to your request is continuing. As soon as our efforts are completed, we will notify you.
Sincerely,
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Donnie H. Grimsley, Dir ctor Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration
Enclosures:
As stated l
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APPENDIX A FOIA 85-782 1.
May 31, 1972 Letter to Skovholt from Butterfield on Structural Integrity of Quad-Cities Tori (2 pages) 2.
June 2, 1972 Letter to Lee from Grier on bolt in torus header failing (2 pages) 3.
June 21, 1972 Note to Keppler from Reinmuth on failure of hanger system (5 pages) 4.
June 23, 1972 Route slip from Keppler on hanger failure (9 pages) 5.
July 3, 1972 Note to Keppler from Hunnicutt on hanger review (2 pages) i 6.
July 5, 1972 Letter to Grier from Hoyt on the results of inspections
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of the headers (8 pages) 7*
July 27, 1972 Note to Skovholt from Engelken on hanger failure (2 pages) 8.
November 9, 1972 Note to Region III Files from Jordan on torus problems (4 pages) 9.
December 1, 1972 Route slip from McDermott on Commonwealth Edison's report to the licensing board on header failure (C6 pages) 10.
September __, 1975 NEDC-20989-1, Class 1, " Mark I Containment Evaluation Short Term Program - Final Report, Volume I" (27 pages) 11, October 6, 1975 Letter to R. Boyd from Ivan Stuart re:
Mark I Containment Evaluation Short Term Program (3 pages) 12.
August,_, 1976
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NE0C-20989, Addendum 3, Class I " Mark I Containment Evaluation Short Term Program Final Report" (83 pages) 13.
Hay 20, 1977 Letter to General Licensees from NRC subject " Summary of meeting held on April 11, 1977 with Representatives of the Mark I Owner's Group" (4 pages) 14.
December 14, 1977 UCRL-50045-77-2, " Reactor Containment Analysis for BWR Suppression Systems" (26 pages) 15*
January 13, 1978 UCRL-52384, " Data Processing for the 1/5-Scale Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Pressure Suppression Experiment" (19 pages)
o Appendix A 2
FOIA 85-782 16.
March 16, 1978 UCRL-52367, Revision 1, " Photographic and Video Techniques Used in the 1/5-Scale Mark I Boiling Water Reactor Pressure Suppression Experiment" (22 pages) 17.
July 25,1978 Letter to W. Smith and R. Scheibel from J. Flynn re: Zimmer Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 - NRC Summary of June 28 Meeting on SRV discharge device and Zimmer Closure Report (37 pages) 18.
Undated Mark 1 Containment Program Program Action Plan (44 pages - double sided)
October 27, 1980 In-Plant SRV Test - LaSalle County (104 pages)
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APPENDIX B FOIA 85-782 i
1, October 27, 1980 Letter to B. Youngblood from L. De1 George
Subject:
LaSalle Units 1 and 2, Response to Informal NRC Questions Concerning In-Plant S/RV Test Plan (17 pages)
PDR ADOCK 05000373A 801027 8011030448 2.
October 28, 1980 Letter to B. Youngblood from L. De1 George
Subject:
Response to Informal Request for Information Concerning S/RV T-Quencher Frequency Range (3 pages)
PDR ADOCK 05000373A 801028 8011040524
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February 3, 1981 Letter to B. Youngblood from L. De1 George
Subject:
LaSalle Units 1 and 2 In-Plant S/RV Test Plan (4 pages)
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PDR A00CK 05000373A 810203 8102050512 4.
November 2, 1981 Letter to A. Schwencer from C. Sargent t
Subject:
LaSalle Units 1 and 2 Proposed Technical l
Specification Special Test Exception for S/RV Testing (2 pages)
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APPENDIX C FOIA 85-782 I
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September, 1975 NEDC-20989-2P, Class III, " Hark 1 Containment Evaluation Short Term Program - Final Program, Volume II, LOCA-Related Hydrodynamic Loads" (56 pages) i 2,
September, 1975 NEDC-20989-3P, Class III, " Mark 1 Containment i
Evaluation Short Term Program - Final Program, Volume III, Load Applicat !on and Screening of Structural Elements" (52 pages) l t
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Novombor 25, 19tl5 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT RE00EST Mr. Donnie H. Grimsley, Director ACT REQUEST Division of Rules and Records
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20555 Doar Mr. Grimsloys Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
5552) and 10 CPR Part 9, I hereby request the following information portaining to tests, incidents, and reports relating to hydrodynamic loads in Prosauro Supprossion Containments of the type associated with boiling water reactors (BWRs):
1)
Any in formation, including transmittal letters, re ports, and notes concerning Safety Rollof Valve tests at Commonwealth Edison's Quad Cities 2 reactor in May 1972; 2)
Any information, including transmittal letters, re po r ts, and notes concerning Startup Tosts at KKM (Muhleborg, Switzerland) in July 1972; 3)
Any information, including transmittal lotters, reports, and notes concerning generic Safety Relief Valvo Tosts at Commonwealth Edison's Quad Cities 2 reactor in October 1972; Vo-so, r--
' F tru, FcAxx, liAtuts, Su utvna & JACoDSON Mr.'Donnie H.
Grimsley Page Two November 25,.1985 4)
Any information, including transmittal letters and notes concerning General Electric Report NEDO 10859 " Steam Vent, Clearing Phonomena and Structural Rosponse of the BWR Torus (Mark I Con ta inment)"
dated. April 1973; 5)
Any information, including transmittal letters, reports, and notes concerning tests of safety and auxiliary systems at Fukushima Unit 2 (Japan) in May and June, 1973; 6)
Any information, including transmittal letters, reports, and noto.s concerning tests of Safety Roliof Valves at Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Unit 1 in 1973; 7)
Any in formation, including transmittal letters, reports, and notes concerning pressure supprossion tests using vertical vents or downcomers, Harviken Reactor Station, Studsvik, Sweden.
please note:that I am defining files and communications to include records as defined in 10 CPR 9.3a and, in addition, all data, including published and unpublished memoranda, personal notes, notes of tolophone conversations, films, photographs, micro ficho, microfilm, tapes and other electronic means of recording data, published and unpublished reports and any other material in the possession of the Agency from whatever source on the subject of pressure supprossion containment.
I am willing to pay appropriate search and reprod uc tion costs annociated with complying with this request.
Please do not hesitate to contact me regarding any questions you may have concerning this request.
Very truly yours, Daurico C. Mo rrow DCM : f a
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f.j.]n*y Mr; Donald J. Skovholt
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Subject:
Additional information concerning the structural integrity of Quad-cities tori Daar Mr. Skovholt:
The purpose of' this letter in to provido further infor-mation related to your letter dated March 13 portaining to the structural integrity of tho Quad-cition tori and to supplomont our responso dated March 27, 1972.
As indicated in this responso, the modification to each torus in tho Quad-Cition Station is conceptually.
identical to that proposed for the Monticello plant.
The concern associated with the bafflo damago at Monticello due to roliof valvo dischargo into the supprossion pool is not relevant to the Quad-Cities Station.
Units 1 and 2 do not have supprossion pool baffles.
Duo to coating problems an investigation was mado and datorminod that the previous location of the roliof valvo dischargo i
was not optimum and that bottor mixing of the dischargo with the supprossion pool water was feasible.
This optimization was achieved by relocation of tho vont pipe dischargo to provido even further ausuranco of completo ' team supprossion in the torus.
The dischargo s
1 was originally located approximately throo feet below the supproscion, pool surfaco'noar the innor wall.
By moving the vont to about nino foot below tho water surface at the torus conter11no, and making the dischargo tangantial to the torus wall in both directions, the momentum of the jota will promote good tangential mixing; also natural convection of haated water rising in the contor of the pool will ensure strong radial convection to the torus walls, thoroby thoroughly mixing in the radial direction as well.
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,Mr. Donald J. Skovholt May 31, 1972 To relocate the dischargo, one additional elbow and fifteen feet of pipe were required.
This extension results in a somcwhat higher pressure drop.
An evaluation was performed to dotorming the losses and pressure at the discharge of the relief valvo itself.
These calculations show that the ine'ronso in equivalent friction loss through the dischargo piping would be about 0.4.
The now piping represents loss than a 10% increase in friction loss.
Thereforo, with the flow choked at the valvo, the slight increase in downstream loss coef ficient will not af fect relief valvo capacity.
The added water in the relief valvo' piping which must now be, accolorated when the valvos open does not materially affect the timo to reach full flow in the dischargo pip 1ng.
The total timo required **
to clear the dischargo piping is loss than one second.
It should be noted that this does not mean thoro is no relief flow out of the vessel turing this timo, but rather that the relief flow is pressucAzing the dischargo piping volume.
Thoroforo, the submprgency offect on the reliof valve operation is negligible.
Verifient; ion of adequato valvo flow capacities will be made during routino ntartup testing.
As described in the lotter from L. O. Mayor to P. A. Morris dated December 15, 1971 on the Monticello docket, the modificacion included splitting the dischargo fluid with a pipe and support,ing this pipo to the torus ring girdor.
This design has the of fcen of reducing the reaction forces and minimizing the amount of brac; Lng required to hold the pipe in placo.
The supports provided at che dischargo piping'olbow are designed to withstand up to 25,000 ;lbs.
of force produced along the axis of the pipo immediately upstream of the "too".
Calculations show that the maximum force which cou1d be produced in less than 10,000 lbs.-
Additionally, stiffonors ara placed at the piping "too" as a precautionary measuro' to provLdo additional bracing against possible dischargo differentials.
,,4nalys is shows that those differentials can never exceed.1000 lbs., which is well within tho design capability of the supports (2000 lbs.).
As the procoding discussion demonstratos, tho.modiflod dis-chargo piping in Quad-cition is providad with sufficient ' bracing to withstand all frees associated with relief valvo dischargos into the suppression pool.
Very truly yours, L. D. Dutterfield, Jr.
Nuclear Licensing Administrator
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Common *alth gdison company Docket No. 50-;65 ATal:
Mr. Byron Lee, Jr.
Assistant to the President F. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinoin 64.6'A.
Centlement This acknouledges the notification received by Mr. Jordan of this office on May.2'.,. 1972, regarding the discovery at Quad-cities Unic
- that the botte in four hangers for the torus suction header pipe h.id failed and
'the header had essgad up to approximately six inches. Ve were informed that the reactor was in " hot standby" condition at the time sad that a shutdown was initiated immediately following discovery of the failed bolte.
Sased on subsequent discussions by our inspector with representatives of your staf f, both at the site and by telephone, it is our understanding that yout investigation into this occurrence is continuing but the precise cause of the hanger bolt tailure, your planned corrective actions before resusing operation, and the additions 1 testing to be done as a result of the: occurrence had not been determined.
It is also our understanding that you will discuss the resulta of your investigation of this occurrence with representatives of this of fice prios to resuming operation of Unit 2.
Further, it is our understanding that you will describe the results of your investigation in your ten day report to the Directorate of Licensing, including a description and schedule for any additional testing planned as a result of the hanger bolt failure, the results of your metallurgical enastaation of the fatted bolts, and the results of stress analysis and Nur et piping and welds.
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Should you have any questions regarding these matters, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
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Boyce H. Grier Regional Director cc:
F. A. Palmer, Superintendent Quad-Cities Station bec: J. G.,Keppler, RO e
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J QQ 4tfile James G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Testing and Operations Branch, RO g' Q
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QUAD CITIES 2 - FAILURE OF HANGER SYSTEM - TORUS SUCTION HEADER Attached for your information and possible action is L. Beratan's report of his June 6,1972 trip to Quad cities 2, to investigate the failure of the hanger system supporting the torus suction header.
Mr. Lofy of Parameter, Inc., accompanied Mr. Beratan.
We expect to receive his report this week (June 19), and will forward it promptly upon receipt.
Mr. Lofy informs us that he was able to reproduce the CB&I hanger design loads based solely on the static weight of the header and the contained water. Furthermore these loads,if equally distri-buted, should not have caused the observed bolts to fail.
Since the bolts failed in double shear rather than by fatigue, he feels that some major static load or loads were not considered by CB&I in the design of the header support system. He suggests that such large static loads were probably caused by the safety systems attached to the header by the architect engineer. This information points to a potentially serious organizational interface problem between the pipe system designer and the torus designer, a situation which may prevail at other reactor sites.
A second significant observation at Quad Cities 2 was the wide distribution in measured loads carried by the several hangers (700 to 22,300 pounds).
If a systea is not properly installed, the designer's work is completely invalidated. We believe the Quad Cities 2 experience justifies the verification of similar hanger loadings at other BWR plants.
A further point to consider is that the investigation should not be terminated merely by specifying the use of a larger bolt. As Mr. Lofy points out, the use of larger bolts results in a larger hole in the hanger bar making that member the weakest link. Quite obviously, the analysis must proceed to each component of the hanger system, including the attachment areas of the torus and the header.
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James G. Keppler a2-In view of our observations at Quad Cities 2, and since the problem may apply to all BWR licensees having a similar ring header design, we believe all such licensees ishould be requested to take the following actions:
1.
Inspect installed hangers for bolt or other failures.
Also, examine the hanger system to assure proper bolt size, bolt material, hole configuration and general adequacy of hanger support.
2.
Measure actual static loads imposed upon each ha'nger by a calibrated jack or an equivalent method. The purpose of these measurements is to demonstrate that the total load is, in fact, properly distributed among the several hangers in accordance with the design intent.
3.
Re-examine the header design stress analysis. Determine that the pertinent static dynamic and seismic loads were considered in the design and the analysis of the header, its hanger system and the attachment points of the hangers to the torus and the header.
- Please advise if we can be of further assistance in resolving this problem.
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G. W. Reinmuth, Chief Technical Assistance Branch i
Regulatory Operations A ttachment:
As Stated cc:
L. D. Low, RO J. W. Flora, RO:lV H. D. Thornburg,'R0 R. W. Smith, RO:V R. H. Engelken, RO D. M. Hunnicutt, RO:III J. B. Henderson, RO
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Y WASHINGTON. D.C. 20545 UMt 5 JUN 211972 G. W. Reinmuth, Chief, Technical Assistance Branch, RO QUAD CITIES 2, DOCKET NO. 50-265 SPECIAL INSPECTION OF THE FAILED HANGER SYSTEM ON THE 24-INCH TORUS SUCTION HEADER On June 6,1972, an inspection was conducted by E. Jordan, Principal Inspector, RO:III; L. L. Beracan, Sr. Structural Engineer, RO:HQ; and R. Lofy of Parameter, Inc., Consultant. The purpose of this inspection was to examine the failed hanger system of the torus suction header, the irepaired hangers, and to discuss with the licensee and his consultants, Sargent & Lundy, Inc., and Chicago Bridge and Iron, their evaluation of the cause of the failure and the proposed fix.
Four 3/4-inch diameter bolts of the hanger system supporting the 24-inch diameter torus suction header were found. in a failed condition following a series of safety system tests'.
The bolts, threaded their entire length, failed in a common mode (double shear).
It was not possible to determine if the failures occurred simultaneously or singly. The failure was discovered by a patrol operator making a routine inspection of the facility.
The 24-inch suction header is supported by four stub tubes attached to the torus at 90 degree intervals and by 12 hangers, three in each quadrant between the respective stub tubes. Three of the failed hangers were consecutive in the 45 t.o 135 degree quadrant, and the fourth at approximately 22 degrees. The unsupported quadrant of pipe was carried by the 20-inch stub tubes located at 45 and 135 degrees azimuth.
The maximum vertical deflection of the header was measured to be 5 3/4 inches.
In analyzing the stresses in the system af ter failure of the hangers, CD&I used a finite element analysis and the Bijlaard method of calculation to determine stresses. The analysis showed that the calculated static loading on each hanger should have been approx,
imately 8000 pounds and 8600 pounds assuming static plus vertical seismic loads. From the material properties of the bolts, each should have been capable of supporting an 18,000 pound load before failure.
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f The maximum membrane stress in the stub tube nossles X-204A and X-204B in the insert plate at the nossle neck was calcul.ated to be 25,200 psi in the circun'creatial direction. At the torus shell plate to insert plate junction, the circumferential stress was calculated to be 26,700 pai.
It should be pointed out that these are local membrane stresses. The specified minimum yield strength of this material (SA516, Gr.70) is 38,000 psi.
The stresses were computed on the basis of the pipe being full of water, the hangers in the quadrant failed; the header bd ng
.__ _,____ supported by the stub tubes, and the header deflected only.4-inches.
1 The measured deflection of 5 '3/4 inches was not considered, nor were the dynamic forces due to pressure transients experienced by the operation e
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of the connected safety systems.
It was not clear whether the static i
or dynamic loads from the safety systems attached to the header or that all seismic interaction loads were considered by CB&I in the design of the hanger system.
The highly stressed stub tubes were dye penetrant tested, and there were no indications of cracking and no visible indications of local buckling or permanent deformations.
The gusset plates which support the han8ers are welded to pads which t
are in turn welded'to the torus.
Since it was reported that the torus walls were observed to flex when the safety systems are operated, t
it was requested that the licensee re-examine the stresses in the torus at the point of the hanger pad attachment.
As a temporary expedient, the four failed bolts were repla'ced with one-inch diameter high strength steel bolts having a partially threaded shank. The licensee expects to replace all hanger bolts i
in Units 1 and 2, including the four temporary bolts in Unit 2 with one-inch diameter high strength s teel bolts having smooth shanks.
All flame cut holes in the gusset plates are to be reamed and dressed to a smooth contour.
It was requested that when the bolts are replaced, the static force required to lift the header so that the bolt can be s' lipped out, be measured. Subsequent information disclosed that these measured forces varied from 700 to 23,000 pounds.
4 Additional analyses are to be conducted taking into account the total deflected position of.the header; the effects of pressure transients experienced during operation of the. safety systems; and the effects of a scismic event on the design of the header, stub tubes, and hangers. General Electric (GE) is in the process of putting toggther
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an instrumentation package and procedures to measure forces, acceler-ations, nnd deflections induced in the header at the points of support by the various pressure transients. GE proposes to factor this information into the evaluation of the adequacy of the existing design.
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G. W. Reinmuth 3-A discussion was held with the licensee and the following concerns identified:
1.
The analysis of the failure of the suction header performed by CB&I was incomplete.
It did not reflect the measured deflected shape nor the dynamic transients induced by the operation of the safety systems.
2.
The data available on the CE dynamic measurement program was incomplete. It was suggested, in addition to the accelerations and deflections in the header, that forces in the hangera be measured when the safety systems are operated to determine the total forces acting on the bolts.
3.
An evaluation of the stresses in the torus wall in the area of the hanger attachments for the most conservative combin-ation of loads at the point of hanger attachment should be made.
4.
The flame cut holes in the gusset plates should be reworked to permit uniform transfer of load.
5.
The data collected should be factored into the design of the torus, torus suction header, and the header hanger system.
L. L. Beratan Sr.. Structural Engineer l
Technical Assistance Branch Regulatory Operations e
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