IR 05000266/2022004
| ML23023A220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2023 |
| From: | Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/EB2 |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2022004 | |
| Download: ML23023A220 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2022004 AND 05000301/2022004
Dear Michael Strope:
On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On January 6, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
January 24, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2022004 and 05000301/2022004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-004-0052
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022
Inspectors:
R. Baker, Senior Operations Engineer
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
J. Corujo-Sandin, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Hansen, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
V. Petrella, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Roach, Senior Operations Engineer
E. Rosario, Reactor Inspector
D. Turpin, Resident Inspector
J. Weigandt, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Licensee Failed to Evaluate All Credited Functions When a Safety-Related Valve Failed to Operate Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-01 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Renewed Operating License Condition 4.F. (fire protection), for the failure to evaluate all credited functions of a failed component as required by EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments. Specifically, when 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, was unable to close remotely from the control room, the licensee evaluated the safety-related pressure boundary function but failed to assess the functions associated with fire protection and the emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
Licensee Preconditioned Valve Prior to Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because the licensee established unevaluated preconditioning prior to performing stroke time testing of valve 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation. Specifically, the licensee, in several cases, manipulated 1RC-427 prior to the performance of the required IST surveillance, which potentially masked degraded conditions.
Inadequate Maintenance Rule Monitoring of the Reactor Coolant System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-03 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Maintenance Rule, for the failure to monitor the performance of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (RCS) against licensee-established goals.
Specifically, the licensee did not identify and properly account for failures of 1RC-427,
RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, to close remotely from the control room, which demonstrated that the performance of the Unit 1 RCS was not being effectively monitored and controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266/2020004-01 Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Close from Main Control Room 71111.12 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated station readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) G-04 emergency diesel generator starting air and the glycol cooling systems on October 5, 2022
- (2) Unit 2 train B component cooling water system on November 17, 2022
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire zones 763, 764, 770, 772, 773, 778, 780, and 785 on November 14, 2022 (2)fire zones 775, 776, 777, 783, 784, and 786 on November 14, 2022 (3)fire zones 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, and 150 on November 15, 2022 (4)fire zones 162, 163, 164, 165, and 166 on November 18, 2022
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on October 31, 2022.
71111.07T - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance Heat Exchanger (Service Water Cooled) (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:
(1)1D containment fan motor cooler (1HX-15D)
Ultimate Heat Sink (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the ultimate heat sink performance on the following:
- (1) The ultimate heat sink, specifically Sections 03.04.b and 03.04.e were completed.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification program annual operating tests and biennial written exams administered from October 10, 2022, through November 11, 2022.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on Wednesday, November 2, 2022.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during G-02 emergency diesel generator testing on November 13, 2022, and December 11, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator requalification exam on October 18, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) B52-DB50-040, 480 Volt DB-50 switchgear breaker
- (2) DY-0C, White 125V DC/120V AC inverter
- (3) Unit 1 spray additive eductor suction valve, 1SI836A
- (4) G-05 gas turbine generator
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk due to reduced coincidence on reactor protection logic during testing, on September 27, 2022 (2)elevated risk due to entry into a shutdown statement, reduced logic coincidence, and testing outside a protected train for Unit 2 engineered safety features (ESF) system logic train B testing, on September 29, 2022 (3)elevated risk due to entry into a 6-hour shutdown statement, entry into an 8-hour shutdown statement, and racking and tripping reactor trip breaker and reactor trip bypass breaker, on September 29, 2022 (4)elevated station risk due to G-04 diesel generator testing on October 4, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 Tave/Tref error meter cycling (2)white substance found during the inspection of HX-13B spent fuel pool heat exchanger
- (3) Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge flow indicator reads slightly over 20 gpm with no flow
- (4) Unit 1 train B safety injection pump oil bubbler empty (5)high vibrations on the control room emergency filtration system
- (6) Unit 1 train A component cooling water pump motor temperature is high
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines were updated in accordance with the PWR generic sever accident technical guidelines and validated.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
(1)1ICP 13.004B, SPEC 200, Reactor Vessel Level and Subcooling Post Accident Monitoring Instruments 18 Month Calibration, after the calibration of the reactor vessel water level and subcooling post-accident monitoring instruments on September 19, 2022 (2)1RMP 9056-4, B-04 Safety Related and Technical Specification Relay Calibrations, after the calibration of the loss-of-voltage relays 1-271/B04, 1-272/B04, and 1-273/B04 on October 24, 2022
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees compliance with the requirements specified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-approved Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the emergency response organization.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
PCR No. 2388138, 07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388248, 07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388292, 07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388405, 07/15/2021
PCR No. 2396565, 07/15/2021
PCR No. 2371336, 08/24/2021
PCR No. 2395711, 08/24/2021
PCR No. 2371891, 12/06/2021
PCR No. 2393791, 12/07/2021 PCR No. 2387151, 12/16/2021
PCR No. 2411811, 12/16/2021
PCR No. 2413964, 06/06/2022
PCR No. 2425960, 06/06/2022 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Shift Manager emergency action level determination and notification during simulator requalification on October 18,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)area radiation monitors in the auxiliary building (2)friskers used at the main exit from the radiologically controlled area (3)portable radiation protection equipment stored ready for use at the radiation protection checkpoint entrance (4)personal contamination monitors 'ready for use' at the exit from the radiologically controlled area (5)personal contamination monitors 'ready for use' at the primary access facility exit (6)continuous air monitors in the auxiliary building (7)tool and equipment monitors 'ready for use' at the exit from the radiologically controlled area
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Mirion iSolo PBNP# 472932
- (2) FASTSCAN whole body counter
- (3) Ludlum 177 serial number 348303
- (4) Canberra GEM serial number 480459 (0712-118)
- (5) Mirion Cronos serial number 1511-198 (6)tool and equipment monitor identification number 330699
- (7) Escort Elf serial number A4-19921
- (8) MGP AMP-50 serial number 479301
- (9) Eberline AMS-4 serial number 330687
- (10) Canberra ARGOS 5AB serial number 712-048/0480461 (11)high volume air sampler serial number 330842 (12)low volume air sampler serial number 330800
- (13) Ludlum 9-3 serial number 333086 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
(1)waste disposal system liquid monitor RE-218 (2)auxiliary building ventilation monitor SPING
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022 EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
The site is in compliance with ANS performance indicator reporting requirements. The site's primary ANS is the Integrated Public Alert Warning System (IPAWS), therefore, for the period of this inspection, no siren performance testing data was available or required. In accordance with EPFAQ 21-03, Revision 1, "Reporting ANS Data Following a Transition to IPAWS," the performance of the licensees ANS was evaluated using NRC Inspection Procedure 71114 Attachment 2, Alert and Notification System" with the results documented in the corresponding section of this inspection report.
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) AR 02429535, 2SC-955 Boric Acid Identified During Containment Walkdown
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program from June 1 to November 30, 2022, for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee Failed to Evaluate All Credited Functions When a Safety-Related Valve Failed to Operate Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-01 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Renewed Operating License Condition 4.F. (fire protection), for the failure to evaluate all credited functions of a failed component as required by EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments. Specifically, when 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, was unable to close remotely from the control room, the licensee evaluated the safety-related pressure boundary function but failed to assess the functions associated with fire protection and the emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
Description:
On October 4, 2020, while performing a plant shutdown of Unit 1 for refueling, the licensee attempted to close 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, from the control room as directed by the plant shutdown procedure. The valve showed dual indication but failed to close fully. The licensee re-opened the valve and immediately received a "Full Open" indication indicating the valve had barely moved from its "Full Open" position. A second attempt showed the same indications. The licensee entered the condition in the corrective action program so it plant staff could evaluate it for operability and functionality to determine if follow-up actions were warranted.
The licensee determined the valve was "Operable." They determined that the valve maintained its safety-related function as a reactor coolant system pressure boundary valve.
However, the valve has other functions, some of which are risk significant. The licensee did not evaluate the valve's functionality against any other functions, notably the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) mitigation actions as directed by the EOPs and fire protection. 1RC-427 has an augmented quality function requirement to close in support of the NFPA 805 post-fire safe shutdown assessment. After questions from the resident inspectors about the non-safety-related functions and how they were affected, the licensee evaluated the additional credited functions and determined that the valve was not functional for several functions.
Corrective Actions: The licensee re-evaluated the valve against all credited functions and determined it could not perform some of those functions and declared it non-functional. The licensee took the necessary actions, including establishing compensatory measures for the NFPA 805 (fire protection) vulnerability.
Corrective Action References: AR 2378631
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to evaluate all credited functions for a failed component as required by EN-AA-203-1001, "Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments," was a performance deficiency. Specifically, when 1RC-427 failed to close remotely from the control room, the licensee only evaluated the safety-related function even though the valve had other credited risk-significant functions.
Screening: Even though there were multiple functions not evaluated, the fire protection function was the most significant. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the valve was not able to perform its required non-safety-related fire protection function for which the licensee failed to implement the required compensatory measures.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Because the issue was related to the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) category, the inspectors answered the questions in step 1.4.7. The inspectors answered "no" to questions A and B and "yes" to question C.
This progressed the inspectors to Step 1.5. The inspectors determined the finding screened to Green (very low safety significance) because the licensee has a fire PRA [probability risk assessment] capable of adequately evaluating the risk and that evaluation indicated a delta-CDF [core damage frequency] of less than 1E-6 as determined by an SRA [senior reactor analyst].
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the licensee failed to completely identify the functions (both safety and non-safety-related) that the valve is required to perform.
Enforcement:
Violation: Point Beach Nuclear Plants 1, Renewed Operating License Condition 4.F, requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805, as specified in the license amendment requests and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated September 8, 2016.
Contrary to the above, from October 4, 2020, through December 21, 2021, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to implement required compensatory measures when 1RC-427 was unable to perform its credited fire protection function.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee Preconditioned Valve Prior to Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because the licensee established unevaluated preconditioning prior to performing stroke time testing of valve 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation. Specifically, the licensee, in several cases, manipulated 1RC-427 prior to the performance of the required IST surveillance, which potentially masked degraded conditions.
Description:
On October 4, 2020, while performing a plant shutdown of Unit 1 for refueling, the licensee attempted to close valve 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, from the control room as directed by the plant shutdown procedure. The valve showed dual indication but failed to close fully. The licensee re-opened the valve and immediately received a "Full Open" indication indicating the valve had barely moved from its "Full Open" position. A second attempt showed the same indications. The licensee entered the condition in the corrective action program to evaluate its operability and document the need for maintenance.
On October 11, 2020, the licensee went to the field, manually manipulated the valve to close and open, and left it mid-position. The licensee then stroked the valve several times electrically and determined that no maintenance was required since the valve was moving as expected. On October 19, 2021, the licensee timed the stroking of 1RC-427 as part of the post-maintenance testing and used it to satisfy the testing required by their inservice testing (IST) program. The valve successfully met the IST requirements and showed no signs of degradation during the testing.
One of the items noted in the condition report was a previous failure of this same valve during the last refueling outage. That condition report identified other times when this valve failed to close. Each time the licensee went into the field and performed work on the valve, either by actual maintenance or manipulating the valve to correct the issue. And each time, the licensee, within a few days of working on the valve, performed the timing of the valve to meet IST requirements. Each time, the valve passed the testing requirements and showed no significant signs of degradation. The licensee closed the issue as resolved with no further actions.
Corrective Actions: The licensee re-evaluated the condition and determined that the valve was unacceptably preconditioned before performing the IST surveillance. By the time of the re-evaluation, the valve was already considered non-functional based on other information. In addition, the licensee adopted a newer version of the ASME OM Code that no longer requires 1RC-427 to be included in the licensee's IST program.
Corrective Action References: AR 2384400
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to evaluate and prevent unacceptable preconditioning on valve 1RC-427 in accordance with ER-AA-113-1000, Inservice Testing Procedure, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee manually (locally) and electronically (remotely) manipulated the valve several times to verify it was able to stroke prior to performing the inservice valve timing test without an evaluation to determine the effect of the preconditioning.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on multiple occasions, the licensee manipulated (both manually and electrically) valve 1RC-427 prior to performing required inservice testing which masked actual degradation with the valve.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "no" to all the questions in Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to schedule the maintenance and testing such that unacceptable preconditioning doesn't occur.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. It also states that test procedures shall include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met.
Contrary to the above, on October 19, 2020, the licensee did not establish an adequate test program to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that 1RC-427 would function satisfactorily in service was properly performed. Specifically, the licensee allowed preconditioning or 1RC-427 prior to performing required inservice testing which masked actual degradation within the valve.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inadequate Maintenance Rule Monitoring of the Reactor Coolant System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266/2022004-03 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.12 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Maintenance Rule, for the failure to monitor the performance of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (RCS) against licensee-established goals.
Specifically, the licensee did not identify and properly account for failures of 1RC-427, RC loop B cold leg to CVCS letdown isolation, to close remotely from the control room, which demonstrated that the performance of the Unit 1 RCS was not being effectively monitored and controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function.
Description:
On October 24, 2020, the licensee performed a maintenance rule evaluation for the failure of 1RC-427 to close on October 4, 2020. In this evaluation, the licensee documented several functions that the valve performs. There is a passive safety-related function to maintain the reactor coolant system pressure boundary and several non-safety-related functions. The evaluation calls states that 1RC-427 has an augmented quality (AQ) to remotely close during an NFPA 805 event to support post-fire safe shutdown. It is also used within several of the licensee's abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) and emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to close to mitigate the consequences from a loss of coolant accident. However, despite documenting that 1RC-427 was required to close to perform these functions and the initial condition is that 1RC-427 failed to close remotely, the licensee did not consider the failure to be a maintenance rule functional failure (MRFF) as defined by licensee procedures ER-AA-100-2002, Maintenance Rule Program Administration, and NP 7.7.5, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, because the licensee was able to stroke the valve manually then electrically stroke the valve with no maintenance performed.
The inspectors questioned the motor-operated valve's ability to perform its functions to close remotely from the control room and automatically for NFPA 805 safe shutdown, AOPs, and EOPs, when it was unable to remotely close when transitioning reactor Unit 1 from hot standby to cold shutdown. Further investigation revealed that this valve has had failures to close multiple times over the course of the last 10 years. When the valve failed to close in 2019, no MRFF evaluation was performed (until 2021 when investigating the recent failure),and in 2020, it was determined not to be an MRFF and was not evaluated against the licensee's performance criteria for either date. Since the valves performance was not being adequately monitored, the licensee failed to recognize the significance of the valve failure, did not determine the cause of the failure, and did not take effective corrective actions for the failures.
Corrective Actions: The licensee re-evaluated the functional failure and determined that the valve failure was an MPFF, based on a historical review determined it was also a repeat functional failure (RMPFF) and that a 50.65(a)(1) assessment was required. On June 14, 2021, the licensee completed the assessment and determined that the reactor coolant system no longer met the 50.65(a)(2) requirements. By the time the licensee completed this assessment, the system was already in 50.65(a)(1) status for a different issue.
Corrective Action References: AR 2370332 AR 2387544
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to monitor the performance of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system (RCS) against licensee-established goals in accordance with ER-AA-100-2002, Maintenance Rule Program Administration, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not identify and properly account for the failure of 1RC-427 to close remotely from the control room within the maintenance rule program.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, not properly evaluating equipment failures and tracking them with the maintenance rule program can lead to more significant concerns.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "no" to all the questions in Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the individual that performed the maintenance rule evaluation misdiagnosed the functional failure and had a misconception with the relationship between operability and functionality.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.65 (a)(1), requires, in part, that the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance of SSCs within the scope of the rule as defined by 10 CFR 50.65 (b), against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) states, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance of an SSC is being effectively controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function.
Contrary to the above, from March 24, 2019, until June 14, 2021, the licensee failed to monitor the equipment against licensee-established goals when the performance of the Unit 1 reactor coolant system had not been effectively controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance. Specifically, the licensee did not identify and properly account for the maintenance preventable functional failures of the1RC-427 valve that occurred on March 24, 2019, and October 4, 2020.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
URI Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Close from Main Control Room URI 05000266/2020004-01 71111.12
Description:
Three finding/violations were identified as described above/below Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors reviewed action requests entered into the corrective action program for the following:
complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the issue identified in the corrective action program
evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues
consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
classification and prioritization of the problems resolution, commensurate with the safety significance
identification of corrective actions that are appropriately focused on correcting the problem
completion of corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue
identification of negative trends associated with human or equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety
operating experience is adequately evaluated for applicability, and applicable lessons learned are communicated to appropriate organizations, and implemented.
The inspectors completed the review and did not note any significant trends that needed to be identified and addressed by the licensee.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On January 6, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to M. Strope and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to D. Peterson, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 27, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to E. Schultz, Licensing Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 28, 2022, the inspectors presented the Triennial Heat Sink inspection results to B. Beltz, Organizational Effectiveness Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
On November 3, 2022, the inspectors presented the Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program inspection results to M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 7, 2022, the inspectors presented the 2022 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Biennial Written Examination and Annual Operating Test summary review inspection results to A. Moore, Operations Training Supervisor, and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 7, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to E. Schultz, Licensing Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PBNP Seasonal Readiness Memo - Winter 2022-23
11/11/2022
Miscellaneous
Winter Seasonal Readiness Work List
10/18/2022
Procedures
Seasonal Readiness
110E029 Sheet 2
Auxiliary Coolant System
110E029 Sheet 3
Auxiliary Coolant System
M-209 Sheet 15
P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator Building
Drawings
M-227 Sheet 2
P&ID Glycol Cooling System Diesel Generator Building
2-CL-CC-001
Component Cooling Unit 2
Procedures
CL 11A G-04
G-04 Diesel Generator Checklist
PFP-0-PAB-66
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 66 Ft
PFP-0-PAB-8
Pre-Fire Plan Primary Auxiliary Building Elevation 8' and
Below
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Protected Area North (Inside the Fence)
Miscellaneous
Crew B 4Q 2022 Fire Drill
10/31/2022
Calculations
98-0020
Containment Recirculation Fan Motor Cooler Service
Water Flow vs. Temperature Requirements for Normal and
Accident Modes of Operation
2423963
1CW-00003, Seal Well Outlet MOV Damage
04/06/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
2425351
U1R4 - HX-15D1-8 Containment Fan Coolers EC
Inspection
04/18/2022
2440412
Rust on Floor Directly Under the U1 and U2 CFC Service
Water Supply Piping
10/26/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2440530
2HX-15B Service Water Return Vibration - Inspect Pipe
Support (HB-19-2H119)
10/27/2022
EPB31S07001802103
Water Intake Facility General Arrangement
M-207 SH.1
P&ID Service Water System
Drawings
M-207 SH.4
P&ID Service Water System
Engineering
Evaluations
2008-0005
Containment Fan & Fan Motor Coolers HX Tube Plugging
Criteria
Miscellaneous
PBW-WMP-700
Westinghouse Letter on Service Water Strainer Power
Supply
05/02/1968
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Circulating Water System Malfunction
Service Water System Malfunction
OI-70
Service Water System Operation
OI-72
Containment Air Recirculation System
RMP 9155
Diver's Inspection Report - Intake Structure
Procedures
TS-33
Containment Accident Recirculation Fan-Cooler Units Unit
40472820-01
1HX-015D - GL 89-13 Motor Cooling Coil Eddy Current
05/01/2019
40472820-02
1HX-015D - GL 89-13 Motor Cooling Coil Eddy Current
05/01/2019
40588444-01
1HX-015D - GL 89-13 Motor Cooling Coil Internal
10/29/2020
40631295-01
1HX-015D - GL 89-13 Motor Cooling Coil
Inspection/Cleaning
05/04/2019
40667905-01
GL 89-13 Inspect and Clean Pumphouse Forebay
11/02/2020
40753062-02
Unit 1 Diving Activities per RMP 9155-2
05/04/2022
40757304-01
GL 89-13 Inspect Crib/Remove Buoys and Fish Deterrent
10/19/2021
Work Orders
40801224-01
TS-33 U1C Accident Fan Cooler Units Surveillance Test
09/08/2022
Miscellaneous
22 Annual Licensed
Operator Requal
Testing Results
Point Beach 2022 Annual LORT Exam Summary Results
11/22/2022
1RE-212 Made Inoperable Following Testing (TS and
ODCM)
09/26/2021
Inadequate Operability Assessment-Degraded RCS
Insulation
2/03/2022
Operability Basis Lacked Documentation of Impact of
Degraded Condition
2/04/2022
Immediate Operability Determination Lacks Required
Considerations
2/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Guarded Equipment Postings Related to G-02 Outage
07/11/2022
22 Week 4 RO A-
Top/C-Bottom
RO Written Examination
11/03/2022
22 Week 4 RO
Categories
RO Question Selections from 2022 LOC Biennial Master
Exam Bank
10/19/2022
Miscellaneous
22 Week 4 SRO A-
Top/C-Bottom
SRO Written Examination
11/03/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22 Week 4 SRO
Categories
SRO Question Selections from 2022 LOC Biennial Master
Exam Bank
10/19/2022
Attendance Records
Licensed Operator Continuous Training Attendance
Records (Various)
21-2022
Medical Records
Licensed Operator Medical Records for 6 Operators
11/01/2022
P000.004A
Rev 1
P000.008B
Rev 11
P000.027D
Rev 2
P000.027F
Rev 1
P000.039E
Rev 5
P000.041
Rev 3
P000.044A
Rev 5
P000.055
Rev 5
P012.001C
Rev 5
P061.001A
Rev 5
P061.005
Rev 4
PBN DT 94.0,
Simulator Health
Management
Transient Testing - Manual Reactor Trip
04/24/2021
PBN DTG 94.0,
Simulator Health
Management
Transient Testing - Simultaneous Trip of Both Reactor
Coolant Pumps
04/24/2021
PBN DTG 94.0,
Simulator Health
Management
Transient Testing - Maximum Rate Power Ramp 100% to
75% to 100% U1C40
04/24/2021
PBN DTG 94.0,
Simulator Health
Management
Transient Testing - Maximum Design Load Rejection
04/24/2021
PBN LC 000.046E
Dynamic Scenario Guide
Rev 2
PBN LOC 000.049E
Dynamic Scenario Guide
Rev 2
PBN LOC 000.049E
Simulator Scenario Based Testing NRC Annual Operating
Exam Scenario
Rev 0
PBN LOC 000.051E
Dynamic Scenario Guide
Rev 3
PBN LOI NRC 22E
Simulator Scenario Based Testing 2021 NRC Exam
Rev 0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Scenario 1
PBN LPC 000.008E
Dynamic Scenario Guide
Rev 6
PBN SIMGL C1.4
Unit 1 Cycle 41 Core Reload Simulator Modification
2/23/2021
Remediation Records
22 Annual Operating Test Failure Remediation
Packages for 4 Individuals
11/02/2022
Remediation Records
22 Biennial Written Examination Failure Remediation
Package for 1 Individual
11/02/2022
Simulator Review
Committee Meeting
Meeting Minutes
03/15/2022
Simulator Review
Committee Meeting
Meeting Minutes
09/26/2022
Watch Proficiency
Records
eSOMS Credit for Standing Watch 04/01/2022 to
09/30/2022 Reports
11/02/2022
FL-LOC-TPD
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program
Description
Rev 4
License Maintenance and Activation
Rev 8
NRC Licensed Operator Exam Security
Rev 6
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Annual Operating
and Biennial Written Exams
Rev 8
TR-AA-220-1004-F04
Dynamic Simulator Exam Scenario Review Checklist
Rev 0
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
Rev 15
TR-AA-230-1007-F01
Crew Simulator Evaluation Forms for 2022 Annual
Operating Test - Staff Crew
Rev 2
TR-AA-230-1007-F02
Individual Simulator Evaluation Forms for 2022 Annual
Operating Test - Staff Crew-All Operators
Rev 3
Procedures
Training Examination Security
Rev 5
Simulator Work
Requests
List of Open Simulator Work Requests
Work Orders
Simulator Work
Requests
List of Closed Simulator Work Requests Since Previous
Biennial Requalification Program Inspection
Miscellaneous
PBN LOC 000 051E
NRC Annual Operating Exam
1SI-836A Spray Eductor Suction Valve Strokes Too Slow
04/26/2007
Stroke Timing of Valves After Hardware Replacement
01/19/2008
Corrective Action
Documents
Trip Bar Gap Out of Tolerance on Left Side of Breaker
2/17/2016
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
D-108 Battery Charger Trouble Coincident with 1P-11B
Start
04/09/2022
SR Breaker Repaired with Wire from NNS Breaker
04/14/2022
1SI-836A Failed IST Stroke Time
04/16/2022
Validation of Safety Related Parts - Refocus
04/16/2022
B52-DB50-040; Check Control Wiring Stud Posts
04/18/2022
DY-0C White Spare Inverter Failed
09/18/2022
DY-0C X3 Gate Transformer Board Cracked Solder Joints
09/23/2022
G05 HMI Panel Screen Says Operating System Not Found
09/24/2022
Inadequate Y System Maintenance Rule Performance
Criteria
10/12/2022
1RC-427 Indicates Intermediate Following Attempted
Closure
08/07/2013
1RC 427 Failed to Shut
08/07/2013
1RC-427, RC Loop to CVCS Letdown, Does Not Close
03/24/2019
1RC-427 Will Not Stroke From 1C04 in Control
10/04/2020
1RC-427 Close Stroke During 1R40 Shutdown Review
04/02/2022
Perform Forensics Examination on Removed Actuator
04/12/2022
N/A Missed in Procedure 9369-1
11/03/2022
Screening Question Adequacy Questioned for 1RC-427
MOV Fail to Close
2/16/2020
Valve 1RC-427 Pre-Conditioned Prior to PMT Inservice
Test
03/31/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Repeat MRFF requires (A)(1) Eval Based on MRFF
Determination
03/22/2021
Drawings
110E017 Sheet 3
P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1
Engineering
Evaluations
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan for Unit 1 RC System
09/13/2021
Fleet Maintenance Rule Scoping Document for System Y
1RC-427 Maintenance Rule Timeline
11/03/2022
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan for Gas Turbine
Miscellaneous
Unavailability Time for G-05
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EN-AA-203-1207-F01
CFR Applicability Determination Form for Standing
Order for 1RC-427, Rev 0
2/22/2020
Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments
Maintenance Rule Program Administration
FPTE 2016-003
NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment
NP 7.7.5
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
Procedures
OM 3.27
Control of Fire Protection and NFPA 805 Equipment
1SI-836A-O - Diagnostic Check
07/21/2008
1SI-836A-O Replace Linkage Arm Bolting
01/18/2008
Perform Diagnostic Check of 1SI-836A Valve
06/23/2004
1SI-836A-O - Diagnostic Check
07/03/2016
1RC-00427 Open and Inspect Valve During 1R40
04/02/2022
B52-DB50-040; Breaker Maint Per RMP 9303 and RMP
9369-1
11/13/2022
SR Breaker Repaired with Wire from NNS Breaker
07/24/2022
Work Orders
1SI-836A Failed IST Stroke Time
07/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AOP-31 - Solar Magnetic Disturbance Alert Response
09/27/2022
PBF-2102c for AOP-31 Rev 4 Periodic Review
01/06/2021
Work Activity Risk Management Plan for the 1(2) ICP
2.005 A(B) Safeguards Logic Test
09/29/2022
Work Activity Risk Management Plan for 1(2) ICP
2.003A(B) Reactor Protection Logic Testing
09/29/2022
PDC for the U1 ICP 02.013 4.16KV Undervoltage Matrix
Relays Surveillance Test
09/27/2022
Miscellaneous
NP 10.3.7
On-line Safety Assessment
Solar Magnetic Disturbance Alert Response
Solar Magnetic Disturbance Alert Response
Procedures
Guarded Equipment
2ICP 2.3B - Reactor Protection Logic Test - Train B
09/30/2022
Work Orders
2ICP 2.5B -- Safeguards Logic Test - Train B
09/29/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
HX-13B SFP HX White Substance Found During
Inspection
09/27/2022
1P-11A Motor Temp High
10/02/2022
TWR To Document Info Share on 1P-11A-M Higher Temps
10/05/2022
2FI-4002 Indicates 20 GPM, while it Should Read 0
10/08/2022
HX-13A/B GL 89-13 Shell Side Borescope Inspection
Improvement
10/24/2022
High Vibrations Noticed in the Control Room From CREFS
11/16/2022
Degraded Inboard Fan Bearing
11/16/2022
Tave Error Meter Reading +0.9 F
10/14/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Bubbler Found Empty on 1P-015B
11/02/2022
Miscellaneous
CCW Pump Motors IR Temperature
10/03/2022
Procedures
GL 89-13 Program Document
HX-013B / Video-Probe Inspect Shell Side of SFP Cooler
10/06/2022
Work Orders
Tave Error Meter Reading +0.9 F
10/14/2022
Thermal Evaluation of Unit 1 Containment Dome Truss in
Support of Risk Informed LAR
001-A
Seismic Evaluation of Unit 1 Containment Dome Truss in
Support of Risk Informed LAR
001-A
Seismic Fragility Analysis of Containment Dome Trusses
000-A
Calculations
Probability of Failure vs. Temperature for Unit 1
Containment Dome Truss in Support of Risk Informed LAR
000-A
06/19/2015
09/08/2017
Corrective Action
Documents
08/16/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
SAMG SAG-7 Review Documentation Missing
2/13/2022
EP Review using Point Beach Nuclear Plant EOP/AOP
Verification Review Form for AR 02055248
Miscellaneous
SRO Review using Point Beach Nuclear Plant EOP/AOP
Verification Review Form for AR 02055248
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Technical Review using Point Beach Nuclear Plant
EOP/AOP Verification Review Form of AR 02055248
08/14/2015
Training Impact Review for AR 02055248
09/24/2015
Validation Review Using Point Beach Nuclear Plant
EOP/AOP Validation Form for AR 02055248
SRO Review using Point Beach Nuclear Plant EOP/AOP
Verification Review Form for AR 02224032
Validation Review using Point Beach Nuclear Plant
EOP/AOP Validation Form for AR 02224032
08/19/2018
Commitment to Maintain Severe Accident Management
Guidelines
2/17/2015
OM 4.3.2
EOP/AOP Verification/Validation Process
SAMG SACRG-1
Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response
SAMG SAG-4
Inject Into Containment
Procedures
SAMG SAG-7
Reduce Containment Hydrogen
40678428-01
U1-Containment / Install Dome Truss Mod Per EC 291725,
Dome Truss #1 Modification
40678428-02
U1-Containment / Install Dome Truss Mod Per EC 291725,
Dome Truss #2 Modification
40678428-03
U1-Containment / Install Dome Truss Mod Per EC 291725,
Dome Truss #3 Modification
Work Orders
40678428-04
U1-Containment / Install Dome Truss Mod Per EC 291725,
Dome Truss #7 Modification
1B-04, Calibrate 1B-04 Tech Spec Relays
10/24/2022
Work Orders
1ICP 13.4 - Spec 200 Tech Spec - Train B
09/23/2022
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Alert Notification System Design
Report
10/25/2020
Miscellaneous
FEMA Letter - Approval of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant
(PBNP) Alert and Notification System Update
2/02/2021
Quarterly ERO Augmentation Drill (Call-In) Records
10/01/2020 -
06/30/2022
Miscellaneous
ERO Staff Training and Qualification Records (Sample
Size 15)
10/26/2022
Procedures
PBNP On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EPG 1.0, Attachment
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Shift Augmentation Drill
EPIP 2.1
Notifications - ERO, State & Counties, and NRC
EPIP 4.1
Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation
EPIP 4.1
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation and
Evacuation
EPIP 4.2
Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation and
Evacuation
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness
Training Program Description
PCR No. 2371336
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix A
Revision
08/24/2021
PCR No. 2371891
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix C
Revision
2/06/2021
PCR No. 2387151
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 1.1 Revision
2/16/2021
PCR No. 2388138,
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 5.0 Revision
07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388248
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 6.0 Revision
07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388292
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix M
Revision
07/15/2021
PCR No. 2388405
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 4.1 Revision
07/15/2021
PCR No. 2393791
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix L
Revision
2/07/2021
PCR No. 2395711
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix A
Revision
08/24/2021
PCR No. 2396565
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 7.0 Revision
07/15/2021
PCR No. 2411811
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - EPIP 6.1 Revision
2/16/2021
PCR No. 2413964
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix C
Revision
06/06/2022
Miscellaneous
PCR No. 2425960
50.54(q) Screen/Evaluation - Emergency Plan Appendix C
Revision
06/06/2022
Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise and Drill
Reports
11/01/2020 -
10/31/2022
Miscellaneous
Point Beach Emergency Preparedness Public Information
Postcard
01/01/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Quarterly
Inventory Records
10/01/2020 -
09/30/2022
Monthly Communication Test Records
10/31/2020 -
09/30/2022
Quarterly Communications Test Records
10/01/2020 -
09/30/2022
TSC, EOF, JIC, and OSC Emergency Preparedness
Supplies Quarterly Inventory Records
10/01/2020 -
09/30/2022
KLD-TR 1247
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Development of Evacuation
Time Estimates
09/12/2022
NPL 2020-0066
CY 2020 Emergency Action Level (EAL) Annual Review
2/11/2020
NPL 2021-0114
CY 2021 Emergency Action Level (EAL) Annual Review
2/14/2021
PBN 20-005
Nuclear Assurance Report - Emergency Preparedness
Audit
08/10/2020
PBN-22-003
Nuclear Assurance Report - Emergency Planning Audit
08/10/2022
EP 1.2.1
Emergency Action Levels and Technical Basis
Procedures
NP 1.5
Periodic Procedure Review
22 Calibration of the "FASTSCAN" Counting System at
the Point Beach Generating Station Two Rivers, Wisconsin
03/02/2022
Instrument S/N 1511-
198
Cronos Calibration Data Sheet
09/08/2022
Instrument S/N
330687
Eberline AMS-4 Calibration Data Sheet
Instrument S/N
479301
AMP-50 Calibration Data Sheet
05/31/2022
Instrument S/N 712-
048/0480461
Canberra ARGOS 5AB Calibration Data Sheet
06/15/2022
Instrument S/N A4-
19921
Escort Elf Air Sampling Pump Calibration Record
01/18/2022
Instrument Serial
Number 348303
Ludlum Model 177 Calibration Data Sheet
08/29/2022
Calibration
Records
Instrument Serial
Number 480459
(0712-118)
Canberra GEM Calibration Data Sheet
05/31/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PBNP# 472932
iSolo Calibration Data Sheet
03/14/2022
PPBP Air Sampler
Number 330800
Low Volume Air Sampler Maintenance and Calibration
Record
06/08/2022
PPBP Air Sampler
Number 33084
High Volume Air Sampler Maintenance and Calibration
Record
01/04/2022
TEM Identification
Number 330699
Tool and Equipment Monitor Calibration Efficiency
08/17/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Instrument S/N 33086
Calibration Data Sheet Ludlum 9-3
09/29/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
A/R No 02440044
Observations Made During Inspection Procedure 71124.05
10/21/2022
HPCAL 1.1
Radiation Protection Instrument Calibration, Repair and
Functional Checks
HPCAL 1.1.2
Operation and Use of the RADCAL Accu-Dose Model 2186
HPCAL 1.54
Calibration of MGP Electronic Personnel Dosimeter Using
the MGP IDC-HF Electronic Dosimeter Calibrator
HPCAL 2.23
Portable Scaler Calibrations
HPIP 2.1.1
Functional Checks of Portable Survey Instruments
HPIP 2.41
Operation of MGP AMP Area Monitor
HPIP 5.69
Daily Operational Checks of the SAM-9/11
HPIP 7.53
Personnel Contamination Monitor (ARGOS 5 WBAB)
Source Response
Procedures
HPIP 7.54
Source Check of the GEM-5 Whole Body Contamination
Monitor
40746301 01
SPING-23 Calibration
08/11/2021
Work Orders
40760481 01
RE-218/RE-218B Waste Disposal System Liquid Monitor
Calibration
09/06/2022
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency
Preparedness - Drill and Exercise Performance
07/01/2021 -
06/30/2022
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency
Preparedness - ERO Drill Participation
07/01/2021 -
06/30/2022
71151
Procedures
PBN-BFJR-18-054
MSPI Basis Document for PBNP
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PBN-BFJR-18-054
MSPI Basis Document for PBNP
Corrective Action
Documents
2SC-955 Boric Acid Identified During Containment
Walkdown
06/09/2022
Boric Acid Leak Screening for Unit 2 RCS Valve 2SC-955
for AR 2429535
Miscellaneous
Boric Acid Leak Screening for 2SC-955 for AR 2351202
04/03/2020