05000298/LER-1991-001, :on 910107,unplanned Actuation of Group IV Isolation Logic Occurred.Caused by Incorrect Placement of Jumper.Event Incorporated in Industry Events Training for I&C Technicians

:on 910107,unplanned Actuation of Group IV Isolation Logic Occurred.Caused by Incorrect Placement of Jumper.Event Incorporated in Industry Events Training for I&C Technicians

ML20067E602
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	02/01/1991
From:	Meacham J, Reeves D NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CNSS913552, LER-91-001, LER-91-1, NUDOCS 9102150196
Download: ML20067E602 (4)

LER-1991-001, on 910107,unplanned Actuation of Group IV Isolation Logic Occurred.Caused by Incorrect Placement of Jumper.Event Incorporated in Industry Events Training for I&C Technicians

Event date:
Report date:
2981991001R00 - NRC Website

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CNSS913nS2 february 1, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Reguiatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

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Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee Event Report 91001, Revision 0, is being forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,

)wMAw J

M. Meacham (ik vision Manager of Nuclear Operations Cooper Nuclear Station JMM:bjs Attachment cc:

R. D. Martin G. R. Horn R. E. Wilbur V. L. Wolstenholm D. A. Whitman INP0 Records Center ANI Library NRC Resident Inspector R. J. Singer CNS Training CNS Quality Assurance I l 7

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Unplonned Actuation of Group VI i solat ion Du r i ng.Sur ve illanc e

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On January 7, 1991, at 1:38 pm, with the plant in operation at full power, an unplanned actuation of the Group VI Isolation logic occurred, resulting in isolation of the Secondary Containment and initiation of the Standby Cas j

Treatment (SCT) System.

The actut. tion occurred due to incorrect placement of a jumper during performance of Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5, Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Source Check, which was being performed by 160 trainees, under the supetvision of qualified 160 Technicians.

The procedure was being conducted as a regularly scheduled surveillance test and as an On.the. Job Training (CJT) exercise.

The cause of the unplanned actuai. ion was the failure of both the qualified Technician, acting as an OJT Instructor, and the trainee to refer to the

- procedure step prior to installation of the jumper.

Corrective action taken included test termination, jumper removal, reset of the Group VI Isolation, and restoracion of Reactor Building ventilation to normal.

The procedure was eviewed and determined to be satisfactory from a content and human factors standpoint.

Both the qualified I&C Technician and the trainee were counseled.

Further corrective action to be taken includes incorporation of this event in Industry Events training for 160 Technicians, wxc..n,ix.is n,

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Event Description

On January 7,1991, at 1:38 pm, an unplanned Croup VI Isolation occurred while performing surveillance testing.

Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.$,

Reector Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Source Check, was being performed as a regularly scheduled surveillance test and as an On.the. Job Training (0JT) exercise. The test had proceeded to the point where the first of the two monitors had been successfully tested, and the trairees had been reassigned to nev " stations",

In setting up for h test of the second monitor, RMP.RM 452B, the trainee in the Control Room was instructed to install a jumper at the location pointed out to him by the qualified Technician. However, neither the qualified Technician nor the trainee referred to the procedure step, nor rechecked

- their work, to ensure jumper location was correct.

In fact, the jumper was installed where it had previously been installed during testing of RMP.RM.452A.

Consequently, several steps later in the procedure, when monitor RMP.RM-452B was exposed to the source, u trip signal was

. generated in the Group VI ESP logic, resulting in isolation of Secondary Containment and initiation of the Standby Cas rre a t.mont (SGT) System.

. B,'

Plant Status I

The plant was in normal operation at full power.

- C.

Ensis for Deport An unplanned actuation of an EST (Group VI Isolation), reportable in accordance with 10CFR50,73 (a)(2)(iv).

D.

Cause

Personnel. Neither the qualified 160 Technician nor the trainee consulted the procedure step for exact jumper placement, nor rechecked their work after placement, to' ensure its installation in the correct location.

E.

Safety Significance

No significant effect.

Other than isolation of the Secondary Containment and startup of the SGT System, plant operation was unaffected. The Group VI Isolation ESF functioned as designed.

F.

Safety Two11entions

- Upon Secondary Containment isolation, ventilation to the Reactor

. Recirculation Pump Motor Generator (RRMG) Sets is lost.

If ventilation is not immediately restored, the RRMG Sets may trip due to high winding temperatures, resulting in loss of the Reactor Recire (RR) Pumps.

This consideration has a high probability of occurrence during hot weather conditions with the plant at full power.

Upon loss of the RR Pumps, a plant trip may result. Regardless, plant recovery will require that the plant be shut down, w:c e ma ine,

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Corrective Action

The surveillance test was terminated, the jumper removed, the isolation signal was reset, at.d normal Reactor Building ventilation was restored.

The procedure was reviewed and determined to be satisfactory frora a content and human factors standpoint. Following confirmation of the cause of the trip and review of the procedure, the surveillance test was satisfactorily completed.

Both the qualified Technician and the trainee were counseled regarding their failures to implement procedural requirements, rurther corrective actions to be taken includes incorporating this event in Industry Events training for 16C Technicians.

II.

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