IR 05000266/2022002
| ML22208A123 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/2022 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22208A123 (28) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2022002 AND 05000301/2022002
Dear Mr. Strope:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On July 11, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
July 27, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Hironori Peterson for Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2022002 and 05000301/2022002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-002-0053
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
March 26, 2022 to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Ng, Project Engineer
J. Park, Reactor Inspector
V. Petrella, Resident Inspector
J. Reed, Health Physicist
Approved By:
Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.22 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR,
Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266/2022002-03 Alpha Monitoring Program 71124.01 Open LER 05000266/2021-001-00 LER 2021-001-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down for refueling outage U1R40. On April 21, 2022, Unit 1 was restarted. On April 22, 2022, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on April 26, 2022, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:
control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units on June 8, 2022
the switchyard and control house on June 9, 2022
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on April 26, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 train A containment spray system on May 19, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 residual heat removal system on April 25, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 505 on April 8, 2022
- (2) Fire Zone 511 on April 8, 2022
- (3) Fire Zone 516 on April 8, 2022
- (4) Fire Zone 520 on April 8, 2022
- (5) Fire Zone 271 on April 11, 2022
- (6) Fire Zone 272 on April 11, 2022
- (7) Fire Zone 273 on April 11, 2022
- (8) Fire Zone 274 on April 11, 2022
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) cable vaults in manholes Z-65A, Z-65B, Z-65D, Z-65E, Z-65J, and Z-65P
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 1 train A containment accident recirculation heat exchanger
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation, and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 28, 2022 to April 13, 2022:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities
ultrasonic exam of welds RC-02-LD-1001-08 & -09, category R-A, item R1.11
ultrasonic exam of weld RC-10-SI-1001-21, category R-A, item R1.11
liquid penetrant surface exam of weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27, augmented exam, LR related
NDE Report No. 2020U1Ven-005 with relevant indications accepted for continued service on RCP 'A' weld attachment pressure boundary welds for replacement of 1CV-323A, Work Order (WO) 40664014
pressure boundary field weld W-D-1 for replacement of 1P-011A, WO 40104554 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities
Unit 1 reactor head penetration no. 14, 37, and 41 subjected to visual exam 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities
boric acid evaluations for RCP 1P-1A and SI pump 1P-15B
corrective actions for boric acid leak on RCP 1P-1A 03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities
eddy current examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B'
secondary side visual examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B'
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 reactor and plant startup on April 21, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator requalification scenario on May 19, 2022
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following structure, system, and component (SSC) remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed six WOs covering a variety of maintenance activities to evaluate whether licensee quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the quality assurance program and are implemented as specified.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on March 29, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 elevated risk due to increased heat load in the spent fuel pool on April 5, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 emergent work due to rod cluster control assembly issues in core location H-2 on April 14, 2022
- (4) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on April 15, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 elevated risk due to white reactor protection calibration of temperature loop on May 3, 2022
- (6) Unit 2 elevated risk due to reduced coincidence during 2ICP 02.005A, "Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train A Actuation Logic Test," on June 24, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-1 (2)void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-2 (3)fuel assembly 1G16 (located in Unit 1 core location H-2) has top nozzle leaf spring pack that is lower than the other three (4)air leak on G-04 emergency diesel generator north bank starting air motors (5)audible noise and slightly elevated temperatures on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge line (6)motor control center 2B32 alternate power supply breaker found racked-in
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 294454, "Replace Rod Position Indication (RPI) in Control Room"
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (2) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2017, HX-1B steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022
- (3) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2018, HX-1A steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022 (4)1ICP 04.029-1, Analog Rod Position Indication Outage Calibration, after rod position indication modification on May 25, 2022
- (5) PC 29, Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test, after maintenance of the G-05 gas turbine on June 2, 2022.
(6)2-SOP-480-B04, Unit 2 Vital Train B 480V Buses, after breaker maintenance for the Unit 2 T-001D pressurizer backup heater D group on June 8, 2022
Unit 1, after 1P-11A component cooling water pump modification on June 9, 2022
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage U1R40 activities from April 1, 2022, to April 26, 2022.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) ORT 3B, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B)
Unit 1, on March 28, 2022
- (2) TS 82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly, on June 12, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769627
- (4) Unit 2 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769618
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) IT 05 Train A, Train A Containment Spray Pump and Valves Unit 1, on May 18, 2022
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) ORT 47, Instrument Air Supply Unit 1, on April 4, 2022
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Z-2003A low pressure pump testing on June 1, 2022
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) a crew simulator evaluation with a drill exercise performance evaluation on May 19,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas and labeling of radioactive material in containers.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers exiting the RCA (2)workers using portal monitors while leaving the site
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Unit 1 narrow range resistance temperature detector replacements
- (2) Unit 1 steam generator Inspection activities (3)spent fuel pool equipment demobilization High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Unit 1 keyway area (in-core instrumentation pathway) field and procedural controls
- (2) Unit 1 regen heat exchanger room
- (3) Unit 1 reactor head on the head stand Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) Unit 1 steam generator manway high efficiency particulate air filtration unit
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)temporary modification installed inside the plant without meeting all requirements of the modification process
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program from December 1, 2021 to May 31, 2022, for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000266/2021-001-00, Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML21271A271). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.22 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Description:
The spray additive system, supported by the containment spray system, assists in reducing the iodine fission product inventory in the containment atmosphere resulting from a design basis accident (DBA).
Radioiodine in its various forms is the fission product of primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is absorbed by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine absorption capacity of the spray, the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes iodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation and elevated temperature, sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is the preferred spray additive. The NaOH added to the spray also ensures a pH value in the acceptable range of 7.0 to 10.5. The minimum pH in the containment sump needed to keep iodine in the iodate form is 7.0. A pH greater than 7 assures the continued iodine removal effectiveness. The maximum pH is based on Equipment Qualification considerations to minimize the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components and is set to 10.5.
The licensee is required to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide, NaOH, in the spray additive tank per surveillance requirement SR 3.6.7.3. This surveillance is done every 6 months and the requirement is to verify the spray additive tank NaOH solution concentration is greater than or equal to 30 percent and less than or equal to 33 percent by weight. To determine the concentration of the NaOH, the licensee used WOs 40769627 and 40769618. The work instructions are as follows:
Sample spray add tank and analyze for % NaOH Verify >= 30% and <= 33% NaOH The WOs state the acceptance criteria as the same as the surveillance requirement in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.6.7.3.
The licensee uses CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method," Revision 8, to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the sample. In the procedure, the licensee titrates the sample from the sodium hydroxide tank using sulfuric acid. After the titration, the licensee then calculates the %NaOH. The procedure says that [t]he 2 sigma precision and single measurement accuracy is approximately +/- 0.3% NaOH. This means that the instrument uncertainty of the titration is +/- 0.3% NaOH.
A chemical reaction will happen between aqueous sodium hydroxide and carbon dioxide to form sodium carbonate and water. In the spray additive tanks, carbon dioxide is able to get into the tanks by normal in-leakage and when the tank is opened up. Since approximately 2013, the licensee had not used a method to minimize the introduction of air into the spray additive tanks.
In CAMP 226, Revision 8, it warns about carbon dioxide and the affect it has on the sodium hydroxide. It states the following:
"Large amounts of carbonate ions from CO2 absorption during sampling, transport, and analysis can interfere with the titration and yield an inaccurately low result. Magnetic stirring apparatus should be operated at a moderate speed. Excessive speed will increase CO2 contamination and insufficient speed prolongs the samples exposure to CO2."
CAMP 226, Revision 8 does not account for the affect the CO2 has on the sodium hydroxide.
With the production of sodium carbonate, the titration could mask the real amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank. When a titration is done, a known substance is added to an unknown substance and an indicator is used to determine when the reaction is complete. The base assumption in a titration is that the only interaction is from the two liquids interacting. In the licensees calculation for the amount of sodium hydroxide, the assumption is that the only substances that are interacting are the sulfuric acid (titrant) and the solution from the spray additive tank. The spray additive tank has been exposed to air in the past and the tank lacks a method to prevent introduction of carbon dioxide to the spray additive tank atmosphere.
Because of this, there is an unknown amount of sodium carbonate in the tank, and this decreases the amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank.
The most recent sodium hydroxide concentration results for Units 1 and 2 are 30.5 percent and 30.5 percent respectfully. The safety concern is not an immediate safety issue because based on engineering judgment there is allowance in the results to account for the instrument uncertainty and the interaction between carbon dioxide and sodium hydroxide.
Corrective Actions: The licensee plans to update the WO to include margin for the uncertainty.
Corrective Action References: Action Request (AR) 2430785
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty when determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide, and the licensee did not take into account the interaction of carbon dioxide with the sodium hydroxide.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to not take into account the instrument uncertainty and the affect the carbon dioxide has on the spray additive tank solution could allow the licensee to believe the NaOH concentration is within the required band when it could actually be outside the allowed band and unable to meet its design function.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because the inspectors answered "no" to all the questions in Exhibit 3.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance because the individuals performing the procedure had the opportunity to challenge why there were two sets of acceptance criteria.
Specifically, the WOs had acceptance criteria of >= 30% NaOH and <= 33% NaOH and NP 3.2.2 Primary Water Chemistry Monitoring Program, Revision 29 has expected values of >= 30% NaOH (TS), <= 33% NaOH (TS), and >= 30.3% NaOH (Admin.).
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires in part, that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, on January 14, 2022, the licensee failed to prescribe an appropriate instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, in WOs 40769627 and 40769618, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty for determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide as called out in CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method," Revision 8. The licensee also did not consider the affect that carbon dioxide has on the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the tank because the licensee did not minimize the introduction of carbon dioxide to the tank.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry Into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.
Description:
On February 15, 2022, an individual was granted access to the Unit 2 volume control tank (VCT) cubicle after receiving a high radiation area (HRA) briefing from radiation protection staff. The individual was briefed to survey maps completed the morning of February 15, 2022, with work area dose rates listed at 55 mrem per hour. The individual signed on to Radiation Work Permit #22-0205 that allowed HRA access, and had electronic dosimeter set points of 21 mrem accumulated dose and 150 mrem per hour dose rate alarms.
While performing work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle, the individual's electronic dosimeter alarmed. Upon receiving the alarm, the individual left the area and reported the dose rate alarm to radiation protection. Review of the electronic dosimeter showed the individual had received a dose rate alarm of 158 mrem per hour. Follow-up radiological surveys identified that the work area had dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour.
Miscommunication between the lead radiation protection technician (RPT) and the RPT performing the survey caused the radiological survey to be completed for only a portion of the work area. The individuals authorized work area also included overhead areas that were not included on the radiological survey map utilized for the HRA briefing.
Corrective Actions: The licensee stopped work in the VCT cubicle and conducted additional radiological surveys of the area.
Corrective Action References: AR 2418890
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Licensee personnel did not comply with requirements for entry into an HRA or locked high radiation area (LHRA), as contained in TS 5.7.1. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized; and, therefore, the worker was not knowledgeable of the dose rates before initial entry in the HRA.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates for all areas authorized to work; and, therefore, the worker was not made knowledgeable of current dose rates which could lead to unintended dose. As provided in Example 6.a of IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," the failure to determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized had the potential to lead to a more significant radiation safety concern because of an ineffective radiation program barrier. Specifically, the miscommunication and incomplete radiation survey resulted in the licensee not properly informing workers of the radiation hazard. Consequently, this performance deficiency was considered to be of more-than-minor significance.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because:
- (1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably-achievable planning or work controls,
- (2) there was no overexposure,
- (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, miscommunication between the work groups caused a radiological survey to be completed without all requisite dose rate information.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.7.1, "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation" condition e. requires, in part, that "Except for individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures, or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals, entry into such areas shall be made only after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. These continuously escorted personnel will receive pre-job briefing prior to entry into such areas. This dose rate determination, knowledge, and pre-job briefing does not require documentation prior to initial entry."
Contrary to the above, on February 15, 2022, the licensee failed to make an entry into such areas (a HRA with dose rates not exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters) by an individual, who was qualified in radiation protection procedures or continuously escorted by such individuals, or after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Specifically, an individual was authorized to work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle (a HRA with actual dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour); however, the licensee failed to determine the dose rates in the authorized work area, indicating to the individual that dose rates were 55 mrem per hour.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Open)
Alpha Monitoring Program URI 05000266/2022002-03 71124.01
Description:
Alpha emitting radionuclides have a significantly lower Annual Limit on Intake than beta-gamma emitting radionuclides that might be present at a nuclear power plant. While the processes used to identify, monitor, and control alpha contamination is similar to those used for beta-gamma emitting contamination, the instrumentation used for alpha contamination is often different and the amount of time needed to measure alpha contamination is often much longer than the count times normally used for beta-gamma contamination. Consequently, nuclear power plants typically perform detailed evaluations of plant systems and areas and determine the ratio of beta-gamma contamination to alpha contamination. The results of this assessment identify circumstances where the controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination may no longer be effective for the contamination hazards in zones or systems with relatively low ratios of beta-gamma to alpha contamination.
The inspectors reviewed licensee technical evaluation titled Site Alpha Characterization Update completed by the licensee's health physics staff on April 4, 2022 (HP-100-032922). The evaluation identified that the reactor coolant system, residual heat removal system, and chemical and volume control system for both units were characterized as alpha level 2 (Significant) for both units. The safety injection system for both units and the shared systems of spent fuel and radwaste processing were characterized as alpha level 3 (Elevated). However, another section of the same evaluation report appeared to have contradictory information, summarizing the activity ratios for each unit and concluding that the most recent classification for each unit was alpha level 1 (Minimal).
While observing work activities that were in progress during the refueling outage, the inspectors identified that the licensees work controls and exposure monitoring seemed to be more consistent with the summarized information rather than the characterization for the systems that were being worked. Specifically, the inspectors observed:
- (1) work activities in the Unit 1 Keyway (under vessel),
- (2) removal activities of the resistance temperature detector (RTD) manifold from the reactor coolant system,
- (3) opening the steam generator manways with diaphragm removal and
- (4) work in the spent fuel pool. For these activities, the inspectors observed that the licensees radiological controls were similar to controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination (Level 1 or Minimal). Based on the inspectors observations and discussions with the licensee, the licensee was unable to demonstrate whether the radiological controls implemented to protect workers and monitor possible internal exposure were effective for the alpha contamination hazards present in these work areas. Specifically, the licensee indicated that it needed additional time to demonstrate how its alpha characterization was consistent with its procedures, job planning, work controls, and exposure monitoring for individuals performing the work to ensure that radiological exposures were monitored and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements (10 CFR Part 20).
Planned Closure Actions: The licensee planned to evaluate its alpha monitoring implemented at the site and to clarify/define how the alpha characterization informs job planning, establishes adequate work controls, and monitors exposure for individuals performing work in areas where normal controls for beta-gamma contamination are not adequate for Significant or Elevated alpha contamination (as identified in the work activities discussed above).
Licensee Actions: The licensee entered the condition in the corrective action program and provided the inspectors with an example from 2021 that involved work with elevated alpha contamination.
Corrective Action References: AR 2424060 Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors reviewed action requests entered into the corrective action program for the following:
complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the issue identified in the corrective action program
evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues
consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
classification and prioritization of the problems resolution, commensurate with the safety significance
identification of corrective actions that are appropriately focused to correct the problem
completion of corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue
identification of negative trends associated with human or equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety
operating experience is adequately evaluated for applicability, and applicable lessons learned are communicated to appropriate organizations, and implemented The inspectors completed the review and did not note any significant trends that were not already identified and addressed by the licensee.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 11, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 13, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Questions During Switchyard Summer Readiness
Walkdown
06/09/2022
M-144, Sheet 2
Heating & Ventilation Temperature Control P&ID
Drawings
M-214, Sheet 4
P&ID Auxiliary Steam, Heating Steam, Chilled & Hot Water
Systems & Details
CL 17C
Heating and Ventilation Checklist
Miscellaneous
NPM 2022-0048
Seasonal Readiness - Summer 2022
05/19/2022
Procedures
Seasonal Readiness
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Material on -5 FT, Unit 1 Area
04/25/2022
110E017, Sheet 1
P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
110E017, Sheet 2
P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
110E017, Sheet 2
P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
110E017, Sheet 3
P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
110E018, Sheet 1
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
110E018, Sheet 2
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
110E018, Sheet 3
P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System
110E018, Sheet 4
P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
Drawings
541F091, Sheet 1
P&ID Reactor Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
Miscellaneous
1-CL-CC-001
Component Cooling Unit 1
NRC Question on PFP-1-CONT-FAC
04/08/2022
PFP-1-CONT-FAC - Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment
Building
04/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Question: PFP-0-PAB 66
04/12/2022
PFP-0-PAB-66
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 66 Ft
Fire Plans
PFP-1-CONT-
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building/Facade
Miscellaneous
Point Beach Nuclear Plant 4 Hour Fire Round Performance
04/11/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Sheet-PAB
NMH-201 Manhole Water Over Cables (WPS Power)
10/03/2020
MH-10 Alarm Did Not Come in on C-314
04/28/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
NMH-201 (WPS Shore Power) Found with Cables Flooded
05/05/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified Errors in Work Order
05/23/2022
6118 E-2
Single Line Diagram WPS/Connections Point Beach N.P.
Unit 1 & 2
Drawings
PBE-816
Cable Vault Locations Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2
Work Orders
Manholes: Yearly (Spring) Inspection
05/10/2022
1HX-015A/Motor Cooling Coil Insp/Cleaning (GL 89-13)
04/01/2022
Work Orders
1HX-015 A1-A8/Remove End Bells, Flex Hoses and
Pressure Test
04/01/2022
1P-001A RCP Seal Injection Line Boric Acid
10/15/2020
Unit 1A RCP Welded Attachment Liquid Penetrant
Indications
2/19/2021
Recordable Indication on SW Piping Support Welded
10/19/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Foreign Material Identified in 1CS-2188
01/25/2021
20-251-E
Boric Acid Evaluation for RCP 1P-1A
2-009-E
Boric Acid Evaluation for SI Pump 1P-15B
LTR-SDA-20-
079-P
Point Beach Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Flaw Assessment
for As-Found Linear Indications During Fall 2020 Refueling
Outage
SG-CDMP-19-8
Point Beach Unit 1 U1R38 Condition Monitoring and
Operational Assessment
Engineering
Evaluations
SG-CDMP-22-2
Point Beach U1R40 Steam Generator Degradation
Assessment
Miscellaneous
2019-0025
ASME XI Repair/Replacement Plan
EMB-PT-001
Visible Liquid Penetration Examination Record for
Weld No. W-D-1 under WO 40104554
04/07/2022
NDE Reports
PB1-PT-22-001
Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27
03/30/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PB1-UT-22-001
UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-09
04/03/2022
PB1-UT-22-002
UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-08
04/03/2022
PB1-UT-22-010
UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-10-SI-1001-21
04/05/2022
PB1-VT-22-013
Visual Exam of Boric Acid (BMV) of RPV Closure Head
04/05/2022
FP-PE-B31-
Welding Procedure Specification (WPS)
MRS-GEN-1217
Rolled Mechanical Plug Installation Using the Advanced
Rolling Tool and the Universal Platform Control Box
MRS-GEN-1240
Position Verification Procedure
MRS-GEN-1387
Steam Generator Tube Plugging Procedure Specification for
Point Beach Roll-Expanded Mechanical Tube Plugs
NDE-451
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Temperature
Applications 40°F to 125°F
NDE-757
Visual Examination for Leakage of Pressure Vessel
PBNP WP-1
Welding Procedure for Carbon Steels
Group P-1 to P-1 GTAW-SMAW
PBNP WP-2
Welding Procedure for Austenitic Stainless Steels ASME
Group P-8 GTAW-SMAW
Procedures
PDI-UT-2
Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of
Austenitic Pipe Welds
I
1CV-323A Prefab Welding
10/24/2020
NDE Administrative Task
11/06/2020
Work Orders
Weld Documents
11/02/2020
Miscellaneous
PBN LOC 22C
001E
As Left
Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence
Reactor Startup
Startup to Power Operation Unit 1
ORT 4 Unit 1
Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Device Unit 1
Procedures
RESP 4.1
BOL Physics Tests
Corrective Action
Documents
1MS-2010 Capacity Incorrectly Documented in
05/31/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NRC Identified Paperwork Needed Clarification
06/01/2022
Resulting from
Inspection
Work Order Missing Date on Signature Block
06/01/2022
1P-011A - 1Prep Assemble Pump & Motor/Machine
Baseplate
04/20/2022
1P-011A - Baseplate Grout Installation Per EC273505
04/20/2022
1P-011A H200 Pipe Support - Temporary
Remove & Restore
04/20/2022
04/14/2022
1MS-02010 / Replace Relief Valve (IST Program)
04/12/2022
04/14/2022
1PT-969 - Replace Transmitter
03/31/2022
Work Orders
B52-DB50-040; Replace Alarm Circuit Wire with SR Wire
04/18/2022
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist at 0700 for U1R40
04/04/2022
Ignition Control Permit for Work Order 40104554 on
04/04/2022
04/04/2022
Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB on 04/05/2022
04/05/2022
Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB for 04/04/2022
04/04/2022
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist at 0444 for U1R40
04/14/2022
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist at 1130 for U1R40
04/14/2022
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist at 1906 for U1R40
04/14/2022
1R40 Critical Path Schedule
04/14/2022
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist on 04/15/2022 at 0433 for U1R40
04/15/2022
PDC for the Unit 1 White Reactor Protection Calibration of
Temperature Loop
05/03/2022
High Risk and Short Duration TSAC Vulnerabilities
for 1(2) ICP 02.005 Safeguards Logic Test - Train A(B)
06/24/2022
1R40 Critical Path Schedule
04/13/2022
Miscellaneous
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist on 03/28/2022 at 2200 for U1R40
03/28/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2006-0035
Parametric Values
6704.001-C-001
Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure
6704.001-C-085
Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure
Calculations
6704.001-C-085
Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure
Audible Noise & Slightly Elevated Temps - 2P29 Discharge
Line
11/08/2021
DA-446 Isolation Valve Is Leaking
11/12/2021
2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B U2 Safeguards Void Found
at 2RH-V-2
01/03/2022
2-TS-ECCS-Train A WO 40769707 Void Found at 2RH-V-1
01/03/2022
H-2 Core Location Not Pass Drag Test
04/13/2022
Continued Operation using FA 1G16
04/15/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Configuration: Alternate MCC Supply Breaker
06/09/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Review Calculation PBNP-994-40-M02 for Mode 6 Operation
03/01/2022
110E029, Sheet 1
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
M-209, Sheet 15
P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator
Building M-209 SH. 15 Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2
M-217, Sheet 1
P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System Point Beach N.P.
Unit 1 & 2
107
Drawings
M-2202, Sheet 2
P&ID Feedwater System Point Beach N.P. Unit 2
Engineering
Changes
CRR Cancel EDG Calcs (See Topic Notes)
Miscellaneous
480 VAC System Design Basis Document
IT 100 G-04
Seat Leakage Test of Diesel Air Compressor Discharge
Check Valves G-04
Procedures
PC 8 Part 2
Monthly AFW Pump Discharge Piping Temperature Checks
PBTP 156, G-04 Minimum Air Start Pressure for Fast Start
11/30/2007
2-TS-ECCS-002 Train A
01/03/2022
Work Orders
2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B
01/03/2022
Calculations
2005-0050
PAB and Control Building Electrical Heat Load Calculation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Missing QC Initial on Completed Work Order
04/14/2022
Engineering
Changes
CC Pump Replacement; Upgrades for Pump Reliability
Work Orders
U1 RPI - Install New Rod Position Recorders in 1C04
04/06/2022
New Installed 1P-11A Did Not Meet Acceptance IT 12A
04/10/2022
IT 12A - CC Pumps and Valves While (in Review)
(Rebaselining)
04/10/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
(P) IT 12 Train A - 1P-11A, (SQR) (Rebaselining)
04/10/2022
Procedures
PC 29
Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test
1P-011A - Operations PMT - RTS
04/27/2022
1MS-2017C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2018C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2017D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2018D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
U1 RPI - RPIR Installation PMT
04/10/2022
1MS-2018A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2018B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2017A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
1MS-2017B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve
04/14/2022
IT-280A, U1 MS Stop VLVS Stroke (CSD) < 200 DegF
04/15/2022
1ICP 4.29-1 - RPI Indicator Calibration and System Checks
04/11/2022
1SI-00896B-O: MOV Actuator Diagnostics & Inspections
04/20/2022
1SI-00896B-O: MOV Stem Lube/Actuat Gearbox Grease
Insp
04/01/2022
2B52-29B; Setup and Stage Spare Breaker Per RMP 9369-1
2/15/2022
2B52-29B; Perform Breaker Swap Using A Prepared Spare
06/08/2022
Work Orders
06/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
NRC Identified Issues During CTMT Walk Down
04/20/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Inspection
Tagout Coversheet for the Tagout of 1 CS P-28A Motor
Interference
04/07/2022
Miscellaneous
Tagout of 1 CW-3 Diving/Welding
04/12/2022
2RMP 9096-1
Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using BIACH
Tensioning System
CL 20
Post Outage Containment Closeout Inspection Unit 1
CL 20A Unit 1
Unit 1 Containment Closeout Inspection
Startup to Power Operation Unit 1
OP 4D Part 3
Draining the Reactor Cavity and Reactor Coolant System
Procedures
OP 4E Unit 1
Reactor Coolant System Lowered Inventory Requirements
Unit 1
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
SAT Analysis Work Order Documentation (NRC Identified)
06/27/2022
0-SOP-FLEX-003
FLEX Portable Diesel Low Pressure Pump Operation,
Z-2003A & Z-2003B
CAMP 226
Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method
Procedures
ORT 3B
Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered
Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit1
1IA-3047-O - Pre-Maintenance Testing - ORT 47
04/06/2022
SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3
01/14/2022
SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3
01/14/2022
IT-05 Train A
06/01/2022
Work Orders
TS-82, G-02 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
06/22/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Typo Found on Paperwork
05/25/2022
- Drill* NARS Form for Classification at 12:40
05/19/2022
- Drill* NARS Form for Classification at 12:17
05/19/2022
Miscellaneous
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
April 2022 DEP PI Data Corrected Document
Corrective Action
Documents
Unanticipated Dose Rate Alarm
2/15/2022
Alpha Characterization
04/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Gatehouse Portal Monitor Issues
HP-100-012521
Site Alpha Characterization Update
01/28/2021
Miscellaneous
HP-100-032922
Site Alpha Characterization Update
04/04/2022
HP 2.14
Containment Keyway Personnel Access
HP 9.2
Steam Generator Primary Channel Head Ventilation
HPIP 3.52
Airborne Radioactivity Surveys
NISP-RP-010
Radiological Job Coverage
Alpha Monitoring
Procedures
ALARA Implementing Procedure
DXW06OY
Whole Body Count for Individual Working in the Keyway
Radiation
Surveys
JXF0VU9
Whole Body Count for Individual in Keyway
RWP 22-1020
Keyway Entries
RWP 22-1025
Scaffolding Containment Outage Activities
RWP 22-1053
Unit 1 Narrow Range RTD Replacement
RWP 22-1054
S/G Handhole Cover Remove/Install
RWP 22-1057
Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing, Tube Sheet
Cleaning
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 22-1058
S/G Manway/Shield Doors & Diaphragm Removal, Cleaning
& Installation
Procedures
HPIP 4.58
Issuance of Respiratory Equipment
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Reactor Coolant
System Leakage
04/01/2021 -
03/31/2022
Miscellaneous
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Safety System
Functional Failures
04/01/2021 -
03/31/2022
LI-AA-100-10003
NRC Performance Indicator
71151
Procedures
NP 5.2.16
NRC Performance Indicators
71152A
Corrective Action
PBN Staff Worked Outside of Process to Install ADV
2/02/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Temporary
Temporary Configuration Changes
Procedures
Standard Design Process
71152S
Miscellaneous
Trend ARs 120121-053122
06/02/2022
1P-28B (MFP) Trip on Timed Overcurrent
07/31/2021
1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open
07/31/2021
1HC-481 ('B' FRV BYP Hand Controller) Didn't Control in
Auto
07/31/2021
1FD-2516B (MSR 'A' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip
07/31/2021
1FD-2517B (MSR 'D' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip
07/31/2021
07/31/2021
Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due to 1P-28B MFP Trip
08/01/2021
1FD-2517A MSR Drain Didn't Open
08/01/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
1FT-475 SG B Steam Flow Channel Indicates on Scale Post
Trip
08/01/2021
Miscellaneous
Root Cause for the 1P-28B-M Main Feed Pump Motor Trip
2/14/2022
1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open
08/09/2021
Work Orders
1OS-1-MOV/Failed to Shut Post Trip
08/09/2021