ML19274E797

Proposes Tech Spec Changes.Changes Are Pro Forma in Nature & Have No Safety or Environ Significance.Class II Amend Fee Encl.W/Affidavit

ML19274E797
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	04/02/1979
From:	Millen C PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
To:	Gammill W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
P-79071, NUDOCS 7904240424
Download: ML19274E797 (10)

Text

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. 90x e40 0ENyER, COLOAAD0 802Ot C. K . 5111.I.I'N SEsion vice enesiorni April 2, 1979 Fo rt S t. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-79071 Mr. William P. Cammill Assistant Director for Standardization and Advanced Reactors Division of Project Management U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50-267 S UBJECT : Technical Speci fication Change LCO 4. 5.1, S R 5. 5. 2, S R 5.1. 2

Dear Mr. Cammill:

This letter is to propose the following changes to the Fo r t S t . Vrain Technical Specifications:

1) LCO 4. 5.1 and SR 5. 5. 2 (Attachment 1)

2) Basis of SR 5.1.2 (Attachment 2)

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR170, we believe that the proposed changes are amendment fee Class II since they are pro fo rma in nature and have no safety or environmental significance.

A draft in the amount of $2,400 for the fee payments is attached.

We request your concurrence with the proposed revisions as soon as possible.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. D. W. Warembourg, (303) 571-7436.

Ve ry truly yours ,

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C. K. Millen Senior Vice President \ D '$

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• t gh Enclosure 790424O N aeg

. f BEEURE TiiE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!c4ISSION In the Matter of the Facility Operating License)

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of ) Docket No. 50-267

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO )

Application for Amendment to Appendix A of Facility Operating License License No. DPR-34 0F Tile PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FOR Tile FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION This application for Amendment to Appendix A of Facility Operating License, License No. DP R-34, is submitted for NRC review and approval.

Respectfully submitted, PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COL 0lt\DO

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By G 'A - ,t,OO -u

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C. K. Millen, Senior Vice President KELLY, STANSFIELD & 0'DONNELL Bryant O'Donnel lobert E. Thompson Public Service Company Building Denver, Colorado 80202 Attorneys for Applicant

STATE OF COLORADO )

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CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER)

C. K. Fullen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says; That he is Senior Vice President of Operations of Public Service Company of Colorado, the Licensee herein; that he has read the foregoing Application for Amendment to Ap.oendix A of Facility Operating License and knows the contents thereof, and that the statements and matters cet forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

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C. K. Fullen Subscribed and sworn to before me this 'G "' day of April, 1979.

Witness my hand and of ficial seal.

My commission expires: W. /.

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,in Notary Public

ATTACHMENT 1 O

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We request a change to LOO 4. 5.1 - Reactor Building, Liniting Conditions __

for Operation, as follows:

The plant shall not be operated at power; reactor vessel internal main-tenance shall not be performed with irradiated fuel in the PCRV; or irradiated fuel handling shall not be performed within the reactor building unless :

a) Reactor Building Integrity is maintained as follows:

1. Personnel access to the building is controlled.

2. The reactor building pressure is sub-atmospheric.

3. The reactor building louvers are closed and the " pressure set point" is at 3 inches of water or 1 css, except that rea c tor building louver groups may be opened one at a time quarterly for surveillance tes ting while the reactor is at power pro-vided that the prerequisites of SR 5.5.2 are adhered to.

4. When the truck doors to the truck bay are open, the reactor floor hatch, the deck hatch, and all personnel doors in the truck bay are closed.

5. When the reactor floor hatch and/or the deck hatch cre open, the truck doors and external personnel doors in the truck bay are closed.

b) Two of the three reactor building exhaust fans are operable.

Reason for Reques ted Change The requested change to LCO 4.5.1 is necessary to allow exercising of the reactor building louvers during reactor operation.

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Basis for Requested Change The periodic exercising of the leuvers with the reactor at power will ensure their operability. No credit has been taken for the successful opera-tion of the pressure relief device (louver system) in determing the conse-quences of any postulated accident (Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.1.1).

The Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) " Rapid Depressuriza tion / Blowdown" an-alysis assumes that the primary coolant with its circulating activity escapes directly f rom the building into the atmosphere without any credit for holdup of filtration b) the ventilation system (reference Final Safey Analysis Re-port, Section 14.11). Based on the analysis, of f-site doses resulting from the Maximum Hypothetical Accident are within the limits prescribed by 10 CFR 100.

The re f o re , the consequence of the Maximum Hypothetical Accident concur-rent with opening one louver group is less than for the analyzed Maximum Hy-pothetical Accident and represents no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

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We request a change to Specification SR 5.5.2 - Reactor Building Presrture Rclief Device, Su rve_illance , as follows :

The reactor building overpressure relief system dif ferential pressure switches shall be functionCly tested on a monthly basis and calibrated annually.

The louver groups shall be individually exercised quarterly.

Quarterly louver testing may be performed while the reactor is in opera-tion only if the following prerequisites are adhered to:

1. Reactor shall be under normal eteady state operating co aitions.

j 2. Primary coolant pressure is within the normal envelope for existing l conditions.

! 3. Reactor building ventila tion system is operating per Technical Speci-fications.

4. No radioactive gas was te releases are in progress, nor is fuel handling being performed.

5. No airborne activity above background as indicated by the building activity nonitors.

6. Area radiation monitors and local alarms are operable per Technical Specifications.

7. No surveillance testing is being performed on the reattor ventila-tion system or the radiation monitoring systems.

8. Only one segment (group o f louvers) of the louver system shall be tested at any given time.

9. Communication shall exist between personnel performing the tests and the control room operators.

10. Capability shall exist to manually shut the louver panels.

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11. Testing of the louver system shall not exceed a total duration of six (6) hours in any one quarter.

12. Non-compliance with any of the above conditions will require testing to be discontinued and the louver systen will be returned to normal.

The reactor building relief (louver) system shall be exercised annually.

Reason for Requested Change The requested change to SR 5.5.2 is necessary in order to make the sur-veillance requirement consistent with LCO 4.5.1.

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s ATTACll>ENT 2

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Public Service Company of Colorado requests the following change to the Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications:

Revise the Basis for Specification SR 5.1.2 - Reserve Shutdown System Surveillance, first paragraph, last sentence to read as follows:

This dif ferential is well below the minimum 115 psi dif ferential required to burst the disc.

Reason for Chance In order to allow for tolerance variations and some non-uniformity of strength characteristics of the rupture discs, an extension beyond the cal-culated limits for the rupture disc burst pressure range mus t be considered.

The calculated burst pressure range was based on a disc of uniform thickness.

The burst pressure range has been verified to be within 165 + 50 psid. The cri:erion for minimum disc burst pressure is to assure that an inadvertent burst of the disc during in place testing does not occur. The 115 psi d.'f-ferential is selected since it is considered a safe margin above the hopper in-place test pressure of 10 psi above reactor pressure.

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