05000298/LER-1995-001, :on 950107,tested Surveillance of Detection Sys Supervisory Circuits.Caused by Defective Procedure.Fire Watch Posted in DG Fire Areas & Maintained Until Detection Sys Was Declared Operable

:on 950107,tested Surveillance of Detection Sys Supervisory Circuits.Caused by Defective Procedure.Fire Watch Posted in DG Fire Areas & Maintained Until Detection Sys Was Declared Operable

ML20080H035
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	02/06/1995
From:	Alford A, Herron J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-95-001, LER-95-1, NLS950057, NUDOCS 9502140370
Download: ML20080H035 (4)

LER-1995-001, on 950107,tested Surveillance of Detection Sys Supervisory Circuits.Caused by Defective Procedure.Fire Watch Posted in DG Fire Areas & Maintained Until Detection Sys Was Declared Operable

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(iv) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
2981995001R00 - NRC Website

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en COOPER NUCLE AR ST ATION Nebraska Public Power District

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NLS950057

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February 6, 1995

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cominission Document Control Desk i

Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee t, vent Report 95-001 is forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

I Sincerely, v

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)

J. T.

ierron P1 nt Manager 1

/nr Attachment cc:

L. J. Callan G. R. Horn

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J. H. Mueller R. G. Jones l

R. A. Sessoms K. C. Walden INPO Records Center NRC Resident Inspector j

R. J. Singer CNS Training CNS Quality Assurance R. L. Koch

,1.

j a.. J 9502140370 950206 gp; PDR ADOCK 05000298 S

PDR f

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NRC FCSM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR RE'tdaA R*Y C01stI5SION APPROWED BY (35 No. 3150-0104 (5-92)

EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH I"

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

$ARD l"c"MMENfS REGARDING BUR EN SI TE O THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH j

(MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N, (See reverse for required nunber of digits / characters for each block)

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAfEE (1)

DOCKET NL55ER (2)

PAGE (3)

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION 05000298 1 OF 3 j

TITLE (4) Surveillance Testing of Detection System Supervisory Circuits IVrNT DAir (5)

I trR MtseBra (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES IINOLVED (8)

S ISION MONTH DAY YEAR years MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 95 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 07 95 95

-- 001 --

00 02 06 OPERATING THIS RIPORT IS SUBMITTED PtRSUANT TO THE REQUIRFIENTS OF 10 CFR i: (Check one or more) (11) g MODE' (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(e)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 000 LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ti) 50.36(c)(2)

50. 73(a)(2)(vi l )

OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(tii) x 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

(Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[C 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)l LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (17) l NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

Art Alford, Senior Staf f Nuclear Licensing & Safety Eng.

(402) 825-3811 CGEPLETF ONE LINE FOR IACH CGOPOIIFNT FAltlRE DFSCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER g

D IC DET K120 Y

SUPPLIIENTAL REPORT EXPICTFD (14)

EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION X

NO (If yes, conplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

DATE (15) 1 ARSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

During installation of design change (DC; 94-0302, three Diesel Generator (DG) carbon dioxide (CO2) photoelectric detector supervi e r, circuitn falled to annunciate when doenergized.

The failure to annunciate was due to sticking contacts which were cleaned and retested satisfactorily. An investigation into the incident determined that the supervisory circuits were not being tested every six months as required by Technical Specification 4.14. B.

The CO2 photoelectric detectors are part of a non-proprietary in-house system design which contains loss of power relays.

These relays were not included in the surveillance procedures when the system was originally installed in 1979.

On Febcuary 1,1995, during the ongoing review of other potentially missed surveillances on supervisory circuits, it was discovered that the supervisory circuits associated with the fire detectors serving the Service Water Pump (SWP) room Halon systems were also not being tested every six months per the Technical Specifications.

This review is continuing.

Per NUREG-1022, the cause of this event is attributed to Defective Procedure, NUREG-1022 code D, specifically an inadequate Design Change Process.

This also satisfies the Special Report requirement of Technical Specification 3.14.B.2.

kRC

I 1

,M C FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMEISSION APPROVED BY OMB No. 3150-0104 i

(5 92)

EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MNBB U14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDCET. WASHINGTON, DC ?0503.

fACitITY NAMF (1)

DoCET NtstBER (?)

LER M!BIBER (6h PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR COOPER NUCLEAR STATION 05000298 2 OF 3 95

-- 001 --

00 TEXT (If more space is reautred. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (IT)

Plant Status The plant was in cold shutdown at the time of the event.

Event Description

During a clearance order being hung for a design change, three DG CO2 photoelectric detector loss of power supervisory circuits failed to annunciate when deenergized. The detectors' internal trouble relay was determined as the cause.

When the detectors' trouble relay is deenergized, its contacts are designed to open and annunciate in the control room. However, when the DG CO2 detectors' trouble relay was deenergized, the contacts remained closed. The detectors' contacts were cleaned and retested satisfactorily.

The DG CO2 detection system and supervisory circuit is of an in house non-proprietary design that does not have an Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) listing. The supervisory circuit for each detector consists of a loss of power relay integral to the detector itself which annunciates within the plant status computer (RONAN) system.

Supervisory meter relays provide annunciation of overall CO2 system power failure.

These meter relays are tested every 18 months. This system was installed in 1979.

On February 1, 1995, during the ongoing review of other potentially missed surveillances on supervisory circuits, it was discovered that the supervisory circuits associated with the fire detectors serving the Service Water Pump (SWP) room Halon systems were also not being tested every six months per the Technical Specifications.

This review is continuing.

Of ten available supervisory circuits, seven are tested by CNS procedures; however, the supervisory circuit associated with the Halon system detectors themselves is one of the three not tested.

The other two are ground fault and pull station supervisory circuits that are not required to be tested by Technical Specifications.

For the SWP Halon system, the test procedure was originally developed and is routinely performed by an outside vendor that has little familiarity with CNS Technical Specification requirements.

Recognition of the Technical Specification requirement for testing the detector supervisory circuits therefore went unnoticed by the test performers. This system was installed in 1985.

Cause

The root cause is an inadequate design change process.

The design change process in use at the time did not provide c*necklists or other steps in the procedure to assure that appropriate Technical Specification surveillance requirements are incorporated into plant procedures.

Checklists have been provided since 1988.

l t

,NAC FONM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR RElaAATORY C(BOIISSION APPROWED BY (35 N0. 3150-0106 (5 92)

EXPIRES 5/31/95 1

l ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH I

THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUESir 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH

{

" EXT CONTINUATION (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF j

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY IWWE (1)

DOCKET IRAGER (2)

LER IRAGER (6?

PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR COOPER NUCLEAR STATION 05000298 3 OF 3 95

-- 001 --

00 TEXT (If more 9;oace is recuired. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) l Safety Si r.ni ficance Although not all of the detector supervisory circuits were tested as required by the Technical Specifications, the alarm functions and system supervisory circuits have been tested and verified operable as required by Surveillance Procedures.

By not testing the individual detector supervisory circuits, had a detector lost power or continuity, it may not have been immediately identified. However, the ability to initiate CO2 or Halon, as applicable, was not compromised.

Based on the above, the safety significance of this event is minimal.

Corrective Action

A fire watch was posted in the DG fire areas and was maintained until the detection system was declared operable.

A temporary procedure change notice to the surveillance procedure was written, the DG CO2 i

detector supervisory circuits were tested and declared operable, and then the fire watch was released.

An hourly firewatch patrol was established for the SWP roo:n.

The SWP room Halon detector supervisory circuit will be verified operable by March 1, 1995.

A surveillance testing validation program, the purpose of which is to review the surveillance testing methods and scope against the Technical Specifications requirements, including fire detection supervisory circuits, is in progress. The Fire Protection i

surveillance validation will be completed by June 1, 1995.

The design change process has been significantly improved since these systems were originally installed, no additional action is planned.

Similar Events

None.

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LIST OF NRC COMMITMENTS l ATTACHMENT 3 l

3 Correspondence'No: NLS950057 The following table identifies those actions committed to by the District in this document.

l Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District.

They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory I

commitments

Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITTED DATE

COMMITMENT

OR OUTAGE The SWP room Halon detector supervisory circuit will be 3/1/95 verified operable.

A surveillance testing validation program, the purpose of which is to review the surveillance testing methods and scope to the Technical Specification requirements, 6/1/95 including fire detection supervisory circuits, is in progress.

PROCEDURE NUMBER 0.42 REVISION NUMBER 0 PAGE 10 0F 16