IR 05000266/2024003
| ML24309A119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2024 |
| From: | Dariusz Szwarc NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Durbin M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2024003 | |
| Download: ML24309A119 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2024003 AND 05000301/2024003
Dear Michael Durbin:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On October 8, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
November 5, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Dariusz Szwarc, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301 License Numbers:
DPR-24 and DPR-27 Report Numbers:
05000266/2024003 and 05000301/2024003 Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-003-0064 Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Location:
Two Rivers, WI Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2024 to September 30, 2024 Inspectors:
J. Masse, Resident Inspector V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist M. Stafford, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By:
Dariusz Szwarc, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Unacceptable Preconditioning of Reactor Protection System Trip Relay Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when the licensee failed to evaluate test results to assure that test requirements have been satisfied. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the effect of preconditioning following the performance of reactor protection system technical specification surveillance testing.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 12, 2024, the unit began coastdown for the upcoming refueling outage. At the end of the inspection period, Unit 2 was operating at 89 percent power.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 component cooling water, trains A and B on July 25, 2024
- (2) G-02 emergency diesel generator starting air system on August 13, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zones 237 and 238 on August 7, 2024
- (2) Fire Zones 770, 771, 772, and 773 on August 13, 2024
- (3) Fire Zones 101, 104, 105, 108, and 109 on September 26, 2024
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator continuing training evaluation on July 24, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Maintenance Rule periodic evaluation review (2)125-volt swing station battery electrolyte levels
- (3) Containment cooling fan functional failure evaluation
- (4) Removed reactor protection system relay failed bench testing
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 elevated risk due to increased lake temperatures and challenges to containment cooling on August 6, 2024
- (2) Elevated risk due to work over the forebay and potential foreign material concerns on August 12, 2024
- (3) Elevated risk due to new fuel receipt and lifting over the spent fuel pool on August 22, 2024
- (4) Unit 2 elevated risk during 4160 V under voltage relay testing, on September 10, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Operability determination for containment based on rising lake temperatures on August 7, 2024
- (2) Past operability of containment accident recirculation fan on August 20, 2024
- (3) Operability of G-04 emergency diesel generator following receipt of lube oil fault alarm on August 20, 2024
- (4) Operability of G-04 emergency diesel generator following trip on reverse power on September 6, 2024
- (5) Operability the G-01 emergency diesel generator after a fuel pump failure on September 10, 2024
- (6) Operability of Unit 1 containment after items left unattended on September 24, 2024
- (7) Operability of the 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A reactor protection system relays following failure of initial test on September 30, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
- (1) IT-06 Train A after packing adjustment on 2SI-871A, containment spray pump suction from residual heat removal heat exchanger, on August 20, 2024
- (2) IT 07B and IT 07C after valve internals replacement on SW-32B, service water pump discharge check valve, on August 21, 2024
- (3) Cable spreading room recirculation fans following maintenance on September 5, 2024
- (4) OI-163 for Unit 1, A safety injection pump after replacement of flow transmitter on September 9, 2024
- (5) G-04 emergency diesel generator following testing, on September 13, 2024
- (6) G-02 emergency diesel generator following replacement of air receivers, on September 25, 2024
- (7) G-01 emergency diesel generator following a maintenance window on September 26, 2024 (8)1DY-01 red channel inverter following circuit board replacement on September 30, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) TS-86, manual start of G-02 and G-03 emergency diesel generators for technical specification surveillance requirements on September 3, 2024
- (2) TS-83, G-03 emergency diesel generator monthly technical specification surveillance on September 4,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, & Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
- (1) Sealed source storage, labeling, and leak testing results
- (2) Storage of radioactive material in warehouse
- (3) Storage of radioactive material in the Flex building
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) Demineralizer cubicles
- (2) Advanced Liquid Processing System
- (3) Resin liners in the truck bay
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste: (1)2022 Dry Active Waste Stream (2)2023 Class B Resin
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Shipment 24-015; Type A shipment for reactor coolant pump impeller
- (2) Shipment 23-047; SCO-II shipment for outage equipment
- (3) Shipment 23-042; LSA-II shipment for dry active waste
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Part 21 assessment pertaining to transmitters used for pressurizer pressure channels
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unacceptable Preconditioning of Reactor Protection System Trip Relay Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when the licensee failed to evaluate test results to assure that test requirements have been satisfied. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the effect of preconditioning following the performance of reactor protection system technical specification surveillance testing.
Description:
On March 21, 2024, Point Beach instrumentation and controls personnel performed technical specification surveillance testing in accordance with test procedure 2ICP 02.003A, Reactor Protection System Logic Train A Surveillance Test. The test uses a selector switch to select different logic configurations and then technicians depress pushbuttons to insert simulated logic conditions into the control scheme. A test light is observed throughout the procedure to validate that the logic signals correctly actuate the reactor trip relays. The test light is illuminated normally throughout the procedure, but it is extinguished when the technicians depress the sufficient combination of pushbuttons to simulate a reactor trip. Prior to starting the test, the station declared the A train of the reactor protection system (RPS) inoperable.
A note prior to step 5.16 in the procedure reads as follows:
Testing of Reactor Protection system logic channels in steps 5.16 through 5.21 are performed by selecting the logic channel to be tested on the selector switch, depressing the trip combination being tested, checking the test light is OFF, releasing the trip combination, and then checking the test light is ON. This will be performed for all the trip combinations. Each individual trip logic test pushbutton will then be depressed, and test light checked that it remained ON.
The technicians performed the procedure without any issues until they reached step 5.20.2.
At this step, the procedure tests the reactor trip on a loss of reactor coolant pump breaker power with reactor power above the P-8 permissive setpoint (35 percent reactor power). This step is associated with selector switch position 23, and it verifies that the reactor would trip if one of the two reactor coolant pump breakers were to open while the reactor is above 35 percent power. Either of the pushbuttons called out in the procedure, S2 or S3, should simulate a reactor trip and extinguish the test light. However, when the S2 button was depressed the test light did not extinguish. With first line supervisor permission, the selector switch was rotated fully clockwise and counterclockwise and then returned to position 23.
Then the S2 pushbutton was depressed again, and the test light still did not extinguish. The S3 pushbutton was depressed, and the test light again did not extinguish. The technicians and first line supervisor notified the control room, and the shift manager came to observe the test. The technicians depressed the S2 pushbutton, and the test light did not extinguish. The technicians released S2 and depressed S3 and the test light did not extinguish. At this point, there had been five instances where the test light did not indicate as expected.
The personnel then reviewed prints of the control logic to troubleshoot the issue. The licensee wrote condition report AR 2481984 to document the issue. To extinguish the test light there are 2 reactor trip relays, 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A, which both must deenergize, which causes their associated contacts in the reactor trip control to open. These relays are downstream of the logic relays, and the logic relays open their contacts when the pushbuttons are depressed. Therefore, if the logic relay contacts were not opening, then the reactor trip relays would not deenergize. If the logic relay contacts were opening, then there could be an issue with the reactor trip relays.
A technician was stationed to observe the logic relay contacts and the technicians performing the test were instructed to hold the pushbutton in its depressed position to give the technician time to observe the logic relay. The test was reperformed with the selector switch in position 23, and the S2 pushbutton was depressed and held in place. The test light did not immediately extinguish, but the logic relay contact was observed to have opened.
After about 2 seconds of holding the pushbutton, the technicians heard an additional relay actuate and the test light extinguished. When the S2 pushbutton was released the test light reilluminated. Then the technicians depressed the S3 pushbutton, and the test light immediately extinguished. Under shift manager direction the technicians performed the next steps of the procedure which test the same trip relays with the selector switch in position 16 and 17. Both tests were satisfactory, and then they reperformed the test on position 23, which was again satisfactory with the test light extinguishing immediately after each depression of the S2 and S3 pushbuttons. The remainder of the procedure was completed satisfactorily, and the reactor protection system was returned to service and declared operable. The licensee decided to replace the reactor trip relays 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A after the next performance of the surveillance test.
On June 20, 2024, the licensee again performed 2ICP 02.003A to satisfy the surveillance requirement. The test was performed satisfactorily, and the reactor trip relays 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A were replaced with new relays, which were bench tested on April 4, 2024. The affected surveillance test steps were reperformed satisfactorily with the new relays installed.
On July 8, 2024, the old 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A reactor trip relays that were removed in the June test were bench tested. It was found that 2RT-7A had a dropout voltage of 9 VDC which is below its acceptance criteria of 12-35 VDC. Reactor trip relay 2RT-8A passed bench testing satisfactorily. This is documented in AR 2490186. The old 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A relays are currently energized in a test setup so that the licensee can perform additional evaluations.
NRC Technical Guidance Part 9900, Maintenance - Preconditioning of Structures, Systems, and Components Before Determining Operability, provides guidance on evaluating the acceptability of preconditioning prior to surveillance testing. Licensee procedure MA-AA-203-1000, Maintenance Testing, uses much of the language of the NRC Technical Guidance to define unacceptable preconditioning as the alteration, variation, manipulation, or adjustment of the physical condition of a System, Structure, or Component (SSC) before or during technical specification surveillance or ASME IST Code Testing that will alter one or more of an SSCs operational parameters which results in acceptable test results, potentially masking the actual as-found condition of the SSC, making it difficult to determine whether the SSC would perform its intended function. MA-AA-203-1000 also states that steps and tasks must be executed such that unacceptable preconditioning is avoided prior to obtaining the as-found data.
Additionally, licensee procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments, Attachment 4, step 15, states repetitive testing to achieve acceptable test results without identifying the root cause or correction of a problem in a previous test is not acceptable as a means to establish or verify operability and may constitute preconditioning.
After the initial test failures in March, the licensee did not assess for potential preconditioning on the reactor trip relay. There were five instances where the pushbuttons were pressed while the selector switch was in position 23 that should have extinguished the test light but did not. The licensee stated that in an event where a reactor coolant pump breaker lost power the matrix relay condition would be present for longer than the 2 seconds that were needed to deenergize the trip relays. However, the licensee did not account for the cycling of the logic relays prior to the test where the pushbutton was held down. If a reactor coolant pump breaker lost power, the matrix relay contacts would not cycle multiple times; they would only open once. Since the conditions of the test could not be reproduced, it is difficult to ascertain whether the reactor trip relays needed multiple cycles of their upstream logic relay contacts to ultimately open the contacts on both reactor trip relays. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the repetitive testing of the reactor trip relay constituted unacceptable preconditioning.
Corrective Actions: On June 20, 2024, the licensee replaced the reactor trip relays that failed initial testing on March 21, 2024, with new relays. The new relays passed their bench testing prior to installation and passed their subsequent surveillance satisfactorily. The licensee is assessing the impacts of this preconditioning.
Corrective Action References: AR 2481984
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees performance of repetitive testing to achieve acceptable test results without identifying a root cause or correction of a problem in a previous test is not acceptable as a mean to establish or verify operability and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee depressed the test pushbuttons multiple times prior to obtaining an acceptable result, which masked the as-found condition of the reactor trip relay, and no evaluation was performed to verify the acceptability of preconditioning.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered no to the reactor protection question in Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee assumed that the relay would perform its safety function because a trip condition would hold the matrix relay contacts open and would mimic the effect of the test when the technicians held the pushbutton. However, no evaluation was performed to address the effect of cycling the matrix relays numerous times, a condition that would not occur if a trip condition were present.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied. Contrary to above, on March 21, 2024, the licensee failed to evaluate test results to assure that test requirements have been satisfied. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the effect of preconditioning during technical specification surveillance testing to assure that the reactor protection system would have fulfilled its safety function.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Michael Durbin, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 15, 2024, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Michael Durbin, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
110E029 Sheet 1
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
Drawings
110E029 Sheet 3
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
Component Cooling Unit 2
CL 11A G-02
G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist
NP 2.1.3
Administrative Control of Red Locks, Lead Seal Wires, and
Padlocks on Plant Equipment
Procedures
STPT 19.2
Emergency Diesel: Generator G-02 General Instrumentation
Corrective Action
Documents
2493075
Smoke Detector Connection Broke
08/16/2024
PFP-0-PAB 46
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Building 46 ft
PFP-0-PAB-8
Pre-Fire Plan Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8' and
Below
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Protected Area North (Inside the Fence)
Miscellaneous
PBN LOC 24D
2E
SM Read/STA Eval
2433110
22 - Point Beach Maintenance Rule (A)(3) Assessment
07/29/2022
2449580
Fleet MREP Action Tracking
2/27/2023
2461514
D-305 Post Recovery Specific Gravity Outside Admin Limits
07/03/2023
2485820
GT Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Action Plan Item Not Completed
05/24/2023
2486793
2W-001A2-A Second Blade Disconnected from Damper Shaft
05/21/2024
2489806
D-305 Battery Specific Gravity Readings
07/01/2024
2489879
D-305 Battery Specific Gravity Reading High
07/02/2024
2490186
Removed 2RT-7A Reactor Protection Relay OOT on Bench
Test
07/08/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
2490382
24 PB Maintenance Rule (A)(3) Assessment
07/10/2024
2ICP 02.003A
Reactor Protection System Logic Train A Surveillance Test
Maintenance Rule Program Administration
ICP 09.013
Bench Testing of Miscellaneous Relays
Procedures
RMP 9046-1
Station Battery 92 Day 12 Month Surveillance Tests
40726204-03
2RP - RT/RC Replacement Relay Bench Testing
09/17/2021
Work Orders
40971502-01
2C-153 - Replace 2RT-7A / 2RT-8A
06/20/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
40971502-02
2C-153 - Bench Check Relays for 2RT-7A and 2RT-8A
04/04/2024
2486793
2W-001A2-A Second Blade Disconnected from Damper Shaft
05/21/2024
2489084
2W-1B2 Containment Cooling Fan Tripped
06/21/2024
2489197
U2 Ctmt Cooling Fans ACMP: Check for Operator Challenge
06/22/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
2492032
U2 Containment Temperatures is Greater than 110F
08/03/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2496102
High Risk PDC Not Covered during PJB
09/24/2024
Miscellaneous
Adverse
Condition
Monitoring and
Contingency Plan
ACMP for CRs 2489084 and 2486793
06/21/2024
2ICP 02.013
4.16kV Undervoltage Matrix Relays Surveillance Test
Procedures
Foreign Material Exclusion Procedure
40796092-04
Unit 2 Build Scaffolding
08/05/2024
Work Orders
40957153-01
2ICP 2.13 - 4160 Volt UV Testing
09/10/2024
Calculations
NEE-021-CALC-
001
Point Beach Unit 1 Debris Generation Calculation
2395149
Received Lube Oil System Fault Alarm
06/06/2021
2430657
U2 RX Trip BKR Did Not Trip during 2ICP 02.003A
06/24/2022
2481984
Unit 2ICP 02.003A RCP Loss of Power Trip Test Failed
03/21/2024
2483050
New NBFD31S Reactor Trip Relay Failed Initial Inspection
04/02/2024
2486793
2W-001A2-A Second Blade Disconnected from Damper Shaft
05/21/2024
2492032
U2 Containment Temperature is Greater than 110F
08/03/2024
2493277
Item Left in U1 Containment
08/19/2024
2493405
Item Left in U1 Containment
08/21/2024
2494041
G-01 Engine Driven Fuel Oil Pump Low Discharge Pressure
08/30/2024
2494264
G-04 Tripped on Revers Pwr While Being Unloaded at
[approximately] 1300 kW
09/02/2024
2494340
G-01 Engine Oil Pressure Lower than Before CMM
09/03/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
2494342
G-01 EDG Injector #16 Has an Exhaust Product Leak
09/03/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2495176
CE Assignment Not Performed
09/11/2024
499B466, Sheet
269
Schematic Diagram 4160V Swgr Bus 1A06 (2A06) Output
Breaker 1A52-80 (2A52-93) from Diesel Generator G-03
(G-04)
6090F03001
Sheet 1
617F354-2 Sheet
4A1
Schematic Diagram - Logic Reactor Protection System Train
A
617F354-2 Sheet
5A
Schematic Diagram Reactor Protection System Reactor Trip
Breaker Switchgear Train A
AWVI 81921 001-
000
Backdraft Damper
Drawings
M-2215, Sheet 1
Heating & Ventilation
Miscellaneous
-
G-01 Main Lube Oil Pressure Deviation
09/05/2024
ARB C01 C3-9
Unit 2 Containment Recirc Coolers Air Flow Low
ARB C102 2-3
Lube Oil System Fault
Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments
Maintenance Testing
NP 7.7.37
Surveillance Frequency Control Program Manual
ORT 7
Operation of Backdraft Dampers Unit 2
Condition Reporting
SEM 7.14
Air Flow Rate Measurement for Containment Accident Fans
W-1A1, W-1B1, W-1C1, W-1D1
STPT 17.1
Heating and Ventilation System
Procedures
TS 34
Containment Accident Recirculation Fan-Cooler Units Unit 2
351180
G-04 / Spurious G-04 Lube Oil Fault Alarm
2/12/2008
376173
G-04 / Monitor G-04 for Cause of Lube Oil Fault Alarm
07/20/2010
40321153-01
LS-03354B / Replace G-04 Lo Low Level Switch
08/18/2017
40844092-01
ICP-13.7B2 - G-04 - Perform Data Sheets 3-10, 14-57, Cals
08/10/2023
40883153-01
2ICP 2.3A - Reactor Protection Logic Test - Train A
03/21/2024
Work Orders
40933123-01
TS-84, G-04 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
06/03/2024
40955301-01
G-01, 18Y Fuel Pump PMs
09/06/2024
40955301-03
G-01 (P-240A) / Repair Fuel Pump
09/05/2024
40990171
G-04 Tripped on Reverse Load While Being Unloaded
09/05/2024
Calculations
2003-0014
MOV Operating Parameters
2489379
2SI-871A Packing Torque Increased Without Proper PMT
06/25/2024
2492827
Parts Issue Extending P-32B SW Pump TSAC Time
08/14/2024
2493155
Multiple Air Leaks on G-01 Air Receivers
08/17/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
2495670
Broke Lead on C13 Inside 1DY-01 Inverter
09/18/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2492837
NRC Identified Work Order Closeout Gap
08/14/2024
Drawings
M-209, Sheet 12
Emergency Diesel Air Starting System
1RMP 9036-2
1DY-01 Red Channel Instrument Bus Static Inverter
Maintenance Procedure
CL 11A G-02
G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist
IT 07B
P-32B Service Water Pump (Quarterly)
IT 07C
P-32C Service Water Pump (Quarterly)
Maintenance Testing
NDE-753
Visual Examination (VT-2) Leakage Detection of Nuclear
Power Plant Components
OI 163
SI, RHR, and CS Pump Runs and Venting SI Pump Casings
RMP 9043-13
Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Mechanical Inspection
RMP 9043-17A
Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Post-Maintenance Run and
Testing
TS 81
Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly
101
TS 83
Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Monthly
Procedures
TS 86
Emergency Diesel Generator Manual Start
40844045-01
1FT-925 - Replace Transmitter
08/23/2024
40844045-03
08/23/2024
40845667-01
SW-00032B Disassemble/Visually Inspect Check Valve
08/14/2024
40845667-02
SW-00032B OPs PMT/RTS (IT-7s as Required)
08/14/2024
40872650-01
2SI-00871A / Packing Adjustments Needed for 2-PT-SI-1
05/03/2024
Work Orders
40881834
T-61A/B/C/D/E/F G-02 EDG Air Receivers One Time
Replacement
09/11/2024
40947200-01
IT 06 Train A
06/17/2024
40952211-01
1DY-01, EM to Maintain and Inspect Inverter
09/21/2024
40952211-03
09/21/2024
40952212-01
G-01, 2Y PMs
08/30/2024
40952212-02
G-01, Ops PMT/RTS
09/05/2024
40952212-03
G-01, Post Maint Testing Per RMP 9043-17A (W/ Ops
Support)
09/05/2024
40955872-02
W-013A2 Operations PMT/RTS
08/26/2024
40955874-02
W-013A1 Operations PMT/RTS
08/26/2024
40955924-01
TS 83, G-03 EDG Operability Test
09/03/2024
40990171-01
G-04 32/G-04 Relay Calibration
09/03/2024
40990171-02
G-04 Troubleshooting Tripped on Reverse Load
09/06/2024
40990171-05
G-04, Install Yokogawa Recorder/Perform Test Run
09/06/2024
40990171-06
G-04 Ops PMT/RTS (TS 84)
09/06/2024
2472891
Error in Shipping Characterization
11/20/2023
2474310
Deficiencies Identified with Rad Material Controls
2/12/2023
248135
RCP Impeller Shipment Has Incorrect Data
04/15/2024
2487316
Increased Dose in Resin Beds
05/29/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
2490954
Change in U2 Radionuclide Distribution Affects Shipping
07/18/2024
HP-100-060222
07/07/2022
Miscellaneous
HP-100-071923
23 Class B Resin 10 CFR 61 Analysis
07/20/2023
RDW 18.1.1
CFR 61 Sampling Program
Radioactive Material Control Program
Shipment of Radioactive Material
Shipment of Radioactive Material
Procedures
Radioactive Materials Surveys for Shipment
2401895
Part 37 Assessment Report
07/08/2023
Self-Assessments
2491403
Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive
Handling, Storage and Transportation Assessment Report
07/23/2024
4091616
Sealed Source Inventory
08/01/2024
Work Orders
40952827
Sealed Source Leak Tests
08/01/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
PBN-BFJR-18-
054
MSPI Basis Document for PBNP
2338607
Ultra Electronics Qualified Life Change Notice
2/17/2019
2340309
Follow-up AR to 02338607-Qualified Life Change Notice
01/07/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
2489869
Part 21 Notification
07/02/2024
Part 21 Reporting
71152A
Procedures
Condition Reporting
44