ML20009E590

Forwards LER 81-011/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

ML20009E590
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	06/16/1981
From:	Lessor L NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20009E596	List: ML20009E590 ML20009E620
References
CNSS810335, NUDOCS 8107280311
Download: ML20009E590 (2)

Text

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Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV \ b; ,J

[ 611 Ryan Plaza Drive '/ X\

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( Suite 1000 m ih P Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.3 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on May 22, 1981. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-81-11 Report Date: June 16, 1981 Occurrence Date: thy 22, 1981 ,

Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Identification of Occurrence:

Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative controls.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

At the time cf the discovery of this occurrence, the reactor was in cold shutdown for refueling.

Description of Occurrence:

The Core Spray header break detection instruments were found to be cross connected.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence was caused by the instrument piping inside the drywell being cross connected at the drywell penetration during plant construction.

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8107280311 810616 PDR ADOCK 05000298 S PDR

r Mr. K. V. Seyfrit June 16, 1981 Page 2.

Analysis of Occurrence:

While using air pressure to void a Core Spray vessel penetration for radiography, a Core Spray break detection alarm was received on the opposite loop. A follow-up investigation of this unexpected alarm revealed that the Core Spray header break detection instru--

ments were in fact connected to the incorrect loops. A review of the station records indicated that the valves and piping outside the drywell from the instruments up to and including the drywell penetration were as designed. The error was that the instrument lines inside the drywell from the Core Spray headers were attached to the incorrect pipe at the drywell penetration during plant  ;

construction.

The function of this detection system is to detect a break in the Core Spray piping between the vessel penetration and the core shroud penetration. If a Core Spray pipe were to break in this area, the Core Spray loop would still inject water into the reactor i vessel outside the shroud and provide for core flooding if the lower reactor vessel was intact. In the event an ECCS injection j was needed, both loops of the Core Spray System would have started automatically and injected water in the reactor vecsel.

This occurrence had no adverse affect on the public health and safety. The event is not repetitive.

Corrective Action:

The Core Spray break detection instruments were ionnected to the proper header.

Sincerely, i

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L. C. Lessor Station Superintendent Cooper Nuclear Station LCL

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