Text

Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000266/2024011 and 05000301/2024011
	ML24256A032
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/18/2024
From:	April Nguyen; NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Durbin M; Point Beach
References
	EPID I-2024-011-0038 IR 2024011
	Download: ML24256A032 (1)
	v • d • e

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2024011 AND 05000301/2024011

Dear Michael Durbin:

On September 10, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach and discussed the results of this inspection with Kim Locke, Principal Engineering Analyst. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach.

September 18, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, April M. Nguyen, Team Leader Palisades Restart Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000266 and 05000301 License Numbers:

DPR-24 and DPR-27 Report Numbers:

05000266/2024011 and 05000301/2024011 Enterprise Identifier:

I-2024-011-0038 Licensee:

Nextera Energy Facility:

Point Beach Location:

Two Rivers, WI Inspection Dates:

July 15, 2024, to September 10, 2024 Inspectors:

M. Garza, Acting Team Lead J. Masse, Resident Inspector R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer A. Price, Resident Inspector Approved By:

April M. Nguyen, Team Leader Palisades Restart Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000266,05000301/2024011-01 Open/Closed

[H.1] -

Resources 71152B The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to follow the Corrective Action Program procedure, PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, to correct a procedural deficiency on Environmental Qualification (EQ) engineering change reviews.

Specifically, corrective actions to update the EQ program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews, and to brief the engineering staff on the issue, were not initiated per the corrective action program procedure.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

Main article: IP 71152

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.

Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). The corrective actions for the following non-cited violations were evaluated as part of the assessment: NCV 2022003-01, NCV 2022011-01, NCV 2022404-06, NCV 2023010-03, NCV 2023401-01, and NCV 2023404-02

Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.

Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.

Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensees implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and was appropriately entering these issues into the CAP. The team determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP in a timely manner and with adequate information.

The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of the organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. Any identified deficiencies or improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution.

The team performed a 5-year review of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). As part of this review, the team reviewed plant health reports, selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The team also performed a system walkdown to assess the material condition of system piping, selected components, and surrounding areas. The team concluded that, in general, deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold.

Corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.

The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues of significance in problem identification.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The issue screening team and the management review committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. In addition, the team observed a healthy dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues.

The inspectors also did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations, or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP. In general, the licensee thoroughly evaluated issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of condition evaluations commensurate with their safety, security, and radiological significance in accordance with their CAP procedure.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of evaluations were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations and issues that were previously identified by the NRC. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely.

During their inspection, the team identified two issues related to implementation of corrective actions that needed to be dispositioned in the significance determination program because they potentially constituted more-than-minor safety significance. The evaluation of these issues are described in more detail in the section below.

Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees performance in the use of operating experience (OE) was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written, and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Overall, OE lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues of significance with the use of operating experience.

Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The team did not identify any issues of significance in the area of self-assessments and audits.

During the inspection, the team identified one issue related to corrective actions as a result of a self-assessment identified deficiency that that needed to be dispositioned in the significance determination program. The evaluation of this issue is described in more detail in the section below.

Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment Based on a review of documents and interviews with licensee staff, the team did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment. The team reviewed the results from recent safety culture self-assessments and had a discussion with the site Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Coordinator. The team also conducted one-on-one interviews with 25 licensee staff concerning the effectiveness of the CAP, the ability to raise issues, and the freedom from potential retaliation for raising issues. In general, the licensees staff was aware of and familiar with the CAP and other processes, such as the ECP, to raise nuclear safety concerns. Licensee staff indicated they could raise safety concerns without a fear of retaliation. Through the interviews and document reviews, the team did not identify, nor were any examples provided, of retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns. The staff interviewed believed that operational issues and issues with high safety significance were being appropriately addressed in a timely manner. The team did not identify any issues of significance in the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000266,05000301/2024011-01 Open/Closed

[H.1] -

Resources 71152B The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to follow the Corrective Action Program procedure, PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, to correct a procedural deficiency on Environmental Qualification (EQ) engineering change reviews.

Specifically, corrective actions to update the EQ program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews, and to brief the engineering staff on the issue, were not initiated per the corrective action program procedure.

Description:

During a review of the Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program for subsequent license renewal in 2022, the licensee identified that their EQ testing and analyses for the safety-related instrument cables to/from five EQ transmitters did not bound the postulated high energy line break conditions in all areas where these cables were routed. The licensee took immediate and long-term corrective actions to address the specific cabling issues.

However, during their evaluation of the deficiency, the licensee Organizational Effectiveness Investigation (OR) identified that the current EQ engineering change review process was too narrow and only focused on components installed in their specific locations. Specifically, licensee procedure, ER-AA-112, Environmental Qualification Program, did not provide a detailed standard for EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables potentially impacted by the change.

Per procedure PI-AA-101-100, Condition Reporting, Attachment 4, Guidance on the Classification of Condition Reports, a gap in program design or implementation of a 10 CFR 50 Appendix B or other regulatory required program, is a condition adverse to quality and is required to be corrected. To correct this specific procedural gap, which was a condition adverse to quality, the licensee prescribed corrective actions (CAs) to review the OR investigation as a case study with the fleet EQ engineering group and to update the program procedure, ER-AA-112, to include a detailed standard for more comprehensive EQ engineering change reviews. The licensees Management Review Committee, whose primary function was to provide oversight of corrective action program implementation, which included the review of new corrective actions, approved the OR and the CAs on February 15, 2023. However, the two prescribed CAs were not initiated in the Corrective Action Program and, as such, no actions were implemented to correct the procedure deficiency or to share the case study until the inspectors inquired about the status of these items on August 6, 2024.

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated a condition report to correct the procedure deficiency, share learnings in a case study, and to conduct an extent of condition review for proper initiation of corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: AR 2492210

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to follow the Condition Reporting procedure, PI-AA-101-100, to correct a condition adverse to quality related to safety-related EQ engineering change reviews.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of a detailed standard for safety-related EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables of EQ components for potential impacts from engineering changes could result in safety-related cables not being able to withstand postulated environmental conditions along their routing.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to Green because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that procedure, ER-AA-112, Environmental Qualification Program, for EQ engineering change reviews was adequate to support nuclear safety since it lacked a detailed standard for safety-related EQ engineering change reviews to consider respective power, control, or instrument cables of EQ components for potential impact from engineering changes, and this could result in safety-related cables not being able to withstand postulated environmental conditions along their routing.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Work Request Was Not Performed Minor Performance Deficiency: On November 30, 2022, emergency diesel generator (EDG)

G-04 experienced a lock-out while in standby and was declared inoperable. The cause of the lock-out was due to spurious actuation of a differential current relay. The relay was replaced with a spare, and the old relay was sent to the vendor for analysis. The analysis found no anomalies and concluded that the actuation was an isolated incident. After reviewing the issue, the station generated work requests (WRs) to replace the differential current relays on both the G-03 and G-04 EDGs with newly manufactured relays. These work requests were generated as a conservative enhancement. They were not generated to correct a condition adverse to quality nor were the work requests necessary for EDG reliability. Specifically, the installed differential current relays at the time of the failure, along with the newly installed spare relay, were not at the end of their vendor recommended life; however, the corrective action was generated to ensure that aging issues would not be a concern. The inspectors reviewed the WRs associated with the replacement of these relays and noted that the WRs were marked completed. However, the workers only validated the date the relays were last replaced but did not replace them. The G-01 and G-02 EDGs do not have these relays installed as a part of their design and did not require a similar relay replacement.

Licensee procedure MA-AA-201, Minor Maintenance Process, section 4.0, step 7.A, states in part, performance of work will be in accordance with the Minor Work Request.

WR 94248769 states a replacement of the 87/G-04 relay should be performed with a new more recently manufactured relay to prevent any potential issues related to aging of the relay. WR 94248770 states a replacement of the 87/G-03 relay should be performed with a new more recently manufactured relay. Neither the 87/G-04 nor the 87/G-03 relays were replaced, and the inspectors determined that the failure to follow the WR instructions was a performance deficiency. There were no violations of regulatory requirements associated with this issue. The licensee wrote AR 2491823 to generate new work requests to replace the relays.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors answered no to all of the more-than-minor questions in IMC 0612 Appendix B.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Corrective Actions Did Not Address Drivers Found Minor Performance Deficiency: In August 2022, the licensee performed an assessment of a number of catastrophic large electric motor failures across the NextEra fleet, including failure of the steam generator feed pump motor at Point Beach. The motor failure at Point Beach caused a plant scram and subsequently reduced power operations for about a week. The self-assessment identified two drivers (deficiencies) for the gap: 1. vendor quality on motor refurbishment/repairs, and 2. station monitoring of motor parameters such as temperature and insulation resistance.

The licensee assigned four corrective actions to address the identified deficiencies. These included establishing and validating critical characteristics for motors undergoing refurbishment or repair, reviewing the procedure for motor parameter trending, reviewing preventive maintenance strategies to increase motor reliability, and conducting electrical maintenance refresher training focusing on performance of insulation resistance testing and polarization index acceptance criteria. However, these four corrective actions created do not specifically address the deficiencies identified in the self-assessment as required per licensee procedure PI-AA-101-1001, Level 1 Core Business Assessments, step 4.2.I, which states include any actions to address drivers and close gaps as applicable. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as AR 2492210, and plans to reassign more specific and deliverable actions to address the drivers of the gap.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors answered no to all of the more-than-minor questions in IMC 0612 Appendix B.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On September 10, 2024, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Kim Locke, Principal Engineering Analyst.

On August 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the preliminary biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Michael Durbin, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Security CDAS Outside the PA Not Meeting E5 Controls

06/04/2024

2038281

Assumption For Consideration to be Added to

Calc 2014-0007

09/26/2022

299091

WO 40583984 Did Not Address Eccentric Pulley

01/24/2019

2334120

W-13B1 Failed to Auto Start

11/03/2019

2357821

Westinghouse NSAL-20-1 OE Evaluation

06/24/2020

2375662

Glycol Leak on HX-38B, CR AC Unit, Piping

11/15/2020

2385966

WEC Tech Bulletin TB-19-5 Thermal Shield Bolt OE,

Revision 1

03/04/2021

2386179

ANI Information Bulletin 11-01 (Rev.1)

03/8/2021

2393356

Discrepancy Between 0-SOP-VNCR-002 and Posted

Information

05/15/2021

2418343

Phone Issues Identified with Quarterly Communications Test

2/09/2022

20177

1C-76 RCP Vibration Display is Erratic

03/01/2022

20483

W-14B Backdraft Damper VNCR-04856B Found Open

03/03/2022

23644

Update Site Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01

04/04/2022

24060

NRC Identified: Alpha Characterization

04/07/2022

27224

Satellite Phones Are Not Functioning

05/10/2022

27363

Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel 1Q22

05/09/2022

28406

Typo Found on Paperwork

05/25/2022

29445

22 TFP Inspection EC 292093 Did Not Evaluate Cable

Routing

06/08/2022

2431209

Boric Acid Residue at Packing on 2SI-870A

07/03/2022

2432355

Rework Required on Monthly Communications Drill

07/20/2022

2432448

1AF-4000, 1P-29 AFP DISCH SG B INLET MOV

Fails to Open

07/21/2022

2432448

Apparent Cause Evaluation for AFP Discharge SG B Inlet

MOV Fails to Open

07/21/2022

2433749

G-04 Crankcase Oil Level Low

08/07/2022

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

2435191

22 PBN PI&R - WO Associated with OE Action Not

Scheduled

08/25/2022

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2435364

Tech Spec Station Battery Surveillance

08/29/2022

2435397

1W-3B CRDM Shroud Fan Tripped Off, Motor Overload Light

Lit

08/29/2022

2436859

Security Timeline Administrative Error

09/15/2022

2437178

Drawing Error Identified

09/19/2022

2437479

1P-10A RHR Pump P1H Vibration Point was Elevated

09/22/2022

2438281

23 CETI: 1SI-897A Weak Link Analysis and Part 21

Review

01/26/2023

2439267

Inadequate Y System Maintenance Rule Performance

Criteria

10/12/2022

2439315

NA Finding - Physical Plant Changes Made Not Per CMP

10/12/2022

2439667

22 PBN Cyber - E5 Controls for Warehouse 6

10/17/2022

2439668

22 PBN Cyber NRC Question CDA Status of Switchstack6

UPS

10/17/2022

2439881

22 PBN Cyber Warehouse Xray Mitigations Not

Implemented

10/19/2022

2440339

Unexplained Level Rise in Unit 1 PRT

10/26/2022

2440412

22 UHS Observation

10/26/2022

2441138

T3 - NSCMP Meeting Minutes

11/02/2022

2441157

Notebook Entry Does Not Meet OM 3.13 Requirement

11/04/2022

2441203

SEL (4-22-06) Equipment Condition Affecting CCTV

11/06/2022

2441409

South Control Room Door-61 Not Latching Properly

11/08/2022

2441987

Degraded Inboard Fan Bearing

11/16/2022

2442066

New Radios Present Multiple Challenges

11/18/2022

2442792

Received Unexpected C02E 1-10 G-04 Diesel Trip or

Lockout

11/30/2022

2443786

SAMG SAG-7 Review Documentation Missing

2/13/2022

2444014

CR Backup URI Laptop Not Functioning

2/15/2022

2444039

HELB Reanalysis Impacts on EQ Cables (EQCK Open

Items)

2/15/2022

2444690

OE: Information Notice 2022-02: Operating Experience

2445800

23 CETI - Document Analysis for IN 2016-06

01/12/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2446862

23 CETI - DBD-02 Lacks Clarity on CCW License Basis

01/26/2023

2446907

23 CETI - FO-3983A Identified Not Included in IST

Program

01/26/2023

2447003

CETI 2023: OM 4.3.8 Time Critical Action 12 Methodology

01/27/2023

2448032

23 - 2024 CNRB North Action Items

2/09/2023

2449366

CR 2449366 Level 3 PCE

2/24/2024

2449833

Generate GDRs for Off Color Engineering Indicators

03/01/2023

2450312

T1 - PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes

2/24/2023

2450559

2P-1B No. 2 Seal Leakage RCDT Level Increase

03/09/2023

2450753

AOP-25 Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip Unit 2

03/11/2023

2451012

2PIPE CH 0601R-01, RMI Insulation End Caps Loose

03/13/2023

245123

OE: NRC Information Notice 2023-01

03/15/2023

2454009

Unit 2 Feedwater Flow Oscillations

04/10/2023

2454872

U2 B MRFV Not Controlling as Expected

04/18/2023

2455516

Very Unsafe Condition - Safety Concern

04/24/2023

2455535

RMS Trailer Smoke Pit Butt Canister Potential Combustion

04/24/2023

2459924

SW-776 Packing Leak and Corrosion

06/13/2023

2460008

2RH-626 Flow Control Valve Did Not Function as Expected

06/14/2023

2460182

Cyber: IDS Inspection Results Gap

06/15/2023

2461016

U2 RCS IN Failed Fuel Action Level 1

06/26/2023

2461971

Fire Inspection Found E-Lights Not on Batt Power

07/10/2023

2462588

CRs Not Yet Screened by MRC

07/18/2023

2463303

MDAFW Discharge Piping Vibration Assessment

07/27/2023

2464138

AOP-12A Current Revision is Technically Incorrect

08/08/2023

2465051

Very Warm Conditions in EOF Front Foyer and

IT Equipment Rm

08/21/2023

2465214

Reduction of Effectiveness Identified in EC

08/23/2023

2465342

WANO Peer Review in Contrast Statements - FP

08/23/2023

2466345

Procedure Step Not Written to Standard

09/06/2023

2467670

Seal Leakage on P-12A, SFP Pump

09/22/2023

2469130

1RH-720, BA Active Leak During 1R41 As-Found

10/10/2023

2469361

Unexpected G-05 Alarm

10/12/2023

2469748

NEO SCRFS Not Allowed on PMCRs for Some Reason

10/16/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2469753

1CC-753 Valve Liner is Worn

10/16/2023

2470427

1RH-706A Pressure Seal Leak

10/23/2023

2470515

MILSTONE OE - PTN AR2470431 - 68% RCP Seal Face

Mismachined

10/24/2023

2470612

Non-Active Leak with Residue Identified on 1CC-764A

10/25/2023

2470891

T2 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes

10/06/2023

2471266

Nonconformance with IST PMT Criteria

10/31/2023

2471727

ISI Inspection Potential Violation App B Criterion V

11/06/2023

2471776

Fire Gear Missing from Storage Location

11/07/2023

2473217

CA Untimely Due to Inappropriate Closure of PMCR

11/28/2023

2473454

AOP-31 Cart Electrical Connection Not Reading Properly

2/01/2023

2475136

KINETRICS (AES) Notification of Potential Part 21 Concern

2/21/2023

2475233

1HX-90 Has a Steam Leak

2/22/2023

2475435

T3 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes

11/10/2023

2475463

Missing Spare Extinguisher

2/28/2023

2476782

IR Zones Require Maintenance

01/17/2024

2477285

NRC FTS Phone Line Issues

01/23/2024

2477288

NRC Identified: 2W-1B1 ACC Fan Discharge Temperature

Trend

01/23/2024

2477787

Fleet Cyber Security Supply Chain Controls Radios

01/30/2024

2477854

Temperatures in EOF IT Equipment Room Very Warm

01/31/2024

2478169

Non-DEP ERO Notification Would Have Been Late

2/02/2024

2478192

Security Officer Not in Assigned Location Per Procedure

2/02/2024

2478731

PS-6352C Failed to Auto Start K-4C, G03 Diesel Air Comp

2/08/2024

2478838

Calculations Impacted by Vendor Software Defect

2/06/2024

2479238

1D-205 Cell 57 Below Acceptance Criteria

2/15/2024

2480755

Identified a Leak

03/07/2024

2480769

RHR Pump Test Line Flow Indicator Transmitter Leakage

03/07/2024

2481393

Station Battery Pilot Cell Thermometers

03/14/2024

2481755

EQ Field Verification Identified Equipment as Non-EQ

03/19/2024

2481896

Reactor Coolant Tavg Deviation Alarm During 2ICP

2.001WH

03/20/2024

2482296

EQ Program Data Issues at PBN, SBK, and PSL.

03/25/2024

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2482467

Opening Radioactive Material Outside the RCA

03/27/2024

2483050

New NBFD31S Reactor Trip Relay Failed Initial Inspection

04/02/2024

2483905

T1 PBN NSCMP Meeting Minutes

2/29/2024

2484145

TSC/OSC Temp Running High During Normal Ops

04/15/2024

2484197

IA-3051B Relief Valve Replacement Capacity Difference

04/16/2024

2484349

U1 Rod Speed Control Indicating 1.2 Deg F Colder than

Process

04/17/2024

2484694

Approved Design did not Consider Service Level 1 Coatings

04/22/2024

2484868

Security Drills and Exercised Procedure Violation

04/24/2024

2485871

EC 299273 and EC 299358 Require Configurations to be

Gathered

05/08/2024

2485911

X-45 in Need of Repair

05/08/2024

2487093

PB Noncompliance with Operability Determination Procedure

05/24/2024

2487235

Trend Review - 50.59 and Operability Requirement

05/28/2024

2487796

SEL 2-24-11 Environmental Conditions Affecting PIDS

06/05/2024

2488820

Charging Pump Oil

06/18/2024

2490426