05000298/LER-1917-001, Regarding Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
| ML17125A259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/2017 |
| From: | Higginbotham K Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS2017024 LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17125A259 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat |
| 2981917001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
H Nebraska Public Power District Alwa1s there when 1ou need us NLS2017024 April5,2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report No. 2017-001-00 Cooper Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46
Dear Sir or Madam:
The purpose of this correspondence is to forward Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00.
There are no new commitments contained in this letter.
Sincerely,
. (U1'.JLii:7jrvh~ ~ ~r.AfJ...-
Kenneth Higginbotham Vice President Nuclear-Chief Nuclear Officer
/jo Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00
. cc:
Regional Administrator w/attachment USNRC - Region IV Cooper Project Manager w/attachment USNRC - NRR Plant Licensing Branch IV Senior Resident Inspector w/attachment USNRC-CNS SRAB Administrator w/attachment COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NPG Distribution w/attachment INPO Records Center w/attachment via ICES entry SORC Chairman w/attachment CNS Records w/attachment P.O. Box 98 /Brownville, NE 68327-0098 Telephone: (402) 825-3811 /Fax: (402) 825-5211 www.nppd.com
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BYOMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
(11-2015) -
10/31/2018
/-..
, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1of3
- 4. TITLE Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR ISEQUENTIALI REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET MONTH DAY YEAR NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET 02 05 17 2017 -
001 -
00 04 05 17 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
!8l 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73. 77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
!8J 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in =
PLANT STATUS YEAR 2017 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 001 Cooper Nuclear Station was in Mode 1, Power Operations, at 100 percent power, at the time of discovery.
BACKGROUND REV NO.
- - 00 The safety objective of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system [EllS:BO] is to provide core cooling, in conjunction with other Emergency Core Cooling Systems, and to provide containment cooling as required during abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents. The RHR system consists of two heat exchangers [EllS:HX], four main system pumps [EllS:P] in two divisions, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation.
The motor-operated minimum flow valves automatically provide the necessary flow through the pump in order to prevent pump overheating. The manual isolation valves for the motor-operated minimum flow valves, RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, are normally con~igured open and sealed.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On September 29, 2016, during Refueling Outage 29 (RE29), RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were sealed closed and danger tagged in accordance with a clearance order to support the RHR Loop A Maintenance Window.
On October 7, 2016, the danger tags for RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were released and the clearance order directed that both valves be restored to their normal configuration. The danger tags were removed and seals applied to the valves. However, the valves were not opened before placing the seals. Second verification incorrectly verified that the valves were sealed open, when they were sealed closed.
A quarterly sealed valve log audit was performed on November 29, 2016, and the seals were verified to be intact. The audit required only that the seals be verified, the audit did not require the valve configuration be checked.
On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, it was discovered that RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were sealed closed. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours0.00875 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.87658e-4 months <br /> and entered Technical Specification {TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.
Subsequently, the operating crew opened RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, independently verified the position of the valves and applied seals to the valves. As such, RHR pumps A and C were declared Operable at 1041 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.961005e-4 months <br /> on February 5, 2017, and TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A were exited.
NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R 3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
Page 3of3 APPROVED BYOMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Cooper Nuclear Station 05000-298 2017 NARRATIVE BASIS FOR REPORT SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 001 REV NO.
-.00 With the minimum flow isolated since October 7, 2016, this is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). In addition, during the time frame of inoperability, Division 2 RHR had also been inoperable on various occasions resulting in both divisions of RHR being inoperable, creating a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)_
The Safety Significance, Root Cause, Corrective Actions, and Previous Events will be provided in the supplemental report_
NRG FORM 366 (06-2016)