IR 05000266/2022002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000266/2022002 and 05000301/2022002

ML22208A123
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	07/27/2022
From:	Hironori Peterson Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4
To:	Strope M Point Beach
References
IR 2022002
Preceding documents:	ML22041B075 (10 February 2022)
Download: ML22208A123 (28)

Text

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2022002 AND 05000301/2022002

Dear Mr. Strope:

On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On July 11, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.July 27, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Hironori Peterson for Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000266 and 05000301

License Numbers: DPR-24 and DPR-27

Report Numbers: 05000266/2022002 and 05000301/2022002

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Inspection Dates: March 26, 2022 to June 30, 2022

Inspectors: J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector R. Ng, Project Engineer J. Park, Reactor Inspector V. Petrella, Resident Inspector J. Reed, Health Physicist

Approved By: Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.11] - 71111.22 NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR,

Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.4] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266/2022002-03 Alpha Monitoring Program 71124.01 Open

LER 05000266/2021-001-00 LER 2021-001-00 for Point 71153 Closed Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,

Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down for refueling outage U1R40. On April 21, 2022, Unit 1 was restarted. On April 22, 2022, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on April 26, 2022, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:

control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units on June 8, 2022 the switchyard and control house on June 9, 2022

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on April 26, 2022

(2) Unit 1 train A containment spray system on May 19, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 residual heat removal system on April 25, 2022.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zone 505 on April 8, 2022

(2) Fire Zone 511 on April 8, 2022

(3) Fire Zone 516 on April 8, 2022

(4) Fire Zone 520 on April 8, 2022

(5) Fire Zone 271 on April 11, 2022

(6) Fire Zone 272 on April 11, 2022

(7) Fire Zone 273 on April 11, 2022

(8) Fire Zone 274 on April 11, 2022

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) cable vaults in manholes Z-65A, Z-65B, Z-65D, Z-65E, Z-65J, and Z-65P

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 1 train A containment accident recirculation heat exchanger

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation, and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 28, 2022 to April 13, 2022:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities ultrasonic exam of welds RC-02-LD-1001-08 & -09, category R-A, item R1.11 ultrasonic exam of weld RC-10-SI-1001-21, category R-A, item R1.11 liquid penetrant surface exam of weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27, augmented exam, LR related NDE Report No. 2020U1Ven-005 with relevant indications accepted for continued service on RCP 'A' weld attachment pressure boundary welds for replacement of 1CV-323A, Work Order (WO) 40664014 pressure boundary field weld W-D-1 for replacement of 1P-011A, WO 40104554

03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities Unit 1 reactor head penetration no. 14, 37, and 41 subjected to visual exam

03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities boric acid evaluations for RCP 1P-1A and SI pump 1P-15B corrective actions for boric acid leak on RCP 1P-1A

03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities eddy current examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B' secondary side visual examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B'

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 reactor and plant startup on April 21, 2022.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator requalification scenario on May 19, 2022

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following structure, system, and component (SSC) remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) The inspectors reviewed six WOs covering a variety of maintenance activities to evaluate whether licensee quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the quality assurance program and are implemented as specified.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on March 29, 2022

(2) Unit 1 elevated risk due to increased heat load in the spent fuel pool on April 5, 2022

(3) Unit 1 emergent work due to rod cluster control assembly issues in core location H-2 on April 14, 2022

(4) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on April 15, 2022

(5) Unit 1 elevated risk due to white reactor protection calibration of temperature loop on May 3, 2022

(6) Unit 2 elevated risk due to reduced coincidence during 2ICP 02.005A, "Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train A Actuation Logic Test," on June 24, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-1

(2) void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-2

(3) fuel assembly 1G16 (located in Unit 1 core location H-2) has top nozzle leaf spring pack that is lower than the other three

(4) air leak on G-04 emergency diesel generator north bank starting air motors

(5) audible noise and slightly elevated temperatures on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge line

(6) motor control center 2B32 alternate power supply breaker found racked-in

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 294454, "Replace Rod Position Indication (RPI) in Control Room"

(2) EC 273505, "CC Pump Replacement; Upgrades for Pump Reliability"

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

(1) IT 40, Safety Injection Valves Train B Unit 1, after maintenance on 1SI-896B on April 1, 2022

(2) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2017, HX-1B steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022

(3) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2018, HX-1A steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022

(4) 1ICP 04.029-1, Analog Rod Position Indication Outage Calibration, after rod position indication modification on May 25, 2022

(5) PC 29, Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test, after maintenance of the G-05 gas turbine on June 2, 2022.

(6) 2-SOP-480-B04, Unit 2 Vital Train B 480V Buses, after breaker maintenance for the Unit 2 T-001D pressurizer backup heater D group on June 8, 2022

(7) IT 12A, CC Pumps and Valves While Aligned for RHR Operation (Cold Shutdown)

Unit 1, after 1P-11A component cooling water pump modification on June 9, 2022

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage U1R40 activities from April 1, 2022, to April 26, 2022.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) ORT 3B, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B)

Unit 1, on March 28, 2022

(2) TS 82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly, on June 12, 2022

(3) Unit 1 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769627

(4) Unit 2 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769618

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) IT 05 Train A, Train A Containment Spray Pump and Valves Unit 1, on May 18, 2022

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) ORT 47, Instrument Air Supply Unit 1, on April 4, 2022

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Z-2003A low pressure pump testing on June 1, 2022

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) a crew simulator evaluation with a drill exercise performance evaluation on May 19,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas and labeling of radioactive material in containers.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:

(1) licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers exiting the RCA

(2) workers using portal monitors while leaving the site

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

(1) Unit 1 narrow range resistance temperature detector replacements

(2) Unit 1 steam generator Inspection activities

(3) spent fuel pool equipment demobilization

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) Unit 1 keyway area (in-core instrumentation pathway) field and procedural controls

(2) Unit 1 regen heat exchanger room

(3) Unit 1 reactor head on the head stand

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

(1) Unit 1 steam generator manway high efficiency particulate air filtration unit

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)===

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) temporary modification installed inside the plant without meeting all requirements of the modification process

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program from December 1, 2021 to May 31, 2022, for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000266/2021-001-00, Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML21271A271). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.11] - 71111.22 NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Description:

The spray additive system, supported by the containment spray system, assists in reducing the iodine fission product inventory in the containment atmosphere resulting from a design basis accident (DBA).

Radioiodine in its various forms is the fission product of primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is absorbed by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine absorption capacity of the spray, the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes iodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation and elevated temperature, sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is the preferred spray additive. The NaOH added to the spray also ensures a pH value in the acceptable range of 7.0 to 10.5. The minimum pH in the containment sump needed to keep iodine in the iodate form is 7.0. A pH greater than 7 assures the continued iodine removal effectiveness. The maximum pH is based on Equipment Qualification considerations to minimize the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components and is set to 10.5.

The licensee is required to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide, NaOH, in the spray additive tank per surveillance requirement SR 3.6.7.3. This surveillance is done every 6 months and the requirement is to verify the spray additive tank NaOH solution concentration is greater than or equal to 30 percent and less than or equal to 33 percent by weight. To determine the concentration of the NaOH, the licensee used WOs 40769627 and 40769618. The work instructions are as follows:

Sample spray add tank and analyze for % NaOH Verify >= 30% and <= 33% NaOH

The WOs state the acceptance criteria as the same as the surveillance requirement in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.6.7.3.

The licensee uses CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method," Revision 8, to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the sample. In the procedure, the licensee titrates the sample from the sodium hydroxide tank using sulfuric acid. After the titration, the licensee then calculates the %NaOH. The procedure says that [t]he 2 sigma precision and single measurement accuracy is approximately +/- 0.3% NaOH. This means that the instrument uncertainty of the titration is +/- 0.3% NaOH.

A chemical reaction will happen between aqueous sodium hydroxide and carbon dioxide to form sodium carbonate and water. In the spray additive tanks, carbon dioxide is able to get into the tanks by normal in-leakage and when the tank is opened up. Since approximately 2013, the licensee had not used a method to minimize the introduction of air into the spray additive tanks.

In CAMP 226, Revision 8, it warns about carbon dioxide and the affect it has on the sodium hydroxide. It states the following:

"Large amounts of carbonate ions from CO2 absorption during sampling, transport, and analysis can interfere with the titration and yield an inaccurately low result. Magnetic stirring apparatus should be operated at a moderate speed. Excessive speed will increase CO2 contamination and insufficient speed prolongs the samples exposure to CO2."

CAMP 226, Revision 8 does not account for the affect the CO2 has on the sodium hydroxide.

With the production of sodium carbonate, the titration could mask the real amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank. When a titration is done, a known substance is added to an unknown substance and an indicator is used to determine when the reaction is complete. The base assumption in a titration is that the only interaction is from the two liquids interacting. In the licensees calculation for the amount of sodium hydroxide, the assumption is that the only substances that are interacting are the sulfuric acid (titrant) and the solution from the spray additive tank. The spray additive tank has been exposed to air in the past and the tank lacks a method to prevent introduction of carbon dioxide to the spray additive tank atmosphere.

Because of this, there is an unknown amount of sodium carbonate in the tank, and this decreases the amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank.

The most recent sodium hydroxide concentration results for Units 1 and 2 are 30.5 percent and 30.5 percent respectfully. The safety concern is not an immediate safety issue because based on engineering judgment there is allowance in the results to account for the instrument uncertainty and the interaction between carbon dioxide and sodium hydroxide.

Corrective Actions: The licensee plans to update the WO to include margin for the uncertainty.

Corrective Action References: Action Request (AR) 2430785

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty when determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide, and the licensee did not take into account the interaction of carbon dioxide with the sodium hydroxide.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to not take into account the instrument uncertainty and the affect the carbon dioxide has on the spray additive tank solution could allow the licensee to believe the NaOH concentration is within the required band when it could actually be outside the allowed band and unable to meet its design function.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because the inspectors answered "no" to all the questions in Exhibit 3.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance because the individuals performing the procedure had the opportunity to challenge why there were two sets of acceptance criteria.

Specifically, the WOs had acceptance criteria of >= 30% NaOH and <= 33% NaOH and NP 3.2.2 Primary Water Chemistry Monitoring Program, Revision 29 has expected values of >= 30% NaOH (TS), <= 33% NaOH (TS), and >= 30.3% NaOH (Admin.).

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires in part, that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, on January 14, 2022, the licensee failed to prescribe an appropriate instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, in WOs 40769627 and 40769618, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty for determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide as called out in CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method," Revision 8. The licensee also did not consider the affect that carbon dioxide has on the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the tank because the licensee did not minimize the introduction of carbon dioxide to the tank.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry Into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.4] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.

Description:

On February 15, 2022, an individual was granted access to the Unit 2 volume control tank (VCT) cubicle after receiving a high radiation area (HRA) briefing from radiation protection staff. The individual was briefed to survey maps completed the morning of February 15, 2022, with work area dose rates listed at 55 mrem per hour. The individual signed on to Radiation Work Permit #22-0205 that allowed HRA access, and had electronic dosimeter set points of 21 mrem accumulated dose and 150 mrem per hour dose rate alarms.

While performing work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle, the individual's electronic dosimeter alarmed. Upon receiving the alarm, the individual left the area and reported the dose rate alarm to radiation protection. Review of the electronic dosimeter showed the individual had received a dose rate alarm of 158 mrem per hour. Follow-up radiological surveys identified that the work area had dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour.

Miscommunication between the lead radiation protection technician (RPT) and the RPT performing the survey caused the radiological survey to be completed for only a portion of the work area. The individuals authorized work area also included overhead areas that were not included on the radiological survey map utilized for the HRA briefing.

Corrective Actions: The licensee stopped work in the VCT cubicle and conducted additional radiological surveys of the area.

Corrective Action References: AR 2418890

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Licensee personnel did not comply with requirements for entry into an HRA or locked high radiation area (LHRA), as contained in TS 5.7.1. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized; and, therefore, the worker was not knowledgeable of the dose rates before initial entry in the HRA.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates for all areas authorized to work; and, therefore, the worker was not made knowledgeable of current dose rates which could lead to unintended dose. As provided in Example 6.a of IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," the failure to determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized had the potential to lead to a more significant radiation safety concern because of an ineffective radiation program barrier. Specifically, the miscommunication and incomplete radiation survey resulted in the licensee not properly informing workers of the radiation hazard. Consequently, this performance deficiency was considered to be of more-than-minor significance.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because:

(1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably-achievable planning or work controls,

(2) there was no overexposure,

(3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and

(4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, miscommunication between the work groups caused a radiological survey to be completed without all requisite dose rate information.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.7.1, "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation" condition e. requires, in part, that "Except for individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures, or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals, entry into such areas shall be made only after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. These continuously escorted personnel will receive pre-job briefing prior to entry into such areas. This dose rate determination, knowledge, and pre-job briefing does not require documentation prior to initial entry."

Contrary to the above, on February 15, 2022, the licensee failed to make an entry into such areas (a HRA with dose rates not exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters) by an individual, who was qualified in radiation protection procedures or continuously escorted by such individuals, or after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Specifically, an individual was authorized to work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle (a HRA with actual dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour); however, the licensee failed to determine the dose rates in the authorized work area, indicating to the individual that dose rates were 55 mrem per hour.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Unresolved Item Alpha Monitoring Program 71124.01 (Open) URI 05000266/2022002-03

Description:

Alpha emitting radionuclides have a significantly lower Annual Limit on Intake than beta-gamma emitting radionuclides that might be present at a nuclear power plant. While the processes used to identify, monitor, and control alpha contamination is similar to those used for beta-gamma emitting contamination, the instrumentation used for alpha contamination is often different and the amount of time needed to measure alpha contamination is often much longer than the count times normally used for beta-gamma contamination. Consequently, nuclear power plants typically perform detailed evaluations of plant systems and areas and determine the ratio of beta-gamma contamination to alpha contamination. The results of this assessment identify circumstances where the controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination may no longer be effective for the contamination hazards in zones or systems with relatively low ratios of beta-gamma to alpha contamination.

The inspectors reviewed licensee technical evaluation titled Site Alpha Characterization Update completed by the licensee's health physics staff on April 4, 2022 (HP-100-032922). The evaluation identified that the reactor coolant system, residual heat removal system, and chemical and volume control system for both units were characterized as alpha level 2 (Significant) for both units. The safety injection system for both units and the shared systems of spent fuel and radwaste processing were characterized as alpha level 3 (Elevated). However, another section of the same evaluation report appeared to have contradictory information, summarizing the activity ratios for each unit and concluding that the most recent classification for each unit was alpha level 1 (Minimal).

While observing work activities that were in progress during the refueling outage, the inspectors identified that the licensees work controls and exposure monitoring seemed to be more consistent with the summarized information rather than the characterization for the systems that were being worked. Specifically, the inspectors observed:

(1) work activities in the Unit 1 Keyway (under vessel),

(2) removal activities of the resistance temperature detector (RTD) manifold from the reactor coolant system,

(3) opening the steam generator manways with diaphragm removal and

(4) work in the spent fuel pool. For these activities, the inspectors observed that the licensees radiological controls were similar to controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination (Level 1 or Minimal). Based on the inspectors observations and discussions with the licensee, the licensee was unable to demonstrate whether the radiological controls implemented to protect workers and monitor possible internal exposure were effective for the alpha contamination hazards present in these work areas. Specifically, the licensee indicated that it needed additional time to demonstrate how its alpha characterization was consistent with its procedures, job planning, work controls, and exposure monitoring for individuals performing the work to ensure that radiological exposures were monitored and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements (10 CFR Part 20).

Planned Closure Actions: The licensee planned to evaluate its alpha monitoring implemented at the site and to clarify/define how the alpha characterization informs job planning, establishes adequate work controls, and monitors exposure for individuals performing work in areas where normal controls for beta-gamma contamination are not adequate for Significant or Elevated alpha contamination (as identified in the work activities discussed above).

Licensee Actions: The licensee entered the condition in the corrective action program and provided the inspectors with an example from 2021 that involved work with elevated alpha contamination.

Corrective Action References: AR 2424060 Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors reviewed action requests entered into the corrective action program for the following:

complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the issue identified in the corrective action program evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences classification and prioritization of the problems resolution, commensurate with the safety significance identification of corrective actions that are appropriately focused to correct the problem completion of corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue identification of negative trends associated with human or equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety operating experience is adequately evaluated for applicability, and applicable lessons learned are communicated to appropriate organizations, and implemented

The inspectors completed the review and did not note any significant trends that were not already identified and addressed by the licensee.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On July 11, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 13, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action AR 2429534 NRC Questions During Switchyard Summer Readiness 06/09/2022

Documents Walkdown

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-144, Sheet 2 Heating & Ventilation Temperature Control P&ID 25

M-214, Sheet 4 P&ID Auxiliary Steam, Heating Steam, Chilled & Hot Water 38

Systems & Details

Miscellaneous CL 17C Heating and Ventilation Checklist 31

NPM 2022-0048 Seasonal Readiness - Summer 2022 05/19/2022

Procedures OP-AA-102-1002 Seasonal Readiness 37

71111.04 Corrective Action AR 2426014 Material on -5 FT, Unit 1 Area 04/25/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 110E017, Sheet 1 P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 61

110E017, Sheet 2 P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 67

110E017, Sheet 2 P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 67

110E017, Sheet 3 P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 48

110E018, Sheet 1 P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 71

110E018, Sheet 2 P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System 22

110E018, Sheet 3 P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System 45

110E018, Sheet 4 P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 53

541F091, Sheet 1 P&ID Reactor Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 59

Miscellaneous 1-CL-CC-001 Component Cooling Unit 1 20

71111.05 Corrective Action AR 2424250 NRC Question on PFP-1-CONT-FAC 04/08/2022

Documents AR 2424251 PFP-1-CONT-FAC - Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment 04/08/2022

Resulting from Building

Inspection AR 2424703 NRC Question: PFP-0-PAB 66 04/12/2022

Fire Plans PFP-0-PAB-66 Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 66 Ft 1

PFP-1-CONT-Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building/Facade 1

FAC

Miscellaneous Point Beach Nuclear Plant 4 Hour Fire Round Performance 04/11/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Sheet-PAB

71111.06 Corrective Action AR 2370216 NMH-201 Manhole Water Over Cables (WPS Power) 10/03/2020

Documents AR 2426379 MH-10 Alarm Did Not Come in on C-314 04/28/2022

AR 2426894 NMH-201 (WPS Shore Power) Found with Cables Flooded 05/05/2022

Corrective Action AR 2428215 NRC Identified Errors in Work Order 05/23/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 6118 E-2 Single Line Diagram WPS/Connections Point Beach N.P. 5

Unit 1 & 2

PBE-816 Cable Vault Locations Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2 1

Work Orders WO 40783843 Manholes: Yearly (Spring) Inspection 05/10/2022

71111.07A Work Orders WO 40752711 1HX-015A/Motor Cooling Coil Insp/Cleaning (GL 89-13) 04/01/2022

WO 40752725 1HX-015 A1-A8/Remove End Bells, Flex Hoses and 04/01/2022

Pressure Test

71111.08P Corrective Action AR 2371705 1P-001A RCP Seal Injection Line Boric Acid 10/15/2020

Documents AR 2371713 Unit 1A RCP Welded Attachment Liquid Penetrant 02/19/2021

Indications

AR 2371850 Recordable Indication on SW Piping Support Welded 10/19/2020

AR 2373770 Foreign Material Identified in 1CS-2188 01/25/2021

Engineering 20-251-E Boric Acid Evaluation for RCP 1P-1A 1

Evaluations 22-009-E Boric Acid Evaluation for SI Pump 1P-15B 0

LTR-SDA-20- Point Beach Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Flaw Assessment 0

079-P for As-Found Linear Indications During Fall 2020 Refueling

Outage

SG-CDMP-19-8 Point Beach Unit 1 U1R38 Condition Monitoring and 0

Operational Assessment

SG-CDMP-22-2 Point Beach U1R40 Steam Generator Degradation 1

Assessment

Miscellaneous 2019-0025 ASME XI Repair/Replacement Plan 2

NDE Reports EMB-PT-001 Visible Liquid Penetration Examination Record for 04/07/2022

Weld No. W-D-1 under WO 40104554

PB1-PT-22-001 Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27 03/30/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

PB1-UT-22-001 UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-09 04/03/2022

PB1-UT-22-002 UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-08 04/03/2022

PB1-UT-22-010 UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-10-SI-1001-21 04/05/2022

PB1-VT-22-013 Visual Exam of Boric Acid (BMV) of RPV Closure Head 04/05/2022

Procedures FP-PE-B31-Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) 10

P1P1-GTSM-001

MRS-GEN-1217 Rolled Mechanical Plug Installation Using the Advanced 6

Rolling Tool and the Universal Platform Control Box

MRS-GEN-1240 Position Verification Procedure 7

MRS-GEN-1387 Steam Generator Tube Plugging Procedure Specification for 0

Point Beach Roll-Expanded Mechanical Tube Plugs

NDE-451 Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Temperature 32

Applications 40°F to 125°F

NDE-757 Visual Examination for Leakage of Pressure Vessel 11

Penetrations

PBNP WP-1 Welding Procedure for Carbon Steels 8

Group P-1 to P-1 GTAW-SMAW

PBNP WP-2 Welding Procedure for Austenitic Stainless Steels ASME 7

Group P-8 GTAW-SMAW

PDI-UT-2 Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of I

Austenitic Pipe Welds

Work Orders WO 40664014-03 1CV-323A Prefab Welding 10/24/2020

WO 40664014-06 NDE Administrative Task 11/06/2020

WO 40664014-07 Weld Documents 11/02/2020

71111.11Q Miscellaneous PBN LOC 22C As Left 0

001E

Procedures AD-AA-100-1006 Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence 21

OP 1B Reactor Startup 83

OP 1C Startup to Power Operation Unit 1 48

ORT 4 Unit 1 Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Device Unit 1 37

RESP 4.1 BOL Physics Tests 32

71111.12 Corrective Action AR 2428808 1MS-2010 Capacity Incorrectly Documented in 05/31/2022

Documents WO 40619651-01

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Resulting from AR 2428869 NRC Identified Paperwork Needed Clarification 06/01/2022

Inspection AR 2428898 Work Order Missing Date on Signature Block 06/01/2022

Work Orders WO 40104554-09 1P-011A - 1Prep Assemble Pump & Motor/Machine 04/20/2022

Baseplate

WO 40104554-38 1P-011A - Baseplate Grout Installation Per EC273505 04/20/2022

WO 40104554-47 1P-011A H200 Pipe Support - Temporary 04/20/2022

Remove & Restore

WO 40595754 1C-112 - Install NUS Modules 04/14/2022

WO 40619651 1MS-02010 / Replace Relief Valve (IST Program) 04/12/2022

WO 40736761 1PM-482A - Install NUS Module 04/14/2022

WO 40774589 1PT-969 - Replace Transmitter 03/31/2022

WO 40823575 B52-DB50-040; Replace Alarm Circuit Wire with SR Wire 04/18/2022

71111.13 Miscellaneous PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 04/04/2022

Checklist at 0700 for U1R40

Ignition Control Permit for Work Order 40104554 on 04/04/2022

04/04/2022

Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB on 04/05/2022 04/05/2022

Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB for 04/04/2022 04/04/2022

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 04/14/2022

Checklist at 0444 for U1R40

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 04/14/2022

Checklist at 1130 for U1R40

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 04/14/2022

Checklist at 1906 for U1R40

1R40 Critical Path Schedule 04/14/2022

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 04/15/2022

Checklist on 04/15/2022 at 0433 for U1R40

PDC for the Unit 1 White Reactor Protection Calibration of 05/03/2022

Temperature Loop

High Risk and Short Duration TSAC Vulnerabilities 06/24/2022

for 1(2) ICP 02.005 Safeguards Logic Test - Train A(B)

1R40 Critical Path Schedule 04/13/2022

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 03/28/2022

Checklist on 03/28/2022 at 2200 for U1R40

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.15 Calculations 2006-0035 Parametric Values 1

6704.001-C-001 Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure 2

6704.001-C-085 Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure 2

6704.001-C-085 Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure 0

Corrective Action AR 2410707 Audible Noise & Slightly Elevated Temps - 2P29 Discharge 11/08/2021

Documents Line

AR 2411221 DA-446 Isolation Valve Is Leaking 11/12/2021

AR 2415042 2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B U2 Safeguards Void Found 01/03/2022

at 2RH-V-2

AR 2415049 2-TS-ECCS-Train A WO 40769707 Void Found at 2RH-V-1 01/03/2022

AR 2424892 H-2 Core Location Not Pass Drag Test 04/13/2022

AR 2425098 Continued Operation using FA 1G16 04/15/2022

AR 2429474 Configuration: Alternate MCC Supply Breaker 06/09/2022

Corrective Action AR 2420216 Review Calculation PBNP-994-40-M02 for Mode 6 Operation 03/01/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 110E029, Sheet 1 P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System 57

M-209, Sheet 15 P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator 13

Building M-209 SH. 15 Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2

M-217, Sheet 1 P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System Point Beach N.P. 107

Unit 1 & 2

M-2202, Sheet 2 P&ID Feedwater System Point Beach N.P. Unit 2 58

Engineering EC 0000258684 CRR Cancel EDG Calcs (See Topic Notes) 0

Changes

Miscellaneous DBD-21 480 VAC System Design Basis Document 10

Procedures IT 100 G-04 Seat Leakage Test of Diesel Air Compressor Discharge 3

Check Valves G-04

PC 8 Part 2 Monthly AFW Pump Discharge Piping Temperature Checks 10

Work Orders WO 346921 PBTP 156, G-04 Minimum Air Start Pressure for Fast Start 11/30/2007

WO 40769707 2-TS-ECCS-002 Train A 01/03/2022

WO 40769708 2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B 01/03/2022

71111.18 Calculations 2005-0050 PAB and Control Building Electrical Heat Load Calculation0

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Corrective Action AR 2424958 Missing QC Initial on Completed Work Order 04/14/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering EC 273505 CC Pump Replacement; Upgrades for Pump Reliability 19

Changes

Work Orders WO 40720933 U1 RPI - Install New Rod Position Recorders in 1C04 04/06/2022

71111.19 Corrective Action AR 2424409 New Installed 1P-11A Did Not Meet Acceptance IT 12A 04/10/2022

Documents AR 2424410 IT 12A - CC Pumps and Valves While (in Review) 04/10/2022

(Rebaselining)

AR 2424412 (P) IT 12 Train A - 1P-11A, (SQR) (Rebaselining) 04/10/2022

Procedures PC 29 Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test 74

Work Orders WO 40104554-26 1P-011A - Operations PMT - RTS 04/27/2022

WO 40667425 1MS-2017C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40667431 1MS-2018C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40667432 1MS-2017D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40667435 1MS-2018D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40720933-04 U1 RPI - RPIR Installation PMT 04/10/2022

WO 40724044 1MS-2018A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40724045 1MS-2018B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40752602 1MS-2017A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40752642 1MS-2017B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve 04/14/2022

WO 40752801 IT-280A, U1 MS Stop VLVS Stroke (CSD) < 200 DegF 04/15/2022

WO 40753172 1ICP 4.29-1 - RPI Indicator Calibration and System Checks04/11/2022

WO 40753269 1SI-00896B-O: MOV Actuator Diagnostics & Inspections 04/20/2022

WO 40753270 1SI-00896B-O: MOV Stem Lube/Actuat Gearbox Grease 04/01/2022

Insp

WO 40785650-02 2B52-29B; Setup and Stage Spare Breaker Per RMP 9369-1 02/15/2022

WO 40785650-04 2B52-29B; Perform Breaker Swap Using A Prepared Spare 06/08/2022

WO 40785650-05 2B52-29B; OPS PMT/RTS 06/08/2022

71111.20 Corrective Action AR 2425608 NRC Identified Issues During CTMT Walk Down 04/20/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Inspection

Miscellaneous Tagout Coversheet for the Tagout of 1 CS P-28A Motor 04/07/2022

Interference

Tagout of 1 CW-3 Diving/Welding 04/12/2022

Procedures 2RMP 9096-1 Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using BIACH 23

Tensioning System

CL 20 Post Outage Containment Closeout Inspection Unit 1 40

CL 20A Unit 1 Unit 1 Containment Closeout Inspection 19

OP 1C Startup to Power Operation Unit 1 48

OP 4D Part 3 Draining the Reactor Cavity and Reactor Coolant System 43

OP 4E Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Lowered Inventory Requirements 10

Unit 1

71111.22 Corrective Action AR 02430785 SAT Analysis Work Order Documentation (NRC Identified) 06/27/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures 0-SOP-FLEX-003 FLEX Portable Diesel Low Pressure Pump Operation, 7

Z-2003A & Z-2003B

CAMP 226 Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method 8

ORT 3B Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered 50

Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit1

Work Orders WO 40749167-02 1IA-3047-O - Pre-Maintenance Testing - ORT 47 04/06/2022

WO 40769618 SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3 01/14/2022

WO 40769627 SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3 01/14/2022

WO 40786948 IT-05 Train A 06/01/2022

WO 40790329 TS-82, G-02 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 06/22/2022

71114.06 Corrective Action AR 2428406 Typo Found on Paperwork 05/25/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous *Drill* NARS Form for Classification at 12:40 05/19/2022

• Drill* NARS Form for Classification at 12:17 05/19/2022

March 2022 DEP PI Data

April 2022 DEP PI Data

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

April 2022 DEP PI Data Corrected Document

71124.01 Corrective Action AR 2418890 Unanticipated Dose Rate Alarm 02/15/2022

Documents

Corrective Action AR 2424060 Alpha Characterization 04/07/2022

Documents AR 2424160 Gatehouse Portal Monitor Issues

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous HP-100-012521 Site Alpha Characterization Update 01/28/2021

HP-100-032922 Site Alpha Characterization Update 04/04/2022

Procedures HP 2.14 Containment Keyway Personnel Access 21

HP 9.2 Steam Generator Primary Channel Head Ventilation 14

HPIP 3.52 Airborne Radioactivity Surveys 48

NISP-RP-010 Radiological Job Coverage 1

RP-AA-102-1000 Alpha Monitoring 6

RP-AA-104-1000 ALARA Implementing Procedure 18

Radiation DXW06OY Whole Body Count for Individual Working in the Keyway

Surveys JXF0VU9 Whole Body Count for Individual in Keyway

Radiation Work RWP 22-1020 Keyway Entries 0

Permits (RWPs) RWP 22-1025 Scaffolding Containment Outage Activities 0

RWP 22-1053 Unit 1 Narrow Range RTD Replacement 0

RWP 22-1054 S/G Handhole Cover Remove/Install 0

RWP 22-1057 Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing, Tube Sheet 0

Cleaning

RWP 22-1058 S/G Manway/Shield Doors & Diaphragm Removal, Cleaning 0

& Installation

71124.03 Procedures HPIP 4.58 Issuance of Respiratory Equipment 29

71151 Miscellaneous Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Reactor Coolant 04/01/2021 -

System Leakage 03/31/2022

Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Safety System 04/01/2021 -

Functional Failures 03/31/2022

Procedures LI-AA-100-10003 NRC Performance Indicator 4

NP 5.2.16 NRC Performance Indicators 23

71152A Corrective Action AR 2417777 PBN Staff Worked Outside of Process to Install ADV 02/02/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents Temporary

Procedures EN-AA-205-1102 Temporary Configuration Changes 18

EN-AA-205-1104 Standard Design Process 1

71152S Miscellaneous Trend ARs 120121-053122 06/02/2022

71153 Corrective Action AR 2399938 1P-28B (MFP) Trip on Timed Overcurrent 07/31/2021

Documents AR 2399939 1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open 07/31/2021

AR 2399940 1HC-481 ('B' FRV BYP Hand Controller) Didn't Control in 07/31/2021

Auto

AR 2399942 1FD-2516B (MSR 'A' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip 07/31/2021

AR 2399943 1FD-2517B (MSR 'D' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip 07/31/2021

AR 2399944 1OS-1-MOV 07/31/2021

AR 2399946 Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due to 1P-28B MFP Trip 08/01/2021

AR 2399947 1FD-2517A MSR Drain Didn't Open 08/01/2021

AR 2399949 1FT-475 SG B Steam Flow Channel Indicates on Scale Post 08/01/2021

Trip

Miscellaneous AR 2399938 Root Cause for the 1P-28B-M Main Feed Pump Motor Trip 02/14/2022

Work Orders WO 40787663 1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open 08/09/2021

WO 40787863 1OS-1-MOV/Failed to Shut Post Trip 08/09/2021

25