Text

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000266/2018003; 05000301/2018003; and 07200005/2018001
	ML18295A328
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/22/2018
From:	Jamnes Cameron; Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4
To:	Craven R; Point Beach
References
	IR 2018001, IR 2018003
	Download: ML18295A328 (27)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES October 22, 2018

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2018003; 05000301/2018003; AND 07200005/2018001

Dear Mr. Craven:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 11, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one Severity Level IV violation.

Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address this issue, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. Further, inspectors documented three Licensee-Identified Violations, which were determined to be of very-low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301;72-005 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 Enclosure:

IR 05000266/2018003; 05000301/2018003; 07200005/2018001 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report sections: 71111.18 Plant Modifications, 71152 Annual Sample Review, and 60855.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Perform Evaluations to Ensure that the Fabrication of Dry Cask Storage Systems Meets the Requirements of the Loading Certificate of Compliance Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable 60855.1 NCV 05000266/2018003-01; 05000301/2018003-01 Closed An NRC-identified Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified when the licensee failed to perform written evaluations to ensure that the dry cask storage systems met the fabrication requirements of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) to which they were loaded.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLANT STATUS

INSPECTION SCOPES

................................................................................................................

REACTOR SAFETY

..................................................................................................................

RADIATION SAFETY

................................................................................................................

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

............................................................................................

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

INSPECTION RESULTS

..............................................................................................................

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

............................................................................................ 14

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

......................................................................................................... 15

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 13, 2018, operators

reduced power to 60 percent to support turbine stop valve testing. Operators returned the

reactor to rated thermal power on September 14, 2018, where it remained for the remainder of

the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near rated

thermal power for the majority of the inspection period. On September 18, 2018, the unit began

coastdown for a refueling outage. The unit ended the inspection period at 91 percent power.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in

IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem

Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for severe

thunderstorms with high winds on August 28, 2018.

71111.04Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1) G-02 EDG with G-01 EDG out-of-service on August 2, 2018;

(2) Unit 2 train A safety injection after testing on August 6, 2018;

(3) Unit 1 train B Containment spray after testing on September 1, 2018; and

(4) Unit 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on September 30, 2018.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected

areas:

(1) Fire Zones 319/320, non-vital switchgear / condensate storage area, on July 27, 2018;

(2) Fire Zones 300/301/303, Unit 1 turbine building 8 foot / lube oil reservoir, on

July 27, 2018;

(3) Fire Zone 680, station auxiliary transformers, on July 27, 2018;

(4) Fire Zone 318, cable spreading room, on July 27, 2018; and

(5) Fire Zone 142, component cooling water pump room, on September 30, 2018.

Annual Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on August 30, September 11, and

September 24, 2018.

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

Internal Flooding (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the turbine-driven

auxiliary feedwater pump area on September 27, 2018.

71111.07Heat Sink Performance

Heat Sink (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the G-01 emergency diesel generator (EDG) cooling water heat

exchanger performance on July 30, 2018.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator scenario on

August 20, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated control room decorum with high workload inside the

main control room on September 20, 2018.

Operator Exams (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated requalification examination results on

September 24, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated

with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) service water valve, SW-LW-62, failure on May 23, 2018.

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent

work activities:

(1) planned maintenance on G-01 EDG;

(2) planned maintenance on 2P-11B component cooling water (CCW) pump;

(3) emergent maintenance on 2P-11A CCW; and

(4) planned maintenance on 2P-15B safety injection pump supply breaker.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality

assessments:

(1) containment airlock door failed leak rate test;

(2) 1TE-407A resistance temperature detector step change;

(3) crossover steam dump valve exceeded opening stroke time;

(4) thread engagement on service water valve limit switch assembly; and

(5) fire door not meeting NFPA 805 criteria.

71111.18Plant Modifications (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) EC 285584; NFPA 805 120VAC and 125VDC Coordination & Cable Protection.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) testing after service water pipe and valve replacement on August 1, 2018;

(2) testing after G-01 EDG maintenance on August 3, 2018;

(3) testing after G-04 EDG radiator fan switch maintenance on August 7, 2018;

(4) testing after 2P-11A CCW pump bearing and seal replacement on August 8, 2018;

(5) testing after 2P-15B safety injection pump supply breaker maintenance on

August 9, 2018;

(6) testing after G-04 diesel fuel oil day tank level switch maintenance on

September 7, 2018; and

(7) testing after resistance-to-voltage converter maintenance on September 11, 2018.

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities (Partial Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the upcoming outage schedule and shutdown safety risk for

refueling outage 2R36 activities from September 21, 2018 to September 30, 2018.

71111.22Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine (2 Samples)

(1) TS-10A, Unit 2 Containment Hatch Leak Test, on July 13, 2018; and

(2) 1ICP 02.031, 1P-53 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Header Pressure Trip

Channel Operability Test, on August 30, 2018.

In-Service (1 Sample)

(1) IT 13 Train B, 2P-11B Component Cooling Water Pump and Valves Unit 2, on

September 5, 2018.

71114.06Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Simulated Control Room

and the Technical Support Center on September 25, 2018.

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.06Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Walk Downs and Observations (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment

systems during plant walkdowns.

Calibration and Testing Program (Process and Effluent Monitors) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees gaseous and liquid effluent monitor instrument

calibration and testing.

Sampling and Analyses (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radioactive effluent sampling and analysis activities.

Dose Calculations (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated dose calculations.

71124.07Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Site Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.

Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees groundwater monitoring program.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification (6 Samples)

The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:

(1) MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems-2 Samples (July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018);

(2) MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems-2 Samples (July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018); and

(3) MS08: Heat Removal Systems-2 Samples (July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018).

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1) Action request (AR) 2267330 and AR 2268488 associated with 480-Volt electrical

cabinets being improperly classified as well-sealed in the licensees fire PRA model.

The licensees fire PRA model was developed to support the licensees transition to an

NFPA 805 licensing basis.

Biennial Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees final closed corrective actions to complete plant

physical changes and procedure changes to address the NRC-identified findings associated

with the site potential for adverse impacts associated with flooding that were originally

documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2013002 and 05000301/2013002

(ML13133A356).

OTHER ACTIVITIESTEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants

The inspector evaluated the licensees operation of the independent spent fuel

storage installation (ISFSI) on-site from June 25 to 29, 2018, and in-office through

September 19, 2018. Specifically, the inspector evaluated:

(1) the material, thermal, and radiological condition of the ISFSI and loaded storage

modules by performing a walkdown on June 27, observing the performance of

operational storage visual surveillance procedure RDW 19.11 on June 27, performing

independent radiological surveys on June 27 and 28, and reviewing the licensees

performance of radiological surveys on June 28;

(2) a heavy lift of the loaded transfer cask from the spent fuel pool to the cask processing

area on June 25 and of the Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) door installation after

placement of the Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) in the HSM on June 28;

(3) welding in accordance with procedures RP 17 Part 5 and SPM 9.7 for DSC No. 30;

(4) non-destructive evaluations of the outer top cover plate and test port plug welds for

DSC No. 30 in accordance with procedure HTPT-DSC-AREVA on June 27;

(5) processing of DSC No. 30 for storage, including performing blowdowns and vacuum

drying; and

(6) the fuel selection for DSC Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34, which were loaded in the

Summer 2018 campaign.

INSPECTION RESULTS

71111.18Plant Modifications

Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.18 - Plant Modifications

This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been

entered into the licensees corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited

Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement:

Violation: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Renewed Operating License

Condition 4.F, requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the

approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c),

National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805, as specified in the license

amendment requests and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated

September 8, 2016.

Section 1.5.1, Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria, of NFPA 805, stated in part, that fire

protection features shall be capable of providing reasonable assurance that, in the event of a

fire, the plant is not placed in an unrecoverable condition. To demonstrate this, the following

performance criteria shall be met: (a) Reactivity Control; (b) Inventory and Pressure Control;

(c) Decay Heat Removal; (d) Vital Auxiliaries; and (e) Process Monitoring.

Section 1.5.1 (d), Vital Auxiliaries, of NFPA 805, stated that vital auxiliaries shall be capable

of providing the necessary auxiliary support equipment and systems to assure that the

systems required under (a), (b), (c), and (e) are capable of performing their required nuclear

safety function.

Contrary to the above, from March 16, 2018 through April 11, 2018, the licensee failed to

ensure that vital auxiliaries were capable of providing the necessary auxiliary support

equipment and systems to assure that the systems required under (a), (b), (c), and (e) are

capable of performing their required nuclear safety function. Specifically, select 120 VAC

instrument buses, needed as a vital auxiliary, would not have been energized during certain

fire scenarios and compensatory measures were not implemented.

Significance/Severity Level: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more

than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of

Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring

the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).

The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding

did not screen to green using questions 1.5.1-A and 1.5.1-B and thus required a detailed risk

evaluation. The Senior Reactor Analyst performed walkdowns of dominant fire sequences

and conducted an onsite review of the licensee's fire calculation which confirmed that the

increase in risk due to the finding was less than 1E-6/year (Green).

Corrective Action Reference: AR 2259195

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Observation 71152 -Annual Sample Review

In June 2018, the licensee identified that electrical cabinets, which housed 480-Volt electrical

components, had been improperly classified as well-sealed in their fire PRA model that was

developed for the transition to an NFPA 805 licensing basis. This classification meant that the

licensee did not have to consider internal fires that propagate to the outside of the panel and

potentially create additional fires. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions

related to the misclassification and did not identify any additional findings or violations. One

licensee identified non-cited violation is documented below for the original misclassification of

the electrical cabinets.

Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152 -Annual Sample Review

This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been

entered into the licensees corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited

Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement:

Violation: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Renewed Operating License

Condition 4.F, requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the

approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c),

National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805, as specified in the license

amendment requests and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated

September 8, 2016.

Section 2.4.3.2, of NFPA 805, states that the PSA [Probabilistic Safety Assessment]

evaluation shall address the risk contribution associated with all potentially risk-significant fire

scenarios.

Contrary to the above, from February 14, 2017 through June 14, 2018, the licensees PSA

failed to address the risk contribution associated with all potentially risk-significant scenarios.

Specifically, the licensee improperly excluded the risk contribution from 27 electrical panels

because they had incorrectly concluded that internal fires would not propagate outside the

panel walls due to them being misclassified as well-sealed.

Significance/Severity Level: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more

than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of

Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring

the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).

The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding

did not screen to green using questions 1.5.1-A and 1.5.1-B and thus required a detailed risk

evaluation. The Senior Reactor Analyst performed walkdowns of dominant fire sequences

and conducted an onsite review of the licensee's fire calculation which confirmed that the

increase in risk due to the finding was less than 1E-6/year (Green).

Corrective Action Reference: AR 2268488

ObservationReview of Corrective Actions 71152 - Biennial Inspection

In February 2015, the NRC completed a supplemental inspection (NRC Inspection

Report 05000266/2015009; 05000301/2015009 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15077A007))

in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95002, Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone

or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to assess the licensees

evaluation of one White inspection finding that affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone.

The NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2016007; 05000301/2016007 (ADAMS Accession

Number ML13169A212) documented NRC review of all licensee-closed corrective actions

regarding potential flooding-related impacts that the NRC had not previously reviewed. That

report documented that for root cause evaluation 01883633, the NRC reviewed corrective

actions number 48, 49, 53, 58 and 62. Corrective actions that remained open and were not

closed at the time of that inspection were corrective actions number 45 and 70.

NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2018010; 05000301/2018010 (ADAMS Accession Number

ML18269A292) documented a partial biennial problem identification and resolution inspection

at Point Beach, which did not include a review of corrective actions 45 and 70. The review of

those corrective actions documented in this report completes the biennial inspection sample

requirements.

60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants

Failure to Perform Evaluations to Ensure that the Fabrication of Dry Cask Storage Systems

Meets the Requirements of the Loading Certificate of Compliance

Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable 60855.1

NCV 05000266/2018003-01;

05000301/2018003-01

Closed

An NRC-identified Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified when the licensee

failed to perform written evaluations to ensure that the dry cask storage systems met the

fabrication requirements of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) to which they were loaded.

Description:

Prior to commencing the 2018 dry fuel storage cask loading campaign at Point Beach, the

licensee had loaded 28 Standardized NUHOMS dry cask storage systems.

Table 1 and Table 2 of Appendix B of the Point Beach 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report for

NUHOMS-32PT System, Revision 16, delineate the CoC amendment to which each Dry

Shielded Canister (DSC) and Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) were fabricated and

subsequently loaded with spent nuclear fuel. Of the 28 systems loaded, 14 of the systems

contained a DSC and/or an HSM, which was fabricated to a different CoC amendment than

the CoC amendment to which that system was loaded.

These 14 affected systems were put into service by the licensee between 2004 and 2016,

and were loaded over the course of four different loading campaigns in accordance with either

Amendment 7, 8, 9, or 13 of CoC 1004. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not

performed evaluations to address any potential differences between the CoC amendments to

which the system components were fabricated and the CoC amendments to which the

systems were loaded. Although the evaluations have not been performed, neither the

licensee, the CoC holder, nor the NRC are currently aware of any significant discrepancies

between the CoCs that would have precluded the licensee from loading the systems it has.

For the 13 affected cask systems loaded between 2004 and 2009 to Amendment 7, 8, or 9 of

CoC 1004, 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)(i)(A) states that The general licensee shall: Perform written

evaluations prior to use, that establish that: conditions set forth in the Certificate of

Compliance have been met. Condition 6 of CoC 1004, Amendment 7, 8, and 9, respectively,

states that, All Standardized NUHOMS Systems must be fabricated and used in

accordance with CoC No. 1004, Amendment No. [X], where X is 7, 8, or 9, respectively.

For the 1 cask system loaded in 2016 to Amendment 13 of CoC 1004, 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(i)

states, in part, that The general licensee must: Perform written evaluations, before use . . .,

which establish that: The cask, once loaded with spent fuel . . . , will conform to the terms,

conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 72.214; Amendment 13

does not have a license condition explicitly related to fabrication, but Condition 3 of

CoC 1004, Amendment 13 requires, in part that, The Standardized NUHOMS System is

certified as described in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) and in the NRCs safety

evaluation report (SER). The Standardized NUHOMS System is a horizontal canister

system composed of a steel dry shielded canister (DSC), a reinforced concrete horizontal

storage module (HSM), and a transfer cask (TC). . . The drawings for the Standardized

NUHOMS System are contained in Appendices E, K, M, N, P, T, U, W, Y, and Z of the

FSAR. The basic components of the Standardized NUHOMS System that are important to

safety are the DSC, HSM, and TC, including the decontamination area shielding and the

support skid supplemental shielding for the OS197L TC. These components are described

in Section 4.2, Table K.2-8 (Appendix K), Table M.2-18 (Appendix M), Table P.2-17

(Appendix P), Section T.2.3 (Appendix T), Section U.2.3 (Appendix U), Section W.2.3

(Appendix W), Section Y.2.3 (Appendix Y), and Section Z.2.3 (Appendix Z) of the FSAR.

Corrective Action: The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. The

licensee plans to perform an evaluation to reconcile the fabrication of the affected systems to

the CoC to which they were loaded.

Corrective Action Reference: AR 02270406

Performance Assessment:

In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy and Inspection Manual

Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

are not subject to the Significance Determination Process and are not subject to the Reactor

Oversight Process, so violations identified at ISFSIs are assessed using traditional

enforcement. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.

Enforcement:

Violation: Prior to February 16, 2011, 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)(i)(A) stated that The general

licensee shall: Perform written evaluations prior to use, that establish that: conditions set

forth in the Certificate of Compliance have been met. Since February 16, 2011,

CFR 72.212(b)(5)(i) states, in part, that The general licensee must: Perform written

evaluations, before use . . ., which establish that: The cask, once loaded with spent fuel . . . ,

will conform to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed

in 72.214.

Contrary to the above, for 14 dry cask storage systems loaded between 2004 and 2016 the

licensee failed to perform written evaluations before use to show that the systems, which

were fabricated to a different CoC amendment than the CoC amendment to which they were

loaded, would meet the conditions of the applicable loading CoC.

Severity: The inspector determined that this violation of NRC requirements is more than

minor as the failure to perform evaluations affects 14 dry cask storage systems loaded over 4

loading campaigns to 4 different CoC amendments and was not an isolated occurrence. This

more than minor determination was informed by Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612

Appendix E, Example 4.a.

The inspector assessed the significance of the violation using the NRC Enforcement Policy

and Enforcement Manual. Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the

Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation

Examples, it should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety

significance; and (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The

inspector found no similar violations in the violation examples. The inspector determined that

this violation is of low safety significance (Severity Level IV) as the NRC is not currently aware

of any significant discrepancies that would prevent the licensee from performing the required

written evaluations.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 60855.1

This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee, has been entered

into the licensees corrective action program, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation,

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.150 states The licensee . . . shall prescribe activities affecting

quality by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the

circumstances and shall require that these instructions, procedures, and drawings be

followed.

Contrary to the above, on June 5 and 6, 2018, the licensee failed to follow procedures for an

activity affecting quality. Specifically, during a dry run in the primary auxiliary building (PAB)

over the spent fuel pool (SFP), the pin lock for the pin which engages the Point Beach pool

lift yoke to the PAB overhead crane was not correctly engaged when lifting the transfer

cask (TC) out of the pool. After the TC was set down in the decon area, the lift yoke was

then left unattended over the SFP over spent fuel. This is not in accordance with procedure

RP 17 Part 4, Revision 26, Step 5.1.4 for engagement of the pin lock, and not in accordance

with procedure MA-AA-212-1000, Revision 16, Step 4.5.3 for leaving a load suspended and

unattended.

Severity Level: The inspector determined the violation was more than minor, as informed by

Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix E, Example 4.k., in that there was a credible

load drop scenario that could impact safety-related equipment.

In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy and IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue

Screening, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations are not subject to the Significance

Determination Process and are not subject to the Reactor Oversight Process, so violations

identified at ISFSIs are assessed using traditional enforcement.

Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the Enforcement Manual, if a violation does

not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a

severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and (2) informed by similar

violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The inspector found no similar violations in

the violation examples. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV in that there

was no load drop, and that the weight of any load on the pin would contribute to opposing any

potential movement of the pin.

Corrective Action Reference: AR 02267334

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public

disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

On August 16, 2018, the inspector presented the radiation protection program inspection

results to Mr.

E. Schultz, Licensing Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

On September 19, 2018, the inspector presented the independent spent fuel storage

installation inspection results to Mr.

R. Craven, Site Director, and other members of the

licensee staff.

On September 24, 2018, the inspector discussed the completed 2018 Licensed Operator

Requalification Program annual operating test and biennial written examination inspection

results with Mr.

A. Fahrenkrug, Operations Training Supervisor.

On October 11, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to

Mr. R. Craven and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

- AOP-13C; Severe Weather Condition; Revision 46

- NOAA-NWS-Alerts; Severe Thunderstorm Watch; 08/27/2018

71111.04Equipment Alignment

- AR 2271678; ISFSI Indication Unexpectedly Alarmed

- AR Search; Subject: Misposition; Search Dates: 04/01 - 08/21/2018

- CL 11A G-02; G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist; Revision 32

- CL 13E Part 2; Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Motor Driven; Revision 56

- CL 7A; Safety Injection System Checklist Unit 2 Modes 1, 2 and 3; Revision 35

- Drawing 110E017, Sheet 2; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 66

- Drawing 110E017, Sheet 3; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 48

- Drawing 110E035, Sheet 1; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 56

- Drawing 110E035, Sheet 2; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 59

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 322B; Elementary Wiring Diagram Containment Spray

Pump 1P-014B; Revision 2

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 788; Elementary Wiring Diagram 1ROV-836A, 1ROV-836B;

Revision 8

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 829B; Elementary Wiring Diagram Diesel Generator Day Tank Inlet

Secondary Isolation FD-3931; Revision 4

- Drawing E-6, Sheet 2; Single Line Diagram 125 Volt D.C. System; Revision 23

- Drawing M-209, Sheet 12; P&ID Emergency Diesel Air Starting System; Revision 23

- Drawing M-219, Sheet 1; P&ID Fuel Oil System; Revision 50

- Drawing M-219, Sheet 2; P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 16

- Drawing M-2217; P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System, Unit 2; Revision 7

- MDB 3.2.6 2B32; 480 V AC Motor Control Centers; Revision 21

- TLB 10; Refueling Water Storage Tank; Revision 7

- TLB 17; Safety Injection Accumulators 1(2) T-34 A/B ; Revision 9

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

- AR 1884019; NFPA-805 Commitments; 06/20/2013

- AR 2117918; Identify Appendix R and NFPA 805 Fire Rounds; 03/16/2016

- AR Search; Fire Drill; 01/02/2018 - 09/28/2018

- Card Log Report; Doors 27 and 28; 07/27/2018 - 07/30/2018

- Fire Drill Scenario; Crew E; 3rd Quarter 2018

- FPTE 2016-009; Point Beach Nuclear Plant Detailed Fire Modeling Report - Fire

Compartment 142GRP, Component Cooling Water Pump Room, El. 8-0; Revision 0

- NP 4.2.32; Respiratory Protection Program; Revision 17

- PBF-2058A; Fire Round Performance Sheet-Turbine Hall and Miscellaneous Areas; 7/30/2018

- PC 74; Conducting and Evaluating Fire Drills; Revision 22; Completed on 9/16/2018

- PC 75 Part 1; Monthly and Turnaround Maintenance for the Scott 4.5 Self-Contained

Breathing Apparatus; Revision 32

- PC 75 Part 2; Monthly Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory; Revision 19

- PFP-0-CB; Pre-Fire Plan, Control Building; Revision 0

- PFP-0-PAB-8; Pre-Fire Plan, Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8 and Below; Revision 0

- PFP-0-PAS; Pre-Fire Plan, Protected Area South; Revision 0

- PFP-1-TB 26; Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 1 Turbine Hall Building Elevation 26; Revision 0

- PFP-1-TB 8; Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 1 Turbine Hall Building Elevation 8; Revision 0

- RP-AA-100; Radiation Protection Administrative Program; Revision 8

- WO 40540625; TS-78 Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Non-TS Surveillance; 8/18/2017

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

- AOP-13C; Severe Weather Conditions; Revision 47

- Calculation 2014-0007; Allowable Flood Levels; Revision 3

- Drawing M-165; Turbine Building Floor/Equipment Drains - Area 3 El. 8 Ft.; Revision 8

- NP 8.4.17; PBNP Flooding Program; Revision 31

- RMP 9422; Circulating Water Pumphouse and Turbine Hall Barrier Placement; Revision 2

71111.07Heat Sink Performance

- NP 3.2.7; Service/Circulating Water Monitoring and Biofouling Program; Revision 5

- ER-AA-123; NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water Program; Revision 2

- GL 89-13 Program Document; Revision 17

- WO 40453347; HX-055A; GL 89-13 Open/Inspect/Clean G-01 EDG Coolant HX; 8/24/2018

- WO 40552718; PC-43.3 Clean Unit 1 Turbine BLDG Service Water Strainers; 5/21/2018

- AR 2249144; HX-55B, G-02 Coolant HX, Foreign Material; 2/12/2018

- AR 2249167; Piece Missing Out of F-222 North Strainer Basket; 2/12/2018

- AR 2237108; Plan Needed For 1HX-12B, CC HX, SW Side Blowdown; 11/21/2018

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

- AD-AA-100-1006; Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence; Revision 15

- OP-AA-100-1000; Conduct of Operations; Revisions 24 and 25

- PBN LOC 000 051E; NRC Annual Operating Exam; Revision 2

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

- AR 1737439; SW-LW-061; Did Not Stroke Shut During IT 72; 2/23/2012

- AR 2132481; SW-LW-62 Did Not Indicate Open During IT 72; 05/18/2016

- AR 2157724;SW-LW-062 Has Sheared Key on Shaft; 09/23/2016

- AR 2157730; SW-LW-062 Has Sheared Key on Valve Sharp; 09/23/2016

- AR 2249653; Received an Out-of-Tolerance Report for M&TE (MCAT-006); 02/15/2018

- AR 2264123; The Use of M&TE Without Signing it Out in Winventory; 05/14/018

- AR 2264246; M&TE Coordinator Failed to Recognize OOT on Accelerometers; 05/15/2018

- AR 2265466; SW-SW-62 Timing Shut Issue; 05/23/2018

- AR 2265474; Limit Switch Issue See AR# 02265466; 05/23/2018

- AR QA Record; AR 2185771; P-32E Flow was Within the Alert Range During IT-7E;

03/21/2017

- AR Search Report; CR; All; 07/13/2005-07/13/2018

- AR Search Report; SW-LW; 07/13/2000-07/13/2018

- Drawing 12137 ESK-11A; Schematic Diagram 120V. A.C. Misc. CKTS. Sh.1 Solenoid

Operated Valves (DWG# 12137-ESK-11A); Revision 21

- Drawing 12137 ESK-3A; Control Switch Contact; Revision 8

- EN-AA-203-1001-F03; Past Operability/Functionality Review (POR) Form; Revision 10:

AR 2265466; SW-LW-62 Timing Shut Issue; 07/19/2018

- EVT-SW-2018-31823; SW-LW-62 Timing Shut Issue; 6/7/2018

- PI-AA-100-1007-F01; Equipment Failure Investigation Checklist; Revision 12; SW-LW-62

Timing Shut Issue; 06/12/2018

- WO 40466904-04; SW-LW-62/Did Not Indicate Open During IT 72; 10/05/2016

- WO 40591514-01; SW-LW-062=S/SW-LW-62 Continued to Cycle When; 03/14/2018

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

- AR 2275000; Door 3 G-01 South Door Latch Found Stuck Retracted Into Door; 08/06/2018

- Current Risk Summary Report; PBN Unit 1 (V.10) and PBN Unit 2 (V.10);

07/30/2018-08/02/2018

- Current Risk Summary Report; PBN Unit 1 (V.10) and PBN Unit 2 (V.10);

08/05/2018-08/06/2018

- Current Risk Summary Report; PBN Unit 1 (V.10) and PBN Unit 2 (V.10); 08/08/2018

- Historical Risk Data Report; PBN Unit 1 (V.10) and PBN Unit 2 (V.10); 07/29/2018-08/10/2018

- NP 10.3.7; On-Line Safety Assessment; Revision 41

- Station Logs; 07/30/2018-08/02/2018

- Station Logs; 08/06/2018-08/10/2018

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

- 1ICP 02.001BL; Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features Blue Channel Analog

Day Surveillance Test; Revision 24

- 1ICP 04.001A; Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Racks Temperature Measurements

(Th &Tc) Refueling Calibration; Revision 13

- AR 2267476; Lack of Thread Engagement on SW-LW-62 Limit Switch Assembly; 06/07/2018

- AR 2271138; 2C2-D1 Containment Door Leakage During TS-10A (Unit 2); 07/06/2018

- AR 2277437; OTDT AND OPDT Rod Stop / Runback Settings; 8/24/2018

- AR 2279459; Unit 1 Blue Channel Delta T Deviation and Blue Channel Tavg Alarm

Indications; 9/13/2018

- AR 2280074; 10S-DV-3 Failed Time to Open; 09/12/2018

- AR 2281062; Door #3 Not Meeting Criteria as a Fire Door; 09/19/2018

- CN-CPS-08-1; Point Beach Unit 1 Overtemperature Delta T and Overpower Delta T Loop

Scaling Calculations; Revision 13

- Drawing 10668 BD-15, Sheet 1; Block Diagram - Instrument Reactor Control System Rod

Control; Revision 14

- Drawing 10668 BD-4, Sheet 1; Block Diagram - Instrument Reactor Protection System Loop

B-1; Revision 12

- Drawing 10668 CD-6, Sheet 1; Wiring Diagram - Interconnect Reactor Protection System

Rack 1-B1 (1C116) Top; Revision 15

- Drawing 541F091, Sheet 1; P&ID Reactor Coolant System; Revision 55

- Drawing SK-E-EC290522-2; EC 290522 Loop B Hot & Cold Leg Narrow Range RTD Block

Diagram; Revision 00A

- EN-AA-203-1201-F02; Revision 4; 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Form; EC 291953 / POD

AR 2279459; Compensatory Measure to Re-Establish the Margin to Trip For U1 Blue Channel;

9/13/2018

- ICP 10.036 Bypass Manifold RTD Swap; Revision 5

- RMP 9011-1; NFPA 805 Fire, Flood, and HELB Door Inspections; Revision 25

- Station Logs; 9/8/2018-9/10/2018

- Station Logs; 9/8/2018-9/11/2018

- WO 40621436; U1 PPCS Alaram For TSM6131B Delta T Deviation @ -3 DEGF; 9/9/2018

71111.18Plant Modifications

- AR 2259195; Mods Do Not Completely Resolve MOD-26-3 for NFPA 805; 04/11/2018

- Calculation No. 2016-0011; 120V AC Vital Instrument Panel Circuit 1Y-04-12 Coordination;

Revision 00

- Drawing 6118 E-6, Sheet 1; Single Line Diagram 125V DC Dist. System; Revision 66

- Drawing E-1020E-B; Wiring Diagram Main Control Board Section C01 Front Vertical Section -

CPR24S; Revision 23

- Drawing E-1628E-A; Wiring Diagram Main Control Board Section C01 - Rear - CPR27AB0;

Revision 32

- Drawing E-1633E-B; Wiring Diagram Main Control Board Section C01 - Rear; Revision 21

- Drawing E-7; Connection Diagram 120V AC Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 1Y-04;

Revision 4

- EC 285584; NFPA 805 - 120VAC Cable Protection and 125VDC Fuse Coordination

- FPTE 2016-003; NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment; Revision 0

- PBN-BFJR-18-039; Point Beach MOD 26 Risk Significance; Revision 0

- WO 40462925-01; EC 285584 Install Fuses to Control/Computer Room; 03/22/2017

- WO 40462925-31; EC 285584 Install Fuses to Control/Computer Room; 10/14/2017

- WO 40462925-33; EC 285584 Install Fuses to Control/Computer Room; 09/28/2017

- WO 40462925-44; EC 285584 Install Fuses to Control/Computer Room; 10/15/2017

- WO 40462925-45; EC 285584 Install Fuses to Control/Computer Room; 10/14/2017

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

- 2RMP 9329-2; 2P-15B Safety Injection Pump Motor Relay Testing and Calibration;

Revision 17

- ABB Bulletin;41-181S; Types GKC, GKT Ground Fault Relay Systems; 01/1991

- AR 2234499; 1P-11B Alignment: MCRP-005 Rotalign Inaccurate Results; 11/02/2017

- AR 2267603; Uncredited LS-02408A Discovered Damaged After PMT; 6/07/2018

- AR 2268152; Air Line Left Unconnected During Maintenance; 06/13/2018

- AR 2269578; Limit Switch Re-Installed Incorrectly During Maintenance; 06/22/2018

- AR 2271409; As Left Flow Direction Not Documented; 7/9/2018

- AR 2271420; NRC Question Regarding Documentation Within WO 40539550

- AR 2273218; P-35B Did Not Secure as Described in WO 40572023 in Manual; 07/24/2018

- AR 2274573; G-01 Fuel Injector #1 and #20 were Found Locked Up; 08/03/2018

- AR 2274784; G-04 Jacket Water and Radiator Temps Outside Normal Bands; 08/05/2018

- AR 2274795; G-04 Engine Temperature Control During Extended Run; 08/05/2018

- AR 2274796; AR to Generate WR (G-04 TS-3343B)

- AR 2274935; New Switch Required Rewiring for Use in Plant; 08/06/2018

- AR 2275001; High Resistance Found on Switch Contacts; 08/06/2018

- AR 2275002; 2P-11A CC Pump Outboard Seal Leak; 08/06/2018

- AR 2275029; As Found Alignment Out of Tolerance CCW Pump; 08/07/2018

- AR 2275110; Extent of Condition on G094 Radiator Fan Fail to Operate; 08/07/2018

- AR 2275548; Spare Relay Damaged During Cal Validation for PM Replacement; 08/09/2018

- AR 2275680; TD Relay Replacement WO Questions; 08/10/2018

- AR 2277914; WO Note Referenced Incorrect WO To Branch To; 8/29/2018

- AR QA Record; AR 2274044; WO 40564534 Seismic Piping Review Required; 08/02/2018

- CN-CPS-08-1; Point Beach Unit 1 Overtemperature Delta T and Overpower Delta T Loop

Scaling Calculations; Revision 13

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 226; Schematic Diagram 4160V SWGR Bus 1-A06 (2-A06) Feeder

Breaker 1A52-85 (2A52-88) to Safety Injection Pumps 1P-15B (2P-15B); Revision 11

- Drawing 6118 E-2011, Sheet 4; Three Line Diagram EDG G-04 4160V Bus 2-A06 Relay &

Metering; Revision 12

- Drawing 6118 M-207, Sheet 1A; P&ID Service Water; Revision 42

- Drawing 6118 M-219, Sheet 3; P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 17

- Drawing 6704-C-323105; Schematic Diagram 480V MCC 1B-40 (2B-40) Radiator Fan;

Revision 8

- IB 7.1.1.7-11 Issue B; Type GKC Ground Relay Without Sensor Test Feature, Type GKT

Ground Relay With Sensor Test Feature, For Use With GS Ground Sensors; 02/1987

- It 13 Train A; 2P-11A, Component Cooling Water Pump and Valves Unit 2; Revision 10;

Completed 08/08/2018

- Maintenance Schedule; G-01 EDG; 8/01/2018

- NP 7.4.3; Post-Maintenance NDE Requirements for Power Piping; Revision 16

- OI 35A: Standby Emergency Power Alignment; Revision 16; Completed 09/07/2018

- Report 10CFR21-0115; 10CFR21 Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliance; Component

EMD Fuel Injector P/N 40084720; 1/6/2017

- RMP 9043-17A; Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Post-Maintenance Run and Testing;

Revision 11

- Station Logs; 08/05/2018-08/08/2018

- STPT 21.1, Sheet 110; Protective Relay Setpoints: Safety Injection Pump 2P-15B -

Cubicle 88; Revision 4

- WO 40488215-08; G-01/Replace 13 Square D Time Delay Relays on G-01; 08/02/2018

- WO 40500502-03; Group C Mechanical Maintenance Items Inspection; 08/03/2018

- WO 40500502-04; Group C Mechanical Maintenance Items Inspection; 08/03/2018

- WO 40522713-01; 2A52-88 - Calibrate and Test 2P-15B Breaker Relays; 08/09/2018

- WO 40522713-03; 2A52-88 - Calibrate and Test 2P-15B Breaker Relays; 08/09/2018

- WO 40530913; EC 288954: Install Jumper/ABB Link and Wiring Modifications at 50G Current

Transformer Inside Rear Compartment of Bus 2A06, Spare Cubicle-88; 08/09/2018

- WO 40530913; EC 288954: Install New GKC 50G Relay and Wiring Modifications in Bus

2A06, Cubicle-88, Due to a Part-21 Issue With the Existing 50G/A52-85 Relay; 08/09/2018

- WO 40530913-03; EC 2888954: Repl Relay 50G/A/52-88 & Jumper T-S1 on Gnd; 08/06/2018

- WO 40539550-01; GT-92 Leaks by the Shut Seat; 5/02/2018

- WO 40564534; Piping HB-19 - UT Inspection Upstream of FP-03741; 05/01/2018

- WO 40601426-02; LS-3991B/Replace the Flip-Pak to Allow Testing; 09/06/2018

- WO 40607513; 2P-011A; Replace Inboard and Outboard Seal and Bearings; 6/15/2018

- WO 40615975-04; AR to Generate WR (G04 TS-3343B); 08/07/2018

- WO 40616036-01; W-181B3-CS/High Resistance Found on Switch; 08/07/2018

- WO 40621436; U1 PPCS Alarm For TSM6131B Delta T Deviation @ -3 DEGF; 9/9/2018

- WP 2018-24; PMT Testing of LS-3991B, T-176B G-04 EDG FO Day Tank High/Low Level

Switch WO40601426-04; 09/07/2018

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities

- U2R36 Outage Safety Review Supporting Documentation; Revision 1

- U2R36 SDS Risk Profile Based on 9/24/18 Schedule; 09/27/2018

- Various U2R36 Schedules (First 100 Hours, Critical Path, Executive Summary)

71111.22Surveillance Testing

- 1ICP 02.031; 1P-53 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Header Pressure Trip Channel

Operability Test; Revision 6

- AR 2246333; Unexpected U2 Cont Press Channel Alert Alarm During Testing; 01/25/2018

- AR 2272958; Unexpected U2 Cont Press Channel Alert Alarm During Testing; 07/20/2018

- AR 2274644; Specified PMT Procedure Not Performed Prior to WO Closure; 8/3/2018

- AR 2278154; Procedure Step Performed Out of Sequence; 8/30/2018

- AR 2278976; Unit 1 Flux Map Detector C Drift Unacceptable; 9/5/2018

- AR 2280185; Unexpected Alarm During 2ICP 02.003A Testing; 9/13/2018

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 1310; Elementary Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Feed Pump 1P-53

Suction Pressure Trip; Revision 0

- Drawing 499B466, Sheet 1800; Elementary Wiring Diagram 1P-053 AFW Pump Service Water

Suction Valve 1AF-4067; Revision 0

- Drawing 62550 CD1-35; Connection Diagram Instrument Rack 1C173A-F; Revision 0

- IT 13 Train B; 2P-11B, Component Cooling Water Pump and Valves Unit 2; Revision 9

- SCR 2016-0148; Revise IT 13 Train B (and IT 13A) for 2P-11B Component Cooling Water

Pump IST Acceptance Criteria; October 4, 2016

- STPT 14.11; Auxiliary Feedwater Setpoint Document; Revision 29

- TS 10A Unit 2; Containment Airlock Door Seal Testing Unit 2; Revision 34

71114.06Drill Evaluation

- AR 2250961; 2018 WANO EP Drill Missed DEP Opportunity; 2/22/2018

- AR 2282119; 3Q18 EP Drill DEP Failure; 09/25/2018

- AR Search; DEP opportunity; 9/1/2017 - 9/28/2018

- AR Search; EP Drill; 9/1/2017 - 9/28/2018

- Emergency Preparedness 3rd Quarter 2018 EP Drill; Revision 0

- EPIP 2.1 Attachment B; Nuclear Accident Reporting Form (NARS) for NUE; 09/25/2018

- EPIP 2.1 Attachment B; Nuclear Accident Reporting Form (NARS) for Alert; 09/25/2018

71124.06Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

- AR 02147034; Unit 2 Façade Sump Detectable Tritium Since 4/2/2016; 07/31/2016

- AR 02184778; ODCM R19 Draft Gaseous Effluent Set Point Problem; 02/09/2017

- AR 02205052; DAVS ISO OOS Time is Beyond the ODCM Recommended 30 Days;

05/15/2017

- AR 02251093; ABVS Isokinetic Stack Sampling System Removed From Service; 02/23/2018

- CAMP 031; Preparation of Batch Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Permits Using RETSCODE

Software; Revision 17

- HPIP 3.51.1; Radiological Sampling For Release Accountability; Revision 39

- HPIP 3.52.2; Containment Forced Vent/Purge/Confined Space Sample From RE-211/212

Cubicle; Revision 11

- LICA-02262858; NRC Radiation Protection Inspection Assessment; 07/09/2018

- OP 9C; Containment Venting and Purging Unit 1; Revision 15

- Point Beach Nuclear Plant Offsite Dose Calculation Manual; Revision 20

- Point Beach Unit 1 RMS System Health Report; 07/25/2018

- Point Beach Unit 2 RMS System Health Report; 07/25/2018

- RAM 2.2; Unplanned/Unscheduled Radioactive Liquid Release Calculation; Revision 12

- Release ID 18-00024L; B-WDT; 05/18/2018

- Release ID 18-00027L; A-MT; 05/26/2018

- Release ID 18-00076G; U1 Containment Vent; 07/11/2018

- WO 4046911301; RM-SPING-23 Calibration; 2/10/2018

- WO 4046911302; RM-SPING-23 Pre-Calibration; 2/10/2017

71124.07Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

- AR 02215240; Escalation of Inland Met Tower OOS - PWE; 07/14/2017

- AR 02220174; Fish Not Labeled as per OI 38; 08/14/2017

- AR 02255756; AR To Generate WO To Install Inland Met Tower Cooms EC; 03/23/2018

- AR 02269351; Environmental Sample Issues at E-02; 06/21/2018

- HPCAL 1.33; F and J Specialty Model DF-1 Low Volume Air Sampler Maintenance and

Calibration Record; Air Sampler SN: Env-11014; 08/02/2018

- HPCAL 1.33; F and J Specialty Model DF-1 Low Volume Air Sampler Maintenance and

Calibration Record; Air Sampler SN: Env-11017; 07/31/2018

- HPCAL 1.33; F and J Specialty Model DF-1 Low Volume Air Sampler Maintenance and

Calibration Record; Air Sampler SN: Env-11013; 07/31/2018

- HPIP 3.58.1; Radiological Environmental Sampling; Revision 10

- HPIP 3.58; Groundwater and Sub Soil Tritium Sampling; Revision 27

- LICA-02262858; NRC Radiation Protection Inspection Assessment; 07/09/2018

- Point Beach Nuclear Plant Offsite Dose Calculation Manual; Revision 20

71151Performance Indicator Verification

- AR Searches; Systems: 4160 Volt System, 480 Volt System, Diesel Air, Diesel Generator;

7/1/2017 - 6/30/2018

- AR Searches; Systems: Component Cooling Water, Service Water; 7/1/2017 - 6/30/2018

- AR Searches; Systems: Safety Injection; 7/1/2017 - 6/30/2018

- MSPI Derivation Reports; High Pressure Injection, Emergency AC, Cooling Water;

Unavailability Index; Units 1 and 2; July 2017 - June 2018

- MSPI Derivation Reports; High Pressure Injection, Emergency AC, Cooling Water;

Unreliability Index; Units 1 and 2; July 2017 - June 2018

- Point Beach Maintenance Rule Data Tracking Logs; Reliability, Availability; 7/1/2017 -

6/30/2018

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

- AR 2266512; 2B-49 Breaker Panel Missing Front Panel Holddown Screw; 5/31/2018

- AR 2267330; NFPA 805 Potentially Incorrect Assessed Ignition Source; 6/6/2018

- AR 2268488; Well Sealed Cabinet Review - Extent of Condition; 6/14/2018

- AR 2268961; RMP-9057 Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance; 6/19/2018

- CR 01883633-45; Internal Flooding Strategy (95002-7); 06/28/2018

- CR 01883633-70; Revise DBD T-41 Module A for Internal Flooding; 08/09/2018

- FPTE 2016-021; Point Beach Detailed Fire Modeling Report - Fire Compartment 305;

Revision 0

- PBN-BFJR-18-045; Fire Modeling Select Electrical Panels at Point Beach; Revision 0

- UFSAR Appendix A-7; Plant Flooding; Revision 2018

60855.1Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

- 2016 Annual Monitoring Report NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Point Beach Nuclear Plant;

04/28/2017

- ALARA Package No.: 18-R0006; 2018 Dry Cask Storage Campaign (6 Canisters); Revision 0

- AR 02196919-04; Level 1 Core Business Assessment Report Guideline: 2018 ISFSI Dry Fuel

Storage Campaign Preparation; 05/10/2018

- AR 02266329; Level 2 Independent Assessment Plan: ISFSI Campaign Readiness;

05/29/2018

- AR 02267334; Problems Identified During Dry Fuel Storage Second Dry Run; 06/06/2018

- AR 02270036; AMP in Truckbay for DFS Found Not Responding Correctly; 06/27/2018

- AR 02270406; Differences Between Fabrication and Loaded CoCs; 06/28/2018

- AR 02270447; ISFSI Tech Spec Table Interpretations; 06/29/2018